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Abstract 
 
The objectives of this thesis are: first, to investigate the impact of investor sentiment in UK 
financial markets in different investment intervals through the construction of separate 
sentiment measures for UK investors and UK institutional investors; second, to examine 
institutional herding behaviour by studying UK mutual fund data; third, to explore the 
causal relation between institutional herding and investor sentiment. The study uses US, 
German and UK financial market data and investor sentiment survey data from 1
st
 January 
1996 to 30
th
 June 2011.    
 
The impact of investor sentiment on UK equity returns is studied both in general, and more 
specifically by distinguishing between “tranquil” and “financial crisis” periods. It is found 
that UK equity returns are significantly influenced by US individual and institutional 
sentiment and hardly at all by local UK investor sentiment. The sentiment contagion across 
borders is more pronounced in the shorter investment interval.  
 
The investigation of institutional herding behaviour is conducted by examining return 
dispersions and the Beta dispersions of UK mutual funds. Little evidence of herding in 
return is found, however strong evidence of Beta herding is presented. The study also 
suggests that beta herding is not caused by market fundamental and macroeconomic 
factors, instead, it perhaps arises from investor sentiment. This is consistent between 
closed-end and open-ended funds.     
 
The relation between institutional herding and investor sentiment is investigated by 
examining the measures of herding against the measures of investor sentiment in the UK 
and US. It suggests that UK institutional herding is influenced by investor sentiment, and 
UK institutional sentiment has a greater impact as compared to UK market sentiment. 
Open-end fund managers are more likely to be affected by individual investor sentiment, 
whereas closed-end fund managers herd on institutional sentiment. 
 
Keywords: Investor sentiment; contagion; institutional investors; equity returns, herding 
behaviour, investment decisions 
 
JEL Classification: G02, G11, G12, G14, G15, G23
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Chapter 1    Introduction 
1.1    Background and Motivation 
Between 2007 and 2009 the world witnessed a series of failure of large financial 
institution that led to a prolonged recession. The financial crisis was the worst since the 
Great Depression and caused significant damage to the economy worldwide. Many 
causes for the financial crisis have been suggested, one of which was that too many 
financial firms acted recklessly and took on too much risk.  Prior to the crisis, the US 
housing bubble caused securities tied to US real estate pricing to be overvalued. 
‘Irrational Exuberance’ encouraged financial institutions to increase their appetite for 
risky investments. The over-leveraged capital structure reduced financial institutions’ 
resilience in case of losses. When the housing bubble burst, prices of linked securities 
plummeted, damaging financial institutions globally. Financial institutions, once seen 
as producers of economic efficiencies, became corroded components for economic and 
financial stability. The crisis has led to a re-examination of many of the sophisticated 
economic assumptions and financial theories, which includes a rethinking of the market 
efficiency hypothesis.  
 
Under traditional finance theories, market participants are assumed to correspond to 
rational ‘economic man’, and the markets are informationally efficient (Fama, 1970). 
Assets are therefore valued rationally at their fundamental value, i.e. asset prices are the 
discounted stream of expected cash flows, and securities are traded in a market where 
all available public information is incorporated into asset prices. The markets correctly 
interpret all the information allowing prices to converge to fundamental values 
instantaneously. Any valuation that deviates from the fundamentals by ‘irrational’ 
traders, if any exist in the markets, will be eliminated by rational arbitrageurs who are 
supposed to know the real value of assets and take advantage of mispricing in the 
market. Assets should be priced at their fundamental value exactly, and no mechanism 
should allow the price to be driven away from this value for sustained period. The 
returns of assets are unpredictable since all available information has been incorporated 
in the asset prices. Prices should behave like independent random walks, and returns 
from time to time should be normally distributed.  
 2 
 
From the 1980s, empirical studies of financial markets have raised numerous anomalies 
and puzzles, where asset prices, volatility and returns do not behave as described by 
these theories, but in a manner that traditional finance theories struggle to explain. For 
example, stock price momentum in the short horizon, (Bernard and Thomas, 1990; and 
Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), and mean reversion in the long run, (Debondt & Thaler, 
1985); excess price volatility in financial markets (Shiller, 1981; LeRoy et al., 1981); 
and leptokurtosis and clustering in the return distributions (Mandelbro, 1963). In order 
to explain the various financial market anomalies and puzzles, scholars have extended 
their research to market participants, utilising concepts, from Psychology and 
Sociology to describe the behaviour of asset prices based on aspects of investors’ 
behaviour. These studies, involving the analytical modelling and empirical 
investigation of the ‘human dimensions’ of investment decision-making, have become a 
research strand known as Behavioural Finance. Investor sentiment is one of its pillars, 
providing an alternative theory of how investors form their beliefs about the market and 
future securities prices. 
 
Equity pricing is the central issue for finance and there is a growing body of literature 
providing theoretical and empirical evidence that investor sentiment is a factor that 
influences asset prices. However, as it is an unobserved variable, obtaining a good 
measure of investor sentiment has become one of the main tasks in empirical research 
of behavioural finance.  In academic research as well as industry practice, many 
indicators are used to accurately measure investor sentiment. Different measures and 
consequent outcomes have their distinctive advantages and drawbacks. This leads to the 
first research question of this thesis:            
 
Research Question 1: 
 
How can investor sentiment be measured and is investor sentiment contagious?  
 
To answer the question involves a classification and evaluation of existing sentiment 
measures. It involves comparing sentiment measures with each other and their relation 
to other market parameters such as returns. Some new proxies are identified as 
components in the construction of a new measure of investor sentiment. As the study 
focuses on UK financial markets, a new set of investor sentiment measures are 
constructed to measure UK investor sentiment. This includes a measure for the overall 
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market sentiment and a measure for UK institutional sentiment. Whilst the financial 
markets are increasingly integrated internationally, investor sentiment is expected to be 
contagious across borders. Therefore, the relationship between UK investor sentiment 
and foreign investor sentiment is investigated, and the empirical studies suggest that 
UK investor sentiment is influenced by foreign, particularly, US investor sentiment.    
 
The availability of two new constructed UK investor sentiment measures warrants the 
analysis of whether UK equities are priced under the influence of investor sentiment. 
This leads to the second research question: 
 
Research Question 2: 
 
Are prices of UK equities affected by investor sentiment, and how does the sentiment 
of different groups of investors influence equity prices? 
 
To answer the first part of the question, equities are categorized into three different size 
groups. The impact of investor sentiment on UK equity prices is examined, but the 
thesis also investigates whether the size effect on equity pricing is caused by investor 
sentiment.  In order to answer the second part of research questions, the sentiment of 
individuals as well as institutional investors is brought into the analysis. This is the first 
time that UK institutional sentiment has been systematically measured and formally 
examined for its effect on equity pricing. According to the survey by the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS), by the end of 2010, institutional investors owned 47.3% of 
UK quoted shares and foreign investors owned 41.2% of the value of the UK stock 
market
1
. Foreign investor sentiment is therefore expected to have some explanatory 
power over UK equity prices, hence adding more information to the answer to the 
second part of the question.  
 
Institutional investors are often seen as representative of rational arbitrageurs; however, 
empirical evidence suggests that psychological biases have been involved in 
institutional investors’ decision making. When financial institutions’ reckless behaviour 
contributes to one of the worst economic crisis in modern history, the behaviour of 
institutional investors comes under spotlight. One of the most typical examples is that 
                                               
1 Source from: Share Ownership: Ownership of UK quoted shares 2010, www.statistics.gov.uk   
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related to the phenomenon of investor psychology known as ‘crowd behaviour’. This is 
usually termed ‘herding’ in the literature. This leads to the third question of the thesis:     
 
Research Question 3:  
 
Do institutional investors herd, and is this caused by sentiment? 
 
In order to answer these questions, a study of institutional herding is conducted by 
examining herd behaviour from UK mutual funds portfolio returns. One rationale for 
institutional investors herding is that the reward structure for fund managers encourages 
them to form their investment portfolios by imitating the benchmark portfolio, normally 
the market portfolio, as the returns on the benchmark are often used to assess fund 
managers’ performance. Therefore evidence of returns of mutual funds tending to 
cluster around market returns can constitute possible evidence of herding. The second 
part of question is answered by directly examining institutional herding measures 
against the investor sentiment measures. This enables the investigation of how 
institutional herding behaviour can be explained by the sentiment of different groups of 
investors.  
 
This thesis joins the field of Behavioural Finance studies, and provides empirical 
evidence of investor sentiment effects on asset prices by utilising UK financial market 
data. At the same time it gives weight to the discussion of institutional investor 
sentiment and behaviour, filling a gap where UK institutional sentiment and behaviour 
have not been empirically studied in the past.  It also proposes new measures for 
investor sentiment and directly investigates how investor sentiment influences 
institutional investor herd behaviour.     
1.2    Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis consists of 6 chapters organised as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature on investor sentiment studies. This begins with 
a brief of summary of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) and the challenges to 
EMH theoretically and empirically. Investor sentiment approaches are introduced, 
including psychology based models and noise trader models, followed by a survey of 
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empirical work on investor sentiment, which includes the measurement of investor 
sentiment.  
 
Chapter 3 empirically studies UK investor sentiment. This begins by constructing a UK 
investor sentiment index at a weekly frequency. The composed investor sentiment 
indexes are then used to examine the relationship between UK investor sentiment and 
foreign investor sentiment. The effect that investor sentiment has on UK equity returns 
is also investigated in this chapter. The analysts are also conducted on a monthly 
frequency. 
 
Chapter 4 reviews investor herding behaviour. The review of herding theories 
concentrates on the cause of herd behaviour and establishes how herd behaviour affects 
asset pricing. Empirical work includes investigating return-base herding and micro-
level herding to provide evidence of herd behaviour of investors.  
 
Chapter 5 studies UK institutional herd behaviour. It begins with investigations of 
herding behaviour in UK open-ended and closed-end funds by using daily, weekly and 
monthly data. The examination of UK institutional herd behaviour is conducted by 
using three different methods. Herd behaviour is also analysed in different stages of the 
financial crisis and under different market conditions. The using of different frequency 
data in the study of UK institutional herding behaviour provides a comparison of the 
analysis.  
 
Chapter 6 studies the relationship between UK institutional herding and investor 
sentiment, particularly the causal relations of investor sentiment to herding. Open-end 
fund herding and closed-end fund herding are both examined. It also involves two time 
frequencies, weekly and monthly, to examine the relationship.  
 
Chapter 7 summarises the findings in the study. It contains a distillation of 
contributions that the study has made and proposes future research questions.    
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Chapter 2    Literature review 
2.1    Introduction 
In the last four decades, the EMH has been the core theory in finance studies. The 
proposition rests on three basic arguments: firstly, investors are assumed to be 
homogeneous and rational, and therefore securities are priced rationally in the market. 
It may be that some investors are in fact not rational, therefore secondly, if irrational 
traders’ activities are randomly on either side of the market they will cancel each other 
out, which would not affect the efficiency that security prices fully reflect all available 
information. Thirdly, if irrational investors act on the same side of the market, they are 
confronted by rational arbitrageurs who are supposed to be able to dominate the market 
by their scope and scale, and therefore eliminate these irrational influences on security 
prices by taking advantage of the mispricing resulting from irrational activities (Shleifer 
2000). The impact that irrational investors would have on security prices and returns 
are therefore insignificant and very short-lived. Friedman (1953) stated that any 
deviation from the fundamental value, i.e. mispricing, will create an investment 
opportunity for riskless profits. Rational traders, i.e. arbitrageurs, will immediately snap 
up the opportunity, thereby restoring fundamental (equilibrium) price.   
 
Empirically, the EMH has been categorised into three forms depending on the nature of 
the information. The weak-form of market efficiency posits that past prices cannot 
predict future prices. Fama (1965) found that stock prices follow random walks, i.e. the 
current changes of security price are independent from their previous changes; therefore 
trading strategies, such as chasing price trends would not be profitable. The semi-strong 
form of market efficiency states that asset prices adjust to new public information 
immediately. The pioneering event-studies of Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) 
demonstrated that important corporate news events were incorporated into share prices 
immediately at the time of public announcement. The strong form of EMH expresses 
that, even when trading on inside information, investors are still not able to make 
profits, because the insider’s information is quickly leaked out and incorporated into 
security prices.  
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2.2    Challenges to Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
2.2.1. Theoretical Challenges to EMH 
With respect to the three basic market efficiency assumptions, behavioural finance 
poses challenges from psychological experimental evidence for investor rationality and 
the scope for arbitrage. If efficient theory stands entirely on the assumption of the 
rationality of investors, the question of whether investors are fully rational would by 
itself present a considerable challenge for the theory.  
1) Are investors fully rational? 
 
In standard finance studies, economic agents are assumed to be fully informed, 
calculate with Bayesian laws and maximise expected utility, i.e. they are fully rational 
in processing information and forming decisions. Sentiment has not been left space in 
decision making and economic activities. The idea of the strictly rational behaviour of 
economic agents has long been debated in economic research. Hayek (1952) stated that 
nobody can be fully knowledgeable, and the limitation of knowledge is unavoidable 
leading to errors appearing in the decision making no matter how ‘rational’ the 
calculations people have applied. Kahneman & Tversky (1973) point out that when a 
decision is made under uncertainty, the calculation of expected returns could divert 
from Bayesian rules and other probability theories. Coase (1988) criticised the perfect 
rational ‘economic man’ assumption, and called the economic theories constructed 
under fully rational assumptions as ‘blackboard economics’. Simon (1991) defined the 
term of bounded rationality to designate the rational choice which is constrained by 
taking into account the cognitive limitation of both knowledge and capacity. Even 
though economic agents try to work in a rational way, their ability to be rational is 
restricted either by the knowledge they have or the resources available to them.  
 
The concept of bounded rationality has been widely extended in behavioural finance 
studies. The information limitations, resource restrictions, and cognitive bias, limit 
investors’ ability to adopt the optimal solution. Intuition, mood, and/or emotion are 
involved in the processes of decision making consciously or unconsciously Therefore 
economic agents cannot always act fully rationally and reach perfect decisions. In many 
finance studies, any non-rational beliefs, preferences or behaviours are simply defined 
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as irrational. In economic studies, the assumption of limited rationality can be broadly 
categorised as: exogenous or endogenous. 
 
(1) Exogenous limited rationality is fairly similar to Simon’s bounded rationality. 
It is that the individuals are following ‘rational’ rules, but the resources, such as 
information, time, knowledge, or finance, available to them are not sufficient. 
This can restrict their activities from being fully rational, resulting in under- or 
over-reactions in the markets. Examples of such investors are noise traders in 
the Black (1986), and Kahneman and Riepe (1998) models, sometimes called 
‘irrational’ investors in economic studies. It can also be seen as a type of 
passive ‘irrationality’.   
 
(2) Endogenous limited rationality is that human beings’ psychological 
characteristics or instincts are unavoidably involved in the collecting and 
processing of information, leading to systematic judgment errors in forming 
beliefs and preference, which in turn affect the valuation of securities. 
Psychological biases such as overconfidence, optimism, representativeness, 
conservatism, belief perseverance, anchoring, and so on, can be one or more of 
the factors that restrict economic agents from judging and behaving in a fully 
rational manner. Investors in the Odean (1998) and Daniel et al (1998) models, 
Barberis et al (1998), DeLong et al (1990) and Hong and Stein (1999) model 
are this kind of bounded rational investors.  
 
Black (1986) and Kahneman and Riepe (1998) call the investors who trade on 
irrelevant information or deviate from the standard decision making models as noise 
traders. DeLong et al. (1990) refer to noise traders as those whose decisions are not 
based on an analysis of fundamentals but on sentiment. Investors’ beliefs, preferences, 
emotions, or mood have been partially or fully involved in their investment decision 
making.  
2) Are irrational trades in the same direction? 
The challenge to the second EMH assumption concerns the direction of irrational trades. 
Kahneman, Tverskey and other psychologist experiments show that people mostly 
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deviate from rationality in the same way rather than randomly, i.e. people are, very 
often, subject to the same cognitive biases and display the same “irrational” preferences. 
Whether they are sophisticated or unsophisticated investors, they form investment 
decisions based on their own beliefs and preferences, which may be subject to the same 
biases, and therefore their investment activities will be highly correlated. Under such a 
premise, they would not trade randomly with each other, but rather they will buy (or 
sell) the same security at probably the same time. Moreover, the sophisticated 
professional money managers, who manage other people’s money, are agents active in 
the market on the behalf of the principles. This delegation introduces further distortions 
into their decisions and creates the incentive to herd in crowds, which means that when 
sophisticated investors take part in the irrational trades, the ‘herd instinct’ leads them to 
follow the trend and to take positions in the same direction rather than the opposite 
direction which will cancel out each other.       
3) How effective is arbitrage?  
When market efficiency entirely depends on the effectiveness of arbitrage, the ability of 
the arbitrageurs, who are not subject to psychological biases, to correct the sentiment 
investors’ mispricing becomes vital. From a theoretical point of view, DeLong et al. 
(1990a) point out that when arbitrageurs take the opposite side to correlated sentiment 
investors and try to bring prices back to fundamental values, a new risk arises from 
such a position: the noise trader risk. This kind of risk manifests when prices are driven 
away even further by the sentiment investors after the arbitrageurs took their position. 
By taking up such risk, arbitrageurs could end up making losses and not being able to 
maintain their position. In this case, risk averse arbitrageurs would worry about the 
damages that possibly occur when price divergence becomes worse and not take up the 
opposite side to the sentiment investors. Arbitrage therefore is a risky process and may 
be of only limited effectiveness.  
 
Furthermore, in the presence of feedback traders, who tend to chase price trends, 
rational investors tended to amplify rather than diminish the effect of sentiment traders 
(DeLong et al., 1990b). Rational investors speculate on the anticipation of further 
changes in asset prices caused by feedback trades, and try to make gains by “taking the 
ride”. Therefore, they never choose to offset all of the effects of irrational investors. 
DeLong et al. (1991) also prove that for a plausible misperception, irrational noise 
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traders can survive and dominate the market in terms of wealth in the long run, 
implying that the correction of mispricing by rational investors’ arbitrage will be a long 
horizon process. Moreover, in the real world, as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out, 
the possibility of an early, forced liquidation would lead many arbitrageurs to have 
short horizons. This means that the arbitrageurs are not able to maintain their positions 
until prices return to their fundamental values. Their arbitrage power over prices again 
is limited. Keynes has a famous quote for the long-lived survival of effects from 
irrational traders: “Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent” 
(“When Genius Failed” (2000) by Roger Lowenstein, p. 123)  
2.2.2. Empirical Challenges 
Empirically, a body of evidence has presented a challenge to the traditional view that 
securities are rationally priced to reflect all publicly available information. These 
studies argue against Market Efficient Hypothesis in respect of the three empirical 
forms.  
 
The weak form of the efficient markets hypothesis proposes that investors cannot make 
excess profits using past price information. A number of studies found positive short-
term autocorrelation of stock returns, or ‘under-reaction’, and negative autocorrelation 
of long-term returns separated by long lags, or ‘over-reaction’. For example, Bernard 
and Thomas (1990), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) found that a stock’s price seems to 
respond to earnings for about a year after they are announced, i.e. stock prices under-
react to earnings announcements in the short-term. Debondt & Thaler (1985) 
discovered that over a long horizon of perhaps 3 to 5 years, the returns that were past 
winners would tend to be future losers, indicating that stock prices tend to overact on 
average in the long run. Subsequent to these findings researchers have identified many 
ways to successfully predict stock returns from past returns, which represent a 
departure from the conclusion that past returns have no predictive power for future 
returns under the efficient market hypothesis.   
 
The semi-strong form of the market efficiency hypothesis has been challenged by a 
number of empirical deviations. The best known among them are the size phenomenon 
and ‘January Effect’. Keim (1983) found that returns of small size stocks always 
outperform the market especially in the month of January. Shleifer (2000) also 
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reviewed Siegel’s work (Siegel, 1998) to show that historically the return on the 
smallest decile of the New York Stock Exchange stocks is 40.55% higher than that of 
the largest decile of stocks. Since the month and the size of firms are already known in 
advance, excess returns should not occur in semi-strong forms of efficient markets. 
 
The basic efficient market proposition is that stock prices do not react unless new 
information materialises. However Shiller (1981) worked on stock market volatility and 
showed that volatility was far greater than could be justified by an efficient market 
model. The evidence regarding excess volatility implies that changes in prices occur not 
for fundamental reasons, but because of factors that might relate to investors sentiment. 
Cutler et al (1991) examine the 50 largest one day stock price movements in the US and 
find that more than news seems to move stock prices, which is broadly consistent with 
Shiller’s finding; that is, except for fundamental information, the price of stocks also 
change with respect to “things as ‘sunspots’ or ‘animal spirits’ or just mass psychology” 
(Shiller, 2003, P. 84).  
2.3    The Investor Sentiment Approach 
In responding to the difficulties of applying efficient market theory to explain financial 
market anomalies, theories of individual and social psychology have been widely 
utilised in finance studies to examine the dedicated factors of asset pricing and its 
changes. The influences of human psychological and interacting behaviour on financial 
markets have become one of the important components in finance studies.   
 
Two questions have been at the centre of behavioural finance studies, theoretically and 
empirically: how asset prices deviate away from their fundamental values; and why the 
deviations cannot be eliminated as suggested in the Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
Barberis and Thaler (2003) point out that behavioural finance has made significant 
advances with regard to two aspects: limited arbitrage and investor sentiment.  
2.3.1. Limited arbitrage 
Arbitrage is an investment strategy that investors simultaneously purchase and sell 
essentially similar or virtually the same securities in two or more different markets to 
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take advantage of price differences and make a riskless profit at zero cost (Sharpe and 
Alexander, 1990). This concept has been extended further to include a combination of 
matching deals transacted by arbitrageurs, i.e. buying underpriced securities and selling 
those overpriced, to earn costless and risk-free returns. As a result of arbitrage, prices 
revert to their fundamental values. According to the definition, the conditions for 
unlimited arbitrage to be possible are:    , the availability of perfect (or close) 
substitutes;     , the fundamental risk is not systematic;      , arbitrageurs have long 
horizons. A series of theoretical and empirical papers demonstrate the violations of 
these conditions, resulting in arbitrage being far from being riskless.  
 
The most obvious risk an arbitrageur faces is that substitute securities are rarely perfect 
or even close (Campbell and Kyle, 1993). It is very difficult, in practice, to find a close 
substitute that is able to remove all fundamental risks by arbitrage. Moreover, the costs 
of security trading result in arbitrageurs facing implementation risks, especially, in the 
presence of short-sales. Shiller (2003) states that ‘smart money’, i.e. arbitrageurs, may 
be at risk when it is difficult to short a stock if the arbitrageurs no longer own the stock. 
Even without the constraint, the costs of establishing a short position make it less 
attractive, because the interest on borrowing may be greater than the security price 
decreases (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). Furthermore, some restrictions for short-selling, 
in practice, may come from legislation and regulation. For example, many pension fund 
and mutual fund managers are not allowed to short-sell. By potential exposure to the 
risks, arbitrageurs are reluctant to take action even if prices are not in equilibrium.    
 
Apart from fundamental and implementation risks, there is also a new systematic risk 
that arises when the sentiment traders are too bullish and/or bearish. When arbitrageurs 
and sentiment noise traders interact in an economy, noise traders can have a substantial 
and long-life impact on asset prices (De Long et al. 1990, 1991; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997; Shleifer, 2000). This can be a limitation for arbitrage. If noise traders are too 
bullish (bearish) about a security, they buy (sell) it and drive the price up higher (down 
lower) than its fundamental value. Arbitrageurs then take short (long) position and hope 
the price reverses to the fundamental soon. However, if noise traders get even more 
bullish (bearish) and push the price up (down) further, arbitragers may have to liquidate 
their position in order to limit their losses. The fear of such scenarios may stop them 
taking an arbitrage position in the first place.    
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Moreover, DeLong et al. (1991) stressed that the long term survival of noise traders 
leads arbitrage to be a long horizon process. However, in the real world, the existence 
of agency relationships results in the separation of brains and resources. The agents, 
such as fund managers, are normally assessed by their short-term performance, leading 
to them have a short-horizon performance targets. The principal (revenue owner) they 
represented, therefore, acts as if he/she has a short horizon. The better informed fund 
managers (arbitrageurs), in this case, may worsen the noise traders’ mispricing either 
acting in the anticipation of a short term price momentum, or being forced to liquidate 
their positions because the investors withdraw their funds in response to the short-term 
losses. The arbitrage again is limited. 
2.3.2. Investor sentiment 
It is believed that in the real world, economic agents make their investment decisions 
not only based on information and facts, but also on the influence of their intuition, 
cognitive psychology, and often on the comments and opinions of others. Kahneman, 
Tversky, Smith, and other psychologists have developed a series of experiments on 
human choices and decision making and incorporated them into economic and finance 
research. In 1970s, Kahneman and Tversky published a series of articles to propose 
Prospect Theory which completely changed the models of decision making from those 
of mainstream economic studies. They illustrate an ‘ ’ shape change of preference 
stating that the value of the outcomes is assigned to a reference point (usually gains and 
losses) rather than the final wealth states (Kahneman and Tverskey (1979)). This means 
that instead of maximizing expected utility, the benchmark utility is applied in the 
valuation of option outcomes, (De George et al. (1999)).  
 
Studies also show that psychological biases such as overconfidence, representativeness, 
and conservatism, may play roles in the formation of economic agencies’ investment 
decisions. Several theoretical studies use psychological biases as a basic mechanism to 
establish the relationship between investors’ sentiment and asset prices, and to explain 
some of the “abnormal” phenomena observed in financial market. For example, Daniel, 
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyan (1998) emphasized that investor overconfidence and 
bias self-attribution can cause stock prices to over-react to private information and 
under-react to public signals. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), consider 
conservatism and representativeness in models to explain stock price over- and under- 
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reaction. Hong and Stein (1999) assume two types of bounded traders: momentum 
traders and news watchers. The assumption stresses the fact that the price trends 
focussed on by momentum traders can be traced back to representativeness heuristic, 
whereas the overwhelming focus on private information by news watchers can reflect 
overconfidence bias. Behavioural finance emerged in responding to the limitations that 
traditional finance has had in explaining financial market anomalies. It provides an 
alternative theme to explore the financial markets, especially regarding the sentiment of 
the market participants and their consequent impact.   
   
Broadly, investor sentiment is defined as ‘… a belief about future cash flows and 
investments that is not justified by the facts at hand’ (Baker and Wurgler, 2007, p129). 
Investor sentiment is, therefore, defined as the theory of how people form their beliefs 
and preferences with cognitive bias, psychological bias, emotion and mood, and then 
predict future asset prices. This suggests that investor sentiment is derived from 
emotional reactions rather than fundamental changes in stock markets, and then 
influences the expectations of stock returns (Xu and Green, 2013). The role of investor 
sentiment has been formally modelled in determining an assets price. The sources of 
sentiment, however, are difficult to be identified and measured. Empirical examinations 
of the importance of sentiment are more likely to refer to speculation bias: excessive 
optimism or pessimism (Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, 1991; Brown, 1999; Brown and Cliff, 
2004). These narrowly define investor sentiment in intuitive terms which represents the 
expectations of market participants relative to a norm which is justified by the facts 
(fundamentals). Bullish investors expect returns to be above the norm and bearish 
investors expect return to be below the norm (Brown and Cliff, 2004). Such definitions 
allow sentiment to be measured by either directly conducting a survey to capture how 
bullish or bearish investors are, such as Bull-bear spread from American Association of 
Individual Investors and Bull/Bear Ratio from Investors Intelligence, or using indirect 
proxies such as financial market bull-bear indicators, e.g. Advance-declines ratio and 
Relative Strength Index.        
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2.4    Survey of Investor Sentiment Theories 
Investor sentiment refers to people’s beliefs based on heuristics rather than Bayesian 
rationality (Shleifer, 2000), and the forming of beliefs is influenced by intuition, 
cognitive psychology, and very often, affected by emotions and/or mood. Baker and 
Wurgler (2007) stress that sentiment always has effects on an investor’s decision 
making, and an impact on asset prices, volatilities and returns. 
2.4.1. Psychological belief base models 
The psychological experiments on human choices and decision making show that there 
is no obvious way of deciding which of the psychological elements are the most 
important in the forming of judgments and decisions. The studies, however, provide 
suggestive hints of how ‘irrational’ agents might tend to behave in an uncertain world. 
Firstly, they might wrongly weight certain information in perception of risks and 
opportunities. Secondly, the preference for risks might be strongly correlated across 
investors. Thirdly, they might fail to accurately assess information resulting in 
miscalculation of the expected returns. 
 
Overconfidence   
 
One of the best documented psychological biases is that individuals tend to 
underestimate variances and are excessively confident about their own judgments, 
(Einhorn& Hogarth, 1978; Lichtenstein et al, 1982; Kahneman et al, 1982).  
Psychological and scientific evidence has also suggested that overconfidence is more 
severe for diffuse and delayed feedback tasks, and experts are more certain about their 
predictions under such circumstances (Daniel et al, 1998). When subjective confidence 
is involved in investment decision making, investors tend to either overestimate 
information precision (Kyle & Wang, 1997; Wang, 1998) or overweight their private 
information (Caballe & Sakovice, 2003; Odean, 1998) and thus react to the information 
to a greater degree than their objective accuracy.  
 
Odean (1998) and Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) model the overconfidence effects on asset 
prices and show that such investor sentiment leads to miss-valuation of private 
information, a subsequent deviation of the asset price away from the fundamental value 
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and ultimately, the generation of positive serially correlated returns and excess 
volatility. They emphasise the psychological bias in the interpretation and valuation of 
private information leading to investors being over-confident about the private signals 
rather than public information, and overreacting to those private signals, driving stock 
prices away from the fundamental price. This deviation can be in both directions. If the 
private information is positive, overconfident investors will push prices up too far 
relative to fundamental values. When further public signals arrive, the overreaction will 
be corrected and result in the price changes being unconditionally negatively auto-
correlated at both short and long lags, and volatilities around private signals being 
increased. Odean’s models also indicate that overconfidence increases trading volume 
and induces greater liquidity.  
 
In the basic model in Daniel, Hirsheifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), the investors were 
assumed to overestimate the precision of private information signals. In a 3 period 
economy, they assume that a common noisy private signal,   , about the value of 
security is received by sentiment investors at day 1, and they trade with those who are 
uninformed. The private information signal is 
             (2.1) 
where,         
  , and   is the terminal value of risky security, and         
  . 
Since rational investors, arbitrageurs, correctly assess the error variance,   
 , but 
overconfident investors underestimate the error variance as   
 , so   
    
 . 
 
At day 2, a noisy public signal,   , arrives, and it is         The noise,         
  , 
and it independents of   and  . All investors have correctly estimated the noisy public 
signal variance,   
  .  
 
At day 3, a conclusive public signal arrived and the security converges to its terminal 
value:     . 
 
Assume the sentiment traders are risk neutral, and the expectation operator is calculated 
based on the sentiment investors’ confident beliefs (denoted by the subscript ). Prices 
in day 1 and day 2 are: 
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                   (2.2) 
                      (2.3) 
By standard properties of normal variables, prices in day 1 and 2 become: 
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where    
    
    
     
   
  
 
Overconfidence in the private signal causes the price to overreact to the new 
information at day 1. This mispricing will be corrected on day 2 and 3 when public 
information signal arrives. The overreaction and correction imply that        
 1,  1  0 is negative and the covariance between day 1 and 2 price change is: 
                  
  
   
   
    
    
  
   
    
  
 
   
    
    
     
   
  
    (2.6) 
Since   
    
 , so                   , and the same process shows that 
                  . These illustrate that if investors are overconfident, the price 
moves resulting from private information are on average partially reversed in the long 
run, and price moves in reaction to the arrival of public information are positively 
correlated with later price changes.  
 
The covariance between the day 2 and 3 price change is 
                 
  
   
    
    
  
   
    
     
    
    
     
   
  
     (2.7) 
It is positive since   
    
  . When the negative change above, between days 1 and 2 
and days 1 and 3, are combined, it can be posited that if investors are overconfident, 
price changes are unconditionally negatively autocorrelated at both short and long lags. 
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Variances of the dates prove that the proportional excess volatility is greater around the 
private signal than around the public signal.  
 
Another bias that appears in Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyan (1998) is self-
attribution. Self-attribution bias means that the outcomes confirm the investor’s 
research. An asymmetric feedback effect was found from psychological experiments on 
people’s confidence. It implies that the investors’ confidence is strongly increased, 
when the public news confirms the investor’s research, but there is no effect on 
confidence when public news rejects the investors’ views.  These result in positive 
short-lag autocorrelation and negative long-lag autocorrelation of price changes. Price 
changes also present positive short-term autocorrelation and negative long-term 
autocorrelation patterns. 
 
Hong and Stein (HS, 1999), on the other hand, investigate the investors who process 
different sets of information and generate different private information. They 
demonstrate that stock prices appear to under react since the ‘newswatchers’ forecast 
stock prices based only on signals that they generated privately, and then slowly adjust 
to the ‘fundamental’ while private information diffuses gradually across the 
‘newswatchers’ population, and the ‘momentum traders’ exploit this price 
underreaction by simply applying trend chasing strategies, which creates an eventual 
overreaction. DeLong et al. (1990) illustrate in an overlapping generation model that 
overconfident traders may have higher expected returns than rational traders in the 
same economy. Hirshleifer et al. (1994) suggest that overconfidence can promote 
herding in security markets.   
 
 Representativeness 
 
Overconfidence can also be traced to the representativeness heuristic, as Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) stressed that people try to categorize events as representative of a 
well-known class then, in making probability estimates, overstress the importance of 
the categorization. Consequently, people see patterns in data that are truly random and 
feel confident. Representativeness heuristic can lead to ‘sample size neglect’, i.e. the 
sample size has been neglected and a small sample has the same representativeness as a 
large one (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). It is sometimes known as the ‘law of small 
numbers’ (Rabin, 2002). One manifestation of the ‘law of small numbers’ in the stock 
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market is that investors based on a history of consistent growth of earning, deduce that 
a firm is a growth company and ignore the fact that very few companies can keep 
growing. The investors in model 2 of Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), BSV 
henceforth, who believe in an earning trend, are subject to the representativeness 
heuristic. They associate past earnings growth too strongly with future earnings growth, 
therefore overreact to the information. It deviates the asset price away from its 
fundamental. 
 
Conservatism 
The conservatism heuristic states that individuals are slow to update new information 
into their beliefs. It suggests that investors cannot adjust their valuation of assets in 
response to the earning news fully and this leads to asset prices underreacting to the 
earning announcements. BSV incorporate conservatism and representativeness to show 
that investor sentiment prevents them from updating their valuation in the correct way, 
resulting in the asset prices under or overreacting to fundamental news and generating 
stock market momentum and excess volatility.  
2.4.2. Problems of belief based models 
Belief based sentiment models are constructed by applying the psychological biases to 
explain the finance anomalies. They model the decision problems of sentiment 
investors which endogenously generate trading mistakes that are correlated with 
fundamentals. In practice it is very difficult to decide which of the psychological 
elements is the most important in forming beliefs and preference. Therefore, the 
majority of belief-based models focus on one or two psychological biases that are 
commonly involved in forming beliefs and valuing the assets, and more generally 
affecting investors’ demands for the assets, which finally influence the prices, returns, 
and volatility. Until now, there has been no single unifying model in behavioural 
finance for investor sentiment, therefore the impact of investor sentiment on the 
security prices, volatilities, and returns have been analysed by applying different forms 
of psychological biases in the studies. Empirically, it is an open question whether 
investors with certain psychological biases can be identified with a specific category of 
investors, such as institutional investors or individual investors. Moreover, most of the 
belief based models are very difficult to be directly applied and tested.  
 20 
 
2.4.3. Noise trader model 
Noise traders are the investors whose decision making process deviates from the 
standard models. They either trade on irrelevant information or make investment 
decisions based on sentiment rather than an analysis of the fundamentals. De Long, 
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) illustrate the importance of noise traders for 
price formation in their model. They point out that there is variability in price from the 
unpredictability of noise traders’ future opinions. The model contains two types of 
investors in the market: rational arbitrageurs and noise traders. 
 
Rational arbitrageurs, denoted as ‘ ’, who accurately perceive the distribution of 
returns from holding the risky asset; and noise traders, denoted as ‘ ’, who misperceive 
the expected price of the risky asset by an independent and identically distributed 
normal random variable,   , where       
    
  . Assuming that the market is 
populated by noise traders with a proportion of   , and rational arbitrageurs which a 
proportion of      . The total demand for the risky asset is therefore composed by 
noise trader demand,   , and arbitrageurs demand,   .  
 
The utility of the investors is a constant absolute risk aversion function: 
                 (2.8) 
where  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and   is the expected final wealth.  
 
With the agents maximizing their expected utility and the normally distributed returns, 
the demands for risky assets of arbitrageurs and noise traders respectively are functions 
of the price of the risky asset, the one-period-ahead distribution of it, and noise traders’ 
misperception of the expected price of the risky asset: 
  
  
               
         
  
       (2.9) 
  
  
               
         
  
 
  
         
  
     (2.10) 
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Where    is the price of the risky asset;   is a fixed real dividend of the risk-free asset; 
  is noise traders’ misperception;      
 is the one-period-ahead distribution of the price 
of risky asset. 
2
 
 
Assuming that both noise traders and arbitrageurs are allowed to take short positions, 
the demands can be negative. Comparing the demand of noise traders to that of 
arbitrageurs, the extra term that appeared in equation (2.10) comes from noise traders’ 
misperception of the expected returns. Noise traders’ demands will be more than 
arbitrageurs’ if they overestimate the expected returns and less than arbitrageurs’ if they 
underestimate.   
 
When the proportion of noise traders in the markets is μ, the proportion of arbitrageurs 
is    . To calculate equilibrium, the price of the risky asset is formulated as: 
     
      
  
   
 
   
 
 
        
 
       
    (2.11) 
Where, μ is the proportion of noise traders,    is a measure of the average “bullishness” 
of the noise traders, and   is the riskless return.  
 
Equation (2.11) shows that the equilibrium pricing function of a risky asset converges 
to its fundamental value of one if the noise trader’s misperception converges to zero. 
The last three terms demonstrate the impact of noise traders on the price of risky asset.  
The second term in the equation shows that the variation of noise traders’ 
misperceptions causes the fluctuations of the asset price. The larger the proportion of 
noise traders to arbitrageurs in the markets, i.e. the higher is µ, the more volatile asset 
prices are. If     
 , the generation of noise traders is more bullish than the average, 
they then bid up the price, and,  if     
 , the generation of noise traders is more 
bearish than the average, they then bid down the price.  
 
The third term in (2.11) illustrates that when noise traders’ average misperception is 
different from zero, the price will deviate from its fundamental. The greater the level of 
                                               
2 According to DeLong et al (1990), maximizing the expected value of each agent’s utility is equivalent to maximizing the 
expected final wealth, i.e.           
 , where   is the mean wealth and   
  is the one-period-ahead variance of wealth. The 
arbitrageurs held the amount of    risky asset to maximise the utility:           
       
                   
    
        
 
  , and noise traders held the amount of  
  risky asset to maximise the utility:           
     
  
                       
        
 
     
     , where    is a function of first-period labour income. 
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noise trader bullishness on average the higher is the price. A lower expected excess 
return is required by arbitrageurs since they bear a smaller share of price risk and 
therefore they are willing to pay a higher price. This ‘price pressure’ effect tends to 
lower noise trader’s relative expected returns.  
 
The last term of equation (2.11) demonstrates how noise traders ‘create their own 
space’. When the risky asset,  , is believed to be mispriced in period   and the price, 
    , is uncertain, neither group is willing to bet too much on this mispricing. 
Arbitrageurs would not hold the risky asset unless compensated for bearing noise trader 
risk. For an asset that everyone agrees is overpriced, the return from increasing a 
position is offset by the corresponding additional price risk. Noise traders thus ‘create 
their own space’ and this space creation effect tends to raise noise trader’s relative 
expected returns.   
 
The noise traders affect asset prices by trading when they are unusually bullish or 
bearish. When their activities are the collective consensus, the prices are driven away 
from fundamental values, and arbitraging short or long positions is now risky since the 
deviations could go further, therefore the rational traders choose to not fully restore 
prices and price volatility is increased by the sentiment of noise traders. Fama and 
French (2006) show that when misinformed investors drive the stock price away from 
the fundamental value by erroneous beliefs generated from the incomplete information 
they processed, informed investors will not fully offset the price effects from the 
misinformed when arbitrage is risky. It implies that the price effects from erroneous 
beliefs do not disappear until the beliefs of the misinformed converge to the beliefs of 
the informed, i.e. the beliefs are eventually completely in agreement. 
2.4.4. The survival of noise traders 
The model has demonstrated the impact on the price of the risky asset by noise traders 
trading when they are unusually bullish or bearish, however, Friedman (1953) pointed 
out that noise traders have the worst possible market timing, they buy high and sell low, 
and will earn lower returns then their rational counterparts, consequently, they are 
finally eliminated by ‘market natural selection’. 
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De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) stressed that it is not necessarily 
the case that noise traders earn lower returns. The difference in returns between noise 
traders and arbitrageurs,      , is the product of the difference in their holdings of the 
risky asset,   
    
  , and of the excess return paid by a unit of the assets. Therefore, the 
difference in returns is 
         
    
                     (2.12) 
Recall the equation (2.9) and (2.10), the difference in returns to the two types of agents 
at time   is: 
            
          
 
       
      (2.13)3 
and by taking the unconditional expectation of (2.13), it results in: 
          
  
                    
 
       
     (2.14) 
An obvious requirement for noise traders to earn higher expected returns in equation 
(2.14) is that the mean misperception of returns on the risky asset must be positive, i.e. 
    .    When the average misperception is positive, noise traders ‘hold more’ of the 
risky asset and raise market risk, thereby increasing their expected return. This is the so 
called ‘hold more’ effect. When the average misperception is negative, i.e.     , 
there is no ‘hold more’ effect and           .  
 
In equation (2.14), the first and second terms in the numerator incorporate the ‘price 
pressure’ and the buy-high-sell-low (or Freidman) effects respectively. When noise 
traders get more bullish, they demand more of the risky asset on average, and they buy 
the most of the risky asset just when other noise traders are buying it. The price is thus 
driven up and the return is reduced. However, the denominator in the equation 
incorporates the ‘create space’ effect, which tends to raise noise trader’s relative 
expected returns. In order to take advantage of noise traders’ misperceptions, 
                                               
3 Equation (2.9) and (2.10) imply:    
 
   
                  
       ; and the one-step-ahead 
variance of    is a unchanging function of the constant variance of a generation of noise trader’s 
misperception   :          
        
  
    
 
      
   (DeLong et al., 1990). 
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arbitrageurs need to bear the greater risk which arises because of the increase in the 
variability of noise traders’ beliefs. 
 
Though noise traders cannot earn higher average returns when they are too bullish since 
the price pressure effect increases with      , they can earn higher expected returns 
when  average bullishness is at intermediate levels. Moreover, equation (2.14) show 
that the larger   is, the greater the range of    is. This means that there are more risk 
averse agents in the market allowing the larger degree of bullishness for noise traders to 
earn higher average returns.  
 
Further to this model, DeLong et al. (1991) also presented a model to illustrate that 
there are plausible misperceptions by noise traders allowing them not only to earn 
higher returns than do sophisticated investors, but also to survive and dominate the 
market in terms of wealth in the long run. The model assumes that noise traders tend to 
assess probability distributions, especially variances, poorly, which is supported by 
psychological evidence of the tendency to underestimate variances and to be 
overconfident. It proves two points; one, that noise traders who are more risk averse 
than log utility and misperceive variances by a small amount are guaranteed to survive 
in the market; two, that there are noise traders of many types who, despite 
misperceiving variances by a large amount, demonstrate faster wealth accumulation 
than rational investors.  
2.5    Investor Sentiment Empirical work 
The motivation of investor sentiment theories is to explain many of the empirical 
financial anomalies, such as Closed-end fund discount, excess volatility, price 
overreaction and underreaction. The development of sentiment theories provides a 
theoretical establishment of the relation between investor sentiment and asset prices, 
thus making some specific testable predictions of asset returns and volatility.  
2.5.1. Investor sentiment and return 
The noise trader models such as DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), 
suggest that subsets of investors may not make investment decisions based on market 
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fundamentals and they are capable of affecting asset prices by way of unpredictable 
changes in their sentiments. This provides the theoretical hypothesis that the expected 
returns are affected by the degree of noise trader’s average bullishness. Empirical 
evidence broadly agrees that even after controlling for “rational” influences such as 
mean-variance (Yu and Yuan, 2011) and Fama-French factors
4
 (Xu and Green, 2013), 
indicators of sentiment do contribute significantly to explaining the time series and 
cross-sectional behaviour of stock returns in a variety of settings. Brown and Cliff 
(1999) find a strong correlation between sentiment and long horizon returns. In the 
study of short-horizon return reversals, Subrahmanyam (2005) finds that the 
relationship between current returns and lagged order imbalance is weaker than that 
between current returns and lagged returns, indicating that instead of inventory effect, 
belief reversal is more likely play a role in return predictability. Beaumont et al. (2005) 
conduct a joint test for the effects of individual and institutional sentiment on return and 
volatility in the German stock market. They found that stock returns increase when 
variations in investors’ sentiment increase. Brown and Cliff (2005) found that 
sentiment is negatively related to stock returns, and the negative relationship is stronger 
for large or growth firms. Moreover, in horizons of a year or more sentiment is always 
more negative to returns than that for the next 6 months. They stressed that for larger or 
growth firms, sentiment is a significant predictor of future returns at the 1 - 3 years 
horizon. That stock returns increase when variations in investors’ sentiment increase 
were found by Bandopadhyaya and Jones (2008). Wang, Keswani, and Taylor (2006) 
test the causal relationship between sentiment, return, and volatility. The results show 
that sentiment is Granger-caused by returns but not vice versa. Schmeling (2009) 
investigated the relationship between investor sentiment and stock returns by 
conducting a cross countries test. The study found that investor sentiment has a 
significantly negative impact on future stock returns, and the impact declines with the 
forecast horizon. In the study of how investor sentiment affects stock market crisis, 
Zouaoui, Nouyrigat and Beer (2011) estimate a logistic model by using panel data. 
They find that investor sentiment is negatively related to the future performance of 
stocks, i.e. when investor sentiment is low, subsequent returns are relatively high.  They 
further find that within a one-year horizon, investor sentiment positively influences the 
probability of the occurrence of stock market crises.  
                                               
4 Fama and French (1996). 
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2.5.2. Investor sentiment and volatility 
One of the implications of sentiment theories is that sentiment should correlate with 
excess volatility, since the variation of noise traders’ misperceptions raises a systematic 
risk and further causes asset price fluctuations. Brown (1999) studied US close-end 
funds (17 funds for period 1993-1994) to investigate the direct relationship between 
investor sentiment and closed-end fund (CEF) volatility. He shows that unusual levels 
of investor sentiment are associated with not only greater volatility, but also heightened 
trading activities. Lee, Jiang and Indro (2002) estimate a GARCH-in-mean model to 
examine the impact of changes in investor sentiment on the conditional volatilities of 
the US major financial market indices (DJIA, S&P 500 and NASDAQ). They find the 
bullish changes in sentiment result in downward adjustments in volatility, and vice 
versa. Beaumont et al. (2005) found increasing variations in investors’ sentiment 
increases conditional volatility in the German stock market. Wang, Keswani, and 
Taylor (2006) found that sentiment measures do not Granger-cause realised volatility, 
except ARMS
5
 which produces the results that the causality has two way effects. 
Verma and Verma (2007) estimate a set of multivariate EGARCH model for DJIA and 
S&P500 returns. They find that sentiments have significant positive effects on stock 
returns, and negative effects on stock volatility. Han (2008) examines whether investor 
sentiment affects option prices and finds that the index option volatility smile is steeper 
(flatter) when investor sentiment becomes more bearish (bullish). In examining the 
relationship between investor sentiment and the stock index risk-neutral skewness, he 
finds that the index risk-neutral skewness becomes more (less) negative when investor 
sentiment is more bearish (bullish). The studies provide empirical support for the 
assumption that investor sentiment does correlate with volatility and suggest a negative 
effect of sentiment on volatility, i.e. bullish sentiment may lead to low volatility and 
bearish sentiment leads to high volatility. 
2.6    Measures of sentiment 
The question therefore, is no longer whether investor sentiment affects stock prices, but 
rather, how to measure and quantify the effects (Baker & Wurgler, 2007). This leads to 
a further empirical question of how to measure investor sentiment.  
                                               
5
ARMS index is also known as TRIN, was first published by Richard W. Arms, Jr. 1967. It is calculated by dividing 
advancing/declining ratio by up/down ratio. (http://quotes.wsj.com/UK/UKX/index-interactive-chart#Boolean) 
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One prevalent method is to use survey-based measures. These are referred to as ‘direct 
measures’. Survey-based measures are created by directly asking people about their 
expectations of the market, and so try to capture the mood of market participants. The 
surveys conducted by American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) and 
Investors Intelligence (II) are the most common such surveys. AAII is conducted by 
targeting individuals. It is primarily interpreted as a measure of individual investor 
sentiment. On the other hand, many of the respondents for II are current or retired 
market professionals, and it is therefore interpreted as a proxy for institutional 
sentiment (Brown & Cliff, 2004). Brown (1999) uses AAII to investigate the direct 
relationship between investor sentiment and closed-end fund (CEF) volatility. Lee Jiang 
& Indro (2002) use II to examine the impact of changes in investor sentiment on 
conditional volatilities of stock returns. Brown and Cliff (2005),Verma & Soydemir, 
(2006) and Fong (2013) also use AAII and II as sentiment measures to examine the 
relationship between sentiment and stock returns. The Consumer Confidence Index 
(CCI) is another survey-based indicator used to measure investor sentiment. Schmeling 
(2009) and Beckmann et al. (2011) use CCI to conduct a cross-border test and they find 
that investor sentiment has a significant impact on future stock returns, and investor 
sentiment in one country affects stock return in another country by passing the 
sentiment across.  
 
The advantage of survey-based measures is that they come from primary data by 
directly asking about people’s thoughts and expectations of the market. They try to 
capture the mood of market participants and in this respect should be able to produce a 
very precise indicator of sentiment. However, there are well-known problems with 
survey measures that can influence the results obtained. For example, the possible 
errors in questionnaire, interview, or respondent can directly affect the quality of the 
results. Another disadvantage of survey-based measure is the low-frequency of the 
sampling period. Though many surveys are conducted on a monthly basis, and some on 
a weekly basis, they are still not of a fine enough granularity to relate short term 
sentiment to daily trading or intraday events. More importantly, surveys rely on 
respondents giving a true indication of their activities, but, very often, people may not 
do what they say they will.  
 
Another method is to use certain financial market indicators as proxies to measure 
investor sentiment. The measures are normally the variables based on financial theories 
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and created from financial data. They have been categorized into four groups by Brown 
and Cliff (2004). The first group of measures consists of variables based on recent 
market performance, such as the ratio of the number of advancing issues to declining 
issues, which is widely used as a sign of bullish (bearish) market sentiment in practice. 
The second group consists of variables that relate to particular types of trading activity, 
for example, the percentage change in short interest, which is seen as a representation 
of how bearish the market is. The third group relates to derivatives trading activity, for 
instance, the ratio of put/call trading volumes, which has been used by technical traders 
for years as an indicator of the market sentiment (Wang, Keswani & Taylor, 2006).The 
last group is those who do not fall into the first three categories, such as, Closed End 
Fund Discount and Mutual fund flows. These financial variables are viewed as ‘market 
weather vanes’ by financial market commentators. Brown and Cliff (2004), using US 
survey sentiment indices, establish some relationship between the variables and 
investor sentiment and construct sentiment indices by using financial variables. 
Financial market indicators are measured with a relatively high degree of accuracy and 
are supported by finance theories. They are also available in higher frequencies. 
However, the link between theory and data can be quite weak and relies heavily on 
their respective interpretation.  
 
A third method is to compose a sentiment index from economic and financial market 
variables. For example, Brown and Cliff (2004) and Baker and Wurgler (2006) extract 
the common factors of the sentiment proxies to build investor sentiment indices from 
selected sentiment proxy variables; Bandopadhyaya and Jones (2006) construct the 
Equity Market Sentiment Index for a group of firms in an equity index; Chen, Chong, 
and Duan (2010) compose an index for Hong Kong investor sentiment; Chen, Chong 
and She (2014) compose one for Chinese investor sentiment; Baker, Wurgler and Yuan 
(2012) and Bai (2014) build indices for global investor sentiment. This method 
overcomes the low frequency and possible inaccuracy of survey-based measures, and 
the weak link between theory and data of financial indicators, although the methods for 
constructing sentiment index can be controversial.  
 
One of the important assumptions of sentiment models is that the financial markets 
consist of different groups of investors. They are classified as ‘informed’ investors (or 
arbitrageurs) and ‘uninformed’ investors (or noise traders). However, in reality it is 
difficult to directly identify who are arbitrageurs and who are noise traders. For 
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simplification, institutional and individual investors are among the most general classes 
of groups, representing arbitrageurs and noise traders respectively in empirical studies. 
Examples of institutional investors are mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, bank 
trust departments and other investment organisations. Compared to individual investors, 
they operate in large volumes of capital and are well equipped with information, 
facilities, and skilled analysts and traders. They are usually thought of as the ‘informed’ 
investors (or arbitrageurs) in the market who are assumed to try to trade securities on 
fundamentals, and take advantage of mispricing by uninformed investors (or noise 
traders), resulting in asset prices being restored to the fundamental value. Individual 
investors, on the other hand, are assumed to be the ‘uninformed’ investors, who make 
decisions with sentiment factors or trade on noise information. Most empirical studies 
of sentiment concentrate on an examination of the relationship between individual 
sentiment and market factors such as volatility and returns. However, Brown and Cliff 
(1999) found that institutional sentiment has a distinct effect in the market that differed 
from that of individual sentiment, and that institutional sentiment has a strong link with 
the returns of large stocks. Jackson (2003) tested order imbalance based on net flows 
into or out of Australian equity markets and found that larger trading of institutional 
traders in certain stocks increased conditional volatility, but that there was no such 
relationship between trades of individual traders and volatility. After estimating a 
multivariate EGARCH model for DJIA and S&P500 returns, Verma & Verma (2007) 
find that both individual and institutional investor sentiment have significant effects on 
stock market returns and volatilities, and individual investor sentiments react to 
institutional investor sentiments but not vice versa.  
2.7    Conclusion 
As a new research field, behavioural finance emerged from debating the theory of 
efficient markets. The assumptions of traditional finance theories have ruled out the 
consideration of investor sentiment, and its research themes defined how markets 
should behave rather than how markets actually behave. The limited role that traditional 
finance has played in explaining the market anomalies has led to the development of 
studies of the effects from market participants’ sentiment and behaviour, especially 
with regard to asset price and returns. In order to answer the core questions of how 
asset prices deviate away from their fundamental values and why the deviations persist, 
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psychological and cognitive biases are incorporated into modelling investor sentiment 
and behaviour.   
 
By considering investor sentiment, belief-based models, such as overconfidence models, 
illustrate the impact of investors’ psychological biases on asset prices when they form 
their beliefs and preferences. Noise trader models show that sentiment based noise 
traders affect security prices by their average misperception, the fluctuation of 
misperceptions, and by introducing a systematic risk that could limit rational investors’ 
arbitrage. These models are good at explaining some of the properties observed in 
financial markets such as, under- and over-reaction, excess volatility, booms and 
crashes. Despite its success, behavioural finance is criticised for failing to provide a 
general theory as traditional finance has done, and only ad-hoc models have been 
created to explain specific stylised facts.  
 
Empirically, the centre of research has shifted to how to measure investor sentiment 
and quantify its effects on stock prices (Baker and Wurgler, 2007). Three methods are 
common. The first uses survey-based techniques which try to identify people’s 
sentiment about economics and financial markets directly. The second method is to 
employ financial market indicators as proxies to measure investor sentiment indirectly. 
Third are composed indices, typically using principal components to extract a single 
sentiment measure from a variety of relevant economic and financial data. All three 
methods have their drawbacks. Surveys are expensive to conduct reliably at high 
frequency and “quick” questionnaires may produce answers which are less reliable.  
Financial market data are in theory more accurate but they involve a risk of circularity 
as they may simply reflect the outcome of share price movements rather than be an 
independent measure of sentiment.  Finally, the use of principal components to create a 
composed index produces a variable which may not be very robust.  The composition 
of the principal components may change as new data become available, implying that 
the entiretime series of sentiment may change over time. However, composed indices 
are probably the most popular of the three sentiment measures, particularly in studies of 
US data, arguably because they largely overcome the reliability issues of surveys and 
the independence issues of pure financial market data. 
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Chapter 3    UK investor sentiment measures 
3.1    Introduction 
After several decades’ studies, investor sentiment has been recognised as an important 
component of the market pricing process and the focus has shifted towards identifying 
and quantifying investor sentiment. Measuring investor sentiment is not a 
straightforward task. Academic research and industry practices have identified and 
utilised various sentiment proxies to measure investor sentiment. These measures 
include sentiment surveys, mood proxies, general economic indicators, and financial 
market proxies; all are used to measure investor sentiment. Many investor sentiment 
measures have been identified in academic research and industry practices.  However, 
the use of financial market proxies as instruments to measure investor sentiment is 
limited by how much the indicators are supported by the financial theories and how to 
interpret the linkage to the data.   Brown and Cliff (2004) construct investor sentiment 
indices by using the principal component method and Kaman Filter method
6
 
respectively. The factor which is filtered out from selected market indicators is 
suggested to be a better measure by the consistency of analysis results from either 
method. Baker and Wurgler (2006) further identify six economic and market indicators 
and apply the First Principal Component method to build a market-wide sentiment 
index to measure investor sentiment. Both Brown and Cliff (2004) and Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) build their sentiment indexes based on the US economic and financial 
market variables. Both are seen as measures of US investor sentiment, especially the 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) index which is widely utilised by scholars for analysis of 
asset prices, such as Lemmon & Ni (2008), Kaplanski & Levy (2011), and Baker, 
Wurgler, & Yuan (2012) and Bai (2014).  
 
Notwithstanding the popularity of this method, few composed sentiment indices have 
been constructed for the UK. In fact, the only two as far as we are aware is an annual 
market-wide index by Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan (2012), and a weekly market-wide 
index by Bai (2014) based on the Baker and Wurgler (2006) approach. Baker et al 
(2012) studiesthe long-term investor sentiment effect in the equity markets and Bai 
(2014) studies the short-term of sentiment effect. However, market anomalies, such as 
                                               
6 The principal component method and Kaman Filter method are described in Appendix 4.   
 32 
 
the well known calendar effect of equity returns, suggesting that investor sentiment is 
also likely to affect returns in a medium run. London is one of the largest financial 
centres in the world and it has been the number one city in terms of financial flows in 
2008.
7
 There are very few studies that examine UK investors’ sentiment and no survey-
based investor sentiment measures available for the UK
8
. Therefore, a study of UK 
investor sentiment will make a contribution to the stream of research on investor 
behaviour and financial markets. 
3.2    UK investor sentiment analysis 
3.2.1. Summary of the Data 
In order to capture the short-term effect of investor sentiment, the analysis of UK 
investors’ sentiment is conducted on both a weekly and monthly basis. Various 
sentiment indicators are used in the analysis. These include the FTSE 100 index put/call 
ratio, trading volume, Closed-end fund discount (CEFD), realized volatility (VOLA), 
relative strength index (RSI), money flow index (MFI) and the advances to declines 
ratio (AVDC). Data for calculating these variables are collected from Datastream. In 
addition to the above proxies, the following are also included:  number of initial public 
offerings (NIPO), collected from London Stock Exchange statistic reports;
9
 consumer 
confidence index (CCI), collected from European Commission Economics Database 
and Indicators
10
; and mutual fund cash position (CFLW), collected from Morningstar 
database. However, these are only available at a monthly frequency. Foreign investors’ 
sentiment proxies are also used in the analysis. They are: American Association of 
Individual Investors(AAII)
11
; Investors Intelligence (II)
12
; the Baker & Wurgler 
sentiment index (BWSI), collected from Jeffrey Wurgler’s website13; German equity 
                                               
7
Worldwide Centers of Commerce Index 2008, Insights, Master Card Worldwide 
8TheEuropean Commission Business and Consumer Surveysfor EU members is only available monthly 
and is concerned with general business and consumer confidence rather than investor or financial 
market sentiment. 
9
London Stock Exchange: http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/home/statistics.htm 
10 European Commission Economics database & indicators:      
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/time_series/index_en.htm 
11
American Association of Individual Investors: www.aaii.com 
12
Investors Intelligence: http://www.investorsintelligence.com/x/default.html 
13
Data source: http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/ 
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index (Sentix), data sourced from Sentix
14
; and German market indicator (GMI), 
collected from The Centre from European Economic Research
15
.  
 
Stock returns are another set of data used in the analysis. Equities traded in the UK 
markets are categorised into three portfolios according to their capitalisation sizes. The 
FTSE 100 Price Index, is used to represent prices of the large-size stock portfolio, and 
the return,     , is computed accordingly. The FTSE 250 Price Index represents prices 
of a medium-size stock portfolio, with return,     . The FTSE Small Cap Price Index 
is used for a small-size stock portfolio, with return,     . Data of the three price indices 
are collected from Datastream. Most of the samples range from 01 January 1996 to 30 
June 2011, but a few variables, such as the German Sentix and the CFLW are not 
available for the full sample period. Therefore, the analysis is also performed on shorter 
sub-samples.  
3.2.2. Definition and calculation of the sentiment proxies 
Advances-Declines Ratio (AVDC): AVDC is usually thought of as a “Market Strength” 
indicator, and is calculated by using the number of stocks rising divided by the number 
of stocks falling in the market. It monitors the direction of the majority of stocks on the 
stock market, and it is used as sentiment within the stock market.   Brown and Cliff 
(2004) and Wang, Keswani and Taylor (2006) both use a modification of AVDC to 
capture the relative strength of the market and form the part of investor sentiment index.    
 
Closed-End Fund Discount (CEFD): The CEFD is one of the earliest indicators of 
market sentiment (Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, 1991).  We calculate the discount from 129 
closed-end investment trusts which are listed on the London Stock Exchange.  The 
daily prices and Datastream-estimated Net Asset Values (NAV) are used in the 
calculation.  The value-weighted discount of Lee et al (1991) is applied for the 
computation. They constructed a value-weighted index of discounts (VWD): 
              
  
        (3.1) 
                                               
14
Sentix: http://www.sentix.de 
15
The Centre for European Economic Research: www.zew.de 
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where:  
   
     
      
  
   
                                                          
       
         
     
                                                    
nt is the number of funds with available DISCi,t and NAVi,t data at the end of period t. 
Money Flow Index (MFI): Apart from RSI (see later), Chen, Chong, and Duan 
(2010)also include the Money Flow Index (MFI) in their construction of sentiment 
measure. The MFI is a momentum indicator to be used as a measure of the strength of 
money going in and out of a security, showing whether the security is overbought or 
oversold.  Constructing the MFI begins with defining the “typical price” (TP) as an 
average of the high, low and closing price at time t, i.e. 
    
  
    
    
 
 
      (3.2) 
where,   
  is the highest price at t,,   
  is the lowest price, and   
  is the closing price.  
The money flow is then defined as:                                 .  If  
          then the money flow at time   is considered as positive.  The total money 
flow over the previous N periods (N = 5 in this study) is calculated as: 
         
                   
                                       
   (3.3) 
The MFI varies between 0 and 100. It contains information of both price and turnover.  
Many practitioners use it as an indicator of the changing in the trend, when MFI 
moves in the opposite direction to the price. 
 
Put-Call Volume ratio (PCV): The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) equity 
put to call trading volume is one of the most widely used to indicate investor sentiment.  
It is often used as a bearish indicator (Brown and Cliff, 2004). It is defined as ratio of 
the trading volume of put options to the trading volume of call options, i.e.      
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. Wang, Keswani and Taylor (2006) utilise PVC for study of investor 
sentiment. Bandopadhyaya and Jones (2008) suggest that Put-call ratio is a better 
choice for measuring market sentiment compared to the Volatility Index (VIX).The 
PCV for the UK is calculated here by using FTSE100 index option put to call trading 
volumes. 
 
Put-Call Open interest ratio (PCO): Wang, Keswani, & Taylor (2006) suggested that 
option open interest is likely to be a better predictor of volatility than PCV, and PCO is 
therefore a preferred measure of investor sentiment.  For the UK we computed PCO, 
from the FTSE100 index option as the ratio of put open interest to call open interest.  
 
Relative Strength Index (RSI): RSI is a market indicator showing whether the market 
is oversold or overbought.  The market is thought to be overbought when RSI is greater 
than 80, and to be oversold when it is less than 20. Chen, Chong, and Duan (2010) 
suggest that RSI may be a proxy of investor sentiment, and use the RSI which is 
calculated from Hang Seng Index as a component to construct an investor sentiment 
index to measure Hong Kong investor sentiment.   
The RSI is defined as: 
         
               
 
   
              
 
   
    (3.4) 
where   is the price at time  ;                            if              , 
otherwise                 .  We use n = 14 as this is one of the most commonly-
used indicators in the market.  
 
Realized Volatility (VOLA): Brown and Cliff (2004) use the realized volatility 
calculated from Open-High-Low-Close data on the S&P 100 Index to construct an 
indicator of investor sentiment. Wang, Keswani and Taylor (2006) directly use the 
Realized volatility as a proxy to measure investor sentiment. The realized volatility 
measure used in this study is calculated by using the extreme value method of 
Parkinson (1980). The daily high and low of the FTSE100 index future prices is used to 
compute the weekly realized volatility. It measures investor expectations for market 
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volatility as implied by the skew of FTSE 100 index future.  A high VOLA indicates a 
low investor sentiment.   
 
Trading volume (VRA): Baker and Stein (2004) suggest that market confidence is 
related to liquidity and argue that trading volume is a noisy measure of liquidity.  We 
follow Baker and Wurgler (2006) and use a measure of the turnover ratio defined as: 
         
       
        
     (3.5) 
where        is the average turnover for the past 5 periods, and         is the 
average turnover for the past 50 periods.  VRA turns out to be I(1), and therefore its first 
difference (DVRA) is used to help construct the sentiment indices.. 
3.2.3. Statistical summary of the weekly variables 
Table 3.1 contains summary statistics of all the weekly variables. The sentiment 
indicator series displays a skewed and leptokurtic pattern and, except for the AVDC 
and the PCV, they all have high first order autocorrelation. All levels of weekly returns 
display excess kurtosis, negative skew and some serial correlation. The non-stationary 
nature of the variables is tested by using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with 
52 lags. The results show that only the trade volume, VRA, cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of unit root at the 10% significance level and the rest of the variables reject 
the null of having unit root at the 1% level. A further test of the first difference of the 
VRA has an ADF statistic value being significant at the 1% level, showing that the first 
difference of VRA (DVRA) is stationary.   
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Table 3.1: Statistics of Weekly Basic Data 
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of the basic data series.  The data are weekly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011 (809 observations).  
Exceptionally the SENTIX index is available only from 28th February 2001 (532 observations). 
Variable definitions: 
AVDC: Advances to declines ratio;  CEFD: Closed-end Fund Discount;  MFI: Money Flow Index;  PCV: Put-call volume ratio;  PCO: Put-call open interest ratio;  RSI: 
Relative Strength Index;  VOLA: Realized volatility;  VRA: Trading volume;  DVRA: first difference ofTrading volume;  AAII: American Association of Individual 
Investors index;  II: American Investors Intelligence index;  SENTIX: German equity sentiment index;  Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-
size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on small-size stock portfolio. 
AC (1) is the autocorrelation coefficient at one lag. ADF is Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic with maximum 52 lags.  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Sum Sq. Dev. AC (1) ADF 
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l 
M
a
rk
et
 I
n
d
ic
a
to
rs
 
AVDC 1.0876 0.4549 1.2329 6.0842 525.589*** 167.2282 0.005 -28.3206*** 
CEFD 6.1710 1.9384 0.5394 4.4652 111.5912*** 3035.919 0.946*** -4.1802*** 
MFI 55.0233 23.520 -0.0673 2.3014 17.06343*** 446983.2 0.799*** -6.0015*** 
PCV 1.3526 0.4580 1.1055 6.3486 542.7550*** 169.5227 0.169*** -9.8230*** 
PCO 1.1830 0.1956 0.2522 2.1609 32.30725*** 30.90311 0.962*** -3.9491*** 
RSI 49.2066 25.7137 -0.4768 1.8330 76.4642*** 533584.7 0.872*** -7.9520*** 
VOLA 1.0117 0.6030 2.6823 14.4282 5372.483*** 293.8059 0.820*** -6.4611*** 
VRA 1.0261 0.1729 0.9335 7.7472 877.1272*** 24.1509 0.926*** 
-1.2628 
  
DVRA 0.000003 0.0663 0.4674 6.5852 462.1597*** 3.5507 0.512*** -10.2222*** 
S
u
rv
ey
 
S
en
ti
m
e
n
t 
In
d
ex
 
AAII 0.1092 0.1933 -0.0893 2.7079 3.942019 30.1047 0.672*** -9.2572*** 
II 0.1863 0.1353 -0.7417 3.5538 84.51907*** 14.7866 0.939*** -5.9866*** 
SENTIX 0.1125 0.1167 0.5343 2.8921 25.5730*** 7.2258 0.849*** -6.3767*** 
M
a
rk
et
 
R
et
u
rn
s Rbig 
0.0575 2.4710 -0.3221 6.2673 373.8274*** 4933.496 -0.091*** -31.1141*** 
Rmid 0.1399 2.4603 -0.4941 5.6379 267.4875*** 4890.773 0.041 -27.2452*** 
Rsmall 0.0393 2.1286 -0.5987 6.9675 578.9446*** 3660.873 0.320*** -11.8891*** 
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3.2.4. Weekly Investor sentiment proxies and equity returns 
Before constructing the sentiment index, the relationship between the sentiment proxies 
and equity returns is analysed regressing the returns on the sentiment proxies following 
the Brown and Cliff (2004) approach to examine the effect of investor sentiment on 
market returns. The sentiment proxies and their one period lagged are both included in 
the regressions. The autocorrelation coefficients indicate that returns of large-size stock 
has first order autocorrelation and returns of small-size stock have up to third order 
autocorrelation. Returns of medium-size stock, however, do not have autocorrelation. 
Therefore one lag of return is included in the regression for large-size stock returns, and 
three lags of return are included in the regression for small-size stock returns. The 
estimation models are as follows: 
                     
 
   
             
 
   
            
 
   
            
 
   
            
 
   
            
 
   
             
 
   
             
 
   
             
 
   
    
                                                                                                                                      (3.6) 
where size = big, mid or sml;    for large stocks and   for small stocks.  
 
They are estimated using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method.  For all three estimates, 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Tests (includes 52 lags) reject the null 
hypothesis of the residual not being autocorrelated. The autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (ARCH) tests (include 2 lags) also reveal that the null hypothesis of 
residuals to be homoscedastic is rejected for all three regressions. Where there is 
residual autocorrelation and/or heteroscedasticity, OLS estimators still give unbiased 
and consistent coefficient estimates as long as no lagged dependent variables, but the 
standard errors could be wrong and consequently mislead inferences made based on 
them. Newey and West (1987) develop a variance-covariance estimator that produces 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors which correct 
for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The models are therefore estimated by 
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OLS with Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance, and the results are 
reported in Table 3.2. 
 
For the large stocks, the weekly returns that are negative and statistically significant 
relate to        ,     ,        and       but those that are positive relate to      , 
     ,     ,     , and        . The coefficients of              ,     , 
      ,            , and         are statistically insignificant at the 10% level, 
indicating that the factors do not affect large stocks returns, which in general confirms 
that which is suggested from the correlation tests. For the small stocks portfolio, the 
coefficient of      ,        ,    ,       ,     , and          is positive, and 
that of       and       are negative and statistically significant. For the medium 
stocks portfolio,     ,        ,        ,      and          are statistically 
significant at the 10% level. More of the sentiment proxy variables seem to be able to 
predict future returns for large and small stocks. The variables with the most evidence 
of some ability to forecast future return are     ,      and     . The regression 
for returns of medium-size stock shows that very few sentiment variables have 
predictive power as to the future returns.     
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Table 3.2: Weekly regressions of returns on sentiment proxies 
Table 3.2 shows the results of estimating equations of the following form: 
                     
 
                
 
               
 
               
 
    
           
 
               
 
                
 
                
 
                 
 
     
          
As there is some evidence of autocorrelation, the estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard 
errors. 
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock 
portfolio;  Rsmall: return on small-size stock portfolio;  AVDC: Advances to declines ratio;  CEFD: 
Closed-end Fund Discount;  MFI: Money Flow Index;  PCV: Put-call volume ratio;  PCO: Put-call open 
interest ratio;  RSI: Relative Strength Index;  VOLA: Realized volatility;  DVRA: first difference 
ofTrading volume.  
Adj-R
2: Adjusted R-squared;  S.E: Standard Error of regression;  AIC: Akaike information criterion. 
 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
AVDCt  3.4432*** 12.9305  4.0788*** 16.9843  2.7777*** 13.1468 
AVDCt-1 -0.2444  1.0828 -0.3132*  1.9511  0.1219  0.7094 
CEFDt  0.8736***  5.9081 -0.1070  0.9711 -0.2897**  2.1221 
CEFDt-1 -0.7786***  5.7406  0.2463**  2.4225  0.4053***  3.0120 
MFIt  0.0077*  1.7532  0.0064*  1.7621  0.0086**  2.2920 
MFIt-1 -0.0043  0.9901 -0.0010  0.2871 -0.0041  1.1311 
PCVt -0.4415**  2.5556 -0.0814  0.6431  0.0489  0.4187 
PCVt-1 -0.0902  0.5667  0.0950  1.0732  0.1808*  1.8086 
PCOt  1.5465  1.2046  0.3250  0.3455  0.4523  0.4743 
PCOt-1 -1.5666  1.2389 -1.3249  1.4625 -1.3547  1.5182 
RSIt  0.0067*  1.9095  0.0039  1.2023  0.0054*  1.9163 
RSIt-1 -0.0094***  2.7588 -0.0045  1.4008 -0.0050  1.5960 
VOLAt -1.3277***  4.5117 -1.1671***  3.7928 -1.1919***  5.2281 
VOLAt-1  0.6463*  2.4199  0.3758  1.4999  0.6600***  2.9629 
DVRAt  0.0043  0.0037 -0.5206  0.5969  0.5249  0.6319 
DVRAt-1  1.3602  1.2422  1.6919  1.5365  0.9365  0.7730 
Adj-R
2 
0.6070 0.6945 0.5978 
S.E 1.5504 1.3612 1.3522 
F-Statistic 74.2508 115.5267 63.9601 
AIC 3.7370 3.4755 3.4659 
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3.3    Construction of the weekly sentiment index 
It is arguable that the use of financial market proxies to measure investor sentiment can 
be economic and practically efficient, since the data are widely available from high to 
low frequencies, and they can be more accurate than those of survey data. However, 
financial market activities can be led by a combination of an asset’s fundamental and its 
investor sentiment. It is still not very clear that when using the sentiment proxies to 
explain asset returns, whether the explanatory power of the proxy variables comes from 
the fundamental part or the sentiment part of the proxies. The reason that the financial 
market variables are able to be used as sentiment proxies is that they all contain the 
factor of investor sentiment. This suggests that the sentiment factor extracted from the 
proxy variables may be a more effective measurement for investor sentiment. Brown 
and Cliff (2004) use the Kalman filter method as well as principal component method 
to extract the common components of the sentiment proxies to build a US investor 
sentiment index from selected sentiment proxy variables. Similarly, Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) also construct a US investor sentiment index from six selected sentiment proxies.  
 
Combining Brown and Cliff (2004) with Baker and Wurgler (2006), eight sentiment 
proxy variables are used for constructing UK market investor sentiment indexes. They 
are: Market strengthen indicator (AVDC), Closed-end fund discount (CEFD), Money 
Flow Index (MFI), Put-call open interest ratios (PCO), Put-call volume ratio (PCV), 
Relative Strength Index (RSI),Realized volatility (VOLA), and the first difference of 
Trading volume (DVRA). These variables come from equity, future and option markets, 
where participants vary from individual to institutional investors, therefore the 
sentiment extracted from the variables is more likely to reflect UK market investor 
sentiment.   
 
The index is constructed following the Baker and Wurgler (2006) approach, first 
principal component method. The first step is to estimate the first principal component 
of the eight sentiment proxies and their lags. This gives the first-stage index (     ) 
with 16 loadings, which is: 
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The second step is to compute the correlation between the       and the current and 
lagged values of each of the proxies. In each pair of the lead and lag variables, 
whichever has higher correlation with the       will be used in next stage. The final 
step is to define the sentiment (     ) as the first principal component of the 
correlation matrix of eight variables selected in the second step. This produces an index: 
                                                       
                                                   
The correlation between the 16-term       and the      index is 0.98, indicating that 
little information is lost in dropping the eight terms with other time subscripts. The first 
principal component explains 32% of the sample variance suggesting that one factor 
captures much of the common variation. 
 
The sentiment proxies related to derivatives trading activities are viewed as measures of 
institutional sentiment because institutional investors are more likely to be dominant in 
the derivatives markets (Brown and Cliff, 2004). Therefore, the variables of    ,    , 
and      are used for constructing institutional sentiment index (     ). Using the 
same method and procedure as for the market sentiment index,     , the  institutional 
sentiment index is produced thus: 
     
 
                                     
The first principal component explains 55% of the sample variance demonstrating that 
one factor captures much of the common variation. The correlation between the 6-term 
first-stage index and        is 0.92, showing that little information is lost in dropping 
the three terms with other time subscripts.  
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The variables,     ,     , and         are used in the construction of both market 
sentiment index,     , and institutional sentiment index,      . This may lead to a 
problem of overlapping. An alternative market sentiment index,      , was therefore 
constructed by excluding    ,    , and     : 
     
                                                   
               
In this case, the first principal component explains 37% of the sample variance, 
implying that the common variation captured by the one factor has not changed much 
with     ,     , and        being excluded. This may suggest that      
  captures 
the same factor as      . The correlation coefficient of      
  and       is 0.9997, 
and it is statistically significant at the 1% level, implying they are the two possible UK 
market sentiment indices. Therefore, the more comprehensive index,      , is used in 
the analysis. 
 
    and       are plotted in Figure 3.1, and the statistical summaries of both 
variables are reported in Table 3.3 Panel A. The market sentiment index,     , 
displays positive autocorrelation;  all the five autocorrelation coefficients are positive 
and statistically significant. The institutional sentiment index,      , exhibits a 
similar picture. These properties suggest that investors are more likely to be bullish if 
they were bullish in the previous period or bearish if they were bearish before, in other 
words, estimated sentiment is somewhat persistent. 
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Figure 3.1: UK market investor sentiment index and institutional sentiment index, 
1996 – 2011 
 
Both indexes show that investors’ sentiment was high in late 1996 and early 1997, the 
period before the Asian Financial Crisis. The market sentiment index,     , was still 
spiking high until late 1997, but the institutional sentiment index,       , falls down 
and stays below the mean until 1999 in the run up to the Dotcom bubble, then declines 
later in the period shortly before the bubble crash. The      is also high in early 1999, 
but it declines in the second half of the year. Both indexes stay high until mid 2007 
when the global financial crisis started. However, the market sentiment,     , dips to 
bearish frequently, especially during 2004, the investors stay bearish for most of the 
year in contrast to the relative high level of       . These patterns may suggest that 
the two sentiment indices, SENT and SENT
P
, are both relatively persistent, but they are 
only moderately correlated with one another. They are likely to provide independent 
measures of investor sentiment. The patterns may also suggest that both market and 
institutional sentiment could have contributed to an asset price bubble.  
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Table 3.3 Panel B reports the correlation coefficients between SENT and SENT
P
 and the 
component proxy variables.  SENT
P
 has high correlation with all its components, and 
also has strong correlation with several non-component indicators, notably CEFD.  
CEFD is normally thought of as an indicator for individual investor sentiment rather 
than institutional sentiment.  The higher correlation between CEFD and SENT
P
 than 
between CEFD and SENT may be attributable to the importance of institutions in the 
UK market (Ammer, 1990).  Apart from CEFD, SENT has a higher correlation with the 
pure market sentiment indicators (ie. all except PCOt, PCVt, VOLAt-1) than does SENT
P
, 
and a lower correlation than SENT
P
 with the institutional indicators: PCOt, PCVt, 
VOLAt-1.  This suggests that the components extracted for SENT and SENT
P
 do capture 
sentiment from different groups of investors.  Granger causality tests between SENT 
and SENT
P 
(Table 3.3 Panel C) suggest that there is bi-directional causality and 
therefore no strong indication that either group of investors tends to lead market 
sentiment in the UK. 
 
    is considered to be a better measure of UK market wide investor sentiment than 
SENT
P
, since it is extracted from variables that generally are seen as indicators of 
investor sentiment and used as proxies to measure investor sentiment. The first 
principle component of these variables is expected to be the factor that captures 
investor sentiment
16
. Similarly,       is constructed to measure UK institutional 
sentiment by extracting the common component from the indicators that are used as 
proxies for institutional sentiment. 
                                               
16  A discussion of whether the constructed      and SENTP are sentiment factors or common 
macroeconomic factors is discussed in section 3.9.2 by orthogonalising sentiment variables against key 
macroeconomic measures. Macroeconomic data is generally available in monthly or lower frequencies 
rather than weekly or higher frequencies. The examination is, therefore, conducted in the monthly 
frequency by using the Index of Production, available in monthly and lower frequencies, as the 
macroeconomic proxy. The Index of Production is a key component of gross domestic production 
measures which is more likely to reflect the business cycle rather than being confused with sentiment.   
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Table 3.3: Properties of weekly UK Investor Sentiment Indices 
Panel A reports summary statistics of the constructed investor sentiment indexes: UK market sentiment (SENT) and UK institutional sentiment (SNETP) 
Panel B shows pairwise correlation coefficients. 
Panel C shows  -values for the F statistics from bilateral Granger causality tests 
Variable definitions: 
SENT: UK market sentiment; SENTP: UK institutional sentiment; AVDC: Advances to declines ratio;  CEFD: Closed-end Fund Discount;  MFI: Money Flow Index;  
PCV: Put-call volume ratio;  PCO: Put-call open interest ratio;  RSI: Relative Strength Index;  VOLA: Realized volatility;  DVRA: first difference of Trading volume. 
ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with a maximum of 52 lags. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
Panel A: Statistical summary of Weekly sentiment indices 
Variable Mean Std Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera ADF 
Autocorrelations at lags 1-5 
1 2 3 4 5 
SENT 50.1432 26.1439 -0.4746 1.8324 76.1325*** -7.954*** 0.872*** 0.733*** 0.595*** 0.475*** 0.356*** 
SENT
P 0.9436 0.5187 -0.8072 5.2046 251.3766*** -4.9581*** 0.708*** 0.686*** 0.647*** 0.632*** 0.561*** 
Panel B:  Investor sentiment correlation coefficients 
 SENTt SENT
P
t AVDCt CEFDt MFIt PCVt PCOt RSIt VOLAt DVRAt 
AVDCt-1  0.3112***  0.0912***  0.0046 -0.0278  0.2697*** -0.0623*  0.0102  0.3619*** -0.0618* -0.2099*** 
CEFDt -0.2595*** -0.4659***  0.0694**  1 -0.1056*** -0.1742*** -0.2576*** -0.2413*** -0.0658*  0.4667*** 
MFIt-1  0.8014***  0.2961***  0.0052 -0.1413***  0.8003***  0.0822**  0.1323***  0.5903*** -0.1294*** -0.3166*** 
PCVt  0.0564  0.6808*** -0.0834** -0.1742*** -0.0437  1  0.3932***  0.0182 -0.1118*** -0.1055*** 
PCOt  0.1540***  0.6835***  0.0002 -0.2576***  0.1158***  0.3932***  1  0.1227*** -0.2040*** -0.3827*** 
RSIt  0.9550***  0.3600***  0.0290 -0.2413***  0.6262***  0.0182  0.1227*** 1 -0.1433*** -0.4810*** 
VOLAt-1 -0.5283*** -0.8123*** -0.0393  0.5093*** -0.3466*** -0.1788*** -0.4020*** -0.5106***  0.1594***  0.8201*** 
DVRAt-1 -0.1391*** -0.0767** -0.0068 -0.0176 -0.1166*** -0.0651 -0.0103  0.1159***  1  0.0584* 
SENTt  1  0.3967***         
Panel C: Granger causality tests of SENT 
 SENTP 
 SENT does not Granger Cause SENTP SENTP does not Granger Cause SENT 
SENT <0.0001 0.0072 
 47 
 
3.4    UK investor sentiment and foreign investor sentiment 
As financial markets are internationally integrated, investor sentiment may also be 
internationally correlated. Beckmann et al. (2011), Baker, Wurgler and Yuan (2012) 
and Bai (2014) discuss three channels through which investor sentiment contagion may 
occur.  First, if investors in one country are optimistic (say) about investment prospects 
in another country, they may bid up the shares of that particular country. Second, if 
investors in one country are optimistic, this may cause a general shift into risky assets, 
including international equities. Both these channels postulate that the effect of foreign 
sentiment on home country share prices occurs through market purchases by foreign 
residents. Third, when foreign investors are optimistic about their own economy this 
leads to domestic investors being optimistic about the local economy due to the linkage 
between the two economies, the foreign sentiment affecting domestic share prices 
indirectly via domestic sentiment.  
 
A fourth possible mechanism is argued that sentiment in a foreign country may affect 
sentiment in the home country directly because of the herding instinct of noise traders, 
and through this channel affect share prices, as home country residents become more or 
less optimistic and trade accordingly. It is well-established that “word-of-mouth” social 
interactions can affect sentiment and investment decisions (Shiller, 1984; Brown, 
Ivković, Smith and Weisbenner, 2008). Investors in different countries are not usually 
as geographically close to one another as the investors that Shiller and Brown et al 
investigated. However, internet message boards have a global reach and there is 
evidence that they influence sentiment and trading (Sabherwal, Sarkar and Zhang, 
2011). Furthermore, foreign sentiment can become local where there is a relatively high 
proportion of foreign ownership of locally-listed stocks, as is the case in the UK.  At 
end-2012, foreign investors owned 53.2% of the value of the UK stock market; of this, 
48.3% was held by investors in North America
17
.  Investing is a global business, and it 
seems plausible that (for example) US fund managers based in the UK might be as 
ready to listen to their US counterparts as well as to their British colleagues in London.  
Therefore, the hypothesis is that there may be direct contagion from sentiment in one 
country to sentiment in another, associated with an impact on share prices. 
                                               
17 Office of National Statistics, Ownership of UK quoted shares 2012. www.statistics.gov.uk. 
 48 
 
Beckmann et al. (2011) use survey-based indices whereas Baker et al. (2012) and Bai 
(2014) used composed indices to examine cross-border contagion of investor sentiment. 
Contagion may be due to common (international) information used in forming 
sentiment in different countries, or equally to investors’ herding across borders. 
However, a change of sentiment in one country may lead to a change in another country 
regardless of how sentiment is measured in different countries. The UK composed 
indices, SENT and SENT
P
, US survey- based indices, AAI and II, and German survey 
sentiment index, Sentix, are used to investigate the relationship between UK investor 
sentiment and US and German investor sentiment. 
 
Sentix index is constructed by a German consulting firm, Sentix GmbH, based on their 
weekly survey started from February 2001. A typical survey has 740 institutional 
investors and about 2000 individual investors participate. The respondents are regarded 
as bullish, bearish or neutral according to their opinions on the financial markets for the 
short-term (next month) and the mid-term (next six months). For each market, indices 
are constructed by using the following formulation: 
       
                 
          
      (3.7) 
Since Sentix is only available from 28/02/2001, the analysis of the relation between UK 
investor sentiment and European investor sentiment is conducted for a period from 
28/02/2001 to 30/06/2011.  
 
As shown in Table 3.4 Panel A, both the       and      have stronger correlation 
with the US institutional sentiment than that with US individual sentiment. This may be 
because home investors, whether institutions or individuals, have less knowledge about 
foreign markets than home markets, and that they would be more likely to pay attention 
to foreign investment “experts”, institutional investors’ sentiment rather than to general 
foreign market sentiment.  Particularly, in the case of      , the correlation 
coefficients show that UK institutional sentiment may have the least correlation to the 
US individual sentiment compared to the US institutional sentiment and the German 
institutional sentiment. The correlation coefficients of Sentix with      and with 
      are both about 30% and significant at the 1% level. This demonstrates that the 
UK-European sentiment correlation may be less than that of UK-US investor sentiment, 
which can be more than 55%.  
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The results of Granger-causality tests with 4 lags between the composed indexes and 
the US and German survey sentiment indexes are reported in Table 3.4 panel B. It 
presents significant evidence that the AAII, II, and Sentix Granger-cause     and 
     ; but the     and       do not Granger-cause AAII, II and Sentix. This 
suggests that the US and European investors’ sentiment appears to lead UK investor 
sentiment, but not vice versa.  
 
 
Table 3.4: Correlation and Granger causality tests: weekly UK and foreign 
investor sentiment 
Panel A shows pairwise correlation coefficients among different sentiment indices. 
Panel B shows  -values for the F statistics from bilateral Granger causality tests as between either of the 
UK indices (SENT or SENTP) and any one of the US or German indices (AAII, II, or SENTIX) 
Test 1: H0: Granger-noncausality from the US/German index to the UK index. 
Test 2: H0: Granger-noncausality from the UK index to the US/German index. 
Variable definitions: 
SENT is UK market sentiment; SENTP is UK institutional sentiment; 
AAII is American Association of Individual Investors index; II is American Investors Intelligence index; 
SENTIX is German equity sentiment index. 
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level. 
Panel A: Correlation tests 
 SENTP SENT AAII II SENTIX 
SENT
P 1.000000     
SENT 0.3967*** 1.000000    
AAII 0.0850*** 0.4113*** 1.000000   
II 0.4352*** 0.5554*** 0.5066*** 1.000000  
SENTIX 0.3006*** 0.2983*** 0.2467*** 0.2588*** 1.000000 
Panel B: Granger causality tests 
 AAII II SENTIX 
 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 
SENT <0.0001 0.9058 <0.0001 0.4826 0.3178 0.9598 
SENT
P <0.0001 0.3161 <0.0001 0.4701 0.0170 0.1207 
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The UK sentiment indices are further regressed on the US and German indices to 
investigate how far foreign investor sentiment directly affects UK investor sentiment. 
The basic model is: 
     
               
 
            
 
                
 
              
  
       
(3.8) 
where SENTt
K
 = UK market sentiment, or institutional sentiment (K=P). 
 
The regression of UK sentiment,     and      , on US and German sentiment 
indices is started by estimating the equation 3.8 using OLS method with Newey-West 
standard errors. The estimation results (Table 3.5) show that many of the higher order 
lagged term of variables are insignificant at the 10% level. The model therefore is 
amended by dropping some of these insignificant variables only where this did not 
produce unacceptable spikes in the estimated lag structure. A simplified regression 
model is estimated and the coefficient results for the simplified model are not much 
different from the basic model. Estimators AIC and Regression Standard Errors are 
improved in the simplified model, suggesting it is a better and more parsimonious 
model than the original model.  
 
Turning first to the estimates including German sentiment, for UK market sentiment, 
one lagged period US individual and institutional sentiment and current European 
investor sentiment have some effect on UK market sentiment and the effect is positive. 
However, US individual sentiment in two periods ahead and US institutional sentiment 
in four periods ahead would have a negative impact on UK market sentiment. The 
opposite direction of the coefficients indicates a partial reversal of the effect of US 
investor sentiment. This may suggest a reverse effect of foreign investor sentiment to 
the UK investor sentiment. It can be seen that the one period lagged impact of AAII 
(AAIIt-1) is 20.0375 while the two-period lagged effect (AAIIt-2) is -15.5311, producing 
a much smaller total effect of 4.5064. Of course, the level of sentiment cannot easily be 
normalised on any particular metric, and so the exact magnitude of any specific 
coefficient does not have a precise interpretation.  
 
For UK institutional sentiment,      , the estimated results show that current US 
individual and institutional have some positive effects on UK institutional sentiment. 
The negative and significant coefficient of one period lagged AAII confirms the reverse 
effect of foreign investor sentiment, particularly the US individual sentiment.   
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From the analysis above, it can be seen that in general, foreign investor sentiment has a 
broadly similar effect on UK market and institutional sentiment. However, by 
examining the details of the estimation results, a couple of differences can be observed.   
One is that the effects on UK market sentiment from US individual and institutional 
sentiment come from lagged terms of US investor sentiment rather than the current 
period, suggesting that US investor sentiment may have predictive power to UK market 
sentiment. The US investor effects on UK institutional sentiment, however, mainly 
come from the current period. This indicates that US investor sentiment is less likely to 
be able to predict UK institutional sentiment.  
 
The other difference is that the reverse effect of US sentiment is absent from UK 
institutional sentiment. The estimated coefficients suggest that UK institutional 
sentiment is affected by current US institutional sentiment positively. This may be 
because, compared to individual investors, institutional investors have better knowledge 
and contact to their foreign peers. Moreover, many UK financial institutions, e.g. 
Goldman Sachs International Bank, JP Morgan Chase Bank, JP Morgan Securities Ltd, 
and Morgan Stanley Bank international, are subsidiaries of US based financial 
institutions, where formal and informal communications between employees in the 
subsidiaries and their headquarters may transfer sentiment. This internal information 
channel would lead to more rapid sentiment contagion than from external observation. 
 
The main data period runs from January 1
st
 1996, but the         is only available from 
28/02/2001, a shorter time-span than the US measures, the regressions are also run 
including only US sentiment for a longer time-span from 01/01/1996 to 30/06/2010. 
The basic model is: 
     
               
 
            
 
              
  
        (3.9) 
Here, SENTt
K
 = UK market sentiment, or institutional sentiment (K=P). 
 
As before, regressions are started by estimating the equation 3.9, and then, it is 
simplified by deleting some higher-order lagged terms that are insignificant. Estimated 
results (Table 3.5) show that AIC and the standard errors are lower in the simplified 
models, implying that the model is a more parsimonious representation of the data.   
 
 52 
 
For UK market sentiment, the significance of current and lagged AAII coefficients 
demonstrate that US individual sentiment have a persistent impact on UK market 
sentiment. The signs of the coefficients again suggest the reverse effect, i.e. a reversal 
of the initial effect. The significance of lagged coefficients of II suggests that previous 
US institutional sentiment has an influence on UK market sentiment. Compared to US 
individual sentiment, the reverse effect of US institutional sentiment does not appear 
immediately after the initial period; instead, the reversal effect occurs after two periods’ 
same direction effect. This may be because signals released from US ‘experts’ are less 
likely to be doubted immediately by UK investors. It takes longer time for the doubts to 
be confirmed.  
 
For UK institutional sentiment,      , it can be seen that both US individual and 
institutional sentiment have explanatory power to UK institutional sentiment. The 
estimated coefficients suggest that US individual sentiment has a sustained impact on 
the UK institutional sentiment but US institutional sentiment has a short and immediate 
impact on the UK institutional sentiment. The coefficient hypotheses tests suggest that 
there is a possibility of the same degree but different directions of impact on UK 
institutional sentiment from US individual and institutional sentiment.   
 
Looking at the regression results in UK market and institutional sentiment both 
variables are greatly influenced by US individual and institutional sentiment. For     , 
the impact of US individual sentiment is more likely to be immediate whereas the effect 
of US institutional sentiment takes longer to materialise.  Both US individual and US 
institutional sentiment have an immediate impact on UK institutional sentiment, but US 
individual sentiment has more persistent effect on UK institutional sentiment than does 
US institutional sentiment.  
 
In summary, UK institutional and market sentiment are both strongly and persistently 
affected by changes in foreign sentiment. Changes in US individual and institutional 
sentiment each have an immediate effect on both UK market and institutional sentiment.  
Both the signs and lag structures of these effects do however differ as between the US 
effects within each equation, and for the same variable across equations. There is strong 
evidence of an apparent partial reversal in the effect of foreign sentiment, perhaps 
reflecting second thoughts by home investors about changes in foreign sentiment.  We 
can see that the sign reversals occur in all the foreign sentiment effects where the effect 
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persists over more than a single week.  Clearly, if the immediate impact of foreign 
sentiment changes is to induce UK investors to trade, then “second thoughts” may well 
induce trade reversals in the subsequent week(s), increasing UK stock market volatility 
as a result. German sentiment also has a significant contemporaneous and lagged effect 
on UK sentiment.  When German sentiment is excluded from the model, the results for 
US sentiment are mostly qualitatively similar to those from the smaller sample, giving 
some confidence in the robustness of the qualitative results, especially bearing in mind 
the two different sample sizes. 
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Table 3.5: Regression analysis of weekly UK sentiment measures on foreign 
sentiment indexes 
Table 3.5 reports the results of estimating equations of the general form:  
     
               
 
            
 
                
 
              
  
        
The data are weekly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. Exceptionally the SENTIX index is available only 
from 28
th
 February 2001. The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard errors. 
Variable definitions: 
SENT
K
 = UK market sentiment (K=M), or institutional sentiment (K=P); AAII: American Association of Individual Investors 
index; II: American Investors Intelligence index; SENTIX: German equity sentiment index. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level. 
 
Including European sentiment  
28/02/2001 - 30/06/2011 
Excluding European sentiment  
01/01/1996 - 30/06/2011 
 SENT SENTP SENT SENTP 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
AAIIt 
4.6676 
(1.2944) 
5.3684 
(1.6286) 
-0.4046*** 
(-4.1164) 
–0.3753*** 
(-4.2692) 
8.6421*** 
(2.6598) 
7.5319** 
(2.3604) 
-0.3150*** 
(-3.8414) 
–0.2811*** 
(-3.7141) 
AAIIt-1 
20.0375*** 
(5.0724) 
20.513*** 
(5.6241) 
0.2996** 
(2.4329) 
0.3556*** 
(3.3021) 
17.5236*** 
(5.1657) 
16.408*** 
(5.0958) 
0.3230*** 
(3.4858) 
0.3704*** 
(4.0184) 
AAIIt-2 
-15.5311*** 
(-3.6297) 
–16.233*** 
(-4.0530) 
0.1040 
(0.8528) 
 -12.2858*** 
(-3.3648) 
–13.896*** 
(-4.1477) 
0.0347 
(0.4044) 
0.0523 
(0.6224) 
AAIIt-3 
-4.5181 
(-1.3298) 
 
-0.1790 
(-1.6249) 
 -5.1334 
(-1.6063) 
 
-0.1207 
(-1.3101) 
–0.1571* 
(-1.7043) 
AAIIt-4 
4.3235 
(1.2180) 
 
0.1274 
(1.2747) 
 -0.6066 
(-0.1847) 
 
0.1405* 
(1.7137) 
0.0648 
(0.8513) 
IIt 
7.9060 
(0.6486) 
7.1304 
(0.6174) 
0.6749** 
(2.0557) 
0.6440*** 
(2.8876) 
11.0110 
(1.0317) 
12.9537 
(1.2224) 
0.5733** 
(2.1809) 
0.5006*** 
(3.1315) 
IIt-1 
57.2529*** 
(3.9759) 
53.078*** 
(3.7997) 
0.1094 
(0.2577) 
 47.9680*** 
(3.7696) 
48.2156*** 
(3.8502) 
0.0690 
(0.1889) 
 
IIt-2 
-25.5630 
(-1.4139) 
–18.744 
(-1.0642) 
0.6839 
(1.4983) 
 -27.1570* 
(-1.7707) 
–25.2721* 
(-1.6831) 
0.3636 
(0.9616) 
 
IIt-3 
6.3183 
(0.4273) 
0.4475 
(0.0303) 
-0.7173 
(-1.6367) 
 -5.1441 
(-0.3863) 
–6.5870 
(-0.5107) 
-0.3832 
(-1.0350) 
 
IIt-4 
-34.9410*** 
(-3.4789) 
–35.655*** 
(-3.8218) 
-0.2720 
(-0.9777) 
 -17.8118** 
(-2.0613) 
–24.2740*** 
(-3.0110) 
-0.2542 
(-1.1086) 
 
SENTIXt 
20.6476** 
(2.4592) 
9.7933** 
(2.3710) 
0.2037 
(0.9043) 
0.2509 
(1.1993) 
    
SENTIXt-1 
-12.0741 
(-1.1550) 
 
0.2638 
(0.9847) 
0.3804 
(1.5325) 
    
SENTIXt-2 
4.8635 
(0.4200) 
 
-0.8163*** 
(-2.9139) 
–0.5728*** 
(-2.6287) 
    
SENTIXt-3 
0.4491 
(0.0412) 
 
0.4127 
(1.4198) 
 
  
  
SENTIXt-4 
-8.0872 
(-0.9031)  
0.0037 
(0.0159) 
 
  
  
SENTt-1 
0.8207*** 
(16.9068) 
0.8121*** 
(32.176)   
0.8464*** 
(23.0593) 
0.8220*** 
(44.681) 
  
SENTt-2 
0.0209 
(0.2882)    
0.0165 
(0.2973) 
   
SENTt-3 
-0.0061 
(-0.0945)    
-0.0274 
(-0.5242) 
   
SENTt-4 
-0.0483 
(-1.3165) 
   
-0.0294 
(-0.8261) 
   
SENT
P
t-1   0.3615*** (6.4897) 
0.3656*** 
(6.8487) 
  0.3142*** 
(6.4092) 
0.3182*** 
(6.4143) 
SENT
P
t-2   
0.2301*** 
(4.7134) 
0.2199*** 
(4.7907) 
  0.2310*** 
(6.6229) 
0.2301*** 
(6.5695) 
SENT
P
t-3   
0.1416*** 
(2.7764) 
0.1289*** 
(2.5892) 
  0.1234*** 
(3.5792) 
0.1154*** 
(3.2100) 
SENT
P
t-4   
0.0989* 
(1.9164) 
0.0745 
(1.4784) 
  0.1665*** 
(3.9962) 
0.1488*** 
(3.4082) 
Adj. R
2 
0.8366 0.8362 0.7082 0.7011 0.8080 0.8078 0.6227 0.6209 
S.E. 10.8932 10.867 0.3068 0.3076 11.4919 11.4846 0.3197 0.3204 
AIC 7.6529 7.6298 0.5138 0.5010 7.7398 7.7323 0.5754 0.5752 
LM test 1.5976*** 0.9359 0.7174 0.8240 1.5078** 1.2494 1.1841 1.1633 
ARCH 4.4172** 4.1401** 2.5251* 2.4847* 2.9918* 3.1165** 9.7366*** 9.4315*** 
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3.5    Investor sentiment effect on UK equity returns 
In the section 3.2.4, the relationship between equity returns and investor sentiment have 
been analysed by regressing against the proxy variables. The results show that some of 
the proxies have highly statistically significant explanatory power over UK equity 
returns. However, it is difficult to be certain whether the explanatory power comes from 
the sentiment component of the proxies or the fundamental part of the proxy variables. 
Since      and       are extracted from the market sentiment proxies to measure 
investment sentiment, they are expected to be less likely to contain fundamental 
components. An analysis of the relationship between UK equity returns and      
and/or       is more likely to reflect the real relationship of UK equity returns and 
investor sentiment.  
 
The returns for large stock portfolio,     , medium stock portfolio,     , and small 
stock portfolio,     , are tested against the composed market sentiment index,       
and institutional sentiment index,      , as well as, the US individual sentiment index, 
    , and institutional sentiment index,   .  Since Sentix is only available from 2001, 
the regressions do not include it in order to estimate under the full sample period data.  
 
First, correlation tests have been conducted and the results are shown in Table 3.6 Panel 
A. The large stock returns display statistically significant correlation with US investor 
sentiment but it does not have a significant correlation with the two composed UK 
sentiment indexes. Returns of medium size stocks also display statistically significant 
correlation with the US individual and institutional sentiment. Additionally, it has 
statistically significant correlation to the UK market sentiment. Returns of small-stock 
portfolio exhibit the strongest correlation to the US individual and institutional 
sentiment. They also have a relatively high correlation to the UK market sentiment, 
though rather less so to the UK institutional sentiment. Among the different size stocks, 
it appears that the returns of small stocks have the strongest correlation to the US and 
the UK investor sentiment, and the large stocks are the group of stocks that have the 
weakest correlation to investor sentiment.  
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Table 3.6: Correlation and Granger causality test for weekly stock returns and 
investor sentiment 
Panel A shows pairwise correlation coefficients between sentiment indices and different size UK stock portfolios. 
Panel B gives  -values for the F statistics from bilateral Granger causality tests as between the sentiment indices and 
the returns on different size UK stock portfolios.  
Test 1:  : Granger-noncausality from stock returns to the sentiment index. 
Test 2:  : Granger-noncausality from sentiment index to stock returns. 
Variable definitions: 
SENT: UK market sentiment; SENTP: UK institutional sentiment; AAII: American Association of Individual 
Investors index; II: American Investors Intelligence index; SENTIX: German equity sentiment index.Rbig: return on 
the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on small-size stock 
portfolio.The data are weekly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. Exceptionally the SENTIX 
index is available only from 28th February 2001. 
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level. 
Panel A: Correlation tests 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
SENT  -0.0094 0.0917*** 0.2563*** 
SENT
P -0.0511 0.0015 0.0635* 
AAII 0.2059*** 0.2629*** 0.3403*** 
II 0.1191*** 0.2020*** 0.2771*** 
Panel B: Granger causality tests 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 
SENT  <0.0001 0.8899 <0.0001 0.7713 <0.0001 0.8345 
SENT
P <0.0001 0.8747 <0.0001 0.4804 <0.0001 0.4306 
AAII <0.0001 0.6950 <0.0001 0.4628 <0.0001 0.2980 
II 0.0001 <0.0001 0.0001 <0.0001 0.0167 <0.0001 
 
 
Second, Granger causality tests are conducted between returns and investor sentiment 
indexes (Table 3.6Panel B). It shows that     ,      , and     , do not Granger-
cause UK stock returns among all size of stocks. US institutional sentiment (  ), on the 
other hand, does significantly Granger-cause returns of all sizes of UK stocks, implying 
that the US institutional sentiment does lead the UK stock price changes regardless of 
the size of stocks. The null hypotheses of Granger-noncausality from stock returns to 
the sentiment indexes are all rejected at the 5% level, suggesting that the UK market 
returns do Granger-cause UK and US investor sentiment. This reveals a very similar 
picture to the Brown and Cliff (2004) investigation of US equity return and investor 
sentiment, which suggests that market returns and sentiment may act as a system. In the 
study, they found strong evidence of market returns predicting investor sentiment, and 
very weak evidence of investor sentiment predicting stock returns over short horizons.     
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Discussion in Section 2.4suggests that psychological bias leads to noise traders’ 
misperceptions that in turn cause asset price fluctuations (DeLong, et al 1990; Daniel et 
al, 1998; and Odean, 1998). Overconfident investors overreact to private information 
and drive stock prices away from fundamentals, and confidence will be affected by 
feedback from the outcome. Therefore, hypothesize is raised as that investor sentiment 
may have an immediate effect on stock returns, and stock returns may affect sentiment 
by the feedback effect. Brown and Cliff (2004) and Wang et al. (2006) show this 
feedback effect of stock returns in a VAR frame work.  Granger causality also provides 
one test of this hypothesis.  
 
A more general model of the impact of investor sentiment on UK stock returns is 
therefore to be considered. The analysis is begun by regressing UK equity returns on 
the two UK sentiment indexes,     and      , the  model (model 1) is:  
             
 
              
 
              
  
       (3.10) 
where   are the stock returns for either     ,     , or     .  
 
The estimation of model 1 results (Table 3.7) show that some of the lagged terms of 
variables are insignificant, therefore leading to an amended model (model 2) which 
drops some of the higher order lagged terms of variables. The estimation results of 
model 2 show that Adjusted R-square, standard deviation and Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) are improved in model 2 which suggests that model 2 is a more 
parsimonious representation of the data. 
 
For returns of large stocks, the estimated coefficients show that both current and one 
lagged UK market sentiment have an effect on returns of UK large stocks. Values of 
the coefficients imply that current market sentiment has a positive effect and the one 
lagged market sentiment has a negative effect.  
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Table 3.7: Regression of weekly returns on UK sentiment indexes 
Table 3.7  reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
                       
 
              
 
              
  
          
The data are weekly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. Exceptionally the SENTIX index is available only 
from 28
th
 February 2001. The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard errors.   
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on 
small-size stock portfolio;  SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. 
  : the Adjusted R-squared; S.E:Standard Error of regression; AIC: Akaike information criterion;  LM: Breusch/Godfrey LM test 
for residual autocorrelation; ARCH: ARCH test for Heteroskadasticity.  
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
α0 
-0.1460 
(-0.4535) 
-0.1329 
(-0.4055) 
-0.0477 
(-0.1401) 
-0.1109 
(-0.3029) 
-0.2354 
(-0.7261) 
-0.3897 
(-1.1355) 
Rt-1 
-0.1578** 
(-2.1356) 
-0.1620*** 
(-2.0951) 
0.0020 
(0.0319) 
 
0.2266*** 
(3.9998) 
 0.2378*** 
(4.0842) 
Rt-2 
-0.0398 
(-0.6148) 
-0.0519 
(-1.0510) 
0.0152 
(0.2564) 
 
0.0731 
(1.5959) 
 
Rt-3 
-0.0079 
(-0.0986) 
-0.0253 
(-0.5036) 
0.0518 
(0.9209) 
 
0.1115 
(1.3319) 
 
Rt-4 
-0.0983* 
(-1.6987) 
-0.0856* 
(-1.7942) 
-0.0237 
(-0.4549) 
 
-0.0803 
(-1.5515) 
 
SENTt 
0.0228** 
(2.2538) 
 0.0234** 
(2.2361) 
0.0130 
(1.4312) 
  0.0135** 
(1.9907) 
0.0199*** 
(2.9707) 
 0.0205*** 
(3.0320) 
SENTt-1 
-0.0153 
(-1.2682) 
-0.0152* 
(-1.6779) 
-0.0081 
(-0.7223) 
-0.0040 
(-0.6409) 
-0.0140 
(-1.6447) 
-0.0084 
(-1.5366) 
SENTt-2 -0.0015 
(-0.1350) 
 
0.0023 
(0.2022) 
 
-0.0015 
(-0.1618) 
 
SENTt-3 0.0077 
(0.6686) 
 
0.0063 
(0.6614) 
 
0.0057 
(0.7105) 
 
SENTt-4 -0.0070 
(-0.9213) 
 
-0.0060 
(-0.9225) 
 
-0.0007 
(-0.1273) 
 
SENT
P
 t 
-0.4171 
(-0.8691) 
-0.2932 
(-0.7840) 
-0.1301 
(-0.3121) 
-0.0767 
(-0.2104) 
-0.2542 
(-0.9057) 
-0.1804 
(-0.7139) 
SENT
P
 t-1 
-0.0337 
(-0.0732) 
 0.0777 
(0.2171) 
0.1978 
(0.5977) 
  0.2722 
(0.9230) 
0.3672 
(1.5797) 
 0.4297* 
(1.8673) 
SENT
P
 t-2 
0.0196 
(0.0644) 
 
-0.4936* 
(-1.6648) 
-0.4350 
(-1.4661) 
-0.4176* 
(-1.8346) 
-0.4485* 
(-1.9110) 
SENT
P
 t-3 
0.2675 
(0.7288) 
 
0.2654 
(0.8887) 
 
0.1226 
(0.5067) 
 
SENT
P
 t-4 
0.0372 
(0.1155) 
 
-0.0479 
(-0.1319) 
 
-0.0490 
(-0.2022) 
 
Adj. R
2 
0.0080 0.0129 -0.0001 0.0077 0.1273  0.1208 
S.E. 2.4687 2.4598 2.4687 2.4548 1.9950  1.9991 
AIC 4.6638 4.6492 4.6638 4.6414 4.2377  4.2319 
LM 1.1434 1.0819 1.7338*** 1.6281*** 1.4532**  1.6552*** 
ARCH 56.0206*** 55.0853*** 49.1399*** 55.0461*** 23.8765*** 39.9187*** 
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For medium stock, the estimated coefficients show that current      is statistically 
significant, and other sentiment variable coefficients are insignificant, demonstrating 
that returns of UK medium stocks are influenced by current UK market sentiment. 
However, the estimated       is 0.013. This may be interpreted as that the impact that 
UK market sentiment has on returns of medium stocks is very small, sometimes can be 
as little as the insignificant UK institutional sentiment.      
 
For returns of UK small stocks, the estimated results show that the sentiment factors 
that affect UK small stock returns are current UK market sentiment, one lagged and two 
lagged UK institutional sentiment.   
 
Regressions of returns on the US and UK sentiment indexes are conducted to allow the 
examination in more detail of investor sentiment’s ability to explain future returns. The 
general regression model is started:   
             
 
   
           
 
   
           
 
 
   
           
 
   
         
 
   
    
           (3.11) 
where   are the stock returns for either     ,     , or     .  
 
The regression processes, again, start from estimating the basic model (results are in 
Table 3.8A) and then amending the models by dropping those variables that are 
insignificance at the 10% statistic level. The estimation results are displayed in Table 
3.8B.  
 
For large stocks(Table 3.8B),       and        are statistically significant at the 1% 
level, demonstrating that current period and one lagged term of US individual sentiment 
have the ability to explain the UK large size stocks’ returns. Moreover,    ,    , and     
are significant at the 5% level, implying that returns of UK large stocks are influenced 
by current, one lagged period, and four lagged period US institutional sentiment.  
 
Regressions of returns of UK medium stocks (Table 3.8B) are quite similar to those of 
UK large stock returns. Current and one lagged terms of US individual sentiment 
together with current and two lagged terms of US institutional sentiment influence 
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returns of UK medium stocks. US institutional sentiment has a slightly longer effect on 
medium size stock returns than that US individual sentiment has.  
 
Regressions of returns of UK small stocks are reported (Table 3.8B). The coefficients 
of current and all three lagged AAII are significant, suggesting that US individual 
sentiment has a longer effect on returns of UK small stocks than that of returns of UK 
large and medium sizes stocks.  The significance of current and two lagged term II also 
demonstrates that US institutional sentiment has an impact on UK small stock returns.  
 
The regressions of return of the three sizes of stock portfolio all have statistically 
insignificant coefficients for the UK sentiment variables,     and      . This 
implies that neither UK market sentiment nor UK institutional sentiment has an impact 
on returns of UK equities.  It is quite different from the regression results presented in 
the previous section where the returns are regressed on UK sentiment indexes alone. 
The regressions show that UK market sentiment does influence UK stock returns, and 
UK institutional sentiment has an impact on returns of UK small stocks. In order to 
explain the differences, it is necessary to look back to the relationship between UK 
investor sentiment and US investor sentiment. From the analysis of the relationship 
between UK investor sentiment,     and       , and US investor sentiment, it can 
be seen that both UK market sentiment and UK institutional sentiment are strongly 
influenced by US individual and institutional sentiment, but not vice versa. This 
suggests that the effect that UK investor sentiment has on returns of UK stocks is more 
likely to be run by US investor sentiment, i.e. UK investor sentiment influences on UK 
stock returns are ‘made in the US’. One explanation may be the unusual proportion of 
UK company shares held by foreign investors, especially in the North America. 
According to the Office for National Statistics, by the end of 2010, foreign investors 
owned 41.2% of the value of the UK stock market with around 60% of these investors 
being North American
18
. The regressions of the three sizes of stock portfolios also 
show that US institutional sentiment in general has a greater impact than US individual 
sentiment on returns of UK stocks. 
 
 
 
                                               
18 Source from: Share Ownership: Ownership of UK quoted shares 2010, www.statistics.gov.uk   
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Table 3.8A: Regression of returns on weekly UK & US sentiment indexes 
Table 3.8A  reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
                       
 
              
 
              
  
              
 
            
 
         
The data are weekly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West 
standard errors. 
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on 
small-size stock portfolio;  SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. 
  : the Adjusted R-squared; S.E:Standard Error of regression; AIC: Akaike information criterion;  LM: Breusch/Godfrey LM test 
for residual autocorrelation; ARCH: ARCH test for Heteroskadasticity. ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical 
significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
α0 -0.4861* -1.7483 -0.2680 -0.8307 -0.3269 -1.0550 
Rt-1 -0.2580*** -3.8904 -0.0889 -1.5735 0.1700*** 3.3080 
Rt-2 -0.1051* -1.7826 0.0094 0.1679 0.0985** 2.2367 
Rt-3 -0.0945 -1.4123 0.0407 0.7581 0.1190 1.5126 
Rt-4 -0.1170** -2.2542 -0.0309 -0.6063 -0.0832* -1.7370 
SENTt 0.0140 1.4917 0.0013 0.1479 0.0068 1.0788 
SENTt-1 -0.0079 -0.7483 -0.0011 -0.1109 -0.0044 -0.5727 
SENTt-2 -0.0005 -0.0519 -0.0004 -0.0360 -0.0043 -0.5021 
SENTt-3 0.0051 0.4795 0.0085 0.9526 0.0065 0.8783 
SENTt-4 -0.0061 -0.8482 -0.0070 -1.1181 -0.0009 -0.1682 
SENT
P
 t -0.1513 -0.3507 0.0903 0.2440 -0.1052 -0.4183 
SENT
P
 t-1 -0.1137 -0.2627 0.0467 0.1440 0.2378 1.0314 
SENT
P
 t-2 0.1060 0.3995 -0.4160 -1.5569 -0.3616* -1.6688 
SENT
P
 t-3 0.2290 0.7210 0.2488 0.9632 0.1540 0.7076 
SENT
P
 t-4 -0.0129 -0.0419 -0.1351 -0.3832 -0.0952 -0.4055 
AAIIt 4.1735*** 5.7801 4.2147*** 5.5114 3.2172*** 5.4291 
AAIIt-1 -3.1631*** -4.7472 -3.0583*** -3.6814 -2.0632*** -3.0995 
AAIIt-2 -0.4920 -0.6746 -1.1505 -1.5681 -1.3773** -2.1733 
AAIIt-3 0.6591 0.9347 1.2685 1.6341 1.2627* 1.8002 
AAIIt-4 -0.5728 -0.7906 -0.6907 -0.9641 -0.2977 -0.5114 
IIt 13.6056*** 6.6048 11.9941*** 6.2902 7.4225*** 4.7399 
IIt-1 -6.8929** -2.0492 -3.7895 -1.2085 -0.2431 -0.1025 
IIt-2 -1.7232 -0.6701 -5.7903* -1.9134 -6.0093** -2.1358 
IIt-3 0.2849 0.1027 2.1089 0.6599 1.2281 0.4538 
IIt-4 -3.9822** -2.3114 -2.1234 -1.0679 -0.3269 -1.0550 
Adj. R
2 0.1778 0.1575 0.2414 
S.E. 2.2513 2.2722 1.8657 
AIC 4.4917 4.5102 4.1160 
LM 1.2425 1.7112*** 1.2199 
ARCH 52.6051*** 47.0913*** 16.5329*** 
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Table 3.8B: Regression of returns on weekly UK & US sentiment indexes after 
deleting insignificant variables 
Table 3.8B  reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
                       
 
              
 
              
  
              
 
            
 
        
The data are weekly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West 
standard errors. Insignificant variables were deleted from the model only where this did not produce unacceptable 
spikes in the estimated lag structure. 
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on 
small-size stock portfolio;  SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. 
  : the Adjusted R-squared; S.E:Standard Error of regression; AIC: Akaike information criterion;  LM: Breusch/Godfrey LM test 
for residual autocorrelation; ARCH: ARCH test for Heteroskadasticity. ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical 
significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
α0 -0.4475 -1.5391 -0.2855 -0.8792 -0.3225 -1.0527 
Rt-1 -0.2322*** -4.3521   0.1740*** 3.5123 
Rt-2 -0.1153** -2.5633   0.0979** 2.3197 
Rt-3 -0.0971** -2.3805   0.1078 1.5603 
Rt-4 -0.1017** -2.2285   -0.0765* -1.8243 
SENTt 0.0064 1.2066 0.0008 0.2207 0.0036 0.9739 
SENT
P
 t -0.0586 -0.2520 -0.1351 -0.5927 -0.0875 -0.3886 
SENT
P
 t-1     0.2257 1.0650 
SENT
P
 t-2     -0.3293 -1.5352 
AAIIt 4.0103*** 6.0382 3.8361*** 5.1932 3.1935*** 5.4831 
AAIIt-1 -3.3533*** -5.7636 -3.1409*** -4.2974 -2.0525*** -3.2092 
AAIIt-2     -1.4408** -2.2948 
AAIIt-3     1.1020* 1.8083 
IIt 13.6888*** 6.8353 11.8334*** 6.2330 7.5338*** 4.8302 
IIt-1 -6.7411** -2.0047 -4.1114 -1.2605 -0.1842 -0.0763 
IIt-2 -1.8130 -0.7303 -5.3677** -2.4268 -5.9423*** -2.9877 
IIt-3 0.0155 0.0056     
IIt-4 -4.0696** -2.5140     
Adj. R
2 0.1831 0.1564 0.2474 
S.E. 2.2388 2.2662 1.8560 
AIC 4.4670 4.4840 4.0945 
LM 1.3500* 1.7945*** 1.1823 
ARCH 57.3004*** 60.2359*** 18.8388*** 
 
 63 
 
3.6    Discussion of simultaneity problem  
Many economic and/or financial variables can be interdependent. If regression models 
involve inter-dependent variables, OLS may be biased, leading to biased coefficient 
estimates and inconsistent estimators. The multivariate dynamic models which applied 
in previous sections’ discussions have contained contemporaneous terms variables on 
the right hand of the equations.  This may introduce simultaneity bias as the 
explanatory variable becomes endogenous.         
 
The analysis of the relationship between return and investor sentiment in previous 
sections, for example, has used sentiment variables and their lagged terms as 
explanatory variable to vary sizes of asset returns. The models were estimated by 
applying OLS method. The coefficients may not be simultaneity biased and estimators 
would be consistent if the variables are not inter-dependent. However, empirical studies, 
such as Bandopadhyaya and Jones (2008), Wang, Keswani, and Taylor (2006), 
suggested that sentiment is Granger-caused by returns, which indicates that the 
regressions of Equation 3.10 may exhibit simultaneity bias.  In order to avoid the 
simultaneity problem, the models (equation, 3.6, 3.10 and 3.11) are restructured by 
excluding the contemporaneous terms explanatory variables, and the regression results 
are reported in Appendix 3.    
 
Comparing the estimated results (Table A1 and A2) to those of the models including 
the contemporaneous terms (Table 3.2 and 3.7), estimated coefficients of UK large 
stock returns exhibit significant differences, particularly in the regressions that 
investment sentiment was measured by using market indicators. Estimated coefficients 
of such as         ,        and         are significantly different. In the model 
with contemporaneous terms, they are statistically significant, implying that they have 
some explanatory power to returns of large stocks. In contrast, the estimations of the 
model without contemporaneous terms are statistically insignificant, suggesting that the 
variables do not have explanatory power to the returns of large stocks. The simultaneity 
problem which arose from the interdependence between UK investor sentiment and 
returns of UK large stocks may suggest that the estimated coefficients in Table 3.2 were 
biased, and the relationship revealed for the regression may not be correct. The 
relationship between returns of large stock and UK investor sentiment may need to be 
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reinterpreted by amending the model to avoid the simultaneity problem. Estimated 
coefficients in Table A2 suggest that neither UK market sentiment nor UK institutional 
sentiment has explanatory power to returns of UK large stocks, which is consistent with 
the examination results of Wang, Keswani, and Taylor (2006). DeLong, et al (1990), 
Daniel et al (1998), and Odean (1998) suggest that psychological bias leads to noise 
traders’ misperception causing the fluctuation of asset price. Overconfident investors 
overreact to private information and drive stock prices away from the fundamental, and 
the confidence will be affected by the feedback of the outcome. It, therefore, can be 
argued that investor sentiment may have an immediate effect on stock returns, and 
stock returns affect sentiment by the feedback effect. The estimates results of returns of 
large stocks in Table A1 – A2 may correspond to the feedback effect of return on 
investor sentiment.   
 
The estimated results from the models which include US investor sentiment (Table A3 
and Table 3.8A), on the other hand, reveal a slightly different story. The possible 
simultaneity problem in statistic estimations method does not affect the estimated 
coefficients of US institutional sentiment. Estimated       and        are statistically 
significant and have very similar values in both models.  
 
The estimated parameters for medium and small sizes stocks, however, do not display 
the same differences as returns of large stocks. For example, the estimations suggested 
that UK institutional sentiment in two lagged terms has some explanatory powers to 
returns of UK medium and small stocks when US investor sentiment was not modelled 
in the equations, which agrees with the estimated outcomes of models including 
contemporaneous terms. This may be because the relationship of returns of UK medium 
and small stocks to investor sentiment is not interdependent, implying that the model 
containing contemporaneous terms does not have the simultaneity problem. The 
regressions by OLS, therefore, are likely to be unbiased and estimators to be consistent. 
Under such conditions, comparing the estimator from the two different kinds of models, 
the Adjusted   , regression Standard Deviation, and Akaike Information Criterion all 
suggest that the models with contemporaneous terms of sentiment variables are more 
parsimonious representations of the data.   
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Similar investigations have been conducted in the analysis of the effects of foreign 
investor sentiment on UK investor sentiment. Estimated coefficients in Table A4 are 
very similar to their corresponding values in Table 3.5, suggesting that 
contemporaneous terms variables of foreign sentiment may not give rise to the 
simultaneity problem, i.e. UK investor sentiment is not interdependent with foreign 
investor sentiment; instead, foreign investor sentiment, particularly, US investor 
sentiment has some explanatory power to UK investor sentiment. This relationship has 
also been revealed from the Granger Causality tests which show that      and 
     are Granger caused by AAII and II but not vice versa. Moreover, the Adjusted 
  , regression Standard Deviation, and Akaike Information Criterion all suggest that 
the models with contemporaneous terms of foreign sentiment variables are more 
parsimonious representations of the data than those without contemporaneous terms of 
foreign sentiment variables.        
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3.7    Investor sentiment and financial crisis 
Previous analysis shows that the UK investors’ sentiment has an effect on UK equity 
returns and the sentiment effect is ‘made in the US’.  In addition, it is thought that 
investor sentiment is more likely to influence investors’ decision making during market 
extreme times, more precisely, financial or economic crisis time. The sample period of 
1996-2011 has experienced several major economic and financial crises; therefore the 
sentiment effects in crisis time can be investigated. This is done by regressing the 
returns on       and       under three conditions: non-crisis period, pre-crisis 
periods, and in-crisis periods respectively.  
 
Table 3.9: Crisis event period definition 
Crisis Pre-Crisis Period Crisis Period 
Asian Financial Crisis 17/10/1996-16/10/1997 17/10/1997-30/01/1998 
Russian Financial Crisis 02/02/1998-20/07/1998 21/07/1998-29/01/1999 
Dotcom bubble & crash 10/03/1999-09/03/2000 10/03/2000-09/03/2001 
2007-8 Financial Crisis 19/07/2006-18/07/2007 19/07/2007-18/07/2008 
 
The pre-crisis and crisis sample periods are detailed in Table 3.9. The event windows 
are generally defined as that from the defined crisis starting date, 1 year prior to this 
date is the pre-crisis period and 1 year after this date is the crisis period, but they can be 
of different lengths for individual events. The defined date of the beginning of each 
crisis is based mainly on the combination of the big events indicating the instability of 
financial markets and the effects starting to have a significant impact on the market 
price. Accordingly, the starting date of the Asian financial crisis is the 17
th
 October 
1997, when the new Taiwan dollar was forced to devalue and the Hong Kong dollar 
was attacked again. This led to the Hang Seng index falling 23% in three days and the 
FTSE350 price index falling nearly 10% in the following two weeks. The Russian 
financial crisis is identified as starting on 20
th
 July 1998, when Russian monetary 
authorities raised the interest rate to over 100%. This is the same date that the FTSE350 
reached its new high of 2972.3, but then fell nearly 25% over the following two and 
half months to 2239.1. The Dotcom bubble crash date is identified as 10
th
 March 2000, 
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when the technology-heavy NASDAQ Composite index reached its peak of 5048.62 
and fell to less than 1500 which is more than a 70% fall over the next 2 years. The 
2007-8 Global financial crisis starting date is set as 19
th
 July 2007, when the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average closed above 14000 for the first time in its history and fell to less 
than 9000 ( more than a 36%) over the following one and half years. The no-crisis 
periods is defined as all dates other than the pre-crisis and the in-crisis periods out. 
 
Three dummy variables are included in the regression model to examine sentiment 
effect on return during different crisis times. The model is: 
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Where    is return of the stock portfolio (either     ,     , or     ).     in non-
crisis periods and zero otherwise;      in pre-crisis periods and zero otherwise; 
     for in-crisis periods and zero otherwise. The regression results are reported in 
Table 3.10. 
 
For the large stock portfolio, estimated coefficients suggest that current institutional 
sentiment has an impact on returns during pre-crisis period but market sentiment may 
not.  This implies that the asset prices bubble to some degree may be caused by 
investors’ sentiment, particularly by institutional sentiment. The negative coefficient of  
     
 
 in pre-crisis period suggests that high levels of optimism push current prices up, 
lowering subsequent returns. However, during non-crisis normal time, returns of large 
stocks are affected by two lagged terms of market sentiment. The positive value 
suggests that current investor optimism would lead to high returns in two weeks time. 
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Comparatively, the result of un-conditional regression indicates that returns of large 
stocks may be affected by current market sentiment. This displays quite a different 
picture from the results under the financial crisis condition.    
 
For the medium-size stock portfolio, coefficients of sentiment variables are not 
significant at the 10% level in the result of unconditional regression, suggesting that 
returns of medium stock are likely not to be affected by investor sentiment. However, 
the two lagged of      and current      are significant during the no-crisis period, 
demonstrating that institutional and market sentiment have an impact on returns in the 
normal time. The significance of current, one lagged and two lagged      and one 
lagged of       during pre-crisis periods suggests that both market and institutional 
sentiment have an impact on medium stock return during the bubble building period, 
and market sentiment has a long-term impact on returns.      
 
For the small-size stock portfolio, coefficients show that both market and institutional 
sentiment have influence over returns of small stocks during normal time. The 
significance of current       also suggests that the prices of small stocks are 
influenced by institutional sentiment in financial crisis time. The statistical 
insignificance of coefficients for sentiment variables during pre-crisis period implies 
that neither market sentiment nor institutional sentiment influences returns of small 
stocks in this period. The result of unconditional regression shows a very similar 
picture to the result from normal time, which is that both current market sentiment and 
post institutional sentiment have some explanatory power to returns of small stocks.  
 
By examining the return and sentiment relation in different market conditions, it 
suggests during the normal period, equity prices are changed following investors’ 
sentiment among all different sizes stocks. The prices of small size stock are affected 
by investor sentiment during the crisis period. For large and medium-size, UK equities 
traded are affected by the UK investor sentiment in the price bubble pre-crisis period, 
however, during the crisis period, equity prices are not affected by investor sentiment, 
which provides evidence to the general opinion that the asset prices bubble to some 
degree, is caused by investors’ sentiment and the price crash can be interpreted as a 
process of the prices reversing back to their fundamentals. Evidence also shows that 
institutional sentiment plays a more important role than the individual sentiment in 
determining returns. 
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Table 3.10: Regression of weekly returns on UK sentiment indexes under financial crisis conditions 
Table 3.10 reports the results of regressions of the following form: 
          
           
                      
             
 
          
             
  
         
       
     
       
           
       
       
 
       
   
       
       
  
         
           
                 
             
 
          
             
  
               
The data are weekly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard errors.     
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on small-size stock portfolio;  SENT: UK 
market sentiment;  SENTP: UK institutional sentiment.  D1 = 1 in non-crisis periods and zero otherwise;  D2 = 1 in pre-crisis periods and zero otherwise;  D3 = 1 in in-
crisis periods and zero otherwise.  The pre- and in-crisis periods are as defined in Appendix 2.  The no-crisis periods consist of the remaining observations in the sample.  
The total number of observation is 809: 183 weeks fall in pre-crisis period, 147 weeks are in-crisis and 479 weeks are normal. 
T statistics are shown in parentheses.   
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
 Full period 
Normal 
period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period 
Full period 
Normal 
period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period 
Full period 
Normal 
period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period 
α1 
0.1018 
(0.3467) 
-0.0918 
(0.2482) 
1.7738*** 
(3.2219) 
1.1782 
(1.3790) 
-0.1246 
(-0.3500) 
-0.2892 
(0.6369) 
1.4424** 
(2.3399) 
0.7117 
(0.8129) 
-0.3890 
(-1.1194) 
-0.5482 
(1.1786) 
0.9451 
(1.5912) 
0.3679 
(0.5281) 
Rt-1 
-0.1418* 
(-1.9138) 
-0.1228 
(1.2993) 
-0.1577** 
(1.9680) 
-0.2925** 
(2.1323) 
-0.0055 
(-0.0885) 
-0.0161 
(0.2090) 
0.2290** 
(2.4943) 
-0.1325 
(1.6151) 
0.2379*** 
(4.0853) 
0.1892** 
(2.4600) 
0.3737*** 
(3.4853) 
0.2879*** 
(3.4333) 
SENTt 
0.0183* 
(1.8815) 
0.0148 
(1.1644) 
0.0095 
(0.6973) 
0.0324 
(1.5041) 
0.0143 
(1.6083) 
0.0201* 
(1.6757) 
-0.0232* 
(1.7826) 
0.0156 
(0.9537) 
0.0204*** 
(2.9867) 
0.0311*** 
(3.2240) 
-0.0055 
(0.5747) 
0.0020 
(0.1381) 
SENTt-1 
-0.0169 
(-1.5626) 
-0.0229 
(1.6053) 
-0.0029 
(0.1966) 
-0.0227 
(0.9496) 
-0.0065 
(-0.6108) 
-0.0205 
(1.4786) 
0.0414** 
(2.5095) 
-0.0049 
(0.2098) 
-0.0081 
(-1.0300) 
-0.0199** 
(1.9677) 
0.0136 
(1.2098) 
0.0123 
(0.6089) 
SENTt-2 
0.0017 
(0.2618) 
0.0146* 
(1.6692) 
-0.0160 
(1.5282) 
-0.0230 
(1.6316) 
0.0022 
(0.3080) 
0.0141 
(1.5445) 
-0.0230** 
(2.1772) 
-0.0183 
(1.0649) 
-0.0003 
(-0.7015) 
0.0041 
(0.5885) 
-0.0090 
(0.9634) 
-0.0155 
(1.1190) 
SENT
P
 t 
-0.3531 
(-0.9162) 
-0.0857 
(0.1650) 
-0.9260** 
(2.2148) 
-0.9462 
(1.1341) 
-0.0649 
(-0.1818) 
0.2254 
(0.4543) 
-0.5125 
(1.2354) 
-0.7694 
(1.2070) 
-0.1790 
(-0.7015) 
0.0561 
(0.1640) 
-0.4181 
(1.1464) 
-0.9314* 
(1.8576) 
SENT
P
 t-1 
0.0113 
(0.0281) 
0.0262 
(0.0515) 
-0.1437 
(0.3167) 
-0.4246 
(0.4236) 
0.2754 
(0.9341) 
0.4773 
(1.1717) 
-0.8106* 
(1.7775) 
-0.0048 
(0.0082) 
0.4290* 
(1.8609) 
0.5732* 
(1.7441) 
-0.3880 
(1.2523) 
0.2731 
(0.5752 
SENT
P
 t-2 
0.1391 
(0.4432) 
-0.1428 
(0.3153) 
0.3279 
(0.7739) 
0.1827 
(0.3329) 
-0.4587 
(-0.9180) 
-0.9180** 
(1.9791) 
0.5483 
(1.4453) 
-0.2471 
(0.5195) 
-0.4452* 
(-0.7901) 
-0.7901** 
(2.2030) 
0.2191 
(0.6760) 
-0.2912 
(1.2912) 
F1 0.9203     0.1708 1.3727  0.6198 0.0054  3.4987* 
F2  0.1201    4.0034** 2.2241  3.5303* 4.8884**  0.6862 
F3       3.3725*  3.5376* 3.2096**  0.2980 
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Table 3.11: Regression of weekly returns on UK sentiment indexes under different market sentiment conditions 
Table 3.11reports the results of regressions of the following general form:          
          
    
     
    
                
    
       
 
   
       
    
       
 
 
   
      
        
                   
          
 
   
       
          
 
 
   
       
The data are weekly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard errors. 
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on small-size stock portfolio;  SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional 
sentiment.  D1 = 1 when                     and zero otherwise; D2 = 1 when                    and zero otherwise. 
Fi, i = 1,…,3, are F tests for the asymmetric effects of UK market sentiment and institutional sentiment: in different market conditions. F1:   
    
   
   , where   
    
 is    when                    and   
    is    
when                   . F2:   
    
   
   , where   
    
 is    when                    and   
    is    when                   . F3:   
    
   
   , where   
    
 is    when                    and   
    is    when 
                  .   
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
                                                                                                                   
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
α0  0.1472 0.2204  0.1188 0.3115  0.2389 0.3457 -0.1635 0.3483  0.0881 0.1591 -0.5095 0.9801 
Rt-1 -0.2272*** 3.0123 -0.1065 1.0421 -0.1212 1.4419  0.0488 0.6354  0.1748* 1.8236  0.2623*** 2.7158 
SENTt  0.0288** 2.1894  0.0124 0.6580  0.0208 1.3402  0.0096 0.5745  0.0212* 1.8084  0.0231 1.4938 
SENTt-1 -0.0292*** 2.6762 -0.0089 0.5632 -0.0142 1.0270 -0.0006 0.0411 -0.0156 1.6162 -0.0028 0.2122 
SENTt-2  0.0047 0.6118 -0.0012 0.1225  0.0014 0.1739  0.0028 0.2504  0.0029 0.4549 -0.0034 0.3842 
SENT
P
 t -0.5775 1.5870 -0.2502 0.3997 -0.3545 1.0887  0.0689 0.1222 -0.2650 1.1075 -0.2107 0.4862 
SENT
P
 t-1 -0.0112 0.0269  0.0736 0.1005  0.2868 1.0470  0.2626 0.4765  0.2417 1.1036  0.6011 1.5401 
SENT
P
 t-2  0.2973 1.0903  0.0086 0.0157 -0.3350 1.1942 -0.5450 1.0521 -0.3640* 1.6697 -0.5090 1.2648 
F1 0.5357 0.2593 0.0098 
F2 1.1862   
F3   0.1013 
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3.8    Weekly returns under different market sentiment condition 
The above section illustrates that the influence that investor sentiment has on stock 
returns and institutional herding can be different during different stages of financial 
crisis. In this section, the impact that investor sentiment has on stock returns and 
investor herding is examined by investigating the possible asymmetric effect under 
different market sentiment conditions. The market wide sentiment is defined as high 
when the sentiment at time   is higher than its mean, i.e.                   , where              
is the mean of the composed market sentiment. The market sentiment is defined as low 
when                   .  
 
Firstly returns are regressed on the market sentiment,     , and the institutional 
sentiment,       under high sentiment and low sentiment condition separately. From 
the regressions in Section 3.5, it can be seen that a model with two lagged terms of 
sentiment variables may be a more parsimonious model. The model therefore is as 
follows: 
     
    
     
    
           
    
       
 
   
       
    
       
 
 
   
   
   
        
              
          
 
   
   
    
          
 
 
   
       
           (3.13) 
where    is return of the stock portfolio (either     ,     , or     ).     
 when                    and zero otherwise;      when                    and zero 
otherwise. The regression results are reported in table3.11.  
 
For large-size stocks, the estimated coefficients indicate that current and lagged market 
sentiment has influence on returns when market sentiment is high. Tests for asymmetric 
effect of market sentiment under different market sentiment conditions suggest that 
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market investor sentiment has symmetrically effects on returns. All institutional 
sentiment variables are insignificant in both high and low market sentiment times, 
implying that institutional investor sentiment does not affect returns of large stocks 
regardless of the market sentiment situation.  
 
The sentiment coefficients for medium-size stocks are insignificant at the 10% level, 
suggesting that investor sentiment has no impact on returns of medium stocks. Null 
hypothesis of asymmetrically effects of market sentiment is rejected suggesting a 
symmetrical effect of market sentiment on returns of medium stocks under different 
market sentiment conditions.         
 
For small-size stocks, when market sentiment is high, coefficient of current market 
sentiment and two lagged institutional sentiment are significant, implying that market 
sentiment and institutional sentiment have some explanatory power on the returns of 
small stocks when the market wide sentiment is high. Coefficients of sentiment 
variables are insignificant when market wide sentiment is low, suggesting that neither 
market sentiment nor institutional has an effect on returns of small stocks when market 
wide sentiment is low. Similar to the large and medium stock, null hypothesis of 
asymmetrically effects of market and institutional sentiment are rejected suggesting a 
symmetrical effect of market and institutional sentiment on returns of small stocks 
under different market sentiment conditions.   
 
The return regressions under high and low market sentiment conditions show that 
returns of all size stocks are not affected by investor sentiment when the overall market 
sentiment is low. However, when market sentiment is generally high, returns of stocks 
can be affected by investor sentiment depending on the size of the shares. Returns of 
large stocks are more likely to be influenced by market sentiment and returns of small 
stocks are influenced by both market and institutional sentiment.   
 
The next step is to factor US sentiment factor into the analysis. The regression model is:  
 73 
 
     
    
     
    
           
    
       
 
   
       
    
       
 
 
   
   
    
    
          
 
   
    
    
        
 
   
   
        
       
       
          
 
   
       
       
   
 
 
   
   
    
          
 
   
       
           
 
   
    
           (3.14) 
where   is return of the stock portfolio,     ,     , or     .      when      
              and zero otherwise;      when                    and zero otherwise. The 
regression results are reported in Table 3.12.  
 
For large stocks, estimated coefficients suggest that UK market sentiment, US 
individual and institutional sentiment all have impact on returns for more than one 
period when the market sentiment is high, especially US institutional sentiment, which 
has continued three period effects on returns of UK large stocks when market sentiment 
is high. The positive current period coefficients and negative lagged coefficients of 
sentiment variables indicate a reversal effect of investor sentiment. Tests of the 
coefficients      
    
       
    
 and      
    
       
    
 cannot be rejected 
at the 10% level, suggesting that the influences of UK market sentiment and US 
individual sentiment may be reversed in the following period. This may imply that UK 
market sentiment and US individual sentiment have a short impact on returns of UK 
large stocks, which reflects the reverse effect of investor sentiment. If the immediate 
impact of investor sentiment changes is to induce investors to trade, then “second 
thoughts” may well induce trade reversals in the subsequent week(s), increasing UK 
stock market volatility as a result.  
 
The estimated coefficients,      
   ,      
   , and    
   , are statistically significant 
demonstrating that current and one period lagged US individual sentiment and current 
US institutional sentiment affects returns of UK large stocks when general market 
sentiment is low. The hypothesis tests suggest reversal effect of sentiment from one 
period to the previous period is not to the same degree as that in the high market 
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sentiment condition. This indicates that investor sentiment influence on equity returns 
is more persistent if the general market sentiment is low.  
 
A further examination of asymmetric effects of investor sentiment shows that UK 
market sentiment and US individual sentiment affect returns of UK large stocks 
asymmetrically and US institutional sentiment influences returns of UK large stocks 
symmetrically. Null of      
    
      
   and      
    
      
    are rejected at the 
10% significance levels, indicating an asymmetrical effect on returns from US 
individual investor sentiment, and the coefficients suggest that US individual sentiment 
has a stronger impact on return when market sentiment is low. The coefficient tests of 
null of    
    
    
    and    
    
    
   cannot be rejected at the 10% level, 
demonstrating a symmetrical effect on returns from US institutional sentiment.  
 
Similar to large stocks, US individual sentiment and US institutional sentiment have 
some explanatory power to returns of UK equity when general market sentiment is high. 
The reversal effect on returns from US individual sentiment also exists. The different 
size effect US individual and institutional sentiment also appears in return of medium 
stocks. Moreover, only current US institutional sentiment is significant suggesting that 
the effect on returns from US institutional sentiment is more persistent. However, the 
coefficients of UK market sentiment are insignificant demonstrate UK investor 
sentiment does not affect UK medium stock returns when market sentiment is high. The 
sentiment effects of US and UK investor sentiment on returns of medium stocks in a 
low market sentiment period display a very similar picture as that in a high market 
sentiment period. Both US individual and institutional sentiment have impact on returns 
of UK medium equities, but UK market and institutional sentiment do not have 
explanation power to returns of medium stocks. The reversal effect of US institutional 
sentiment exists in the low sentiment market which is different from that of the large 
stocks. The examination of asymmetric effects of investor sentiment shows a similar 
result as to the large stock, which is that US individual sentiment affects returns of UK 
medium stocks asymmetrically and US institutional sentiment influence returns of UK 
medium stocks symmetrically. 
 
Similar to large and medium stocks, US individual and institutional sentiment have 
impacts on returns of UK small stocks in both high and low market sentiment 
conditions. The reversal impact on returns of small stocks only exists in US 
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institutional sentiment and the influence of US individual sentiment is more persistent 
when market sentiment is high. This is different from large and medium stocks which 
presents a reversal effect of US individual sentiment on returns under high market 
sentiment condition. When market sentiment is low, the reversal effect on return of 
small stocks exists in both US individual and institutional sentiment which is similar to 
that of medium stocks. The same as large and medium stocks, the asymmetric effect on 
returns of UK small stocks appears on US individual sentiment, as the null of 
     
    
      
    is rejected at the 5% significance level. The return effect of US 
institutional sentiment is symmetrical in the high and low sentiment market.  
 
Returns of three different sizes of UK equities are regressed again UK and US 
sentiment indices under different market sentiment condition. When US investor 
sentiment has not been taken into account, Estimated results suggest that returns of UK 
large and small stocks are affect by UK market sentiment, and UK institutional 
sentiment has impact on the return of small stocks when the market wide sentiment is 
high. However, the effect of UK market sentiment on return of small stocks is less 
significant than that on return of large stocks. Returns of all sizes of stocks are not 
affected by investor sentiment when market sentiment is low. When US investor 
sentiment is considered, the effect of UK market sentiment on return of large stocks 
exists along with effects of US individual and institutional sentiment when market wide 
sentiment is high.  The UK market sentiment effect on return of small stock, however, 
is insignificant. The impact of investor sentiment for small stocks comes from US 
investor sentiment. This reflects the suggestion of UK investor sentiment ‘born in USA’. 
The examinations of impact UK and US investor sentiment on different sizes of UK 
stock return under different market sentiment conditional also suggest that US investor 
sentiment has impact on UK equity returns regardless the size and the market condition 
different. Generally, US individual sentiment has an asymmetrical effect on UK returns 
under different market sentiment conditions and US institutional sentiment has a 
symmetrical effect.  
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Table 3.12: Regression of weekly returns stocks on UK and US sentiment indexes 
under different market sentiment conditions 
Table 3.12 reports the results of regressions of the following general form:     
     
     
         
               
           
 
   
       
           
 
 
   
   
    
              
 
   
    
            
 
   
   
        
          
    
          
 
   
       
          
 
 
   
       
          
 
   
   
    
           
 
   
    
The data are weekly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West 
standard errors. 
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on 
small-size stock portfolio;  SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment.  D1 = 1 when                     and 
zero otherwise; D2 = 1 when                    and zero otherwise. 
Fi, i = 1,…,4, are F tests for the asymmetric effects of UK market sentiment and institutional sentiment: in different market 
conditions. F1    
    
   
   , where    
    
 is    when                   and   
    is     when                  .  F2    
    
   
   , 
where    
    
 is    when                   and   
    is     when                  . F3 is f-statistic of null hypothesis of   
    
   
   , 
where    
    
 is    when                   and   
    is     when                  .  F4 is f-statistic of null hypothesis of   
    
   
   , 
where    
    
 is    when                   and   
    is     when                  . 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level.  
 Rbig Rmid Rsmall 
 
     
              
     
              
     
              
     
              
     
              
     
              
α0 
-0.0357 
(-0.0557) 
-0.0956 
(-0.3033) 
-0.1400 
(-0.2191) 
-0.5041 
(-1.2561) 
-0.1011 
(-0.1954) 
-0.7088 
(-1.5173) 
Rt-1 
-0.2939*** 
(-4.2377) 
-0.1842** 
(-1.9823) 
-0.1822** 
(-2.2789) 
-0.0569 
(-0.7514) 
0.1504* 
(1.6541) 
0.1942** 
(2.1518) 
SENTt 
0.0262** 
(2.1741) 
-0.0008 
(-0.0453) 
0.0129 
(0.9202) 
0.0000 
(-0.0004) 
0.0119 
(1.0885) 
0.0087 
(0.6047) 
SENTt-1 
-0.0265*** 
(-2.6471) 
0.0017 
(0.1174) 
-0.0103 
(-0.7884) 
0.0090 
(0.6080) 
-0.0096 
(-1.0514) 
0.0107 
(0.8311) 
SENTt-2 
0.0050 
(0.7191) 
-0.0039 
(-0.4231) 
0.0018 
(0.2288) 
0.0007 
(0.0669) 
0.0038 
(0.6213) 
-0.0069 
(-0.7807) 
SENT
P
 t 
-0.4658 
(-1.3693) 
-0.2098 
(-0.3539) 
-0.1736 
(-0.5548) 
0.1769 
(0.3713) 
-0.1218 
(-0.5319) 
-0.1414 
(-0.3914) 
SENT
P
 t-
1 
-0.0490 
(-0.1218) 
-0.2070 
(-0.2964) 
0.2498 
(0.9036) 
-0.0482 
(-0.0915) 
0.2090 
(0.9367) 
0.3886 
(1.0140) 
SENT
P
 t-
2 
0.2757 
(1.1245) 
0.2266 
(0.4777) 
-0.3591 
(-1.2772) 
-0.4086 
(-0.8818) 
-0.3568 
(-1.5779) 
-0.4138 
(-1.1220) 
AAIIt 
2.0035*** 
(3.0210) 
7.0849*** 
(5.6178) 
2.9546*** 
(3.6001) 
5.7782*** 
(4.6780) 
2.1272*** 
(3.4024) 
4.4667*** 
(4.4174) 
AAIIt-1 
-2.1883*** 
(-2.9852) 
-4.6128*** 
(-3.7900) 
-1.6312* 
(-1.7963) 
-4.7465*** 
(-3.3130) 
-1.0472 
(-1.5046) 
-3.0301*** 
(-2.6676) 
AAIIt-2 
-0.2130 
(-0.3207) 
-0.4006 
(-0.3346) 
-0.6660 
(-0.8102) 
-0.8024 
(-0.7774) 
-0.5510 
(-0.8920) 
-0.7356 
(-0.7816) 
IIt 
11.8238*** 
(5.7023) 
13.5813*** 
(4.0469) 
10.3684*** 
(4.3234) 
12.5905*** 
(4.4647) 
6.7238*** 
(3.6356) 
6.5767*** 
(2.6505) 
IIt-1 
-6.7462** 
(-2.1545) 
-7.0243 
(-1.2315) 
-4.6686 
(-1.3290) 
-2.1619 
(-0.4154) 
-1.9521 
(-0.7281) 
2.4268 
(0.5699) 
IIt-2 
-4.2690** 
(-1.9798) 
-4.4310 
(-1.1804) 
-3.9287 
(-1.4940) 
-7.2262** 
(-2.1916) 
-4.0544* 
(-1.7781) 
-6.6851** 
(-2.1241) 
F1 12.6208*** 3.8918** 4.0863** 
F2 3.0123* 3.7489*  
F3 0.2111 0.3710 0.0023 
F4 0.0019  0.4703 
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3.9    Monthly Investor sentiment measures 
In their study, Brown and Cliff (2004) constructed sentiment index based on US 
financial indicators in weekly and monthly frequencies, and suggest that investor 
sentiment is negatively related to small stock return in the monthly frequency, but in 
weekly frequency, institutional sentiment has some predictive power for large stock 
return. The weekly and monthly sentiment indices conducted in Brown and Cliff (2004) 
utilised different sample time spans which makes it difficult for a comparison of 
investor sentiment impact on returns in different investor intervals. Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) also constructed an investor sentiment index from US financial indicators in a 
monthly frequency, and it has been widely used as a sentiment measure in scholarly 
research. So far, the only constructed UK investor sentiment indices (to the author’s 
knowledge) are Baker et al (2012) and Bai (2014) which has composed in one 
frequency
19
.  Therefore, there is a gap for constructed UK monthly frequency sentiment 
measures. In the following sections a monthly UK investor sentiment is going to be 
constructed. The monthly index is constructed by using the same components in the 
same time span. This therefore, provides a better like for like comparison of investor 
sentiment effect on equity return in different time intervals.     
 
Apart from the sentiment indicators discussed in weekly analysis, there are more 
sentiment measures available in monthly frequencies. This includes UK Consumer 
Confidence Index (CCI), the number of Initial Public Offerings (NIPO) and Fund cash 
flow (CFLW). Consumer Confidence Index is used as an indicator to measure the 
degree of optimism on the country's economy and consumers' personal financial 
situation, which is expressed through consumer's activities of savings and spending. 
The UK Consumer Confidence Index is conducted by the European Commission based 
on the monthly surveys of consumer confidence. The number of Initial Public Offerings 
is the number of new issues on the London Stock Exchange main market
20
. The 
fluctuations of IPO volumes can be interpreted by the investor sentiment (Baker & 
Wurgler, 2006). Fund cash flow is seen as an indicator of institutional sentiment since 
the proportion of fund assets held in cash reflects how optimistic the fund managers are 
about the market. CFLW in this study is an average of the percentage cash assets held 
                                               
19
Baker et al (2012) composed the index in annually data and Bai (2014) composed in a weekly frequent.   
20 Data is collected from http://www.londonstockexchange.com 
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by Unit Trusts calculated by Morningstar. The data is only available from November 
2002 to June 2011.  
3.9.1. Analysis of Monthly Data 
Table 3.13 contains summary statistics of all the monthly variables. In the monthly 
variable series, AVDC, MFI, PCO, PCV and RSI show a relatively small degree of 
skew and almost no kurtosis. The Jarque-Bera test cannot reject the normal distribution 
at the 10% level for these variables. Compared to weekly variables, the lower frequency 
are usually better behaved. All other variables exhibit a skew and leptokurtic pattern. 
Except for AVDC, the sentiment indicators are highly auto-correlated, but all monthly 
returns have almost no serial correlation. ADF test results suggest that CCI, RSI, and 
VRA are non-stationary their first differences are stationary. Therefore, their first 
differences,     ,      and      , will be used in future analysis.  
3.9.2. Relation between sentiment proxies and equity returns 
First, the monthly relation between the sentiment proxies and equity returns is analysed 
by regressing returns on the sentiment proxies. The sentiment proxies and their one 
period lagged are both included in the regressions. The autocorrelation coefficients 
indicate that returns of large-size stocks do not have autocorrelation.  Returns of 
medium-size stocks and returns of small-size stock have first order autocorrelation, 
therefore one lag of return is included in the regression for medium and small-size 
stock returns.  The regression results are reported in table 3.14. Compared to the weekly 
regression, there are fewer coefficients of returns of large stocks that are statistically 
significant in the monthly regression. This may imply that returns of large stocks are 
influenced less by investor sentiment in longer investment intervals.  There are more 
sentiment coefficients significant for medium-size stocks than that of for large stocks, 
indicating that return of medium stock may be more likely to be affected by investor 
sentiment.  Moreover, the significant variables indicate that returns of medium-size 
stocks are not only affected by institutional investor sentiment, but are also influenced 
by individual sentiment. Returns of small-size stock have the most amount of 
significant coefficients among three sizes of stocks, suggesting that returns of small 
stocks are the most likely to be affected by investor sentiment.  
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Table 3.13: Statistics of Monthly Basic Data 
Table 3.13 provides summary statistics of the basic data series.  The data are monthly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011 (186 observations).  Exceptionally the CFLW is 
available only from December 2002 (103 observations), and BWSI is available only to December 2010 (180 observations). 
Variable definitions: 
AVDC: Advances to declines ratio; CCI is UK Consumer Confidence Index; DCCI: first difference ofUK Consumer Confidence Index;CEFD: Closed-end Fund Discount; CFLW is mutual 
fund cash position;   MFI: Money Flow Index; NIPO number of Initial Public Offer; PCV: Put-call volume ratio;  PCO: Put-call open interest ratio;  RSI: Relative Strength Index;  VOLA: 
Realized volatility;  VRA: Trading volume;  DVRA: first difference ofTrading volume;  AAII: American Association of Individual Investors index;  II: American Investors Intelligence 
index;  GMIND: German equity sentiment index;  Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on small-size stock portfolio. AC (1) is 
the autocorrelation coefficient at one lag. ADF is Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic with maximum 5 lags.  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Sum Sq. Dev. AC (1) ADF 
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l 
M
a
rk
et
 I
n
d
ic
a
to
rs
 
 
AVDC 1.0128 0.2006 0.1868 2.7888 1.4278 7.4453 0.123 -11.9552*** 
CCI -6.3339 7.6095 -1.4060 5.0331 93.3157*** 10712.2600 0.935 -2.1607 
DCCI -0.06270 2.62874 -0.04516 3.9492 7.0077** 1271.49 -0.113 -8.3475 
CEFD 6.2322 1.9731 0.4069 4.0131 13.0875*** 720.2009 0.866 -3.7325*** 
CFLW 2.7018 0.6782 0.6087 3.4305 7.1562** 46.9154 0.659 -3.1226** 
MFI 39.9504 20.5517 0.4725 2.0322 14.1799*** 78139.0800 0.954 -3.4668** 
NIPO 7.5591 6.1239 1.4958 6.3410 155.8657*** 6937.8490 0.498 -3.8519*** 
PCO 1.1818 0.1910 0.2211 2.0018 9.2373*** 6.7495 0.88 -3.3829** 
PCV 1.2865 0.2653 0.2858 2.6710 3.3712 13.0238 0.45 -8.3381*** 
RSI 68.7345 40.6715 -0.8405 1.9023 31.2387*** 306021.5 0.936 -2.4104 
DRSI -0.0057 14.2614 -1.4187 9.7217 410.33*** 37423.36 -0.088 -14.7284*** 
VOLA 1.0329 0.5649 2.4786 12.8092 936.1603*** 59.0395 0.746 -5.1767*** 
VRA 1.0119 0.0695 0.1083 4.2789 13.0389*** 0.8941 0.825 -1.6848 
DVRA -0.0001 0.0412 -0.3721 4.5026 21.671*** 0.3124 0.048 -12.77717 
S
en
ti
m
en
t 
In
d
ex
 
 
AAII 0.1043 0.1984 0.1534 2.3353 4.1538 7.2809 0.429 -8.5466*** 
BWSI 0.2122 0.6080 1.3434 5.2656 92.6413*** 66.1647 0.973 -1.4221 
DBWSI -0.0020 0.1378 -0.4524 5.8843 68.1550*** 3.3817 0.134 -11.5897*** 
GMIND 29.8855 36.8700 -0.4968 2.3965 10.4727*** 251488 0.955 -3.4685*** 
II 0.1829 0.1319 -0.7156 3.3733 16.9560*** 32.18934 0.695 -5.7242*** 
M
a
rk
et
 
R
et
u
rn
 
Rbig 0.2566 4.2484 -0.7632 3.7521 22.4415*** 3338.9970 0.053 -12.8289*** 
Rmid 0.6114 5.2553 -1.0442 6.4129 124.0710*** 5109.2810 0.174 -11.3504*** 
Rsmall 0.1730 5.8419 -0.3890 7.3648 152.3416*** 6313.5910 0.257 -10.4023*** 
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Table 3.14: Monthly regressions of returns on sentiment proxies 
Table 3.14 shows the results of estimating equations of the following form: 
                     
 
                
 
                 
 
              
 
    
           
 
               
 
               
 
                
 
                
 
      
          
As there is some evidence of autocorrelation, the estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard 
errors.The data are monthly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. 
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock 
portfolio;  Rsmall: return on small-size stock portfolio;  AVDC: Advances to declines ratio; DCCI is first 
deference of UK Consumer Confidence Index; CEFD: Closed-end Fund Discount;  MFI: Money Flow Index;  
PCV: Put-call volume ratio;  PCO: Put-call open interest ratio;  RSI: Relative Strength Index;  VOLA: 
Realized volatility;  DVRA: first difference ofTrading volume.  
Adj-R
2: Adjusted R-squared;  S.E: Standard Error of regression;  AIC: Akaike information criterion. 
 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
AVDCt 13.0335*** 7.7995 17.4371*** 17.4638 15.7573*** 9.8041 
AVDCt-1 -3.1893** -2.3590 -1.2631 -0.7627 -0.5534 -0.2479 
DCCIt 0.1421** 2.2611 0.0744 1.0900 0.2203* 1.4453 
DCCIt-1 0.0727 0.8169 0.0852 1.2596 0.0453* 0.3787 
CEFDt 0.1740 0.8891 -0.2472 -1.2160 -0.6969* -1.6612 
CEFDt-1 -0.0296 -0.1450 0.5081** 2.5561 0.9483*** 2.6869 
MFIt 0.0051 0.3024 0.0365** 2.6045 0.0447** 2.2486 
MFIt-1 -0.0045 -0.2692 -0.0239* -1.7721 -0.0236 -1.3236 
PCVt -0.1970 -0.0809 0.1884 0.0812 -0.4415 -0.1311 
PCVt-1 0.8004 0.3128 -2.9299 -1.3229 -1.9296 -0.5835 
PCOt -1.4910* -1.6877 -0.6334 -0.6964 -0.3927 -0.3037 
PCOt-1 -0.1583 -0.1381 0.2231 0.2571 -0.5716 -0.4917 
DRSIt 0.0002 0.0097 -0.0225 -1.5935 -0.0092 -0.5325 
DRSIt-1 -0.0041 -0.2606 -0.0177 -1.4336 -0.0086 -0.4773 
VOLAt -3.5314*** -6.2659 -4.6256*** -8.3867 -4.5246*** -4.3578 
VOLAt-1 1.8892*** 3.3176 2.9442*** 4.9464 3.2407*** 3.0431 
DVRAt -3.9438 -0.8244 -5.8532 -1.3722 -5.5994 -1.0016 
DVRAt-1 0.2255 0.0486 -2.2373 -0.5282 -9.9685* -1.8444 
Adj-R
2 0.6396 0.8203 0.6995 
S.E 2.5627 2.2384 3.2166 
F-Statistic 19.0451 44.9674 23.4173 
AIC 4.8176 4.5518 5.2768 
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3.9.3. Composition of monthly investor sentiment indices 
As when constructing the weekly index, the first step to compose the monthly investor 
sentiment index is to estimate the first principal component of the sentiment proxies 
and their lags. This gives the first-stage index (     ) with 16 loadings.  
                                                          
                                                
                                                  
                                      
               
The second step is to compute the correlation between the      , and the current and 
lagged values of each of the proxies. In each pair of the lead and lag variables, 
whichever has higher correlation with the       will be used in the final stage to 
produce an index,     , as follows: 
                                                     
                                                    
The correlation between the 16-term       and the      index is 0.96, indicating that 
little information is lost in dropping the eight terms with other time subscripts. The first 
principal component explains 32% of the sample variance suggesting that the principle 
factor captures some of the common variation. 
 
   ,    , and      are again used for composing monthly institutional sentiment 
index (     ). Applying the same method and procedure above, the institutional 
sentiment index is produced thus: 
     
 
                                     
The same process as before as need to examine whether the use of    ,    , and 
     in both constructing       and      will cause an overlapping 
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problem(Section 3.3). A market sentiment index,      , is constructed by excluding 
   ,    , and     : 
     
                                                   
             
In this case, the first principal component explains 33% of the sample variance, 
implying that the common variation captured by the one factor has not changed much 
with     ,     , and        being excluded. This may suggest that      
  captures 
the same factor as      . Moreover, the correlation coefficient of      
  and       
is 0.9548, and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. Similar to the weekly result, 
     
  is 99.97% correlated to      , suggesting that the UK market sentiment 
indexes which are constructed including or excluding the institutional sentiment proxies 
are very similar. This suggests there is hardly a problem of overlapping in the 
indexes      and     
   by including    ,     , and         in the construction 
of      . 
 
Monthly      and       are plotted in Figure 3.2. Monthly      and       
display quite similar patterns. Both sentiment indexes are generally hovering around 
their means. Individually, market sentiment,     , generally stays above its mean in 
1996 and 1997, then has a sharp fall from early 1998, and reaches a relatively low point 
in late 1998. This fall can be seen as a reflection of the second phase of the Asian 
financial crisis. Market investor sentiment bounces back in the first half of the year 
1999 and then starts to slide down until reaching one of the lowest points in early 2002. 
This may reflect the dotcom bubble crash. It stays at a low level during the year 2002, 
and then rises up to a very high level in late 2003 and then stays way above the mean 
until mid 2007 when the 2007-8 global financial crisis started.  Market sentiment, 
    , falls down to one of its lowest point at late 2008 when Lehman Brothers 
declared bankruptcy, and stays there until early 2009. It then reverses back to a high 
level in about two months, and stays at that level until early 2010.     stays around 
the mean for the rest of sample period.   
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Figure 3.2: Monthly composed investor sentiment indexes 
 
 
Institutional sentiment,      ,  looks more volatile than market sentiment. It is at a 
relatively high level in mid 1996 while      was at around its mean level, and stays 
there until mid 1997 when the Asian financial crisis started. During late 1997 and early 
1999, institutional sentiment stays low with a sharp spike upwards in early 1998 in the 
short period of market stability after the first phase of the Asian financial crisis. The 
      spikes high in mid 1999 and stays at a relatively high level for most of the year 
in the period of the Dotcom bubble, then returns low in late 1999, shortly before the 
bubble crash, whereupon it stays under the average level until late 2003. From early 
2004 to early 2008,       has a long period of far higher than average, compared to 
    ’s moderate higher than mean.  In mid 2008 institutional sentiment has a sharp 
fall to its lowest point in the entire sample period, which is similar to       reflecting 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, before reverting gradually back around its mean in 
early 2010.    
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The statistical summary (Table 3.15A Panel A) shows that, similar to weekly sentiment 
indices,  UK monthly investor sentiment is highly autocorrelated, which is very similar 
to US and European investor sentiment. This suggests that investor sentiment is 
persistent.  
 
Table 3.15A Panel B correlates the monthly sentiment measures. The majority of the 
correlations between the constructed sentiment indices and component variables are 
similar to those in the weekly frequency.     is highly correlated to      ,         
and      , which suggests that the factor extracted represented both individual and 
institutional investors. There is no correlation between     and    . Different from 
weekly data, monthly      does not correlate to the trading volume,     . Similar to 
weekly data,      , it not only has high correlation to the component variables, but 
also has strong correlation with the non-component sentiment indicators. The 
coefficients for        and     show that institutional sentiment correlates highly to 
market sentiment indicators. This is confirmed by the 44% correlation of     and 
     , which is very similar to 40% of correlations between weekly      and 
     . 
 
Both the market sentiment index and the institutional sentiment index have the lowest 
correlation with trading volume. As with the weekly data, trading volume has not more 
than 20% correlation to other sentiment measures and in the monthly data, there is no 
significant correlation between them. Compared to other components, the one period 
lagged realised volatility,        , has very high correlation to most of the sentiment 
measures, indicating that volatility has a strong link to investor sentiment.  
 
The correlation tests also show that both     and      , have strong correlation to 
CFLW. Brown & Cliff (2004) expect the cash holdings to be more correlated with 
institutional sentiment than with individual sentiment.  The correlation coefficient of 
CFLW and       is -0.62 comparing to -0.43 of correlation between CFLW and 
    . This confirms Brown & Cliff (2004)’s expectation of stronger correlation 
between mutual fund cash position and institutional sentiment. It, in one way, suggests 
that the constructed UK sentiment indices are good measures of different groups of UK 
investor sentiment.  The direct measure, Consumer Confident Index (CCI), is widely 
used as a measure of investor sentiment, particularly individual sentiment. The 
correlation coefficients of DCCI and      are greater than that of DCCI and      , 
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which may be a indication of       capturing some individual sentiment, though 
neither of the coefficients is significant. The p-value of the coefficient of DCCI and 
     is 0.1182 which indicates that the probability of DCCI correlating to      is 
fairly high and therefore,      may, in some degree, relate to some individual investor 
sentiment. Consumer's activities of savings and spending can be heavily influenced by 
the general macroeconomic and market fundamental factors, and it is not necessarily 
just reflected by their sentiment. This is confirmed by the correlations between DCCI 
and other investor sentiment proxies. DCCI is only statistically correlated to AVDC and 
does not correlate to all other indicators. This may suggest that DCCI does not capture 
investor sentiment as much as it is expected, and this would be one of the reasons for 
the weak correlation between DCCI and     . 
 
Baker & Wurgler (2006) suggest that the number of Initial Public Offerings (NIPO) can 
be interpreted by the investor sentiment. The correlation between      and NIPO is 
statistically significant, suggesting that      may reflect investor sentiment. However, 
this correlation may reflect a common economic cycle component, as NIPO may also 
change with the economic cycle. The index that is extracted by principal components 
method may be not a common sentiment component but a common economic 
component since the principal components analysis cannot distinguish between them 
(Baker & Wurgler, 2006).    
 
A regression of the composed index on macroeconomic indicators is conducted to 
examine whether it is reflected in common macroeconomic news. UK Index of 
Production provides an indicator of growth in the output of production industries and it 
is a key component of UK gross domestic production (GDP) measures. It is more likely 
that it is a distinctive macro variable which reflects the business cycle and cannot be 
confused with sentiment as might be argued for the interest rates. Interest rates such as 
a 3 month T-bill rate and a 10 year government bond rate are always used as 
macroeconomic indicators because changes of the rates are viewed as a reflection of 
business cycle and monetary policy. However, investors in the money markets may also 
make their decisions under the influence of sentiment, which leads to changes of 
interest rates also reflecting investor sentiment factors. The growth in the UK Index of 
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Production
21
, IOP, is therefore used as the indicator of UK macroeconomics in the 
investigation.   
 
Regressing SENT on IOP and its lagged term allows investigation of whether SENT  
reflects a common economic factor rather than investor sentiment. The regression 
shows evidence of residual serial correlation. In order to deal with autocorrelation in 
the dynamic model, a lagged term of SENT is added in the regression: 
 
                                  
 
where IOP is the growth in the UK index of productions, and the estimated results are 
summarised in Table 3.5C.  
 
The coefficients for both      and       are not significant, indicating that the 
macroeconomic indicator has no explanatory power to the constructed index,     . 
Moreover, the adjusted R-squared of the model which includes the macroeconomics 
factors, decreases 0.0002 from that of the model excluding the macroeconomics factors. 
This suggests that the macroeconomics factors have very little effect on      (only 
0.02%). This confirms that the component that was extracted from the sentiment 
proxies is likely to be a common investor sentiment factor.    
 
A regression of       on IOP and its lagged term is conducted using model: 
 
     
 
            
 
                 
 
where IOP is the growth in the UK index of productions, and the estimated results are 
also summarised in Table 3.5C.  
 
The coefficient of      is significant but        is not, which suggests that the 
macroeconomic factor has some explanatory power to      . However, the 
coefficient of      is 0.04 indicating that every unit change of IOP only affects 0.04 
unit of      
 
, which can be seen as very small impact. The adjusted R-squared of the 
model that includes the macroeconomic factors, decreases 0.005 from that of the model 
                                               
21 The growth in the Index of Production is the first difference of Index of Production.  The Index of 
Production data is collected from The office for National Statistics (ONS) http://www.ons.gov.uk/  
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excluding the macroeconomics factors. This suggests that the macroeconomic factors 
have a very small effect on      
 
 (0.5%), which also confirms that the factor 
extracted from the component sentiment proxies is likely to be a common investor 
sentiment factor rather than a common economics component.    
 
Additionally, a second index is constructed by removing the common economic factors 
from each of the sentiment proxies. Following Baker Wurgler (2006) procedure, 
regressing each of the eight sentiment proxies on IOP, the residuals from the 
regressions may be cleaner proxies for investor sentiment. An index of the 
orthogonalized proxies is composed by following the same procedure as before: 
 
     
               
             
              
            
 
           
              
               
               
  
where the superscript, r, represent the sentiment index and the proxies are the 
orthogonalized correspond variables.       
 
     
  retains most of the appealing properties of SENT in terms of the signs and the 
timing of the components. Only       
  appeals different timing, and        
  has 
diffident sign and timing. A summary of the correlations of the sentiment measures is 
reported in Table 3.5B. The orthogonalized sentiment measures are plotted against their 
original respectively in Figure 3.3. The plots
22
 show that orthogonalizing to macro 
variables does not significantly affect any component of the index (Panel 1-7) and the 
overall index. The correlation tests also suggest that       and       are highly 
correlated (80%). This indicates that      may capture the variables which reflect 
investor sentiment.   
 
The same procedure has been conducted for the institutional sentiment and the 
orthogonalized institutional sentiment index is:   
 
     
   
           
            
 
            
 
 
                                               
22 The variables are standardized sentiment measures in the plots.   
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where the superscript, r, represent the sentiment index and the proxies are the 
orthogonalized corresponding variables.   The statistic summary and correlations are 
also reported in Table 3.5B.      
   
 retains all of the appealing properties of      
 
 
in terms of the signs and the timing of the components. The plot of      
   
 against   
     
 
 (Figure 3.3 Panel 11) suggests that orthogonalizing macro variables does not 
significantly affect the sentiment index. Moreover, the correlation test indicated that 
     
   
 and      
 
 are highly correlated (more than 97%), which suggest that both 
indices capture very similar factors, likely to be the institutional sentiment.  
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Figure 3.3: Investor sentiment index and the components  
AVDC: Advances to declines ratio;  AVDCr: the orthogonalized Advances to declines ratio; CEFD: Closed-end 
Fund Discount;  CEFDr: the orthogonalized Closed-end Fund Discount;  MFI: Money Flow Index;  MFIr: the 
orthogonalized Money Flow Index;  PCV: Put-call volume ratio;  PCVr: the orthogonalized Put-call volume ratio; 
PCO: Put-call open interest ratio;  PCOr: the orthogonalized Put-call open interest ratio; DRSI: the first difference 
of Relative Strength Index; DRSIr: the orthogonalized of the first difference of Relative Strength Index;   VOLA: 
Realized volatility;  VOLAr: the orthogonalized Realized volatility;  DVRA: first difference ofTrading volume; 
DVRA
r: the orthogonalized first difference of Trading volume; SENT: UK market sentiment; SENTr: the 
orthogonalized UK market sentiment; SENTP: UK institutional sentiment; SENTp,r: the orthogonalized UK 
institutional sentiment. The data are monthly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. The variables 
are standardized when they are plotted.     
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Table 3.15A: Properties of monthly UK Investor Sentiment Indices 
Panel A reports summary statistics of the constructed investor sentiment indexes: UK market sentiment (SENT) and UK institutional sentiment (SNETP) 
Panel B shows pairwise correlation coefficients. 
Panel C shows  -values for the F statistics from bilateral Granger causality tests 
Variable definitions: 
SENT: UK market sentiment; SENTP: UK institutional sentiment; AVDC: Advances to declines ratio;  CEFD: Closed-end Fund Discount;  MFI: Money Flow Index;  PCV: Put-call 
volume ratio;  PCO: Put-call open interest ratio;  RSI: Relative Strength Index;  VOLA: Realized volatility;  DVRA: first difference ofTrading volume.The data are monthly and cover the 
period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. 
ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with a maximum of 12 lags.***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
Panel A: Statistical summary of Weekly sentiment indices 
Variable Mean Std Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera ADF 
Autocorrelations at lags 1-5 
1 2 3 4 5 
SENT 20.3275 10.4377 -0.1456 2.5854 1.9680 -3.3222** 0.821*** 0.665*** 0.511*** 0.350*** 0.176** 
SENT
P 1.0212 0.4356 -0.8064 4.4858 37.0646*** -4.4809*** 0.801*** 0.665*** 0.579*** 0.539*** 0.493*** 
Panel B:  Investor sentiment correlation coefficients 
 SENTt SENT
P
t AVDCt CEFDt MFIt PCOt PCVt RSIt DVRAt VOLAt 
AVDCt-1 0.3728*** 0.2304*** 0.1232* -0.2370*** 0.3573*** 0.0654 -0.0866 0.4950 0.0768 -0.3717*** 
CEFDt -0.4576*** -0.5454*** -0.1347* 1 -0.3866*** -0.2569*** -0.2015*** -0.2015*** -0.0407 0.6141*** 
MFIt-1 0.9899*** 0.3660*** 0.1106 -0.3866*** 1 0.1777** 0.0238 0.1285* 0.0369 -0.4512*** 
PCOt 0.2203*** 0.7949*** 0.0568 -0.2569*** 0.1777** 1 0.6231*** 0.1285* 0.0307 -0.3905*** 
PCVt 0.0780 0.6798*** 0.0518 -0.2015*** 0.0238 0.6231*** 1 -0.1475** 0.0161 -0.1655** 
DRSIt-1 0.2309*** 0.0618 -0.0224 0.0106 0.1346* 0.0159 -0.0056 -0.0876 -0.0900 -0.0743 
VOLAt-1 -0.5495*** -0.8423*** -0.0599 0.6354*** -0.4869*** -0.4548*** -0.2313*** -0.1023 0.0849 0.7476*** 
DVRAt -0.00177 -0.0389 0.0211 -0.0407 0.0369 0.0307 0.0161 -0.0023 1 0.0030 
CFLWt -0.4258*** -0.6157*** -0.1001 0.6061*** -0.3609 -0.3837*** -0.3780*** -0.1267 -0.0878 0.5758*** 
DCCIt 0.1158 0.0285 0.1440* 0.0240 0.1023 -0.0016 -0.0017 0.0843 -0.0676 -0.1208 
NIPOt 0.1588** 0.0829 0.0634 -0.2794*** 0.1468** -0.0503 -0.1148 -0.1174 0.0627 -0.2376*** 
SENTt 1 0.4360*** - - - - - - - - 
Panel C: Granger causality tests of SENT 
 SENTP 
 SENT does not Granger Cause SENTP SENTP does not Granger Cause SENT 
SENT 0.0732 0.3970 
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Table 3.16B: Properties of monthly UK Investor Sentiment Indices 
Panel A reports summary statistics of the constructed investor sentiment indexes: UK market sentiment (     ) and the orthogonalized UK market sentiment (     ) 
Panel B shows pairwise correlation coefficients. 
Variable definitions: 
SENT: UK market sentiment; SENTP: UK institutional sentiment; SENTr: the orthogonalized UK market sentiment; SENTp,r: the orthogonalized UK institutional sentiment; AVDCr: the 
orthogonalized Advances to declines ratio;  CEFDr: the orthogonalized Closed-end Fund Discount;  MFIr: the orthogonalized Money Flow Index;  PCVr: the orthogonalized Put-call 
volume ratio;  PCOr: the orthogonalized Put-call open interest ratio;  RSIr: the orthogonalized Relative Strength Index;  VOLAr: the orthogonalized Realized volatility;  DVRAr: the 
orthogonalized first difference of Trading volume.The data are monthly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011.ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with a maximum 
of 12 lags.***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
Panel A: Statistical summary of Weekly sentiment indices 
Variable Mean Std Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera ADF 
Autocorrelations at lags 1-5 
1 2 3 4 5 
SENT
r 0.0417 8.9446 -0.0054 2.7438 0.5040 -4.9724*** 0.767*** 0.582*** 0.408*** 0.270*** 0.093 
SENT
p,r 0.0022 0.4166 -0.4722 3.4283 8.2444 -5.0334*** 0.753*** 0.587*** 0.507*** 0.484*** 0.473*** 
Panel B:  Investor sentiment correlation coefficients 
 SENTt
r 
SENTt
p,r 
AVDCt
r 
CEFDt
r 
MFIt
r 
PCOt
r 
PCVt
r 
DRSIt
r 
DVRAt
r 
VOLAt
r 
AVDCt
r
-1
 0.0963 0.1887** 0.0995 -0.1712** 0.3048*** 0.0363 -0.0817 0.4952*** -0.0876 -0.3111*** 
CEFDt
r -0.3937*** -0.4810*** -0.0868 1 -0.3350*** -0.2407*** -0.2122*** -0.0127 -0.0499 0.5720*** 
MFIt
r
-1 0.9905*** 0.3422*** 0.0764 -0.3010*** 0.7721*** 0.1520** 0.1294* -0.0659 0.1341* -0.3378*** 
PCOt
r 0.1923*** 0.7834*** 0.0295 -0.2407*** 0.1629** 1 0.6217*** -0.0715 0.0435 -0.3761*** 
PCVt
r 0.1658** 0.7083*** 0.0297 -0.2122*** 0.0279 0.6217*** 1 -0.1520** 0.03869 -0.1608** 
DRSIt
r
-1 0.1983*** 0.0480 -0.0334 0.0356 0.1166 0.0279 -0.0016 -0.0906 -0.0900 -0.0496 
VOLAt
r
-1 -0.4801*** -0.8280*** -0.0025 0.5424*** -0.3879*** -0.4211*** -0.2508*** -0.0836 0.0987 0.6546*** 
DVRAt
r
-1 0.0559 0.0536 0.0958 -0.0160 0.1211 0.0291 0.0952 0.0476 0.0432 0.0551 
SENTt 0.8037***          
SENTt
p  0.9712***         
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Table 3.17C: Reports the results of regression composed monthly UK Investor Sentiment Indices on macroeconomics indicator 
Table 3.15C  reports the results of estimating equations of the general form:  
Including Economics Factors Model:       
              
                     
Excluding Economics Factors Model:       
              
     
The estimation method is OLS, however when LM or/and ARCH is significant, the model is estimated by OLS with Newey-West standard errors. The data are monthly and cover the period 1st January 1996 
to 30th June 2011. Exceptionally the BWSI is available only to December 2010. 
Variable definitions: 
SENT
K
 = UK market sentiment (K=M), or institutional sentiment (K=P); IOP: the growth in UK Index of production.  
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level. 
 SENT SENTP 
 
Including Economics Factors Excluding Economics Factors  Including Economics Factors Excluding Economics Factors  
 Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
α 3.8109*** 3.8502 3.4758*** 3.7187 0.2189*** 4.2863 0.2044*** 4.1566 
SENTt-1 0.8101*** 18.7543 0.8245*** 20.9271 0.7888** 17.1414 0.8013*** 18.0735 
IOPt 0.4461 0.9092   0.0444** 2.0531   
IOPt- 0.6494 1.3238   -0.0033 -0.1498   
Adj. R
2 0.6789 0.6787 0.6456 0.6402 
S.E. 5.9165 5.9181 0.2599 0.2619 
AIC 6.4150 6.4048 0.1645 0.1689 
LM test 1.8044 2.8254** 1.5072 1.0605 
ARCH 1.6949 1.6370 0.8369 0.8156 
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3.9.4. Composed UK sentiment indexes and foreign sentiment measures 
In order to investigate the relation between UK investor sentiment and foreign investor 
sentiment, two US survey sentiment indexes and one constructed investor sentiment 
index are used for analysis of the relationship between UK and US investor sentiment, 
and one German survey sentiment index is used in the analysis of relation between UK 
and European investor sentiment. AAII, II, and Baker & Wurgler sentiment index 
(BWSI)
23
 represent US individual, institutional, and market investor sentiment 
respectively. German Market Indicator (GMI)
24
, are used to represent European 
investor sentiment.  
 
GMI is an indicator of German Economic Sentiment. It is published monthly by the 
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW). The indicator is calculated from the 
results of the ZEW Financial Market Survey, with up to 350 financial analysts and 
institutional investors taking part in it. The sentiment index is constructed from the 
difference between the percentage share of survey participants that are bullish and the 
share of participants that are bearish for the expected German economy in the next six 
months. Since the index is conducted from the survey results based on institutional 
investors, it is seen as an index for German institutional sentiment. According to the 
UK Office for National Statistics, by the end of 2012, more than 53% UK quoted shares 
are owned by foreign investors, and among them 26% are owned by investors in 
Europe. As Germany is the largest single economy in Europe Union, investor sentiment 
in Germany could be a good representative of European investor sentiment. Unlike the 
weekly Sentix, data for GMI is available for the whole sample period, 01/01/1996 – 
30/06/2010.        
 
When looking at the relationship of investor sentiment between UK and foreign 
institutional sentiment (Table 3.16 Panel A), both       and      have very strong 
correlation with the US institutional survey sentiment index, II. They are also correlated 
with German institutional sentiment, although by rather less than with US institutional 
sentiment. Moreover, the correlation of SENT
P
and US individual sentiment is 
                                               
23 Data is availed on Jeffrey Wurgler website: http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/ 
24 GMI data is download from  http://www.zew.de 
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insignificant while SENT
P 
is strongly correlated with II. SENT is also more highly 
correlated with II than with AAII. 
 
The coefficient between      and BWSI is significant, demonstrating that investor 
sentiment of these two countries are correlated on a market wide scale. It is worth 
noting that the correlation between BWSI and AAII is not significant, but the 
correlation between BWSI and II is suggesting that the constructed US sentiment index 
is more likely to capture US institutional sentiment.  However, the correlation of BWSI 
and II is negative, which is different from the correlation between the Brown and Cliff 
(2004) constructed US sentiment and the survey institutional sentiment (II).  
 
Both UK institutional sentiment and UK market sentiment have greater correlation with 
US institutional sentiment than that with European institutional sentiment. They have 
much weaker correlation to US individual and market sentiment. This implies that 
foreign institutional sentiment is more likely to have a greater impact on, or to be 
affected by, UK investor sentiment.    
 
Granger-causality tests provide more evidence of the effect that foreign investor 
sentiment has on UK investor sentiment. The test results (Table 3.16 Panel B) show 
that it is more likely that both US individual and institutional sentiment Granger-cause 
UK investor sentiment but not vice versa. This means US individual or/and institutional 
sentiment leads to UK market or/and institutional sentiment, but UK investor sentiment 
does not lead to US individual or institutional sentiment. The Granger-causality 
relationships between US market sentiment (BWSI) and UK market and/or institutional 
sentiment, display a different picture. For UK market sentiment, there is not a 
statistically Granger-causal relationship to US market sentiment, i.e. neither UK market 
sentiment leads US market sentiment or vice versa. For UK institutional sentiment, it 
shows that the causal effect could be in both directions, i.e. US market sentiment is 
affected by UK institutional sentiment and vice versa. The causality tests also 
demonstrate that UK institutional sentiment is caused by European institutional 
sentiment but does not lead European institutional sentiment.   
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Table 3.18: Correlation and Granger causality tests: monthly UK and foreign 
investor sentiment 
Panel A shows pairwise correlation coefficients among different sentiment indices. 
Panel B shows  -values for the F statistics from bilateral Granger causality tests as between either of the 
UK indices (SENT or SENTP) and any one of the US or German indices (AAII, II, or GMI) 
Test 1: H0: Granger-noncausality from the US/German index to the UK index. 
Test 2: H0: Granger-noncausality from the UK index to the US/German index. 
Variable definitions: 
SENT is UK market sentiment; SENTP is UK institutional sentiment;AAII is American Association of 
Individual Investors index; BWSI: Baker & Wurgler sentiment index;DCCI is first deference of UK 
Consumer Confidence Index; II is American Investors Intelligence index; GMI is German equity sentiment 
index.The data are monthly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. 
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level. 
Panel A: Correlation tests 
 SENTP SENT DCCI AAII II BWSI GMI 
SENT
P 1.0000       
SENT 0.4360*** 1.0000      
DCCI 0.0147 0.1175 1.0000     
AAII -0.0412 0.2234** 0.1047 1.0000    
II 0.3554*** 0.4500*** 0.1233 0.4092*** 1.0000   
BWSI -0.0137 -0.1993*** -0.0982 0.0733 -0.1444* 1.0000  
GMI 0.2137*** 0.3982*** 0.1598** 0.2432*** 0.2241*** -0.1136 1.0000 
Panel B: Granger causality tests 
 AAII II BWSI GMI 
 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 
SENT 0.0196 0.1881 <0.0001 0.9491 0.1772 0.1008 0.2671 0.4072 
SENT
P 0.0494 0.2821 <0.0001 0.8885 0.0654 0.0168 0.0646 0.6025 
 
Further regressions are run to robustly examine the relationship between UK investor 
sentiment and foreign investor sentiment. The UK sentiment index is regressed on their 
lagged terms and on the US sentiment indexes and the European sentiment index. US 
market sentiment, BWSI, has a slightly short sample period, which is from January 
1996 to December 2010. The model therefore, is also estimated by excluding BWSI, 
with data covering the full sample period to compare whether the effect from foreign 
investor sentiment behaves differently. The model is: 
             
 
   
           
 
   
         
 
   
    
 
   
                 
 
   
    
                                                                                                                            (3.15) 
where   is the composed UK sentiment indices      and     
  at time  .  
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Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM tests (up to 12 lags) indicates residual serial 
correlation in the OLS estimations, and in order to mitigate the problem, Newey-West 
HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4) is applied in the estimation 
method.  Following the same procedure as in the weekly analysis, the models are 
simplified by deleting insignificant variables.  
 
For UK market sentiment (Table 3.17), the estimated coefficients of reconstructed 
models tell a very similar story to the original models. All the coefficients of BWSI are 
not significant demonstrating that US market sentiment does not have explanatory 
power for UK market sentiment. Estimated coefficients suggest that only US 
institutional sentiment has an impact on UK market sentiment. Similarly to the weekly 
data, a reverse effect also exists in the monthly regression, though most of the 
coefficients of foreign sentiment variables are not significant.  
 
The estimations show that the UK market sentiment,     , is affected by both one 
lagged and two lagged of US institutional sentiment, since     and     are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The coefficients for US market sentiment variables in model 
1 and US individual sentiment and European Institutional sentiment in model 2 are 
insignificant. This suggests that UK market sentiment is not affected by US individual 
sentiment, European institutional sentiment or US market sentiment. It generally agrees 
with the results of Granger causality tests.  
 
For the UK institutional sentiment (Table 3.17), Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM 
tests (up to 12 lags) indicate that there is no residual serial correlation in the four 
regressions, and ARCH test (2 lags) shows no heteroskedasticity as well. This suggests 
that the estimated parameters from OLS method are unbiased and efficient. The models 
are estimated first and the estimated results show that coefficients of higher order 
lagged terms are insignificant. The models are simplified by deleting insignificant 
variables. The improvement of the standard error suggests that the amended model can 
better fit the data. 
 
Looking at estimated coefficients in model without BWSI first, the significant of        
and     demonstrates that current US individual sentiment and one lagged US 
institutional sentiment have explanatory power to UK institutional sentiment. The 
coefficients for European Institutional sentiment variables are insignificant, indicating 
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that European Institutional sentiment may have no effect on UK institutional sentiment. 
This confirms the Granger causality tests results, which show that US institutional 
sentiment has the highest significance level to Granger cause UK institutional sentiment, 
and European Institutional sentiment has the lowest significance level to Granger cause 
UK institutional sentiment. This strongly significant    , however, suggests a different 
effect of US individual and institutional sentiment on UK institutional sentiment.    
 
The estimated     and       are statistically significant in model 1, implying that one 
period lagged US institutional sentiment and current US market sentiment have an 
impact on UK institutional sentiment, however, the coefficients for US individual 
sentiment are still insignificant. This suggests that the explanatory power of US 
individual sentiment to UK institutional sentiment is overtaken by the US market 
sentiment.  
 
Compared to weekly data, fewer foreign investor sentiment indices affect UK investor 
sentiment in monthly frequency. For example, US individual sentiment has a strong 
effect on both UK market and institutional sentiment in weekly frequency but has a 
weak marginal effect in monthly frequency. The reverse effect is also stronger in 
weekly frequency. This may because that investor sentiment in one country can directly 
affect sentiment in another country via investor herding instinct. Christie and Huang 
(1995) suggest that herding is generally a short-term behaviour. Internet message 
boards and globalized investment business make it possible that foreign sentiment 
becomes local. When fundamental information is incorporated slowly into decision 
making, investors tend to gradually adjust their investment decision and correct the 
behaviour. In both weekly and monthly frequency, US institutional sentiment has a 
significant and persistent impact on UK investor sentiment. This, in one way, confirms 
the hypothesis that domestic investors are likely to pay attention to foreign institutional 
sentiment to general foreign market sentiment. The fact that 53% of listed UK shares 
are owned by foreign investors and more than 82% of the foreign owners are 
institutional investors may be one of the reasons to explain the impact of foreign 
institutional sentiment on UK investor sentiment.  
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Table 3.19: Regression analysis of monthly     on foreign sentiment indexes 
Table 3.17  reports the results of estimating equations of the general form:  
Model 1:       
               
 
            
 
       
 
                    
 
              
  
       
Model 2:       
               
 
            
 
       
 
                    
  
         
    
The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard errors. The data are monthly and cover the period 1st January 
1996 to 30th June 2011. Exceptionally the BWSI is available only to December 2010. 
Variable definitions:  
SENT
K
 = UK market sentiment (K=M), or institutional sentiment (K=P); AAII: American Association of Individual Investors 
index; II: American Investors Intelligence index; GMI: German equity sentiment index. BWSI: Baker & Wurgler sentiment index, 
i.e. US market sentiment. t statistics are shown in parentheses. ***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; 
*Significant at 10% level. 
 SENT SENTP 
 Including BWSI  
01/01/1996 - 31/12/2010 
Excluding BWSI  
01/01/1996 - 30/06/2011 
Including BWSI  
01/01/1996 - 31/12/2010 
Excluding BWSI  
01/01/1996 - 30/06/2011 
 
Model 1 
Reconstructed 
model 1 
Model 2 
Reconstructed 
model 2 
Model 1 
Reconstructed 
model 1 
Model 2 
Reconstructed 
model 2 
AAIIt 
0.0110 
(0.3217) 
0.0100 
(0.3051) 
0.0063 
(0.2030) 
0.0065 
(0.2219) 
-0.0016 
(-1.2842) 
-0.0015 
(-1.3268) 
-0.0022** 
(-1.8413) 
-0.0018* 
(-1.7230) 
AAIIt-1 
0.0039 
(0.1355) 
0.0044 
(0.1506) 
0.0003 
(0.0098) 
-0.0006 
(-0.0222) 
-0.0002 
(-0.1403) 
 
-0.0005 
(-0.3478) 
 
AAIIt-2 
-0.0034 
(-0.1268) 
0.0105 
(0.5143) 
0.0017 
(0.0675) 
0.0079 
(0.3812) 
0.0009 
(0.6404) 
 
0.0014 
(1.0676) 
 
AAIIt-3 
0.0168 
(0.7130) 
 
0.0047 
(0.2037)  
0.0004 
(0.3663) 
 
0.0005 
(0.3987) 
 
IIt 
0.0714 
(1.5367) 
0.0747 
(1.5546) 
0.0722 
(1.5680) 
0.0781* 
(1.6611) 
0.0029 
(1.2080) 
0.0032 
(1.3964) 
0.0029 
(1.2850) 
0.0032 
(1.4684) 
IIt-1 
0.1463** 
(2.5796) 
0.1592*** 
(2.8479) 
0.1638*** 
(2.8698) 
0.1659*** 
(3.0269) 
0.0044 
(1.5010) 
0.0046** 
(2.1371) 
0.0058** 
(2.1185) 
0.0050*** 
(2.4212) 
IIt-2 
-0.1242** 
(-2.0731) 
-0.1363*** 
(-3.1784) 
-0.1511** 
(-2.7232) 
-0.1543*** 
(-3.7428) 
-0.0025 
(-0.8582) 
 
-0.0035 
(-1.2424) 
 
IIt-3 
-0.0030 
(-0.0495) 
 
-0.0011 
(-0.0200)  
0.0008 
(0.3494) 
 
0.0014 
(0.5803) 
 
GMIt 
0.0688 
(1.2732) 
0.0672 
(1.3695) 
0.0735 
(1.5109) 
0.0738 
(1.6171) 
0.0011 
(0.4416) 
0.0003 
(0.5911) 
0.0005 
(0.1923) 
0.0005 
(0.9259) 
GMIt-1 
-0.0437 
(-0.4371) 
-0.0649 
(-0.7822) 
-0.0449 
(-0.4932) 
-0.0646 
(-0.8393) 
0.0033 
(0.7845) 
 
0.0031 
(0.749)  
GMIt-2 
-0.0592 
(-0.5127) 
0.0079 
(0.1594) 
-0.0481 
(-0.4406) 
0.0047 
(0.1092) 
-0.0068 
(-1.6111) 
 
-0.0051 
(-1.26618)  
GMIt-3 
0.0488 
(0.7745) 
 
0.0377 
(0.6213)  
0.0026 
(1.0828) 
 
0.0020 
(0.8850)  
BWSIt 
-0.1772 
(-0.0606) 
-0.0891 
(-0.0318) 
  
0.2525 
(1.6476) 
0.2337* 
(1.6608) 
  
BWSIt-1 
-1.0259 
(-0.2350) 
-1.7286 
(-0.4266) 
  
0.0072 
(0.0316) 
-0.0657 
(-0.3143) 
  
BWSIt-2 
-2.6046 
(-0.5862) 
0.8435 
(0.2659) 
  
-0.4033* 
(-1.7908) 
-0.1799 
(-1.2442) 
  
BWSIt-3 
2.8614 
(0.8489) 
   
0.1213 
(0.7829) 
   
SENTt-1 
0.7688*** 
(11.1152) 
0.7607*** 
(16.7962) 
0.7826*** 
(11.4637) 
0.7756*** 
(18.2760)     
SENTt-2 
0.0585 
(0.5796) 
 
0.0620 
(0.6311) 
     
SENTt-3 
-0.0771 
(-1.0209) 
 
-0.0841 
(-1.1819) 
     
SENT
P
t-1     
0.6119*** 
(7.6233) 
0.6937*** 
(14.7399) 
0.6448*** 
(8.3546) 
0.7126*** 
(15.7607) 
SENT
P
t-2     
0.0495 
(0.5225)  
0.0363 
(0.3979)  
SENT
P
t-3     
0.1149 
(1.5005)  
0.0942 
(1.2754)  
Adj. R
2 0.7266 0.7315 0.7248 0.7292 0.6880 0.6855 0.6807 0.6809 
S.E. 5.5441 5.4636 5.5065 5.4328 0.2483 0.2482 0.2477 0.2466 
AIC 6.3705 6.3099 6.3340 6.2810 0.1582 0.0999 0.1309 0.0701 
LM test 1.6125* 1.7714* 1.9497** 1.8485** 0.8258 0.6289 0.8647 0.8647 
ARCH 0.5522 0.9297 0.8839 1.1858 0.2814 0.9891 0.6686 0.6686 
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3.10    Monthly Investor sentiment and equity returns 
The returns are tested against all the market sentiment indices. Correlation tests in 
Table 3.18 Panel A show that returns of all size stocks in UK have the strongest 
correlation to US individual and institutional sentiment. This, in one sense, is suggested 
by the ownership of UK shares, 53% UK quoted shares are owned by foreign investors, 
and among them 48% are owned by investors in North America. 
25
 The correlation 
analysis also shows that returns of all size stocks hardly have any correlation to UK 
institutional sentiment. Return of medium and small size stocks have some correlation 
to UK market sentiment, but they are not as strong as to US investor sentiment. Returns 
of large and small-size stocks have some correlation with European Institutional 
sentiment. Returns of small stocks are those most widely correlated investor sentiments 
around the world amongst the three categories of stocks.   
 
Granger causality test (up to 3 lags) are conducted to examine the causal relation 
between returns and investor sentiment indices (Table 3.18 Panel B). The results show 
that the US, UK and European investor sentiments do not Granger-cause returns of 
large stocks at the 10% significance level except US institutional sentiment. The test of 
Granger-noncausality II is rejected at the 5% significance level, suggesting that US 
institutional sentiment may Granger-cause returns of large stocks. The tests of Granger-
noncausality also show that large stock returns are likely to lead the investor sentiments 
in these three countries except the US individual sentiment, AAII, and US market 
sentiment, BWSI. This is similar to the results of Wang, Keswani & Taylor (2006). 
 
For medium stocks, the results suggest that UK, US and European investor sentiment 
does not cause stock price changes but medium stock returns do appear to have some 
causal effect on UK and European investor sentiments and US institutional sentiment. 
The results also indicate that there is no causal relationship between medium stocks and 
US individual and market sentiment in either direction.  
 
 
 
                                               
25Ownership of UK Quoted Shares 2012, Office for national statistic 
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Table 3.20: Correlation and Granger causality test for monthly stock returns and 
investor sentiment 
Panel A shows pairwise correlation coefficients between sentiment indices and different size UK stock 
portfolios. 
Panel B gives  -values for the F statistics from bilateral Granger causality tests as between the sentiment 
indices and the returns on different size UK stock portfolios.  
Test 1:  : Granger-noncausality from stock returns to the sentiment index. 
Test 2:  : Granger-noncausality from sentiment index to stock returns. 
Variable definitions: 
SENT: UK market sentiment; SENTP: UK institutional sentiment; AAII: American Association of 
Individual Investors index; II: American Investors Intelligence index; GMI: German equity sentiment 
index; BWSI: Baker & Wurgler sentiment index, i.e. US market sentiment index. Rbig: return on the 
large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on small-size stock 
portfolio.The data are monthly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. Exceptionally the BWSI is 
available only to December 2010 
 
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level. 
Panel A: Correlation tests 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
SENT 0.1014 0.1596** 0.2178** 
SENT
P 0.0194 -0.0175 -0.0118 
AAII 0.3176*** 0.3316*** 0.3287*** 
II 0.32897*** 0.4133*** 0.4028*** 
GMI 0.1247* 0.1139 0.1796** 
BWSI -0.1411* -0.1773** -0.1944*** 
Panel B: Granger causality tests 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 
SENT <0.0001 0.2777 <0.0001 0.7314 <0.0001 0.8549 
SENT
P <0.0001 0.6361 <0.0001 0.9259 <0.0001 0.6491 
AAII 0.5524 0.6664 0.9633 0.2477 0.8752 0.0834 
II 0.0022 0.0436 0.0201 0.1823 0.0576 0.5223 
GMI <0.0001 0.2756 <0.0001 0.9090 0.0003 0.8836 
BWSI 0.2593 0.2120 0.3078 0.1245 0.2789 0.1543 
 
 
For small stocks, the test of null of AAII cannot cause      cannot be rejected at the 5% 
level, indicating that prices of small stock are led by US individual sentiment, however, 
the null is rejected at the 10% level, suggesting it is still highly possible that returns of 
small stock are Granger caused by US individual sentiment. Similar to medium-size 
stocks, returns of small stocks have some impact on US institutional sentiment and UK 
and European investor sentiments but not vice versa.   
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Finally, regressing returns on the US, UK and European sentiment indexes investigates 
the details about their ability to predict future returns. The estimations are run in two 
models because of the shorter sample period of     . The models are:   
 
Model 1:  
             
 
   
           
 
   
           
 
 
   
           
 
   
         
 
   
          
 
   
           
 
   
    
                                                                                                                           (3.16) 
Model 2: 
             
 
   
           
 
   
           
 
 
   
           
 
   
         
 
   
          
 
   
    
                           (3.17) 
where   is returns of large, medium, and small-size stock portfolio.  
 
The estimated results are reported in Table 3.19A, Table 3.19B and Table 3.19C 
respectively. The majority of the coefficients of sentiment variables for the lagged 
terms are statistically insignificant; therefore, the models are simplified by deleting 
some of the lagged terms of variables. The standard error and AIC are all improved in 
the reconstructed models, suggesting they are parsimonious models.   
 
For large stocks, the estimated coefficients from both models present almost the same 
results though they are estimated by slightly different sample data. The results 
demonstrate that US institutional sentiment in current and lagged have some 
explanatory power to returns. This confirms the suggestion from the Granger-causality 
test about returns of large stocks and US institutional sentiment, II. All the other 
estimated sentiment coefficients are not significant, indicating that they are unlikely to 
influence returns of large-size stocks. This is quite different from the estimation results 
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in the weekly interval, which indicates that UK large stock returns are affected by both 
US institutional sentiment and US individual sentiment. The positive signs of    
suggest sentiment impact is reversed afterwards in the following periods. 
 
For medium stocks, estimated coefficients demonstrate that US institutional sentiment 
has a significant and relatively long term influence on returns of UK medium stocks.  
Coefficients of      ,     , and    , are not significant, suggesting that UK market 
sentiment, US individual sentiment and European institutional sentiment may not affect 
UK medium stock returns. This is quite different from the estimated results from the 
weekly interval, which show that US individual sentiment has an influence on UK 
medium stock returns but UK institutional sentiment has no effect on medium stock 
returns. However, US institutional sentiment has the greatest degree of influence on UK 
medium stock returns amongst all the sentiment indexes in both investment intervals.  
 
The significant current UK institutional sentiment in model 2 suggests that UK 
institutional sentiment also has an influence on UK medium stock returns. It is notable 
however, that the coefficient becomes insignificant to the returns in model 1 which 
includes US market sentiment in the regression. Instead, US market sentiment is one of 
the significant explanatory factors of the returns of UK medium stocks. From the 
analysis of UK institutional sentiment in the previous section (section 3.8.4), it shows 
that US market sentiment is one of the significant determining variables for UK 
institutional sentiment. This indicates that UK institutional sentiment is led by US 
market sentiment. Therefore, the influence that UK institutional sentiment has on 
returns is taken place via US market sentiment, i.e. the UK institutional sentiment effect 
on returns of UK medium stocks is ‘Made in USA’. 
 
For small-size stocks, the estimated results from both models present very similar 
pictures, though US market sentiment is included in model1 as an explanatory variable, 
which suggests that US market sentiment does not affect returns of UK small stocks.    
The strongly significant    ,     ,       and     demonstrates that returns of small-
size stocks are affected by US institutional sentiment and European institutional 
sentiment in their current and one period lagged term. In addition, the significance of  
     
 
 and      
 
 indicates that the one and two lagged UK institutional sentiment 
also has influence on returns of UK small stocks. The sign of the variable coefficients 
suggest a strong reverse effect of investor sentiment on returns.  
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The regression results exhibit the following features. Firstly, returns of all size stocks in 
the UK equity market are affected by US institutional sentiment. This means that US 
institutional sentiment has an impact on UK equity prices regardless the size different. 
Secondly, both UK market sentiment and US individual sentiment have no effect on 
UK stock returns regardless of stock sizes, i.e., UK market sentiment and US individual 
sentiment do not influence UK equity returns. Thirdly, whether UK institutional 
sentiment, European institutional sentiment, and US market sentiment have an impact 
on UK equity returns is dependent on the size of the stock. European Institutional 
sentiment has an impact on returns of UK medium and small stocks, US market 
sentiment influences returns of UK medium stocks, and UK institutional sentiment 
affects the returns of UK small stocks. Fourthly, among the three sizes of stocks, 
returns of small stocks are more likely to be affected by domestic and foreign investors’ 
sentiment. Returns of large stocks are only influenced by US institutional sentiment.   
Finally, similarly to weekly frequency, reverse effect, i.e. the initial effect of investor 
sentiment reversing in the following periods, exists in all sizes of equities. 
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Table 3.21A: Regression analysis of monthly returns of large stocks (    ) on 
sentiment indexes 
Table 3.19A reports the results of estimating equations of the general form:  
Model 1:                       
 
             
 
              
  
              
 
            
 
             
 
    
          
 
       
Model 2:                       
 
             
 
              
  
              
 
            
 
             
 
      
    
The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard errors. The data are monthly and cover the period 1st January 
1996 to 30th June 2011. Exceptionally the BWSI is available only to December 2010 
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on 
small-size stock portfolio;     : UK market sentiment;     : UK institutional sentiment;AAII: American Association of 
Individual Investors index; II: American Investors Intelligence index; GMI: German equity sentiment index. BWSI: Baker & 
Wurgler sentiment index, i.e. US market sentiment 
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level. 
 
Including BWSI (01/01/1996 - 31/12/2010) Excluding BWSI (01/01/1996 - 30/06/2011) 
 
Model 1 Reconstructed model 1 Model 2 Reconstructed model 2 
 Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat 
Constant -2.1804* -1.7210 -1.1182 -1.4407 -2.4375*** -2.2303 -1.3362 -1.5991 
Rbig, t-1 -0.1145 -1.3841   -0.1093 -1.3682   
Rbig,t-2 -0.0683 -0.6843   -0.0511 -0.5353   
Rbig,t-3 0.0056 0.0642   0.0020 0.0242   
SENTt 0.0304 0.4824 0.0146 0.4224 0.0373 0.6255 0.0212 0.6299 
SENTt-1 -0.0142 -0.1671   -0.0162 -0.2019   
SENTt-2 0.0080 0.1215   0.0085 0.1320   
SENTt-3 0.0147 0.3301   0.0203 0.4791   
SENT
P
t 0.0119 0.0101 0.4558 0.6037 -0.0457 -0.0390 0.3050 0.4907 
SENT
P
t-1 0.7619 0.4959   0.6713 0.4530   
SENT
P
t-2 -1.6784 -0.9879   -1.4414 -0.8617   
SENT
P
t-3 1.5275 1.0506   1.1374 0.8818   
AAIIt 0.0303 1.3806 0.0261 1.5653 0.0269 1.4109 0.0198 1.1617 
AAIIt-1 0.0097 0.5501   0.0023 0.1393   
AAIIt-2 -0.0057 -0.2874   -0.0081 -0.4506   
AAIIt-3 -0.0013 -0.0659   -0.0089 -0.5313   
IIt 0.2161*** 5.1994 0.2008*** 6.0538 0.2187*** 5.7461 0.2100*** 5.8856 
IIt-1 -0.2067*** -4.6631 -0.1919*** -5.8431 -0.1967*** -4.4826 -0.1922*** -6.8558 
IIt-2 -0.0071 -0.1200   -0.0067 -0.1143   
IIt-3 0.0313 0.6539   0.0371 0.7882   
GMIt 0.0330 0.7825 0.0103 1.2394 0.0402 0.9254 0.0107 1.1488 
GMIt-1 -0.0262 -0.3096   -0.0413 -0.5034   
GMIt-2 -0.0039 -0.0580   0.0102 0.1572   
GMIt-3 0.0065 0.1827   0.0019 0.0551   
BWSIt -2.0388 -0.7298 -0.7343 -1.5458     
BWSIt-1 3.0373 0.8766       
BWSIt-2 -1.4532 -0.4208       
BWSIt-3 -0.4529 -0.1676       
Adj. R
2 0.2513 0.2821 0.2558 0.2765 
S.E. 3.7707 3.6686 3.7056 3.6312 
AIC 5.6381 5.4814 5.5805 5.4543 
LM test 1.9668** 1.5719 2.0997** 1.6971* 
ARCH 2.0574 1.4622 1.6935 1.3281 
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Table 3.19B: Regression analysis of monthly returns of medium stocks (    ) on 
sentiment indexes  
Table 3.19B reports the results of estimating equations of the general form:  
Model 1:                       
 
             
 
              
  
              
 
            
 
             
 
    
          
 
       
Model 2:                       
 
             
 
              
  
              
 
            
 
             
 
      
     
The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard errors. The data are monthly and cover the period 1st January 
1996 to 30th June 2011. Exceptionally the BWSI is available only to December 2010 
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on 
small-size stock portfolio;     : UK market sentiment;     : UK institutional sentiment;AAII: American Association of 
Individual Investors index; II: American Investors Intelligence index; GMI: German equity sentiment index. BWSI: Baker & 
Wurgler sentiment index, i.e. US market sentiment.  
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level. 
 
Including BWSI (01/01/1996 - 31/12/2010) Excluding BWSI (01/01/1996 - 30/06/2011) 
 
Model 1 Reconstructed model 1 Model 2 Reconstructed model 2 
 Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat 
Constant -0.7740 -0.4370 -1.1018 -0.6800 -1.4603 -0.8405 -1.4637 -1.5992 
Rmid, t-1 -0.0005 -0.0060   0.0058 0.0726   
Rmid,t-2 -0.1214 -1.4669   -0.0970 -1.1914   
Rmid,t-3 0.0653 0.7205   0.0774 0.9071   
SENTt 0.0457 0.6906 0.0363 0.7314 0.0539 0.8672 0.0497 1.2350 
SENTt-1 -0.0078 -0.0892   -0.0084 -0.1015   
SENTt-2 0.0351 0.4519   0.0303 0.4048   
SENTt-3 -0.0557 -0.9479   -0.0352 -0.6286   
SENT
P
t -0.6149 -0.4798 -1.3577 -1.4033 -0.6871 -0.5919 -1.5488* -1.6573 
SENT
P
t-1 0.9342 0.5536   1.0798 0.6234   
SENT
P
t-2 -2.2326 -1.1124   -2.1814 -1.0785   
SENT
P
t-3 0.9549 0.6630   0.5747 0.4137   
AAIIt 0.0390 1.7017 0.0266 1.1798 0.0330 1.5455 0.0182 0.9294 
AAIIt-1 0.0168 0.8349   0.0085 0.4359   
AAIIt-2 0.0116 0.5190   0.0032 0.1570   
AAIIt-3 -0.0235 -1.1160   -0.0315 -1.6688   
IIt 0.2478*** 4.3931 0.2536*** 4.5918 0.2571*** 4.9358 0.2649*** 6.7144 
IIt-1 -0.1838*** -3.4411 -0.1586*** -3.4682 -0.1860*** -3.6154 -0.1619*** -3.5566 
IIt-2 -0.0507 -0.8419 -0.0646* -1.6687 -0.0410 -0.7278 -0.0642 -1.4873 
IIt-3 0.0882* 1.9620 0.0883** 2.1203 0.0925** 2.0287 0.0859** 2.3919 
GMIt 0.0837 1.6485 0.0036 0.3090 0.0879* 1.7410 0.0049 0.4899 
GMIt-1 -0.1031 -1.0601   -0.1083 -1.1733   
GMIt-2 0.0431 0.4976   0.0349 0.4227   
GMIt-3 -0.0241 -0.5051   -0.0106 -0.2332   
BWSIt -0.4614 -0.1747 -1.0717* -1.8738     
BWSIt-1 0.9611 0.2615       
BWSIt-2 1.6505 0.3827       
BWSIt-3 -3.3628 -1.1851       
Adj. R
2 0.3053 0.3080 0.3028 0.2989 
S.E. 4.4934 4.4687 4.4330 4.4316 
AIC 6.9883 5.8869 5.9390 5.8633 
LM test 1.4532 0.7808 1.1852 0.7391 
ARCH 6.5620*** 2.6717* 3.4226** 2.1276 
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Table 3.19C: Regression analysis of monthly returns of small stocks (    ) on 
sentiment indexes  
Table 3.19C reports the results of estimating equations of the general form:  
Model 1:                       
 
             
 
              
  
              
 
            
 
             
 
    
          
 
       
Model 2:                       
 
             
 
              
  
              
 
            
 
             
 
      
     
The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard errors. The data are monthly and cover the period 1st January 
1996 to 30th June 2011. Exceptionally the BWSI is available only to December 2010 
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on 
small-size stock portfolio;     : UK market sentiment;     : UK institutional sentiment;AAII: American Association of 
Individual Investors index; II: American Investors Intelligence index; GMI: German equity sentiment index. BWSI: Baker & 
Wurgler sentiment index, i.e. US market sentiment 
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level. 
 Including BWSI (01/01/1996 - 31/12/2010) Excluding BWSI (01/01/1996 - 30/06/2011) 
 Model 1 Reconstructed model 1 Model 2 Reconstructed model 2 
 Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat 
Constant -1.0625 -0.5491 -1.8119 -1.4237 -1.9991 -1.4982 -2.1221* -1.7544 
Rmid, t-1 0.0474 0.5390 0.0797 0.9041 0.0799 0.8851 0.0934 1.0875 
Rmid,t-2 -0.1476* -1.9171 -0.1212 -1.3876 -0.1269 -1.4113 -0.1151 -1.3489 
Rmid,t-3 0.0270 0.3208   0.0455 0.5149   
SENTt 0.1167 1.4524 0.0863 1.1375 0.1130 1.5104 0.0992 1.3487 
SENTt-1 0.0121 0.1226 -0.0325 -0.4401 0.0189 0.2026 -0.0321 -0.4468 
SENTt-2 -0.0742 -0.8395   -0.0788 -0.8361   
SENTt-3 -0.0394 -0.5260   -0.0106 -0.1480   
SENT
P
t -1.0160 -0.6420 -1.6064 -0.9623 -1.1206 -0.6578 -1.8017 -1.1057 
SENT
P
t-1 2.3223 1.3259 3.3949* 1.7406 2.6916 1.3730 3.2765* 1.7140 
SENT
P
t-2 -3.6577* -1.6830 -2.9441* -1.7817 -3.4888* -1.7726 -2.9835* -1.8687 
SENT
P
t-3 1.1334 0.6777   0.5668 0.3432   
AAIIt 0.0370 1.6146 0.0330 1.3194 0.0314 1.2598 0.0269 1.1254 
AAIIt-1 0.0399* 1.8101 0.0355 1.4337 0.0266 1.0001 0.0242 1.0146 
AAIIt-2 0.0119 0.4436   0.0000 -0.0010   
AAIIt-3 -0.0315 -1.3123   -0.0373 -1.5602   
IIt 0.2388*** 3.5139 0.2265*** 4.7718 0.2424*** 5.2329 0.2378*** 5.2714 
IIt-1 -0.1985*** -3.5155 -0.1993*** -3.4594 -0.1981*** -3.4172 -0.1944*** -3.4509 
IIt-2 -0.0329 -0.5371 -0.0109 -0.1986 -0.0132 -0.2163 -0.0119 -0.2203 
IIt-3 0.0839* 1.7213 0.0597 1.3379 0.0839* 1.6599 0.0598 1.3679 
GMIt 0.1042** 1.9806 0.1080*** 2.6220 0.1139** 2.3687 0.1083*** 2.7650 
GMIt-1 -0.1096 -1.0569 -0.1007** -2.4862 -0.1318 -1.5864 -0.0997** -2.5898 
GMIt-2 0.0680 0.6496   0.0665 0.7959   
GMIt-3 -0.0555 -0.8735   -0.0366 -0.7608   
BWSIt -0.8291 -0.2980 -1.1381 -0.3734     
BWSIt-1 3.2072 0.8136 -0.2144 -0.0692     
BWSIt-2 1.6030 0.3339       
BWSIt-3 -5.4521 -1.5877       
Adj. R
2 0.3005 0.3041 0.2876 0.2836 
S.E. 5.0084 4.9842 4.9744 4.9433 
AIC 6.2058 6.1466 6.1694 6.1173 
LM test 1.7658* 1.4287 1.3355 1.2628 
ARCH 1.0922 0.6365 0.5073 0.4374 
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3.11    Monthly investor sentiment and financial crisis 
The sentiment effects in the crisis time are investigated by imposing the defined normal, 
pre and in-crisis period conditions. According to the estimation results in section 3.9, a 
regression model that includes one period lagged term is generally a better fit model for 
investigating the relationship between returns and investor sentiment. Before imposing 
the financial crisis condition, the relationship between UK stock returns and UK 
investor sentiment is explored by regression returns on the composed indexes, 
     and      . The regression results are in Table 3.20 and it can be seen that both 
UK market and institutional sentiment have no effect on the returns on large and 
medium size stocks. For small size stocks, current market sentiment has a positive 
effect on returns and institutional sentiment cannot influence stock returns. The 
financial crisis conditions: non-crisis period, pre-crisis periods, and in-crisis periods 
conditions are imposed to investigate investor sentiment effect to stock returns in 
different crisis stages. 
     
           
                 
             
 
   
       
             
 
 
   
      
       
     
       
           
       
       
 
   
   
    
       
       
 
 
   
      
           
             
    
             
 
   
       
             
 
 
   
       
                         (3.18) 
where    is return of the stock portfolio (either     ,     , or     ).     in non-
crisis periods and zero otherwise;      in pre-crisis periods and zero otherwise; 
     for in-crisis periods and zero otherwise. The regression results are reported in 
Table 3.20. 
 
For large stock, the coefficients of all sentiment variables are insignificant in the 
unconditional regression, suggesting that investor sentiment generally has little effect 
on returns. When imposed in crisis conditions, the coefficients of sentiment variables 
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are insignificant in the normal time, which agrees with the unconditional regression. 
The significant of      
          
 demonstrates that returns are affected by current 
institutional sentiment at pre-crisis period. All coefficients of sentiment variables are 
insignificant during non-crisis period and crisis period, suggesting that returns of large-
size stocks may only be affected by institutional sentiment in the bubble building pre-
crisis time.  This may be an implication that institutional sentiment is one of the factors 
that contribute to the asset price bubble. Tests of asymmetric effect of investor 
sentiment suggest that the influence that institutional sentiment has on returns in the 
pre-crisis period is different from that in the normal time, however, the null of 
     
         
      
         
 cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level, 
suggesting a symmetric effect of institutional sentiment on returns of large stocks in 
pre- and in-crisis periods.  
 
As with returns of medium stocks, the coefficients of all sentiment variables are 
insignificant in the unconditional regression, suggesting that investor sentiment 
generally has little effect on returns of medium stocks. When imposed in crisis 
conditions the coefficient of       
       is significant, demonstrating that lagged 
market sentiment has an impact to returns of medium stocks. All coefficients of 
sentiment variables are insignificant during normal and pre-crisis periods, suggesting 
that investor sentiment has little influence on returns of medium-size stocks in normal 
and pre-crisis time. 
 
For small-size stocks, estimated coefficients suggest that current market sentiment is 
more likely to influence returns of small-size stocks in general in the unconditional 
regression, and market sentiment influences returns of small stocks is to a different 
degree from that of institutional sentiment influence on returns of small stocks. When 
the conditions are imposed,      
       is significant during normal time, which 
confirms the suggestions that come from the unconditional regression. No coefficients 
of sentiment variables during pre-crisis period are significant, implying that returns of 
small stocks are not affected by investor sentiment in this time. However, during 
financial crisis periods, lagged market sentiment has some explanatory power to returns 
of small stocks. This is very similar to returns of medium stocks. The tests of 
asymmetric effect of market sentiment in different crisis stages are rejected.  
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Among large, medium, and small stock portfolios, all coefficients of institutional 
sentiment variables are insignificant in normal and crisis time, and all coefficients of 
market sentiment variables are not significant during pre-crisis time. This suggests that 
institutional sentiment has very little influence on returns in normal and crisis time, and 
market sentiment has little effect on returns during pre-crisis period. The regression 
results also indicate that it is more likely that returns of large stocks are affected by 
institutional sentiment in the market unrest time, and returns of medium and small 
stocks are influenced by market sentiment.  This is because the large stocks seem to be 
held and traded by institutional investors and the ownership and trading activities of 
medium and small stocks are more likely to spread between institutional and individual 
investors.   
 
The tests of asymmetric effect of investor sentiment in pre- and in-crisis periods 
suggest that the effects on returns of stocks are symmetrical. Especially, for large stocks, 
the null is rejected at a high significance level, suggesting that returns of large stocks 
may be affected by institutional sentiment pre-crisis as well as in crisis period, and the 
degree can be the same.  
 113 
 
Table 3.22: Regression of monthly returns on UK sentiment indexes under financial crisis conditions 
Table 3.20 reports the results of regressions of the following form: 
          
           
                      
             
 
          
             
  
         
       
     
       
           
       
       
 
       
   
       
       
  
         
           
                 
             
 
          
             
  
               
     
The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard errors. The data are monthly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. 
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on small-size stock portfolio;  SENT: UK 
market sentiment;  SENTP: UK institutional sentiment.  D1 = 1 in non-crisis periods and zero otherwise;  D2 = 1 in pre-crisis periods and zero otherwise;  D3 = 1 in in-
crisis periods and zero otherwise.  The pre- and in-crisis periods are as defined in Appendix 2.  The no-crisis periods consist of the remaining observations in the sample.   
t statistics are shown in parentheses.  Fi, i = 1,…,5, are F tests for the quantitative effects of UK market sentiment and institutional sentiment: F1:     ; F2:      ; F3: 
  
         
       
; F4:   
       
   
      ; F5:   
         
       
; F6:   
       
   
      ; F7:   
         
       
. F8:   
       
   
       
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
 Full period 
Normal 
period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period 
Full period 
Normal 
period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period 
Full period 
Normal 
period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period 
α1 
-0.4926 
(-0.4965) 
-0.7622 
(-0.7151) 
3.9461 
(1.1575) 
7.8279** 
(2.0518) 
0.2734 
(0.2164) 
0.5230 
(0.3462) 
3.7181* 
(1.7998) 
6.9727** 
(2.3777) 
-0.1439 
(-0.0972) 
0.1526 
(0.0806) 
3.3831 
(1.5173) 
6.3143** 
(2.3437) 
Rt-1 
0.0554 
(0.5881) 
0.0306 
(0.2721) 
-0.4377 
(-1.3589) 
-0.0683 
(-0.4022) 
0.1557* 
(1.8261) 
0.1383 
(1.1191) 
-0.0198 
(-0.1405) 
-0.1558 
(-1.0802) 
0.2198** 
(2.4846) 
0.1616 
(1.4591) 
0.2414** 
(2.0926) 
-0.0409 
(-0.2477) 
SENTt 
0.0176 
(0.2660) 
0.0594 
(0.6517) 
0.0800 
(0.7305) 
-0.1584 
(-1.0460) 
0.0774 
(1.0956) 
0.1290 
(1.2189) 
0.0212 
(0.2184) 
-0.1099 
(-0.6936) 
0.1463* 
(1.7385) 
0.2195* 
(1.8071) 
0.0217 
(0.2608) 
0.0076 
(0.0420) 
SENTt-1 
0.0267 
(0.4232) 
0.0450 
(0.4936) 
-0.1408 
(-0.1408) 
-0.1974 
(-1.6107) 
-0.0063 
(-0.0884) 
0.0235 
(0.2135) 
-0.0644 
(-0.6580) 
-0.2638* 
(-1.8175) 
-0.0559 
(-0.6383) 
-0.0438 
(-0.3359) 
-0.0626 
(-0.6077) 
-0.3515** 
(-2.2185) 
SENT
P
 t 
-1.3383 
(-1.1739) 
-0.7289 
(-0.5166) 
-5.1585*** 
(-2.7687) 
-3.5111 
(-0.9853) 
-2.1980 
(-1.6221) 
-2.8306 
(1.3812) 
-2.3850 
(-0.9249) 
-2.3342 
(-0.9979) 
-2.9464 
(-1.6396) 
-3.3896 
(-1.2591) 
-0.6990 
(-0.2435) 
-5.7085 
(--1.4527) 
SENT
P
 t-1 
1.1781 
(1.0219 
-0.2413 
(-0.1756) 
4.5049 
(1.6045) 
1.2264 
(0.4064) 
0.9962 
(0.7596) 
0.1944 
(0.0952) 
1.3333 
(0.5396) 
0.7085 
(0.3305) 
1.3989 
(0.8890) 
0.2880 
(0.1197) 
-0.3826 
(-0.1363) 
3.0541 
(1.1968) 
F1  0.3100 7.6474*** 0.8971  0.0067 0.3125 0.1939 2.8511* 1.7380 0.0607 2.0365 
F2          0.0178 0.0127 1.6882 
F3  3.5677*     
F4  0.1682     
F5    2.4505  2.2505 
F6    1.3134  2.5611 
F7      1.8238 
F8      0.9268 
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3.12    Monthly returns under different market sentiment conditions 
In this section, the impact that investor sentiment has on stock returns and investor 
herding is examined by investigating the possible asymmetric effect under high 
(                  ) and low (                  ) UK market sentiment conditions, where  
            is mean of the composted market sentiment. As demonstrated in the previous, 
returns of UK stocks are most likely to be affected by US investors’ sentiment, 
therefore the investigation of returns under different market sentiment conditions will 
be conducted by regression returns on UK and US sentiment indexes. The model is as 
follows: 
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where    is return of the stock portfolio (either     ,     , or     ).     
 when                    and zero otherwise;      when                    and zero 
otherwise. 
 
For large-size stocks (Table 3.21), the significant of coefficients of    
    
,    
    
,    
   , 
and     
   suggests that current and lagged US institutional sentiment influences returns 
of UK large stocks in both high and low UK market sentiment. The insignificant of 
coefficients of other sentiment variables indicates that in UK market and institution 
sentiment, and US individual sentiment have little impact on returns of UK large stocks, 
regardless of the condition of UK market sentiment. Tests of asymmetric effect of US 
institutional sentiment on returns of UK large stocks suggest that there is an asymmetric 
effect from US institutional sentiment on returns of UK large stocks under high and low 
market sentiment.  
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Table 3.23: Regression of returns of large stocks on UK and US sentiment indexes 
under different market sentiment conditions in monthly frequency 
Table 3.21 reports the results of regressions of the following general form:     
     
          
    
     
    
                
    
       
 
   
       
    
       
 
 
   
       
    
          
 
   
    
    
        
 
   
   
        
                   
          
 
   
       
          
 
 
   
   
    
             
 
   
    
           
 
   
    
Estimated by OLS with Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance.The data are monthly and cover the period 1st 
January 1996 to 30th June 2011. 
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on 
small-size stock portfolio;  SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment.  D1 = 1 when                     and 
zero otherwise; D2 = 1 when                    and zero otherwise. 
Fi, i = 1,…,5, are F tests for the asymmetric effects of UK market sentiment and institutional sentiment: in different market 
conditions. F1:      .  F2:      . F3:   
    
   
   ;   where    
    
 is    when                   and   
    is     when       
           .  F4:   
    
   
   , where    
    
 is    when                   and   
    is     when                  .  
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level.  
 Rbig Rmid 
Rsmall 
 
     
              
     
              
     
              
     
              
     
              
     
              
α0 
2.9062 
(1.1970) 
-2.2601** 
(-2.2384) 
0.8040 
(0.3481) 
-1.6951 
(-0.8860) 
1.3936 
(0.5168) 
-2.4195 
(-1.1074) 
Rt-1 
-0.2643 
(-1.6202) 
-0.0024 
(-0.0287) 
0.1323 
(1.3422) 
-0.0174 
(-0.1675) 
0.3508*** 
(2.9249) 
0.0502 
(0.5767) 
SENTt 
-0.0360 
(-0.6259) 
-0.0119 
(-0.1148) 
-0.0831 
(-1.1307) 
0.0780 
(0.7210) 
-0.0796 
(-0.8592) 
0.1565 
(1.1986) 
SENTt-1 
-0.0088 
(-0.1404) 
0.0518 
(0.6553) 
0.0500 
(0.7447) 
-0.0101 
(-0.1111) 
0.0502 
(0.6098) 
-0.1093 
(-0.8935) 
SENT
P
 t 
-2.1489 
(-1.2171) 
-0.1257 
(-0.0866) 
-2.7540 
(-1.2422) 
-0.5163 
(-0.3343) 
-2.9516 
(-1.1211) 
-1.7465 
(-0.9157) 
SENT
P
 t-
1 
1.4409 
(0.8868) 
0.9265 
(0.7826) 
1.8829 
(0.9679) 
-0.2309 
(-0.1308) 
1.2907 
(0.5783) 
1.5030 
(0.7439) 
AAIIt 
0.0116 
(0.4881) 
0.0212 
(0.9291) 
0.0164 
(0.5800) 
0.0079 
(0.2941) 
0.0253 
(0.7682) 
0.0051 
(0.1755) 
AAIIt-1 
-0.0004 
(-0.0154) 
0.0055 
(0.2601) 
0.0137 
(0.5431) 
0.0207 
(0.8158) 
0.0052 
(0.1974) 
0.0471* 
(1.8558) 
IIt 
0.1460*** 
(3.0011) 
0.2803*** 
(6.3227) 
0.1931*** 
(3.2063) 
0.3348*** 
(4.4892) 
0.1287** 
(2.0690) 
0.3276*** 
(3.7255) 
IIt-1 
-0.1298*** 
(-3.1893) 
-0.2580*** 
(-6.2171) 
-0.1037* 
(-1.7911) 
-0.2705*** 
(-4.9133) 
-0.0514 
(-0.8542) 
-0.2772*** 
(-4.3702) 
F1 1.6723 0.0767 1.7362 0.3027 1.3361 1.2025 
F2 0.9358 1.0022 1.0260 0.0005 0.2541 0.7660 
F3 4.1459** 2.0942 3.1995* 
F4 4.5336** 4.1283** 6.2570** 
Adj-R
2
 0.288981 0.2649 0.2673 
S.E. 3.609076 4.5377 5.0347 
AIC 5.5076 5.9656 6.1734 
LM test 1.2992 0.7412 1.6145* 
ARCH 4.3331** 2.4108* 0.2561 
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There are several differences between the results from weekly and monthly frequencies. 
Estimated coefficients in weekly frequency indicate that US individual sentiment has an 
effect on the return of UK large stocks under both high and low market sentiment 
conditions. Coefficients in monthly frequency, however, do not display the same effect. 
Another difference is that UK market sentiment also affects returns of large stocks in 
weekly frequency when the market wide sentiment is high, while there is no effect on 
returns in the monthly frequency. Individual investors are more like change their 
sentiment quicker than institutional investor sentiment. The effect of this change on 
return appears as the reverse effect in a shorter time span. In weekly frequency, it 
shows that the effect of US individual sentiment reverses straightaway in the next 
period, but it takes a longer time for US institutional sentiment effect to reverse. The 
effect of US institutional sentiment is more likely to be persistent in the short term.             
 
For returns of medium stocks (Table 3.21) estimated coefficients display very similar 
picture as returns of large stocks. Current and US institutional sentiment influences 
returns no matter whether the overall UK market sentiment is high or low. Coefficients 
of UK market and institutional sentiment, and US individual sentiment have little 
influence on returns of UK medium stocks under both high and low market sentiment 
conditions. Hypothesis tests suggest that US institutional sentiment may have an 
asymmetric effect on returns of UK medium stocks under high and low market 
sentiment.  
 
For small stocks (Table 3.21), estimated coefficients suggest that returns of UK small 
stocks are only affected by current US institutional sentiment when UK market wide 
sentiment is high. When UK market wide sentiment is low, current and lagged US 
institutional sentiment, as well as lagged US individual sentiment have impact on 
returns of small stocks. However, US individual sentiment has a much less significant 
impact compared to US institutional sentiment. This is quite different from the 
estimated results from weekly regression. In weekly frequency, coefficients suggest 
that US individual sentiment has a persistent effect of returns of UK small stocks when 
market wide sentiment is high. When market sentiment is low, US individual still 
affects returns highly significantly; however, the effect is reversed immediately in the 
following week. This may be the reason that in the monthly regression, US individual 
affect is persistent but at a very low significance level, i.e. over a relatively long 
interval, US individual sentiment is not reversed completely. UK investor sentiment has 
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little influence on returns of UK small stocks under both high and low market condition. 
The asymmetric effect tests indicate that US institutional sentiment has an asymmetric 
effect on returns of UK small stocks.   
 
From the regressions of returns among all size of stocks, it shows that US institutional 
sentiment has some explanatory power on UK equity returns no matter whether UK 
market wide sentiment is high or low and the effects can be asymmetric under different 
market sentiment conditions. When market wide sentiment is low, returns of small 
stocks are affected by US individual sentiment. All size stocks are likely not to be 
affected by either UK market sentiment or UK institutional sentiment regardless of 
what the market sentiment condition is. This generally confirms the finding that UK 
investor sentiment has very little explanatory power over UK equities, and in many 
cases, the influence of UK investors’ sentiment on returns is more likely to be via US 
investors’ sentiment.   
3.13    Conclusion 
In this chapter, the effects of foreign and local investor sentiment on UK equity returns 
are investigated using both weekly and monthly data. First, a set of practical investor 
sentiment indices is constructed to make separate measures of UK market wide investor 
sentiment and UK institutional investor sentiment. Prior literature and available 
sentiment indices focus on the United States: very few sentiment indices have been 
constructed for UK investor sentiment. They based on the Baker and Wurger (2006) 
approach, and are on annual and weekly frequencies. The UK market wide investor 
sentiment composed in this paper, although not the first, is a more comprehensive one. 
Combining the approaches of Brown and Cliff (2004) and Baker and Wurger (2006), 
the index is constructed by including a wider range of investor sentiment proxies. 
Moreover, the UK institutional sentiment index is one of the very few composed 
indices which measure institutional investor sentiment and it is the first one for UK 
institutional sentiment.  
 
Secondly, the composed UK investor sentiment measures are examined against US and 
European investor sentiment measures. This reveals that UK investor sentiment is 
heavily influenced by US and European investor sentiment. US individual and 
institutional sentiment, and European sentiment all have the power to predict UK 
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market sentiment, and US institutional sentiment has a greater effect on UK market 
sentiment than does US individual sentiment. UK institutional sentiment, on the other 
hand co-moves with US investor sentiment, and it is also affected by European investor 
sentiment. 
 
Thirdly, the impact of investor sentiment on asset returns segregated by stock size is 
examined. It shows that returns on portfolios based on different sizes of stock are 
affected by different groups of investor sentiment over different investment intervals. In 
the weekly interval, returns of stocks are influenced by US individual and institutional 
sentiments regardless of the size difference. Reverse effect appears as return reversal in 
the following periods after initial sentiment affects the return. The reversal effect of 
institutional sentiment takes a relatively longer time than individual sentiment has for 
large and medium stocks, but for returns of small stock, it is individual sentiment that 
takes a longer time to reverse. In the monthly interval, returns of large stocks are 
influenced by US institutional sentiment. Returns of medium stock returns are affected 
by both US institutional sentiment and European institutional sentiment. Returns of 
small size stocks are influenced by UK, US and European institutional sentiments. The 
direct impact of foreign investor sentiment on UK equity returns is studied, as a large 
proportion of UK equities are held by foreign investors, and we find that UK equity 
returns are influenced heavily by US investor sentiment and hardly at all by local 
investor sentiment.  The sentiment impact across different financial crisis stages is also 
examined. The results demonstrate that price bubbles may to some degree be caused by 
investor sentiment, and that a financial crisis may be a process of price reversal back to 
the fundamental.  
 
Sentiment effects on UK equity returns are also examined under different market 
sentiment conditions. The results show that in the weekly interval, returns of stocks can 
be affected by investor sentiment when market sentiment is generally high. Returns of 
large stocks are more likely to be influenced by UK market sentiment as well as US 
individual and institutional sentiment. Returns of medium and small stocks are largely 
influenced by US individual and institutional sentiment.  The effects US individual 
sentiment on UK equity returns are asymmetric and it appears that individual sentiment 
has a greater impact on returns when market sentiment is low. In the monthly interval, 
US institutional sentiment has some explanatory power on UK equity returns no matter 
whether UK market wide sentiment is high or low. The effects can be asymmetric for 
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large and small stocks. When market wide sentiment is low, returns of small stocks are 
affected by US individual sentiment. 
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Chapter 4    Institutional Investor Herding 
4.1    Introduction 
Herding is typically described as a behavioural tendency for an individual to follow the 
actions of others. It can be defined as ‘…the phenomenon of individuals deciding to 
follow others and imitating group behaviours rather than deciding independently and 
atomistically on the basis of their own, private information.’ (Baddeley, 2010, p282). 
The experimental evidence in social psychology suggests that individuals always abide 
by the group decision even when they perceive the group to be wrong (Sherif and 
Murphy (1936); Trade and Parsons (1903)). Investors, much like every human being, 
dwell in societies amongst other people with whom they interact. By observing other 
market participants, they may agree with the course of action from observation and 
choose to follow it. This convergence of opinions combined with convergence in trades 
leads to investor herd behaviour.  
 
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) suggested that herding can be either a rational or 
irrational form of investor behaviour.  Rational form of herding is generated by using 
information about other’s actions and making sequential decisions following Bayes’ 
rule. It is fostered by information cascades, reputation concerns and compensation 
structures. Baddeley (2010) argues that the outcome generated by Bayesian models can 
be good or bad depending on whether the actions of predecessors send down the correct 
or incorrect track. The learning from other’s actions involves a cognitive process of 
information. The reputation concerns of herding corresponds what Keynes (1936) 
observed ‘…it is better to be conventionally wrong than unconventionally right’ 
(Baddeley, 2010, p282). Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) also point out that theoretical 
work on herding behavioural indicates that some irrational phenomena can actually 
arise very naturally in a fully rational setting. Irrational herding, on the other hand, is 
suggested as an outcome of a process which sociological, psychological and emotional 
factors are given a role in the decision making.  
 
An investor is influenced by others in investments decisions and financial transactions. 
Such influence may be entirely rational, and it can be irrational perhaps due to a ‘herd 
instinct’ in the investor’s decision-making, or an emotional response to information.    
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Financial markets are highly active and competitive. Market participants trade based on 
their own perceptions of risks and opportunities, the expected prices, and predicted 
returns. The price of securities is believed to be affected by the interactions of the 
trading activities of investors who hold heterogeneous beliefs, preferences, and trading 
strategies. When rational arbitrageurs meet bounded rational or irrational noise traders 
in the market, they trade on the fundamental information, simultaneously adjusting their 
trading strategies to react to other market participants. The unpredictable nature of 
noise traders’ sentiment may stretch the mispricing further after arbitrageurs bet against 
the mispricing, and such risk can stop rational traders taking the opposite position 
against the noise traders to correct the mispricing. Rather, they may take the position in 
the same direction as sentiment investors, which could result in persistent mispricing 
staying unadjusted.   
 
Welch (2000) pointed out that the incentives for investors to adopt herd behaviour can 
be varied. Utility interaction, sanction on deviants, positive payoff externalities, 
informational externalities, principal-agent payoff externalities, and irrational agent 
behaviour are typically theories that show the incentive to adopt herd behaviour. 
However, in the empirical applications, it is very difficult to discriminate such fine 
differences between the theories. Therefore the empirical studies focus on whether 
similar investment decisions are taking place in financial markets rather than test a 
particular theory.  
4.2    Herding Theories 
Herd behaviour in financial markets is often interpreted as investors chasing the trends 
and fads of the markets and trading on the same side of the market at a certain time. 
The academic literature is rich in models outlining the rationale of herding, information 
cascades, or feedback trading. According to the forces that drive investors into herding, 
the mechanisms can be generally summarised as: information difference, principal-
agent relationship and investors’ sentiment.  
 
Information-driven herding behaviour, ‘informational externalities’ in Welch (2000), 
occurs because investors believe that ‘others’ may have some important information 
about the returns and this is revealed by their actions (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et 
al., 1992; and Shiller, 1995). Investors face similar investment decisions under 
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uncertainty. Each of them has private information about the correct course of action, 
but the private information is not observable. Individual investors, therefore, observe 
each other’s actions in conjecturing the return information or signal which may be 
useful. Herding behaviour arises in this setting. Under such circumstances herd 
behaviour is the outcome of information inefficiency rather than the incentive problems 
inherent in the principal-agent relationship.  
 
Principal-agent relationship based herding behaviour, referred to as ‘principal-agent 
payoff externalities’ in Welch (2000), is relevant for professionals as a result of the 
incentives provided by the compensation scheme or in order to maintain their 
reputation. The professionals are fund managers who make investments on behalf of 
others or analysts who provide analytical information to investors. The uncertainties 
about the stock picking skill and portfolio managing ability of investment managers 
raise concerns from both the investors and the money managers. The reward scheme 
and terms of employment provide the incentives of the agents to imitate (Scharfstein & 
Stein, 1990; Trueman, 1994; Graham, 1999; Brennan, 1990; Zwiebel, 1995; and Maug 
& Naik, 1996).  
 
On one hand, the ability of fund managers to pick the ‘right’ stocks (or analysts’ 
recommendation), is always assessed by confirming the portfolio with other investment 
professionals. The manager will be considered as high ability if they have picked 
similar stocks as others. This encourages managers to form investment portfolios by 
imitating others rather than according to their own information (Bikhchandani & 
Sharma, 2001). Under such a mechanism, Scharfstein & Stein (1990) developed a 
‘learning’ model in which managers herd on the investment decisions of others with the 
incentive of manipulating the labour market’s inference regarding their own ability.  
 
On the other hand, having learnt about the ability of the managers, investors update 
their beliefs and take appropriate action in which relative performance evaluation is 
introduced. It is believed to be optimal for the principal (i.e. employer of the investment 
manager) to write a relative performance contract to maximise a weighted sum of the 
principal’s and the agent’s utility. When the compensation of the investment manager 
depends on his/her investment performance compared with that of other similar 
professionals, investment managers tend to ignore their own information and “go with 
the flow” (Maug & Naik, 1996). In their models, Maug and Naik (1996) consider a 
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risk-averse agent investor whose compensation depends on the performance of his/her 
own investment portfolio relative to the performance of a benchmark. The benchmark 
can be the performance of a separate group of investors or the return of an appropriate 
index. When both the agent and the benchmark have imperfect private information 
about asset returns, information inefficiency can be one of the reasons for the agent to 
imitate the benchmark in that his/her optimal investment portfolio moves closer to the 
benchmark’s after observing the benchmark’s actions. The relative performance 
compensation contract provides additional incentives for an agent to imitate the 
benchmark. The fact that the investment manager’s compensation will decrease if the 
investment portfolio underperforms the benchmark would cause the agent to skew the 
investments even more closely towards the benchmark’s portfolio.   
 
Reputational considerations are also relevant to agency-concerns as they may lead to 
professional herd behaviour. A professional with a strong reputation has an incentive to 
imitate others in order preserve his/her reputation and the one with a weak reputation 
may use herding as a means of free riding on the reputation of better-reputed peers. 
Therefore professionals tend to exhibit similarities by adhering to the line of the 
‘opinion leaders’ or the perceived majority. Trueman (1994) reveals that analysts 
release forecasts similar to those previously announced by other analysts, even when 
this is not justified by their own information. Welch (2000) points out that an analyst’s 
recommendations revision has a significant positive influence on the next two analyst’s 
revisions, especially when short-run ex-post stock returns are accurately predicted by 
the revision and if the most recent revision has occurred more recently, the influence is 
even stronger.  
 
The sentiment based approach demonstrates the mechanism of intentional herding 
behaviour by individuals who are not fully rational. Papers include Delong et al. (1990), 
Froot et al. (1992), Hirshleifer et al. (1994), Grinblatt et al. (1995) and Lux & Marchesi 
(1999). They model herd behaviour under two basic noise trader theory assumptions: (i) 
some investors are sentiment driven (i.e. not fully rational); (ii) arbitrage is risky and 
hence limited. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992), FSS henceforth, show that investors 
have exogenous short horizons and seek information held by other traders. They may 
ignore information about the fundamental value of the asset and herd on a subset of 
information because information spillover is positive in the short-horizon. This means 
that when fundamental information has not been incorporated into prices, a trader is 
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made better off by trading on the same information as others. The model illustrates that 
the marginal return from trading increases when speculators liquidate their holding 
before the fundamental information is realized because more news about the same part 
of fundamental information that the speculators trade on is priced in the market.  
 
Instead of timing market liquidity as in FSS model, Hirshleifer et al. (1994) assume that 
private information is received either early or later by investors. The sequential nature 
of arrival of private information has a significant effect on both the trading decisions 
and the types of information being collected. The model suggests that the trades of 
early-informed traders are positively correlated with the private information before it 
arrives to the late-informed traders, and negatively correlated after it arrives to the late-
informed traders. The trades of the late-informed traders are positively correlated with 
the previous period trades of the early-informed traders, and the risky asset price moves 
are positively correlated with the private information. These indicate that the early-
informed traders can make a profit by reversing their position when late-informed 
traders start to trade on the same information and it becomes more pronounced as the 
proportion of late-informed traders increases.  
4.3    Positive feedback models 
The time-variation of information and market liquidity also implies that investors can 
sometimes profit by herding on private information or noise traders’ systematic 
sentiment. DeLong et al. (1990) demonstrate that speculative investors tacitly 
coordinate their trades based on anticipating the positive feedback trader trades of noise 
investors. Positive feedback traders tend to chase the price trends, they buy securities 
when prices rise and sell when they fall (i.e. momentum).  
 
As shown in Figure 4.1, in anticipation of such price herd behaviour, speculators buy 
more today, reflecting good news, and so drive prices up higher. Positive feedback 
traders, then buy the securities in response to the price increase. This may keep the 
price above fundamentals even as speculators sell out the securities and make profit. 
The speculators betting on positive feedback traders’ trend chasing behaviour rather 
than the asset fundamentals, leads the price change in response to the news to be 
temporarily greater than the news warranted, i.e. the price overreacts to the news and 
deviates from the fundamentals. By taking advantage of the short-horizon extrapolation 
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of positive feedback traders, speculators can increase their overall profits, and drive the 
asset price away from its fundamental value.   
 
Figure 4.1
26
: Price effect with positive feedback traders. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
This figure shows that anticipating feedback traders’ price trend tracing strategy, speculators overreact to 
the news and push the price away from its fundamental level. 
 
Boco, Germain, & Rousseau (2010) further introduce informed overconfident traders 
into DeLong et al., (1990)’s model to look at how overconfident traders exploit the 
presence of feedback traders. Consistent with DeLong at al., (1990), the four period 
model shows that in the presence of positive feedback traders, neither rational informed 
nor overconfident informed traders can stabilise security prices while they exploit the 
positive feedback trader’s present in the market. The model also indicates that the main 
source of excess volatility is due to the trading from feedback traders rather than that of 
overconfident traders.  The excess volatility depends critically on the number of 
feedback traders in the market. 
                                               
2 Source of original: Daniel, Hirshleifer & Subrahmanyam (1998),  page 1847 
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4.4    Herding: Empirical Evidence 
In the market setting, herding behaviours are characterised by investors suppressing 
their own beliefs and basing their investment decisions solely on the collective actions 
of the market, even if they disagree with them. This can be an investment strategy 
based on mimicking other market participants’ actions or the market consensus. The 
consequences of herd behaviour will be reflected either in an aggregate level in asset 
returns or a micro level in investors’ accounts, or both.  
 
The return-base suggests that herd behaviour reflects on returns in that the individual 
stock returns tend to cluster around the average market return.  Thus, examining the 
cross-sectional dispersion of returns can detect herd behaviour in the markets.  In this 
level, herding is measured in two ways: one is the dispersion of individual asset returns 
to those of the overall market portfolio; the other is the deviation of the asset biases’ 
betas from the CAPM betas.  Cross section dispersion measures are generally used as 
the media to examine herding behaviour in the market which can be referred to as 
indirect measures. They focus on the price implication of herding is based on financial 
theories. Stock returns data is widely available and in higher frequencies such as daily 
and weekly. The links between theories and the measures, however, can be quite weak 
and subject to different interpretations. They generally measure the collective behaviour 
of all participants in the markets and do not discriminate between one group of 
investors and the other.  
 
The micro-level of herding investigation is based on the assumption that herding 
investors trade on the same stock (or same group of stocks) in the same direction at the 
same period. Therefore, examining trade order imbalance is used to detect herd 
behaviour directly by measuring the number of buyers and sellers active or the 
monetary value of the trades during a given period.   These measures enable the 
investigation of herd behaviour by groups, such as institutional and individual investors. 
Stock fundamentals are likely to cause investors to buy or sell the same stock (group of 
stocks) at the same time which may generate significant order imbalance and be 
presented as herding evidence. It is, therefore, difficult to distinguish the source of 
herding by this measure. The measure also needs detailed investors’ trading or holding 
data which, in practice, is limited in availability and perhaps in very low frequency, 
such as quarterly and/or half –year data.          
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4.4.1. Return-based herding 
Christie and Huang (1995) (CH) use daily and monthly data to test for herd behaviour 
at the industry-level as well as at aggregate market level in the US. The extreme returns 
are defined as those lying one or five percent standard deviations from the period's 
(1962-1988 for daily and 1925-1988 for monthly) market-mean. Using the linear model 
framework presented later, CH document an absence of herd behaviour, as the cross-
sectional dispersion of stocks was found to be increasing irrespective of the extreme 
returns being positive or negative. However, the increase in dispersion was found to be 
greater during extreme up versus extreme down market periods, indicating perhaps a 
sign of herd behaviour during the extreme down market periods.  
 
Chang, Cheng, and Khorana (2000) (CCK) utilised the modified model incorporating 
the nonlinearities and asymmetry of direction  to test for the presence of herd 
behaviours in US, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan equity markets. The 
results are mixed. Similarly to CH, they document an absence of herding in the US 
equity market.  Neither did the Hong Kong market display investors herding behaviour. 
However, partial evidence of herding in Japan was documented and significant proof of 
herding in the two emerging markets, South Korea and Taiwan. Much like CH, CCK 
also found a higher rate of increase in the cross-sectional returns’ dispersion during up- 
versus down-market.  
 
Using daily price series of thirteen commodity futures contracts traded on three 
European exchanges, Gleason, Lee and Mathur (2003) employ CH method to document 
the absence of herd behaviour, and the cross-section return dispersion appears more 
uniform during extreme up periods compared to extreme down periods. Gleason, 
Mathur and Peterson (2004) utilise intraday Exchange Traded Funds data and apply CH 
and CCK methods. They again cannot find evidence of herd behaviour during extreme 
markets and again, they find a higher rate of increase in the cross-section return 
dispersion during extreme up markets as opposed to extreme down ones.  
 
Caporale, Economou, & Philippas (2008) utilise CH and CCK measures to examine 
daily, weekly and monthly returns of stocks traded in the Athens Stock Exchange. They 
document the absence of herd behaviour during extreme market period, but evidence of 
herding over the whole sample period (1998-2007) for all three time intervals. Their 
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findings also indicate that herding is stronger during periods of a rising market versus 
falling one.  
 
Hwang and Salmon’s (2004) (HS) empirical studies of US and South Korean markets 
document highly persistent herd behaviour in both markets. The results on the US 
market here are quite different from those of CH and CCK. At the same time, HS 
extend the investigation of herding towards other factors, such as, size (small minus big, 
SMB), value (book-to-market high minus low, HML), and factors of Fama and French 
(1993), and document factor herd behaviour in both the US and South Korean markets.  
 
Demirer and Kutan (2006) use both individual firm and sector-level data to examine 
herd behaviour in Chinese stock markets by applying CH approach. They document the 
absence of herding during extreme markets, but their findings indicate a higher cross-
sectional returns' dispersion during extreme up-markets in opposition to the extreme 
down-markets. Tan, Chiang, Mason & Nelling (2008), however, apply a CCK measure 
on Chinese dual-listed stocks and find the presence of herding behaviours in the 
Chinese markets. Their findings also indicate that herd behaviour is more pronounced 
in the rising markets.      
 
Caparelli, D’Arcangelis and Cassuto (2004) apply the methods of CH, CCK and HS to 
test for herding on the COMIT index in Italy. Their studies generate fairly mixed results. 
The CH approach provides no evidence of herd behaviour during extreme periods, 
which is in line with Christie and Huang (1995), Chang, Cheng, and Khorana (2000), 
Gleason, Mathur and Peterson (2004), Caporale, Economou, & Philippas (2008) and 
Tan, Chiang, Mason & Nelling (2008). The findings indicate that cross-section return 
dispersion is higher in the extreme up-market versus extreme down-market. CCK 
approach, however, reveals that herding evidence has been found in both global sample 
and size-verified subsamples. The HS approach confirms the presence of herding 
behaviour in the market.  Finally, Demirer, Kutan and Chen (2010) employ CH, CCK 
and HS methods to examine daily returns of stocks traded on the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange. They document the absence of herding in most sectors except the 
Electronics sector during market extreme periods. Their findings also indicate a non-
linear and decreasing relation between return dispersion and the market return, 
suggesting herd behaviour in the market. The herding effect is more likely to be 
prominent during falling markets.     
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4.4.2. Micro-level accounts-based herding 
In the micro-level, studies employ individual account data test for herd behaviour.  
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), LSV henceforth, propose the standard order 
imbalance measures, which are calculated based on the number of institutional buyers 
related to the number of institutional sellers of a given stock or industry group at the 
same time. They calculate the order imbalance for each stock-quarter in their 769 US 
equity funds sample during the 1985-1989 period and find an inverse relationship 
between fund herding and stock-size in US market; that is, that funds herd to a greater 
degree in smaller capitalisation stocks. Grinblatt, Timan and Warmers(1995) studies 
US mutual funds between 1974 and 1984 and finds very weak evidence of funds 
tending to buy and sell the same stocks at the same time. In the mean time, their 
investigations reveal that majority mutual funds tend to buy past ‘winners’ but do not 
systematically sell past ‘losers’. Wermers (1999) further examine 20 years (1975-1994) 
of U.S. mutual fund data and found a fairly low but slightly higher level herding than 
pension fund on average stocks.  
 
Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999) and Hong and Yi (2006) also applied LSV measure and 
found various levels of herding in the Korean equity market by employing different 
frequencies of data: daily versus monthly.  Choe et al (1999) show that foreign funds 
herd less during the Asian Crisis compared to the normal periods, while Hong and Yi 
(2006) find that the concurrent relation between the degree of the herding of fund 
managers and stock returns is positive from the buy side of trades and is negative from 
the sell side of trades. Wylie (2005) also found evidence of herding in U.K. equity 
mutual funds by testing through LSV measures. Positive-feedback trading was also 
tested by examining the relationship between the demand of a stock and the past 
performance of it, and the result shows some evidence of positive-feedback trading in 
small stocks, but not in large stocks. Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2009), on the other hand, 
extend the studies by employing eighteen years (1983-2001) US security markets and 
two brokerages data. They show that the imbalance of buyer and seller initiated small 
trades, suggesting strong herding by individual investors. 
 
Return-based herding studies generate very mixed results. The method that measures 
herding via extreme market condition seems to point towards the absence of herding 
during extreme market periods and suggests that turbulent periods discourage herding. 
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This may be due to the lack of a definitive market direction as Hwang and Salmon 
(2004) explain. However, the relationship between return dispersion and market 
provides evidence of herding in financial markets. The results of the examination of 
dispersion of time varying beta appear particularly to indicate that herding exists in 
both emerging and developed markets. Micro-level account based herding 
investigations provide results indicating the existence of herding in markets amongst 
market participants, irrespective of their classification, more so in emerging capital 
markets.        
4.4.3. Institutional herding VS Individual herding 
In the global financial markets, institutional investors play an ever-increasing role. For 
example, the shares of common equities held by investment institutions in the US have 
increased from 32% to 68% of total market value from 1980 to 2007 (Lewellen 
(2009))
27
, and in China increased from 5% to 48.7% between 2002 and 2007(BSR 
2009)
28. Whether institutional investors’ decisions and subsequent trading strategies are 
rational or not has become a vital factor in studying financial market anomalies and 
puzzles. 
 
Individual investors are expected to exhibit a greater tendency to herd than institutional 
investors, as they often have limited access to information due to the costs (both 
financial and non-financial) of gathering and processing information. It is prudent and 
perhaps even rational for individual investors to assume that others know more than 
they do and to make their trading decisions based on the actions of the crowd. 
Moreover, because of the lack of information picking and analysis skills, individual 
investors are more likely be attracted by attention catching information and be 
influenced by other people’s opinions. Their investment decisions are made, more or 
less based on intuition, feeling and mood, and psychological biases may amplify 
existing herding intentions among individuals.  
 
                                               
4Sources come from quarterly 13F filings compiled by Thomson Financial. 
5“Sustainable Investment on China 2009 Overview”, and data sources come from CSRC, “China Capital 
Markets Development Report”   
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An alternative perspective is that herd behaviour is more likely to be in vogue among 
institutional investors, and the scale and scope of herding are greater than individual 
investors. There are several theoretical foundations leading to institutional investor herd 
behaviour. Firstly, in order to build or maintain reputation, institutional investors (i.e. 
fund managers) may herd in the crowd (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Trueman 1994). 
As discussed in section 4.2, principal-agent relationship promotes the incentive of 
institutional investors to mimic others’ decisions and trading strategies. Secondly, 
institutional investors know more about each others’ trades since they are able to 
allocate sufficient of resources to study the market and their peers, at the same time, 
their trades are more visible to others, due to the size of the trade volumes, and the 
disclosure of holding position which is required by regulation. They may infer 
information from the prior actions of peer group agents and herd as a result (Shiller and 
Pound, 1989; Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Thirdly, correlated private 
information, such as analysts’ recommendations, are more likely to reach institutions 
than reach individuals. Institutional fund managers end up favouring the same indicator 
and trading on the same side of the market (Froot et al., 1992; Hirshleifer et al., 1994). 
 
The above two hypotheses lead to two primary streams of empirical herding study. One 
stream concentrates on investigating individual investor herding. The other stream 
focuses on the behaviour of institutional investors. The studies for institutional herding 
primarily try to find herding evidence in the micro-level by measuring the imbalance in 
the number of buyers to sellers in one particular stock (or group stocks). 
 
Empirically, evidence of herding by fund managers has been found in both developed 
equity markets, like the U.S, UK, and Japan, and emerging equity markets, such as 
Korea, Taiwan, and China (Lakonishok et al. (1992), Grinblatt et al (1995), Wermers 
(1999), Wylie (2005), Choe et al. (1999), Chang et al (2000) and Liao et al.(2011)). 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) find that the US pension funds herd in smaller stocks but herd 
much less in large stocks. Grinblatt, Timan and Warmers(1995) studies US mutual 
funds and find very weak evidence of funds herding on buying and selling of the same 
stocks. Wermers (1999) further find a fairly low but slightly higher level of herding 
than pension funds on average stocks. Choe et al. (1999) and Hong and Yi (2006) find 
various levels of herding in the Korean equity market and Wylie (2005) Agudo, Sarto 
and Vicente (2008) find herding in U.K. and Spanish equity funds respectively.  
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Claudio& Schmukler (2012) found evidence of institutional herding by studying 
Chile’s pension funds.  
 
Indeed, institutional investors often engage in transactions which are similar to other 
institutions. Hirshleifer et al. (1994) indicated that institutional investors tend to 
investigate and trade the same group of stocks, in other words, they buy or sell the same 
stocks at roughly the same time. With the increasing number and size of institutional 
investors involved, their transactions may have a significant impact on stock price, 
volatility and return (Campbell, Lettau and Xu, 2001; Bennett, Sias and Starks, 2003). 
Nofsinger and Sias (1999) investigated the relationship between stock returns and the 
fraction of shares held by institutional investors by applying US NYSE 20 year’s data 
(1977-1996). They found that the stocks which institutional investors purchase 
subsequently outperform those they sell, and institutional herding is positively 
correlated with lag return and appears to be related to stock return momentum. There 
also appears to be a positive relationship between annual changes in institutional 
ownership and returns, which suggests that institutional investors engage in a greater 
level of positive feedback trading than individual investors, and their herding has a 
larger price impact.  
 
Compared with institutional investors, individual investors often are referred to as 
ignorant and uninformed investors trading on sentiment. The information they are able 
to access is limited and they are more likely be influenced by other people’s opinions, 
such as, brokerage house recommendations, popular market gurus and forecasters. 
Practically, individual investors are more likely to engage in irrational positive 
feedback trading because they extrapolate by past growth rates (Lakonishok, et al, 
1994). Applying Australian data for the period 1991-2002, Jackson (2003) uses an 
order imbalance measure based on net flows into or out of the equity market to explore 
the patterns in the trades of investors both in aggregate market level and cross-sectional 
level. He found at both levels, systematic correlations hold for both the trade number 
and the trade volume of individual investors, and the relationship is consistent over the 
observation period, which provides evidence of the herding of individual investors. 
Barber, et al (2009) study results suggest strong herding by individual investors, who 
predominantly buy (or sell) the same stocks as each other during the same period. The 
study also shows that the stocks heavily bought by individual investors one week earn 
strong returns in the same and the subsequent week, and vice versa.    
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4.5    Methods to measure herding 
Christie & Huang (1995) (CH henceforth) uses cross-sectional standard deviation 
(CSSD)
29
 and cross-sectional absolute deviation (CSAD)
30
 to quantify the dispersion of 
asset returns. The rationale of their model is that a rise in herding would be imprinted 
into a decline of dispersion of returns. CH also point out that a low dispersion can be 
contributed to by other factors, such as a lack of new information in the market. They 
suggested that herd behaviours are more likely to be present during market stress 
periods, i.e. the price movements are more extreme. They isolated the level of 
dispersion of equity returns,   , in the extreme tails of the distribution of market returns, 
using the time series model: 
         
      
        (4.1) 
  is CSSD or CSAD.   
 and  
  are dummy variable defined as follows: if the market 
return on day   lies in the extreme lower tail of the distribution,   
   ; otherwise it is 
equal to zero. If the market return on day   lies in the extreme upper tail of the 
distribution,   
   ; otherwise it is equal to zero. Statistically significant negative 
values of    and    indicate the presence of herd behaviour, and    denotes the average 
dispersion of the sample excluding the regions covered by the two dummy variables.  
 
Chang, Cheng, and Khorana (2000), CCK henceforth, modified the Christie and Huang 
(1995) model to examine the relationship between CSAD and the market portfolio 
return,   , to study herd behaviour. Applying a conditional version of Black (1972) 
CAPM
31
, they define the average Absolute Value of the Deviation (AVD) as: 
                        (4.2) 
                                               
29      
       
  
   
   
, where    is the observed return on stock  ,    is the cross-sectional average return of the 
portfolio, and   is the number of stocks in the portfolio. 
30     
       
 
   
 
, where    is the observed return on stock  ,   is the cross-sectional average return of the portfolio, 
and   is the number of stocks in the portfolio. 
31 expected return of any asset,  , at time   is:                      
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  is the return on zero-beta portfolio,     is the systematic risk of asset  , and    is the 
systematic risk of an equally-weighted market portfolio, i.e.    
 
 
   
 
   . The 
expected CSAD is: 
      
 
 
                
 
     (4.3) 
CSAD and    are then used as proxies for the unobservable expected CSAD and 
return of market portfolio respectively. The increasing and linear relation between 
dispersion and the market expected returns can be revealed by deriving first and second 
order differentiation
32
.  
 The rational asset pricing models predict that dispersions are an increasing function of 
the market return and also the relation is linear. If individual participants tend to follow 
aggregate market behaviour then the linear and increasing relation between dispersion 
and market return will no longer hold.  Therefore the model is: 
                         
 
                                                    
Since CSAD is the absolute value of dispersion of return, the absolute term of market 
returns,     , are also used to examine the positive linear relation. The square power of 
     examines the non-linear relation.      
 
The modified model incorporates the possibility of nonlinearities in the market as well 
as directional asymmetry, i.e. different degree responses of herding in up- versus down 
markets:  
     
       
       
      
       
   
 
       (4.5) 
     
         
         
        
         
     
 
     (4.6) 
     
    (     
     ) is the absolute value of an equally-weighted realised return of all 
available securities on day  , when market is up(down). The investors expected return 
would be a less than proportional increase (or decrease) in the CSAD measure if there 
                                               
32 First order differentiating equation 4.3:  
      
      
 
 
 
        
 
     . The second order 
differentiation of equation 4.3 is: 
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is herd behaviour during market stress periods. The return dispersions will decrease or 
increase at a decreasing rate with an increase in market return if severe herding is 
present. During market stress periods, herd behaviour would result in a non-linear 
relation between CSAD and the average market return, and this will be captured by a 
negative and statically significant   .    
 
Hwang & Salmon (2004), (HS) on the other hand argue that neither the CH nor CCK 
method has included any device to control for movements in fundamentals, therefore, it 
is impossible to identify whether the causes for the decrease in return dispersions are 
herding behaviours or just the adjustment to fundamentals. They point out that the 
perception of risk return relationship of assets may be distorted if investors are 
influenced by behavioural biases, and it is possible that betas of the stocks will deviate 
from their equilibrium values. Thus beta of a stock does not remain constant but 
changes with the fluctuations of investors’ sentiment. The cross-sectional dispersion of 
betas is expected to be smaller in the presence of herd behaviour. They then propose a 
method to test for herding on the basis of cross-sectional dispersion of the factor-
sensitivity of assets.  
 
A herding parameter,    , which is based on the CAPM equilibrium risk-return 
relationship and is biased by investors herding towards the performance of the market 
portfolio, is introduced to capture herd behaviour present in markets. When herding 
exists in the conventional CAPM, the equilibrium relationship no longer holds and both 
the beta and the expected return will be biased. Therefore given the view of the market 
at time  ,        , the expected asset return following CAPM equilibrium will be: 
                       (4.7) 
Where     is the return on asset   at time       is the market return at time  , and      is 
the systematic risk measure.  
 
The biased expected asset return will be   
  
           
             (4.8) 
Where   
       is the biased short run conditional expectation on the excess returns of 
asset   and     
  is the market’s biased beta of asset   at time  .  
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HS assume that when investors herd towards the return of market portfolio, instead of 
the equilibrium relationship equation (4.7), the following relationship holds:  
  
      
       
     
                     (4.9) 
where     is a latent herding parameter that changes over time.       suggests the 
individual assets move in the same direction with the same magnitude as the market 
portfolio, indicating a perfect herding, and        indicating there is no herding, and 
the equilibrium CAPM applies.        means that some degree of herding exists 
in the market.  
 
The herding behaviour HS try to explore is market-wide rather than a single asset. 
Equation 4.9, therefore, is assumed to hold for all assets, and the cross-sectional mean 
of     
          is always 1. Standard deviation of     
  is: 
 
         
                                                  
                   
 
where      is standard deviation of the cross-section of     
                 is the 
cross-sectional expectation     
             
In order to measure    , HS establish the state space model by taking logarithms of the 
cross-sectional mean of     
 , resulting in: 
             
                  (4.10) 
where        represent the cross-sectional standard deviation,               , 
and                       , where                       and 
            
 ). Assuming a mean zero AR(1) process, this gives: 
                    (4.11) 
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where              
  , and the model can be estimated using the Kalman filter. When 
   
   , the model becomes              
          , which means no herding 
exists, indicating       for all  . The existence of herding can be captured by a 
statistically significant value of    
 . HS also constructed alternative models which 
include other factors, such as market volatility and returns, size and book-to market 
factors, and macroeconomic variables. 
4.6    Conclusion 
Herding, in its simplest terms, is referred to as a group of investors trading in the same 
direction at a certain time. In its broader terms, investors are also identified as herding 
when they follow each other into or out of the same (or same group) of securities over 
same period of time (Sias, 2004). Information inefficiency is clarified as one of the 
drivers of investors herding behaviour. Observing others’ actions to conjecture the 
private information they may have, investors mimic each other’s behaviour. Principal-
agent mechanism herding suggests that the separation of ownership and management of 
investment fund leads to professional investors herding behaviour. The reward scheme, 
term of employment, and measure of assessment promote incentives for fund managers 
to ‘learn’ the investment decisions of others. Noise trader theories assume that some 
investors are sentiment-driven in decision making. Sentiment investors may ignore 
fundamental information and only seek information held by others which leads to the 
investment decisions are made based on the same information as others. DeLong et al. 
(1990) and Boco et al. (2010) demonstrate the price effect with trend tracing positive 
feedback investors.  They suggest that asset price is driven away from its fundamental 
value by speculators taking advantage of herding behaviour of positive feedback traders.   
 
Empirically, there are two major methods used for investigating herding behaviour. 
One of the approaches is to examine the level of individual stock returns clustering 
around the average market return. Cross section of return dispersions are generally used 
as the media to measure herding behaviour in the market. The assumption of this 
approach is that if the positive linear relation between market return and the cross-
section return dispersion, which is suggested by rational asset price model, no longer 
holds there is herding behaviour evidence in the market. Christie & Huang (1995) 
investigate herding behaviour under extreme market conditions and Chang, Cheng and 
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Khorana (2000) examine the possible negative linear or non-linear relation of return 
dispersion and the absolute market returns. Herding evidence in US and UK markets is 
hardly found by these methods, though mixture results are received from investigating 
the markets in other countries. Hwang & Salmon (2004), however, found persistent 
herding behaviour in both US and South Korean markets by examining the cross-
section dispersion of systematic risk (beta) of stocks. These three methods are normally 
used for investigating herding behaviour in market level. They do not discriminate 
between one group of investors and the other, such as individual and institutional 
investors.  
 
Given the leverage of institutional investors in capital markets and the potential for 
destabilisation-inducing herding on their behalf, institutional investors’ behaviours 
attract ever-increasing interest for research from scholars and practicians. Weak 
evidence is found in the study of US and UK funds (Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny, 
1992; Wermers, 1999; Wylie, 2005; and Barber, Odean & Zhu, 2009). The widely used 
method for investigating institutional herding behaviour is to examine herding 
behaviour at the micro-level which measures the imbalance of buying and selling a 
stock by institutional investors. The returns of institutional investor portfolios have 
hardly been examined for the purpose of studying institutional herding behaviour. 
Therefore, in the following chapters, institutional investor portfolio returns are going to 
be examined to investigate herding behaviour of UK institutional investors.   
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Chapter 5    Institutional portfolio herding 
5.1    Introduction 
Amongst the studies of investors’ sentiment and behaviour, institutional investor 
sentiment and herding behaviour are also found in the markets. Evidence suggests that 
they have strong explanatory power over stock price and return. One of the popular 
views holds that institutional herding is primarily responsible for large price 
movements of individual stocks (e.g. Lakonishok et al. (1992)). According to Brown & 
Cliff (2004), institutional sentiment can be one of the sources of strong co-movement of 
stock returns. This also implies that except for agency problems, security characteristics, 
and the manner in which information is incorporated in the market, sentiment may be 
another force for institutional investors engaging in herd behaviour. This has already 
been suggested by Friedman (1984) and Dreman (1979). 
 
Although a recent growing body of literature is devoted to institutional investor herding, 
extant studies take divergent paths. One of the paths depicts investor engagement in 
herding as a result of an irrational but systematic response to fads or sentiment. Another 
path suggests that herd behaviour in the market is a result of agency problems, security 
characteristics, and/or the manner in which information is disseminated in the market. 
One of the consequences of the principle-agent relationship is that agents are evaluated 
by comparing their investment performance to that of their peers or a benchmark. This 
can lead agents, such as fund managers, to suppress their own portfolio picking 
strategies and try to mimic the portfolio of a market ‘winner’ or a generally accepted 
market portfolio in order to keep their investment returns in line with at least the market 
average. There is also ‘hidden index-tracking’ – portfolio managers who charge for 
stock picking will largely track an index. Examining the portfolios of professional 
money managers is therefore one way to approach the study of institutional investors’ 
herding behaviour. In the market-wide herding studies, the dispersions of individual 
asset returns (or betas) to the market portfolio returns are used to measure investors’ 
herd behaviour in the equity markets. Similarly, the dispersions of individual fund 
returns (or betas) to those of the market (or a benchmark) portfolio can be used to 
measure the herd behaviour of fund managers. 
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In the following sections, investigation of herd behaviour of UK institutional investors 
is conducted by examining UK open-ended funds and closed-end funds separately.  An 
open-ended fund is a collective investment scheme without restriction on issuing and 
redeeming shares, i.e. open-ended funds continuously selling fund shares to, and 
purchasing back fund shares from, investors. The prices of open-ended funds mirror the 
value of the fund’s investments, i.e. the net asset value (NAV). The changes in NAV 
reflect the money manager’s portfolio picking decisions and trade strategies.  A closed-
end fund, on contract, has a fixed number of shares and new shares are not created by 
managers to meet demand from investors. Investors can only purchase or sell the shares 
in the market. Closed-end funds usually raise capital by conducting an Initial Public 
Offering (IPO) of a fixed amount of shares, and the shares are traded on a stock 
exchange. Prices of shares are determined by the market and can be different from fund 
NAV.    
5.2    Data Description and Summary statistics 
In this section, 84 UK Unit trusts and Open-ended investment companies (OEICs) and 
119 closed-end funds which are listed on the London Stock Exchange main market are 
selected to be used for examination of the herding behaviour of open-ended fund 
managers and closed-end fund managers respectively.   
 
Among the 84 opened-funds, 74 of them mainly invest in large cap companies and 10 
of them invest in mid-cap companies. The sample open-ended funds are equity focused 
funds whose investment holdings are concentrated on UK listed companies shares 
traded on the London Stock Exchange. The UK equity focused funds are qualified as 
such when there are more than 70% of holdings that are UK equities at the year of 2011. 
The 119 closed-end funds, on the other hand, are randomly selected without restriction 
of the trust investing in specific types of assets.  
 
The UK mutual funds are selected for several reasons. Firstly, the UK equity market is 
dominated by institutional and foreign investors. According to the UK Office of 
National Statistics, by the end of 2010, institutional investors owned 47.3% of UK 
quoted shares, foreign investors owned 41.2%, and UK individuals owned 11.5% of the 
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value of the UK stock market
33
. Therefore, fund managers’ investment behaviour can 
be a good representation of UK institutional investors.  
 
Secondly, there are very few empirical studies on institutional herding behaviour in the 
UK markets. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there are only four works so far 
studying investor herd behaviour in the UK. Hwang & Salmon (2004, 2007) and Khan 
& Hassairi (2011) examine the UK stock market and find significant and persistent 
market-wide equity return herding. However the investors examined in these studies are 
not distinguished into different groups, which means that the herding tested in a 
market-wide level is the mixture of both institutional and individual investors’ 
behaviour.  Wylie (2005) analyses the proportion of net buying or selling in one stock 
by UK equity mutual fund managers to find evidence of investors herding in individual 
stocks.  
 
Thirdly, until now the institutional investors’ herd behaviour has been largely examined 
at the stock level, i.e. investors following each other to buy or sell the same stock or 
group of stocks. It has not been studied at a portfolio level, where institutional investors 
mimic a benchmark investment portfolio or market portfolio rather than forming a 
portfolio according to their own information.  
 
The hypothesis that will be tested in this study is that institutional investors, represented 
by fund managers, herd on market return, i.e. market return is used as a benchmark 
when institutional investors construct the investor portfolio. This is an investment style 
herding.  
 
The daily price of the open-ended funds, NAVs of closed-end funds and FTSE 350 
Index are collected to calculate the fund and the market returns. Other financial and 
economic data such as the FTSE 350 Volume, S&P 500 Index, UK 3-month Treasury 
Bill rate, and UK 10-year Government bond rate have been collected and used in the 
study as sample variables for other economic factors.  
 
In the UK, Unit Trusts are quoted at bid and ask prices for buying and selling 
respectively, and the prices used for calculating the returns in this research are daily 
middle prices of bid and ask. OEIC prices are the unified quoted prices without being 
                                               
33 Source from: Share Ownership: Ownership of UK quoted shares 2010, www.statistics.gov.uk   
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adjusted for fees and charges. By the different ways they pay out their dividends and 
other investment incomes, investment funds of Unit Trust and OEICs are often 
classified as income unit (or share)  or accumulation unit (or share). Income Units pay 
out dividends and other income as cash directly to investors, normally shortly after the 
fund distribution date, whereas Accumulation Units do not pay the cash out, and instead, 
they reinvest them directly into the fund, which inflates the funds’ capitalisation. The 
price of each unit increases with the number of units remaining the same. In order to 
keep the prices of different classes of fund comparable, the prices of Income Units used 
in the following study are adjusted for dividend and other investment incomes that have 
been paid out by cash. Some of the mutual funds hold both Accumulation Unit and 
Income Unit accounts. In order to avoid duplication, only the Income Unit account is 
chosen in the sample if the fund has both accounts.  
 
Daily data are used as the basis to calculate weekly and monthly variables. Daily 
returns are calculated by applying                . Weekly returns are calculated 
as:               , and monthly returns are calculated using the prices at the last 
trading day of each month:                   . To eliminate calendar effects, 
daily returns are analysed using market time regressions, i.e. excluding non-trading 
days such as weekends and public holidays, and weekly returns are the weekly 
Wednesday returns. The weekly and monthly data used in the study are non-over 
lapping data.  
 
The sample period is from 01 January 1996 to 30 June 2010. It covers the major 
financial incidents of the 1997 Asian crisis, the 1998 Russian crisis, the dotcom bubble 
and its crash, and the recent financial crisis.  
 
A summary of daily, weekly and monthly variables is presented in Table 5.1A, B and C 
respectively.  It should be noted that since over-lapping data are not used, the number 
of observations significantly decreases from daily data to monthly data. This may lead 
to sample size problems in the later estimations, and will be discussed in a later section 
(section 5.4).  
 
Looking at the values of kurtosis of variablesof    , volume and   
  , it suggests that 
the distributions for the series have fatter tails than a normal distribution. The excess 
kurtosis generally decreases from daily frequencies to monthly frequencies among 
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these variables. This feature stands out more in the volume distribution, since the 
Jarque-Bera test cannot reject the null of normal distribution in the monthly frequencies. 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests show that the volume cannot reject 
hypothesis of unit root and the ADF tests are rejected for the first difference of volume 
in all three frequencies. Thus the first difference of the volume is used in the analysis.      
 
In the daily data, the maximum market return is about 9% on 24/11/2008. It is 
accompanied by the greatest volatility, CSSD and CSAD for both open-ended funds 
and closed-end funds. The maximum foreign market return appears on 13/10/2008, and 
the largest trading day in the sample period is 19/09/2008. The minimum value of daily 
market return is -8.83% on 10/10/2008 and the foreign market return is -9.47 on 
15/10/2008. These may suggest that the large return turbulence is the impact of the 
financial market crisis, especially the 2007-8 Global Financial Crisis.  
 
In the weekly data, the maximum return is in the third week of March 2003 (beginning 
17/03/2003) accompanied by the greatest volatility. The minimum market weekly 
return is in the first week of October 2008, and at the same time the foreign market 
return reaches its minimum. This may imply the co-movement of global markets on 
certain factors. The date with largest CSAD and CSSD for mutual funds is the last 
week of October 2008. The largest trading week is the second week of August 2007. 
The weekly data again gives some hints for the impact of the financial crisis on the 
variables and the influence foreign markets would have on the UK market.  
 
The monthly data exhibits similar characteristics to the daily and weekly data. The 
extreme values are more likely to appear during financial crisis periods. The maximum 
value of the market return is in April 2009 and the minimum value in September 2008. 
Both the absolute return and volatility are at their maximum in October 2008. The 
largest volume of shares has been traded in March 2006 and the biggest monthly 
increase of trade volume happened in February 2000.  
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Table 5.1A: Statistics of Daily Basic Data for investigating mature funds 
Table 5.1A provides summary statistics of the basic data series.  The data are daily and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011 (3911 observations).   
Variable definitions: 
   : is the market return which is calculated from FTSE 350 Price Index;      is the absolute value of market return;    
  is the square of market return. CVOL: the change of market trading volume calculated in 
the same manner as market return (i.e.         
      
         
 ; Volume: the actual market trading volume;    
  : the foreign market return which is calculated by use S&P 500 Price Index.CSADop: Cross Section 
Absolute Deviation of open-ended funds; CSSDop: Cross Section Standard Deviation of open-ended funds; SDop the standard deviation of the time very betas of the 84 open-ended funds. LogSDop is 
nature log of beta standard deviation;CSADcl: Cross Section Absolute Deviation of closed-end funds; CSSDcl: Cross Section Standard Deviation of closed-end funds; SDcl the standard deviation of the 
time very betas of the 119 closed-end funds. LogSDcl is nature log of beta standard deviation. 
 
AC (1) is autocorrelation coefficient at one lag. ADF is Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic with maximum 250 lags. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level.  
 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Min Date Max Max Date Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque-
Bera 
AC(1) ADF 
Rm 0.013904 1.189161 -8.82747 10/10/2008 9.005264 24/11/2008 -0.18145 8.979935 5848.79*** -0.022 -29.9221*** 
|Rm| 0.83052 0.851091 0  
9.005264 24/11/2008 2.974709 16.66257 35509.85*** 0.245 -9.0692*** 
R
2
 m 1.413935 3.99217 0  
81.09479 24/11/2008 9.966363 148.2781 3504098*** 0.221 -5.8113*** 
CVOL 0.041898 33.52859 -594.353 19/02/1998 571.6285 20/02/1998 -0.32059 79.42532 951878.8*** -0.373 -23.2423*** 
Volume 1574245 788967.9 1666 19/02/1998 5489280 19/09/2008 0.374044 2.803227 97.50675*** 0.855 -3.6455*** 
R
F
 m 0.019304 1.287385 -9.46952 15/10/2008 10.9572 13/10/2008 -0.17047 10.57503 9369.672*** -0.063 -48.6596*** 
CSADop 0.767267 0.654945 0.117148 15/10/2010 8.178290 24/11/2008 3.315474 21.77003 64577.71*** 0.518 -7.7110*** 
CSSDop 0.902114 0.676788 0.167339 25/08/2006 8.31677 24/11/2008 3.237223 21.10783 60263.93*** 0.560 -7.4650*** 
CSADcl 0.7030 0.4419 0.1749 03/04/1996 5.6428 24/11/2008 3.0227 19.7802 51853.71*** 0.496 -7.8282*** 
CSSDcl 0.9601 0.5699 0.2500 03/04/1996 7.9842 31/12/2008 3.1213 22.6864 69523.42*** 0.501 -7.9835*** 
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Table 5.1B: Statistics of Weekly Basic Data for investigating open-ended funds 
Table 5.1B provides summary statistics of the basic data series.  The data are weekly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011.   
Variable definitions: 
   : is the market return which is calculated from FTSE 350 Price Index;      is the absolute value of market return;    
  is the square of market return. CVOL: the change of market trading volume calculated in 
the same manner as market return (i.e.         
      
         
 ; Volume: the actual market trading volume;    
  : the foreign market return which is calculated by use S&P 500 Price Index. CSADop: Cross Section 
Absolute Deviation of open-ended funds; CSSDop: Cross Section Standard Deviation of open-ended funds; SDop the standard deviation of the time very betas of the 84 open-ended funds. LogSDop is 
nature log of beta standard deviation;CSADcl: Cross Section Absolute Deviation of closed-end funds; CSSDcl: Cross Section Standard Deviation of closed-end funds; SDcl the standard deviation of the 
time very betas of the 119 closed-end funds. LogSDcl is nature log of beta standard deviation. TS: the Term Spread defined as the difference between the rate on UK 10 year gilt and UK 3 month 
Treasury bill. RTB, the relative treasury bill rate, is defined as the difference between the UK 3 month treasury bill rate and its 12-month moving average.  AC (1) is autocorrelation coefficient at one lag. ADF is 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic with maximum 52 lags. Obs is number of observation.  
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level.  
 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Min Date Max Max Date Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque-
Bera 
AC(1) ADF 
Rm 807 0.062962 2.397154 -12.3902 08/10/2008 12.73801 13/03/2003 -0.40106 6.109077 346.6655*** -0.075 -30.5761*** 
|Rm| 807 1.753296 1.634764 0.007702 02/08/2000 12.73801 19/03/2003 2.168343 10.52443 2536.128*** 0.309 -6.1118*** 
R
2
 m 807 5.74319 12.93042 5.90E-05 02/08/2000 162.2569 19/03/2003 6.533577 62.73042 125706.2*** 0.316 -10.1615*** 
CVOL 807 0.191809 33.77084 -203.63 30/12/1998 201.4175 06/01/1999 -0.27843 12.87063 3286.487*** -0.231 -5.4156*** 
Volume 807 7619363 3700434 369475 30/12/1998 1.62E+07 15/08/2007 0.077392 1.924897 39.67094*** 0.868 -1.5943 
R
F
 m 807 0.090252 2.495023 -16.4508 08/10/2008 10.1824 16/10/2002 -0.55372 6.81817 531.4373*** -0.053 -29.9482*** 
CSADop 807 0.896307 0.579898 0.228504 31/12/2003 5.418843 29/10/2008 2.397622 11.69984 3318.170*** 0.488 -8.3242*** 
CSSDop 807 1.119692 0.645256 0.314122 23/05/2007 6.293215 29/10/2008 2.308118 11.58805 3196.536*** 0.519 -7.8868*** 
SDop 808 0.397732 0173175     
2.238993 12.54376 3741.571*** 0.146 -24.4614*** 
LogSDop 808 -0.999394 0.385855     
0.251224 3.634850 22.06809*** 0.209 -15.0690*** 
TS 807 0.209439 3.571555 
    
2.476009 20.18018 10749.27*** -0.062 -5.7602*** 
RTB 808 -0.002795 2.931903 
    
-1.554069 34.59553 33933.90*** -0.115 -11.72175*** 
CSADcl 808 1.4220 0.7477 0.3946 29/06/2005 7.5788 29/10/2008 2.5860 15.3109 6002.99*** 0.506 -5.7849*** 
CSSDcl 808 1.9782 0.9911 0.5792 29/06/2005 9.2490 29/10/2008 2.3195 12.5475 3793.38*** 0.527 -4.0091*** 
SDcl 808 0.5815 0.2485     2.3625 11.2199 3026.38*** 0.104 -25.550*** 
LogSDcl 808 -0.6101 0.3486     0.9385 3.9285 147.6457*** 0.159 -13.316*** 
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Table 5.1C: Statistics of monthly Basic Data for investigating open-ended funds 
Table 5.1C provides summary statistics of the basic data series.  The data are monthly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011.   
Variable definitions: 
   : is the market return which is calculated from FTSE 350 Price Index; CSAD: Cross Section Absolute Deviation; CSSD: Cross Section Standard Deviation;       is the absolute value of market return;    
  is 
the square of market return. CVOL: the change of market trading volume calculated in the same manner as market return (i.e.         
      
         
 ; Volume: the actual market trading volume;    
  : the foreign 
market return which is calculated by use S&P 500 Price Index. CSADop: Cross Section Absolute Deviation of open-ended funds; CSSDop: Cross Section Standard Deviation of open-ended funds; SDop the 
standard deviation of the time very betas of the 84 open-ended funds and the betas are estimated by applying OLS method on daily fund returns, according to Hwang &Salmon(2004) approach. LogSDop is 
nature log of beta standard deviation; CSADcl: Cross Section Absolute Deviation of closed-end funds; CSSDcl: Cross Section Standard Deviation of closed-end funds; SDcl the standard deviation of the 
time very betas of the 119 closed-end funds. LogSDcl is nature log of beta standard deviation. TS: the Term Spread defined as the difference between the rate on UK 10 year gilt and UK 3 month 
Treasury bill. RTB, the relative treasury bill rate, is defined as the difference between the UK 3 month treasury bill rate and its 12-month moving average.  AC (1) is autocorrelation coefficient at one lag. ADF is 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic with maximum 12 lags. Obs is number of observation.  
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level.  
 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Min Date Max Max Date Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque-
Bera 
AC(1) ADF 
Rm 186 0.292689 4.248502 -14.3488 30/09/2008 8.762429 30/04/2009 -0.8473 3.957803 29.36529*** 0.068 -12.6421*** 
|Rm| 186 3.272909 2.714049 0.000498 30/06/2003 14.34876 30/09/2008 1.364873 5.018998 89.34097*** 0.143 -5.3838*** 
R
2
 m 186 18.03839 29.81232 2.48E-07 30/06/2003 205.8868 30/09/2008 3.238832 15.98463 1631.846*** 0.207 -10.9572*** 
CVOL 186 0.560873 21.0768 -49.1089 29/08/2008 60.58278 29/02/2000 0.135812 3.049526 0.5908 -0.456 -4.2846*** 
Volume 186 3.31E+07 1.50E+07 8445925 30/08/1996 6.18E+07 31/03/2006 -0.04056 10812754 10.97502*** 0.861 -1.5966 
R
F
 m 186 0.410092 4.724222 -18.5637 31/10/2008 9.232381 31/03/2000 -0.91078 4.598617 44.0619*** 0.112 -12.086*** 
CSADop 186 1.315180 0.618664 0.494403 31/07/2008 3.768470 30/07/1999 1.377736 5.006491 90.04444*** 0.413 -8.6963*** 
CSSDop 186 1.737894 0.826543 0.670414 31/07/2008 5.011428 30/09/2009 1.472912 5.406958 112.1528*** 0.439 -4.2822*** 
SDop 186 0.256028 0.067260     
1.662443 9.651039 428.5067*** 0.214 -10.8633*** 
LogSDop 186 -1.393236 0.245789     
0.212696 4.201390 12.58829* 0.265 -10.2879*** 
TS 185 0.908548 7.886121 
    
3.341009 21.04021 2852.844*** 0.439 -4.373438*** 
RTB 186 0.011128 8.000211 
    
-3.326831 38.59983 10165.05*** 0.614 -6.609223*** 
CSADcl 186 2.8803 1.2518 1.2417 31/08/2004 8.0128 31/10/2008 1.3777 5.0065 90.044*** 0.458 -4.7876*** 
CSSDcl 186 4.0611 1.8201 1.6946 31/08/2006 11.8327 29/02/2000 1.4729 5.4070 112.153*** 0.473 -4.7064*** 
SDcl 186 0.3694 0.0635     
1.8751 8.1598 315.326*** 0.215 -10.879*** 
LogSDcl 186 -1.0085 0.15542     
1.1542 5.1402 76.8009*** 0.234 -10.659*** 
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Calendar effects on asset return have been well documented.  The most pervasive are 
the day-of-the-week effect and the January Effect, which state that the distribution of 
stock returns varies according to the day of the week and month of the year. Cross 
(1973) and French (1980) investigate the weekend effect and find evidence that the 
average return on Monday is significantly less than that of the other days of the week. 
Calendar effects are not limited to the equity markets, they have also been found 
present in other financial markets such as the futures market and bond market (Cornell 
1985; Dyl and Meberly, 1988). Therefore, statistic tests have been conducted according 
to French’s (1980) method for the day-of-the-week and January effect.  
 
The following regression is used to formally test the effects: 
              
 
         (5.1)  
where           represent Tuesday to Friday respectively for the day-of-the-week 
effect, and          represent February to December respectively for the month-of-
the-year effect;     is the return and the dummy variables indicate the day (month) of 
the week (year) on which the return is observed, for example             , 
              , etc.  
 
Table 5.2 Panel A presents the result for the testing of day-of-the-week. The 
coefficients for market return, CSAD, CSSD, and foreign market return (represented as 
return of S&P index) are not statistically significant suggesting that there is no different 
between Monday and the days in the rest of the week, i.e. no day-of-the-week effect 
among these variables. This is different to the results of Cross (1973) and French 
(1980), however, the coefficients of volatility (calculated as the square of the market 
return) show that the volatility on Monday is statistically significantly larger than the 
rest of the days of the week. The coefficients of CVOL and volume suggest the trading 
volumes on Monday are statistically less than those of rest days of the week.  Panel B 
of Table 5.2 presents the result for testing month-of-the-year. The significant 
coefficients of volume show that January is the greatest trading month over a year. 
However, the insignificant coefficients of all other variables suggest that there is no 
seasonal effect among these variables.   
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Table 5.2: Test results of the ‘Day-of-the-week’ and ‘Month-of-the-year’ effects 
Table 5.2 reports the results of regressions of the following general form:               
 
   ,  
where           represent Tuesday to Friday respectively for the day-of-the-week effect, and          represent February to December respectively for the month-of-the-year effect;     is the variable Return, 
Volatility, CSAD, CSSD, CVOL, Volume and   
 ; the dummy variables indicate the day (month) of the week (year) on which the return is observed, for example             ,               , etc.  
Variable definitions: 
   : is the market return which is calculated from FTSE 350 Price Index; CSADop: Cross Section Absolute Deviation of open-ended fund; CSSDop: Cross Section Standard Deviation of open-ended funds;       is 
the absolute value of market return;    
  is the square of market return. CVOL: the change of market trading volume calculated in the same manner as market return (i.e.         
      
         
 ; Volume: the actual 
market trading volume;    
  : the foreign market return which is calculated by use S&P 500 Price Index; CSADcl: Cross Section Absolute Deviation of closed-end fund; CSSDcl: Cross Section Standard Deviation 
of closed-end funds;   
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
Panel A: Day-of-the-week effect 
Variable Return Volatility CSADop CSSDop CVOL Volume R
F
 m CSADcl CSSDcl 
Monday 0.042791 1.820102*** 0.783868*** 0.918625*** -19.39573*** 1316881*** 0.040554 0.733287*** 0.997966*** 
Tuesday -0.02206 -0.497769** 0.006392 0.007660 38.9829*** 281715.5*** -0.00168 -0.029029 -0.039430 
Wednesday -0.0911 -0.529973*** -0.039710 -0.036629 23.59725*** 340611.7*** -0.02403 -0.040037* -0.041429 
Thursday -0.04082 -0.475486** -0.035190 -0.033946 19.40647*** 359993.2*** -0.03119 -0.043987* -0.067799** 
Friday 0.013195 -0.493991** -0.012834 -0.018107 13.43067*** 282550.1*** -0.04801 -0.035680 -0.037655 
Panel B: Month-of-the-year effect 
January -1.52998 23.3276*** 1.384623*** 1.862988*** 31.61079*** 34600000*** -0.35696 3.321335*** 4.608098*** 
February 2.206546 -12.1339 0.001292 -0.08776 -34.76399*** -1113364 -0.83185 -0.754212* -0.956079 
March 2.285215 -12.9988 -0.08931 -0.15303 -21.91889*** 2155162 1.848947 -0.579651 -0.602582 
April 3.855679 -5.0827 -0.21122 -0.2565 -49.08971*** -4216950 2.668611 -0.693547 -0.940126 
May 1.007517 -12.7157 -0.13207 -0.18685 -26.04125*** -1764655 0.757159 -0.550491 -0.758654 
June -0.0769648* -10.29 -0.22589 -0.26512 -29.53559*** -1503398 -0.22338 -0.490003 -0.481036 
July 1.990038 -3.55065 -0.03902 -0.11552 -27.87352*** 370614.5 0.302156 -0.471059 -0.651841 
August 1.923802 -7.48075 -0.13481 -0.256 -48.99729*** -5263856 -0.76156 -0.581635 -0.665610 
September -0.0058431*** 21.12739 0.080293 0.052361 -14.74868*** 444146.1 0.13581 -0.134483 -0.217296 
October 2.434498 3.342441 0.154089 0.154101 -27.06851*** 1795341 1.359284 -0.031199 -0.125978 
November 2.367191 -12.7434 0.145379 0.163143 -36.3505*** 1371.054 2.102456 -0.412974 -0.620548 
December 3.994865 -9.51204 -0.36602 -0.5367* -57.87442*** -8659587 1.872575 -0.565576 -0.513989 
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CH suggested that the use of different frequency of data would reveal the different time 
horizons of herd behaviour affecting market prices. If the use of daily data implies that 
herd behaviour is a very short-lived phenomenon, the use of monthly data then 
indicates that herd behaviour requires a longer time to affect asset prices. By the nature 
of decision making processes of institutional investors, it is more likely that their 
herding behaviour would take a longer time to have an impact on market prices. 
Investor sentiment, however, may also cause herding behaviour which could be in a 
relatively short-term. The possible of short-term herding effect is also of interest. 
Therefore, daily, weekly and monthly data are used for analysing herding behaviour of 
institutional investors in representing short, medium and long time horizons.  
5.3    Portfolio herding in market stress periods 
CH propose that herd behaviour is more likely to exist during market extreme periods. 
The ‘extreme’ market movements are defined as the lower and upper tail of the market 
returns distribution at 5 percent (or 1 percent). Following such criterion, equation (4.1) 
has been estimated by restricting   
  and   
  to 5% and then1% of the lower and upper 
tails. The rationale of this analysis is that if fund managers form their portfolio in a 
style of imitating the return of market average, the return dispersion should be less in 
the turbulent time than that of normal time. Therefore, the coefficients of the two 
dummy variables are expected to be negative. The regression results are very similar in 
CSAD (Table 5.3A) and CSSD (Table 5.3B) measures.  
 
In fact, the estimated coefficients display a very similar picture in both open-ended 
funds and closed-end funds.  The positive significant of coefficients,   and   , 
demonstrate that return dispersions are greater during extreme market periods versus 
normal periods. This indicates the absence of herding in market stress time. This 
finding is consistent with previous works, such as CH’s test on US stock market data, 
Demirer & Kutan’s (2006) test on the Chinese stock market, Lin & Swanson (2003) 
and Demirer et al’s. (2010) test on the Taiwanese stock market, Gleason et al. (2003) 
study on commodity futures traded on European exchanges, and Gleason et al. (2004) 
on Exchange Trade Funds.  
 
When examining the asymmetric dispersion in the extreme up- and down-market, the 
application of daily data suggests that dispersions of both open-ended funds and closed-
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end funds are at a greater level during extreme up-market than that of extreme down-
market. This is in line with Christie and Huang (1995), Gleason, Mathur and Peterson 
(2004), Caporale, Economou, & Philippas (2008) and Tan, Chiang, Mason & Nelling 
(2008). 
 
The asymmetric return dispersion in extreme up- and down-market may be caused by 
investors’ asymmetric attitude to losses. According to Prospect theory, an economic 
agent’s response to loss is more extreme than to that of gain (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1986). When market return is in the extreme lower tail, the heavy losses of the overall 
market promote pessimistic expectations among investors. The fear that their 
investment portfolio performs worse than the market average leads fund managers to 
match up their investment portfolios to the market portfolio.  These matching and 
catching up processes can protect fund managers’ reputation by blaming the losses to 
the overall market performance rather than their stock picking skill. When market 
return is in the extreme upper tail, opportunism expectation arises among investors. 
Performance of fund investment portfolio is expected to ‘beat the market’, hence fund 
managers can be rewarded for out-performance. This leads the manager to structure 
their portfolio to maximise the expected portfolio returns according to their private 
information rather than just following the overall market consensus. The asymmetric 
effect may be a sign of investor sentiment impact on fund managers forming investment 
portfolio. However, it does not necessarily suggest herding behaviour since the return 
dispersion in the extreme markets is greater than that in the normal time.  
 
The CH method mainly looks for herding evidence by examining the return dispersions 
during the extreme period (up and down 5% or 1% distribution tail) against that of the 
normal periods. If the average dispersions in both of the tails are greater than that in the 
normal time, no herding is proved. If the dispersion in either of the tails is less than that 
of the normal period, there is evidence of herding. One key point of CH approach is the 
criteria that are applied for defining the market extreme. CCK and HS argue that since 
the criteria of judging market extreme level plays an important role in CH method, the 
statistical result is significantly subject to the criteria used to define the market stress 
and how many samples fall into the interval.   
 
From Figure 5.1, it can be seen that the market returns have a high peak and fat tail 
distribution, which is confirmed by the parameters of Kurtosis and the significance of J-
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B test. However, the distribution chart also shows that the returns are highly 
concentrated in the significant interval. The number of outliers is a tiny fraction of the 
total observation. For example, the number of samples in the daily returns that lie in the 
5% upper tail is 88 and in the 5% lower tail is 126 as compared to the total sample size 
of 3911. In the 1% criteria, the number of returns distributed in the upper and lower 
tails is 38 and 53 respectively. The monthly data is an extreme case as there are no 
returns in the 1% up tail. HS also point out that market stress does not necessarily imply 
the market as a whole should display either large negative or large positive returns. For 
example, large price swings in FTSE100 Index have been seen in some periods while 
the UK stock market as a whole has not shown any dramatic change in the aggregate. In 
addition, the method to use 1% or 5% distribution as the cut-off point to identify the 
extreme market is rather arbitrary. Practically, what constitutes an extreme return can 
vary among different investors and is variable over different periods. Moreover, the CH 
method is more likely to capture herding only during market stress periods. It should be 
noted, however, that herding may occur to some extent over the entire return 
distribution and may become more pronounced during the market extreme periods. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Distribution density function of daily market return 
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As stated in section 3.6, during the sample period, the market has experienced several 
major financial crises. They are the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 1998 Russian 
financial crisis, the dotcom bubble & crash and the 2007-8 global financial crisis. These 
events show either large negative or positive returns, or serve as a turning point of the 
general market trend, i.e. a reverse from a bull market to a bear market and they all 
have a significant impact on the local and global economies. The pattern of market 
prices in each crisis appears to display similar characteristics: a quick rise in market 
prices in a continuous process before the crisis starts, which normally displays a feature 
of low return volatility in a continuous period, followed by a sharp fall or falls of prices, 
which are accompanied by great return volatility. These phenomena are sometimes 
described as the process of bubble building and bursting in the financial literature.  
 
One argument states that an asset bubble is caused by investor irrational investment 
activities and the bursting of the bubble is actually a process of correcting asset prices 
to reverse back to their fundamental. The argument suggests that during a bubble 
building period, the investment decisions are not made based on asset fundamental 
value but on psychological biases involved in the decision making process, and herd 
instinct is believed to be present in such decision-making processes to reduce investors’ 
uncertainty. When the market is overvalued by some irrational agents through their 
trading activities, sophisticated (i.e. institutional investors) may ride the bubble to 
maximise their profits (Abreu & Brunnermeier, 2003), or initiate a trade with the 
expectation of the positive-feedback traders buying those securities at a higher price 
later and drive stock prices to deviate more from their fundamentals (DeLong et al., 
1990). Accordingly, two hypotheses will be examined in this study: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  if the continuously rising asset price in the bubble building period is a 
result of the investors herd behaviour, the herding parameters are expected to be 
statistically significant.           
 
Hypothesis 2:  if the crisis itself is a process of asset prices reverting to the fundamental 
rather than herding behaviour of investors, the herding parameters are expected to be 
statistically not significant.           
 
In order to capture herd behaviour in the unrest periods of the market, an alternative 
criterion is utilised for investigating the severe market events. Using the non-crisis, pre-
 153 
 
crisis and in-crisis periods defined in section 3.6, CH method is used for the empirical 
examination of whether the return dispersion is significantly lower than average during 
the market stress period, which is classified as the pre-crisis period and the in-crisis 
period now.  
         
        
          (5.2) 
Where    represents the herding measures of CSAD or CSSD.    
   
  if day    is in 
the pre-crisis period; otherwise it is equal to zero.   
     if day    is in the in-crisis 
period; otherwise it is equal to zero. The estimation results are presented in Table 5.4 
 
The results of both open-ended funds and closed-end funds present very similar 
pictures. In the daily frequency, the significant negative values of     indicate that the 
return dispersions in the pre-crisis periods are lower than that in the non-crisis period. 
This suggests investor herd behaviour does exist in the pre-crisis in the daily data. The 
positive and significant   implies that there is no evidence of herd behaviour in the 
crisis period. These regression results generally support the argument that herd 
behaviour exists in the bubble building time, i.e. the pre-financial crisis period, and the 
financial crisis is a process of market reversal back to the fundamental. These results 
support hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2. However, when the regressions use weekly and 
monthly data, the significant levels of     indicate that return dispersions during pre-
crisis periods have hardly any difference from those in the normal time, providing no 
evidence of herding behaviour in pre-crisis period.   is still positive and significant, 
confirming the non-herding suggestion in financial crisis periods.  
 
Comparing the coefficients in different frequencies, the significant level of return 
dispersion in pre-crisis is less than that during the normal period, falling significantly 
from daily data to monthly data. This may suggest that herd behaviour is greatest in the 
daily investment activities, and then decreases alongside the increases of investment 
interval. This again supports the idea that herd behaviour is greater in the short term 
investment interval as compared to the long term interval. Moreover, the CSAD 
measures show slightly stronger statistical signs of herding evidence, which indicates 
the CSAD is more likely to be the better measure of herding as suggested by CCK. 
 
The linear CH model provides a simple method to detect herd behaviour under specific 
market conditions, for example market stress time or financial crisis period. The 
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approach relies on assuming that there is no herding in the normal period, therefore the 
return dispersions in this period become a benchmark for others to be compared to. A 
lower level than the benchmark return dispersion becomes evidence of herd behaviour. 
The limitation of this approach is that it needs a benchmark return dispersion to 
compare with. Investors are assumed to make investment decisions according to asset 
fundamentals during the benchmark period. In practice, however, to identify the 
benchmark itself can be an issue needed to be studied further. CCK, therefore, suggest 
that examining the relationship between return dispersion and the market return can be 
a more powerful method to test market herd behaviour. 
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Table 5.3A: Regression Coefficients: Dispersions mutual funds during periods of market stress measuring by CSAD 
Table 5.3A reports the results of regressions of the following general form:          
      
    ,  
Where               ; if the market return on day   lies in the extreme lower tail of the distribution,   
   ; otherwise it is equal to zero. If the market return on day   lies in the 
extreme upper tail of the distribution,   
   ; otherwise it is equal to zero. The sample period is January 1996 – June 2010, t-statistics are given in parentheses. The    statistics test the null 
hypotheses that      .  
The regressions are estimated by Least Squares with Newey-West HAC standard Errors and Covariance. 
Variable definitions: 
CSAD: Cross Section Absolute Deviation; ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statist ical significance at 10% level. 
 
CSAD Market return in the extreme upper/lower 5% of the return distribution Market return in the extreme upper/lower 1% of the return distribution 
 
Open-ended funds Closed-end funds Open-ended funds Closed-end funds 
 
Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly 
  
0.6976*** 
(44.1155) 
0.8411*** 
(29.1270) 
1.2616*** 
(20.9130) 
0.6398*** 
(62.8214) 
1.3381*** 
(33.5787) 
2.7466*** 
(20.8053) 
0.7273*** 
(41.6586) 
0.8644*** 
(28.5829) 
1.7075*** 
(19.3959) 
0.6662*** 
(57.9730) 
1.3734*** 
(33.0261) 
2.8224*** 
(19.5381) 
β1 
1.5234*** 
(9.2936) 
1.0164*** 
(5.3625) 
1.3796*** 
(22.8687) 
1.3429*** 
13.4936) 
2.0853*** 
(5.0588) 
1.9667*** 
(14.8971) 
2.1349*** 
(8.2720) 
1.7365*** 
(5.1073) 
N/A 
1.8746*** 
(11.6025) 
3.8574*** 
(5.7276) 
N/A 
β2 
1.0982*** 
(12.0283) 
1.0099*** 
(6.2341) 
0.8577*** 
(2.6461) 
1.0287*** 
(15.2082) 
1.2427*** 
(7.7576) 
2.2887*** 
(3.6591) 
1.4626*** 
(8.4998) 
1.4483*** 
(7.1074) 
1.4154*** 
(3.1036) 
1.4189*** 
(13.3391 
1.8335*** 
(6.8947) 
2.6919*** 
(4,3170) 
Adj-R2 0.200647 0.155094 0.113675 0.3615 0.2265 0.1737 0.163979 0.139932 0.056945 0.3026 0.2226 0.0929 
S.D. 0.585564 0.533035 0.582440 0.3531 0.6576 1.1379 0.598844 0.537796 0.802665 0.3691 0.6593 1.1922 
SSR 1339.994 228.4373 62.08031 487.3508 348.1120 236.9470 1401.462 232.5367 118.5457 532.3050 349.8813 261.5142 
Log LH -3454.877 -635.8414 -161.8720 -1477.0140 -806.3191 -286.4369 -3542.584 -643.0181 -222.0309 -1649.5530 -808.3673 -295.6116 
Fc 5.789369** 0.000726 2.702739 11.3849*** 3.9652** 0.2456 4.409856** 
 
0.534973 
 
N/A 7.0287*** 6.7780*** - 
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Table 5.3B: Regression Coefficients: Dispersions of mutual funds during periods of market stress measuring by CSSD 
Table 5.3B reports the results of regressions of the following general form:          
      
    ,  
Where               ; if the market return on day   lies in the extreme lower tail of the distribution,   
   ; otherwise it is equal to zero. If the market return on day   lies in the 
extreme upper tail of the distribution,   
   ; otherwise it is equal to zero. The sample period is January 1996 – June 2010, t-statistics are given in parentheses.  
The    statistics test the null hypotheses that      .  
The regressions are estimated by Least Squares with Newey-West HAC standard Errors and Covariance. 
Variable definitions: 
CSSD: Cross Section Standard Deviation ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
CSSD Market return in the extreme upper/lower 5% of the return distribution Market return in the extreme upper/lower 1% of the return distribution 
 
Open-ended funds Closed-end funds Open-ended funds Closed-end funds 
 
Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly 
α 
0.8259*** 
(49.1291) 
1.0547*** 
(31.3515) 
1.6668*** 
(19.6745) 
0.8855*** 
(63.0678) 
1.8798*** 
(32.9287) 
3.8884*** 
(19.4182) 
0.8585*** 
(46.0283) 
1.0819*** 
(30.8731) 
1.7075*** 
(17.9956) 
0.9168*** 
(59.1658) 
1.9210*** 
(32.9221) 
3.9752*** 
(18.6961) 
β1 
1.6625*** 
(9.9411) 
1.3298*** 
(5.7053) 
1.8978*** 
(22.4019) 
1.5641*** 
(12.4289) 
2.3423*** 
(5.0263) 
2.2755*** 
(2.2755) 
2.3228*** 
(9.1132) 
2.4689*** 
(7.2997) 
N/A 
2.1995*** 
(10.5166) 
4.4734*** 
(6.0088) 
N/A 
β2 
1.2043*** 
(13.1670) 
1.1284*** 
(6.7117) 
1.1327** 
(2.5456) 
1.2239*** 
(14.7229) 
1.5061*** 
(7.0557) 
2.9851*** 
(3.4820) 
1.6003*** 
(9.5533) 
1.5857*** 
(7.2629) 
1.4154*** 
(3.2771) 
1.6665*** 
(12.6167) 
2.1805*** 
(5.9498) 
3.9927*** 
(4.5422) 
Adj-R2 0.2248 0.1754 0.1130 0.3006 0.1737 0.1355 0.1827 0.1646 0.0569 0.2507 0.1736 0.0969 
S.D. 0.5959 0.5859 0.7785 0.4766 0.9009 1.6923 0.6119 0.5898 0.8027 0.4934 0.9010 1.7296 
SSR 1387.6770 276.0341 110.8961 887.7886 653.3392 524.0922 1463.0350 279.6653 118.5457 951.2073 653.4350 550.4342 
Log LH -3523.2540 -712.2089 -215.8274 -2649.8240 -1060.6660 -360.2632 -3626.6650 -717.4823 -222.0309 -2784.7510 -1060.7250 -364.8239 
Fc 8.1740*** 0.2025 2.8199* 8.4062*** 2.9711* 0.6287 6.7656*** 4.6451** - 5.7896*** 6.6021** - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 157 
 
Table 5.4: Regression Coefficients: Dispersions of open-ended funds during periods of market stress identified by financial crises 
Table 5.4 reports the results of regressions of the following general form:          
   
     
     ,  
Where               ; if the market return on day   lies in the extreme lower tail of the distribution,   
   
   if day    is in the pre-crisis period; otherwise it is equal to zero.   
    if 
day    is in the in-crisis period; otherwise it is equal to zero. The sample period is January 1996 – June 2010, t-statistics are given in parentheses.  
Variable definitions: 
CSAD: Cross Section Absolute Deviation; CSSD: Cross Section Standard Deviation ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
CSAD Market return in criteria pre-crisis & crisis period CSSD Market return in criteria pre-crisis & crisis period 
 
Open-ended funds Closed-end funds 
 
Open-ended funds Closed-end funds 
 
Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly 
 
Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly 
α 
0.7904*** 
(23.5038) 
0.8977*** 
(16.3952) 
1.2439*** 
(14.1976) 
0.6959*** 
(29.5799) 
1.3699*** 
(19.2428) 
2.6089*** 
(16.8555) 
0.9190*** 
(25.4029) 
1.1030*** 
(17.6901) 
1.6061*** 
(15.1636) 
0.9366*** 
(31.5884) 
1.8689*** 
(20.2688) 
3.6005*** 
(17.2595) 
β1 
-0.1977*** 
(-4.8714) 
-0.1231* 
(-1.8196) 
0.0719 
(0.3816) 
-0.0824*** 
(-2.6528) 
-0.0112 
(-0.1035) 
0.5685 
(1.2985) 
-0.1970*** 
(-4.5099) 
-0.0995 
(-1.2377) 
0.1825 
(0.6687) 
-0.0692* 
(-1.7071) 
0.1136 
(0.7641) 
1.0569* 
(1.6592) 
β2 
0.1149** 
(2.2234) 
0.1450* 
(1.7741) 
0.2785** 
(2.3758) 
0.1404*** 
(4.0574) 
0.3003*** 
(3.0104) 
0.7712*** 
(3.0355) 
0.1483*** 
(2.6902) 
0.2147** 
(2.3445) 
0.4601*** 
(2.8584) 
0.2137*** 
(0.2137) 
0.4604*** 
(3.1887) 
1.1871*** 
(2.9160) 
Adj-R2 0.0242 0.0191 0.0196 0.0254 0.0221 0.0594 0.0266 0.0225 0.0368 0.0268 0.0277 0.0818 
S.D. 0.6470 0.5743 0.6126 0.4363 0.7394 1.2140 0.6677 0.6380 0.8112 0.5622 0.9773 1.7441 
SSR 1635.7210 265.1978 68.6706 743.8893 440.1113 269.7190 1742.4260 327.2288 120.4189 1235.3690 768.8001 556.6415 
Log LH -3844.8410 -696.0494 -171.2550 -2304.0110 -901.0584 -298.4845 -3968.4180 -780.8585 -223.4890 -3295.9050 -1126.4110 -365.8668 
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5.4    Portfolio herding under different market conditions 
CCK advise that the appearance of a negative linear or non-linear relationship can be an 
indicator of herding in the market. The regression model therefore is: 
                         
 
       (5.3) 
An estimated negative    or    in the equation shows the breaking of the fundamental 
price function, which demonstrates the existence of herd behaviour. Particularly, if the 
herd behaviour is caused by the sentiment of investors, the degree of herding can be 
asymmetric in different market conditions.  
5.4.1. Herding under Different Market Return Condition 
Consistent with CCK’s empirical study, the regressions have been run in two such 
specifications: the up-market, when returns are greater than zero, and the down-market, 
when returns are less than zero. The regression model is: 
             
              
        
 
           
             
   
          
 
       
           (5.4) 
where the superscripts up and down refer to positive market returns and negative 
market returns respectively.     when the market has a positive return, i.e.     ; 
otherwise equals to zero.     when the market has a negative return, i.e.     ; 
otherwise equals to zero
34
. Equation 5.3 and 5.4 are regressed in daily, weekly and 
monthly frequencies. The estimated results from open-ended and closed-ended funds 
(Table 5.5A and Table 5.5B respectively) show a very similar feature.  
 
In the daily and weekly data, none of the coefficients in Equation 5.3 is significantly 
negative, which provides no evidence of herding in the market. When the up and down-
                                               
34 30-day (week and moth) moving average values have been used as benchmarks for defining the market 
conditions (Tan et al., 2008). Estimated coefficients suggest very similar results as the zero benchmark, 
which is available upon request.   
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market conditions are applied (Equation 5.4), the return dispersion is still an increasing 
function of the market return regardless of market condition, suggesting the absence of 
herding behaviour under either condition. The test has not found an asymmetric effect 
in rising and falling markets.   
 
Different from the daily and weekly data, the monthly    is not significant 
demonstrating there is not a linear relation between return dispersion and market return. 
However, positive significant    in the unconditional model still gives no clear sign of 
herd behaviour. When the up- and down conditions are imposed,   
  
 is insignificant, 
implying the linear relation between does not exist.  
 
Comparing the coefficients in the three time frequencies, values of coefficient,    
reduces while the frequency is lower. It shows that the rates of         increasing with 
       decrease when the investment interval increases. This may hint that it is more 
likely that it takes a longer time for herding behaviour to affect asset prices. This may 
be the result of the institutional investors undertaking positive feedback trading, i.e. the 
medium and long term investment strategies involved in buying ‘winners’ and selling 
‘losers’ ( Nofsinger and Sias, 1999).   
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Table 5.5A: Regression results of CSAD on the linear and squared term of the market portfolio: up and down market for open-ended 
funds 
Table 5.5A reports the results of regressions of the following general form:                          
 
   , where the whole sample data is estimated.  Model with up and down-market conditions is:  
             
              
        
 
           
                
          
 
      , where the superscripts up and down refer to market returns going up and market returns 
going down respectively.       when the market has a positive return, i.e.     ; otherwise equals to zero.     when the market has a positive return, i.e.     ; otherwise equals to zero.  The 
sample period is January 1996 – June 2010, t-statistics are given in parentheses. The   ,    , and    are the  - statistics of the null hypotheses that   
  
   
    ,    
  
   
     and     
      respectively. 
 
Variable definitions: 
CSAD: Cross Section Absolute Deviation;   : market returns  ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CSAD Daily  
 
Weekly 
 
Monthly 
Coefficients Whole Sample 
Up market  
( R>0) 
Down market 
( R<0) 
Whole Sample 
Up market  
( R>0) 
Down market 
( R<0) 
Whole Sample 
Up market  
( R>0) 
Down market 
( R<0) 
α 
0.4201*** 
(18.0877) 
0.3794*** 
(16.5588) 
0.4591*** 
(17.1381) 
0.6105*** 
(16.9478) 
0.5592*** 
(11.8385) 
0.6841*** 
(15.1799) 
1.1962*** 
(12.8214) 
1.2694*** 
(8.0363) 
1.2336*** 
(11.7815) 
γ1 
0.3821*** 
(7.5812) 
0.3798*** 
(8.3943) 
0.3974*** 
(7.0071) 
0.1420*** 
(4.1767) 
0.1518*** 
(3.6837) 
0.1265*** 
(2.8913) 
-0.0188 
(-0.5244) 
-0.1238  
(-1.5225) 
0.0030 
(0.0569) 
γ2 
0.0211 
(1.3926) 
0.0396*** 
(3.4396) 
0.0009 
(0.0465) 
0.0064* 
(1.7864) 
0.0058 
(1.6404) 
0.0073 
(1.2661) 
0.0100*** 
(3.4177) 
0.0258** 
(2.4103) 
0.0072** 
(2.0587) 
Adj-R2 0.3728 0.3845 0.281071 0.2846 0.155972 0.1611 
S.D. 0.5187 0.5138 0.491694 0.4905 0.568373 0.5666 
SSR 1051.329 1031.043 194.3771 192.6922 59.11773 57.7961 
Log LH -2980.454 -2942.35 -570.6916 -567.1788 -157.3245 -155.222 
F1  
0.069111 
 
0.266067 
 
1.567254 
F2  
3.187010* 
 
0.054611 
 
2.520042 
F3  
6.423717** 
 
4.818478** 
 
0.034013 
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Table 5.5B: Regression results of CSAD on the linear and squared term of the market portfolio: up and down market for closed-end 
funds 
Table 5.5B reports the results of regressions of the following general form:                          
 
   , where the whole sample data is estimated.  Model with up and down-market conditions is:  
             
              
        
 
           
                
          
 
      , where the superscripts up and down refer to market returns going up and market returns 
going down respectively.       when the market has a positive return, i.e.     ; otherwise equals to zero.     when the market has a positive return, i.e.     ; otherwise equals to zero.  The 
sample period is January 1996 – June 2010, t-statistics are given in parentheses. The   ,    , and    are the  - statistics of the null hypotheses that   
  
   
    ,    
  
   
     and     
      respectively. 
The model is estimated by OLS with Newey-West standard errors.  
 
Variable definitions: 
CSAD: Cross Section Absolute Deviation;   : market returns  ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
CSAD Daily  
 
Weekly 
 
Monthly 
Coefficients Whole Sample 
Up market  
( R>0) 
Down market 
( R<0) 
Whole Sample 
Up market  
( R>0) 
Down market 
( R<0) 
Whole Sample 
Up market  
( R>0) 
Down market 
( R<0) 
α 
0.4033*** 
(35.7081) 
0.3770*** 
(27.5642) 
0.4289*** 
35.8838) 
1.0017*** 
(20.1038) 
0.9291*** 
(14.0828) 
1.0894*** 
(22.5387) 
2.4463*** 
(11.7701) 
2.8478*** 
(7.4775) 
2.1799*** 
(12.5037) 
γ1 
0.3275*** 
(14.1747) 
0.3303*** 
(11.8295) 
0.3314*** 
(16.9452) 
0.1876*** 
(3.2311) 
0.1822*** 
(3.2311) 
0.1979*** 
(5.9841) 
0.0445 
(0.5290) 
-0.2358 
(-1.2783) 
0.2322*** 
(2.6386) 
γ2 
0.0197*** 
(2.7600) 
0.0288*** 
(3.4899) 
0.0097* 
(1.8594) 
0.0159*** 
(3.3361) 
0.0262*** 
(3.3361) 
0.0069* 
(1.8239) 
0.0160* 
(1.9341) 
0.0468** 
(2.2173) 
0.0014 
(0.1919) 
Adj-R2 0.6228 0.6292 0.4436 0.4668 0.2141 0.2265 
S.D. 0.2714 0.2691 0.5577 0.5460 1.1097 1.1009 
SSR 287.9637 282.8420 250.4060 239.0890 225.3489 218.1675 
Log LH -447.7427 -413.0351 -673.2250 -654.5409 -281.7695 -278.7576 
F1  
0.0012 
 
0.0644 
 
4.3728** 
F2  
4.3375** 
 
4.8947** 
 
3.5150* 
F3  
10.2729*** 
 
5.3461** 
 
2.4047 
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5.4.2. Herding under Different Trading Volume Conditions 
Trading volume has been suggested as one of the proxies of investors’ sentiment (Baker 
& Stein, 2004; Kumar & Lee, 2006) and is used as a mean to measure the herding 
towards particular stocks (Lakonishok et al. 1999; Sia, 2004). Therefore, it can be one 
of the factors associated with the level of herding. The examinations are conducted in 
two specifications: up-volume market and down-volume market
35
. The model is:   
       
           
                  
      
    
      
        
   
                  
          
        
           (5.5) 
where the superscripts up-vol and dw-vol refer to the volume greater or lesser than zero 
respectively. D1 = 1 in volume up-market, which is defined as the market when 
volume>0, otherwise is zero;D2 = 1 in volume down-market, which is defined as the 
market when volume<0, otherwise is zero. Table 5.6 presents the results of the sample 
estimations.  
 
The estimated results are very similar in both open-ended and closed-end funds. In 
daily and weekly data, no coefficient of the linear and non-linear factors is significantly 
negative, implying that the relation between return dispersion and market return that is 
predicted by rational asset pricing models still holds. This again suggests that no herd 
behaviour exists regardless of the trading volume conditions. In the monthly interval, 
when the market trading volume goes down, both coefficients,   
      and   
      , are 
not significant. It shows that the return dispersions do not relate to the market returns. 
Although this is not an indicator of herding behaviour, the broken relationship which is 
predicted by rational asset price models may suggest herding behaviour when the 
market is in a volume down time.  
 
 
                                               
35As defined in the previous chapter:                
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Table 5.6: Regression results of CSAD on the linear and squared term of the 
market portfolio: up and down-volume market 
Table 5.6 reports the results of regressions of the following general form 
       
           
                  
          
      
           
               
   
          
        
where the superscripts up-vol and dw-vol refer to the volume greater of lesser than zero respectively.    
 in volume up-market, which is defined as the market when         , otherwise is zero;      in volume 
down-market, which is defined as the market when         , otherwise is zero. The sample period is 
January 1996 – June 2010. t-statistics are given in parentheses. The    to    are the  - statistics of the null 
hypotheses that   
         
      ,      
         
      , , and                , respectively. 
The model is estimated by adjusting the standard errors using the Newey-West procedure 
Variable definitions: 
CSAD: Cross Section Absolute Deviation;   : market returns  ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical 
significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CSAD Open-ended funds Closed-end funds 
 
Daily  Weekly Monthly Daily  Weekly Monthly 
αup-vol 
0.3999*** 
(13.8811) 
0.6427*** 
(14.2205) 
1.1135*** 
(8.9756) 
0.4096*** 
(28.7665) 
1.0357*** 
(17.7536) 
2.3710*** 
(8.1185) 
γ1
up-vol 
0.3927*** 
(6.4816) 
0.1173*** 
(3.1607) 
0.0228 
(0.4231) 
0.3236*** 
(10.9616) 
0.1765*** 
(4.0282) 
0.1181 
(0.9606) 
γ2
up-vol 
0.0123 
(0.7093) 
0.0069* 
(1.7881) 
0.0081* 
(1.8451) 
0.0175* 
(1.9592) 
0.0127** 
(2.1818) 
0.0106 
(0.9819) 
αdw--vol 
0.4331*** 
(18.0339) 
0.5834*** 
(12.3781) 
1.2201*** 
(9.8632) 
0.3964*** 
(31.5748) 
0.9964*** 
(16.2657) 
2.5326*** 
(9.5408) 
γ1
dw-vol 
0.3768*** 
(7.4087) 
0.1552*** 
(3.4595) 
-0.0076 
(-0.1234) 
0.3312*** 
(13.6968) 
0.1548*** 
(3.0826) 
-0.0503 
(-0.3121) 
γ2
dw-vol 
0.0372*** 
(2.7586) 
0.0094 
(1.5336) 
0.0042 
(0.5902) 
0.0249*** 
(4.1238) 
0.0297*** 
(5.0750) 
0.0236 
(1.2822) 
Adj-R2 0.3780 0.2843 0.1626 0.6239 0.4548 0.2095 
S.D. 0.5165 0.4906 0.5661 0.2710 0.5521 1.1129 
SSR 1041.8640 192.7726 57.6920 286.8473 244.4746 222.9531 
Log LH -2962.7700 -567.3470 -155.0542 -440.5327 -663.5403 -280.7755 
F1 0.0535 0.5804 0.122861 0.0544 0.1271 0.6266 
F2 1.9748 0.1284 0.193404 0.8366 4.6487** 0.3395 
F3 1.0881 1.0509 0.420950 0.7098 0.2910 0.1962 
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5.4.3. Herding under Different foreign Market Return Conditions 
According to the UK national statistics office, about 40% of UK listed shares are 
owned by foreign investors, therefore the foreign market changes are expected to have 
an impact on the UK equity market and consequently influence the UK fund managers 
decision making. Examination of institutional investor herding under the up-foreign-
market and down-foreign-market conditions is conducted by using S&P 500 Composite 
Index as the representative of foreign market indicator. S&P 500 Composite Index is a 
capitalisation-weighted index for 500 largest capitalisation companies which are 
actively traded in the US. The up-foreign market is defined as the returns of foreign 
market being greater than zero, i.e.       , and the down-foreign market is defined 
as the returns of foreign market being less than zero, i.e.       . The models applied 
in the tests are: 
       
           
                  
      
    
      
        
   
                  
      
    
        
           (5.6) 
where the superscripts up-for and dw-for refer to the foreign market returns greater or 
lesser than zero respectively.    in up-foreign market, zero otherwise;       in 
down-foreign market, zero otherwise
36
. The empirical results of estimation are reported 
in Table 5.7.  
 
The estimated coefficients present very similar pictures for open-ended and closed-end 
funds in daily and weekly data.   
      
and   
      
 are positive and significant, 
supporting the prediction of the relationship between dispersion and market made by 
rational return price models. None of   
      
  and    
      
 is significantly negative, 
which rules out the rate of changing return dispersions decreasing with market returns. 
This provides no evidence of the existence of herd behaviour in either up-foreign or 
down-foreign market. 
                                               
36 30-day (week and moth) moving average values have been used as benchmarks for defining the market 
conditions (Tan et al., 2008). Estimated coefficients suggest very similar results as the zero benchmark, 
which attached in Appendix.   
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In the monthly interval, none of the γ is negative and significant, suggesting that no 
herding behaviour has been found among open-ended and closed-end fund managers. 
The insignificant of  
      
and  
      
 suggests that linear relation between dispersion 
and market return does not hold, and the significant of  
      
 and  
      
 for open-
ended funds indicates that there is a non-linear relation between them. It is notable that 
estimated   
      
 and   
      
 for open-ended funds are negative. However, the 
relation of dispersion and market cannot easily be normalised on any particular metric, 
and so the exact magnitude of any specific coefficient dost not have a precise 
interpretation. It is the signs and relative magnitudes of coefficients on the same 
variable when compare in the different conditions. This may be a sign that herding is 
likely to exist in a falling foreign market. It is because that information about foreign 
financial markets cannot reach the domestic investors at the same speed and level as 
that of the local market, the sentiment biases are more likely to be involved in investors’ 
decision making. Investor sentiment becomes one possible factor that causes herd 
behaviour. According to Prospect theory, economic agent’s response to loss is more 
extreme than gain (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). In the foreign down-market, the 
negative foreign market returns promote pessimistic expectations about local market 
return among investors. The fear of making heavier losses than market average 
motivates fund managers to try to match their portfolio at least in line with the market 
portfolio. 
5.4.4. Herding under Different Market Volatility Conditions 
The use of zero as a benchmark to identify whether a market is an up-market or a down 
market has a limitation. For non-return variables, such as market volatility (   
 ) which 
normally is calculated as the square of the market return in period   and does not have a 
negative value, Tan et al. (2008) propose the use of moving averages as benchmarks for 
defining the high or low market conditions.    
  is regarded as high if on day   it is 
greater than the previous 30-day moving average
37
, and    
  is characterised low if it is 
less than the previous 30-day moving average. The same processes apply for weekly 
and monthly data
38
.   
                                               
37 60-day, 90-day and 120-day moving averages are also used to characterize market volatility as high or 
low. 
38 Because of the data availability, 60, 90 and 120-month moving averages are not applicable.   
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           (5.7) 
where the superscripts high and low refer   
    
    and   
    
   respectively,  
  
   =30 day (week or month) moving average.      when   
    
   , zero 
otherwise;     when   
    
   zero otherwise. The estimated results are reported 
in Table 5.8. 
 
The estimated coefficients from both open-ended and closed-end funds exhibit very 
similar results. There is no significant negative coefficient to provide evidence for 
herding behaviour in all three frequencies of data. Particularly, the positive and 
significant   s and insignificant    in daily data demonstrate that return dispersion is an 
increasing linear function of market return regardless of the level of market volatility. 
In the weekly and monthly data, some of the coefficients have negative values which 
may imply a decreasing relation between return dispersion. Especially, the estimated 
negative coefficients are more likely to appear in the low volatility period. This may 
suggest that institutional investors are likely to herd in the medium and long term when 
the market is less volatile. This can be explained in that the low volatile time is 
normally the period when less public information in the market. Investment decisions 
are made according to private information. Institutional investors have more resource to 
collect and analyse information of their peers and are therefore more likely to herd on 
each other’s portfolio. Statistically however, the estimated coefficients are not 
significant negative which suggests that the herding evidence is not found.     
 
The analysis relation between cross-section mutual fund return dispersion and market 
return shows that fund managers do not herd in a short investment interval, but may 
herd when market volatility is low in the medium or long investment interval. However, 
there is no significant sign suggesting herding behaviour in both high and low volatility 
markets.  
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Table 5.7: Regression results of CSAD on the linear and squared term of the 
market portfolio: up and down foreign market 
Table 5.7 reports the results of regressions of the following general form 
       
           
                  
      
    
      
           
                  
      
    
        
where the superscripts up-for and dw-for refer to the foreign market returns greater of lesser than zero respectively.     in up-
foreign market, zero otherwise;       in down-foreign market, zero otherwise. The sample period is January 1996 – June 2010. t-
statistics are given in parentheses. The    to    are the  - statistics of the null hypotheses that   
      
   
      
,      
      
 
  
      
, , and                , respectively. 
The model is estimated by adjusting the standard errors using the Newey-West procedure 
Variable definitions: 
CSAD: Cross Section Absolute Deviation;   : market returns  ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 
5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CSAD Open-ended funds Closed-end funds 
 
Daily  Weekly Monthly Daily  Weekly Monthly 
αup-for 
0.4328*** 
(18.8995) 
0.5484*** 
(11.8023) 
1.1299*** 
(10.6630) 
0.3825*** 
(32.9820) 
0.9724*** 
(15.2819) 
2.2675*** 
(9.6785) 
γ1
up-for 
0.3007*** 
(7.2357) 
0.1616*** 
(3.9563) 
-0.0332 
(-0.5143) 
0.3319*** 
(15.0130) 
0.1649*** 
(3.1097) 
0.0933 
(0.6596) 
γ2
up-for 
0.0435*** 
(3.6017) 
0.0039 
(1.3380) 
0.0159* 
(1.7926) 
0.0223*** 
(3.3389) 
0.0266*** 
(3.6293) 
0.0118 
(0.7311) 
αdw--for 
0.4180*** 
(14.1041) 
0.6966*** 
(14.3613) 
1.3667*** 
(1.3667) 
0.4355*** 
(26.8808) 
1.0300*** 
(20.0511) 
2.6821*** 
(8.2882) 
γ1
dw-for 
0.4519*** 
(6.9316) 
0.1145** 
(2.3646) 
-0.0660 
(-1.1739) 
0.3089*** 
(8.5486) 
0.2205*** 
(6.4805) 
0.0109 
(0.0910) 
γ2
dw-for 
-0.0016 
(-0.0946) 
0.0092 
(1.4076) 
0.0123*** 
(3.0241) 
0.0195* 
(1.7419) 
0.0056 
(1.4924) 
0.0171 
(1.6302) 
Adj-R2 0.3135 0.2860 0.1604 0.5376 0.4587 0.2111 
S.D. 0.5427 0.4900 0.5669 0.3005 0.5501 1.1118 
SSR 1149.904 192.3110 57.8467 352.6453 242.7106 222.4922 
Log LH -3155.713 -566.3798 -155.3032 -844.3680 -660.6147 -280.5831 
F1 3.7107* 0.8153 0.1449 0.3249 0.9497 0.1704 
F2 5.1078** 0.6469 0.1292 0.0528 6.6747** 0.0622 
F3 0.1653 6.5308** 1.7703 8.9553*** 0.6719 1.1047 
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Table 5.8: Regression results of CSAD on the linear and squared term of the 
market portfolio: high- and low-market volatility under moving average 30 
Table 5.8 reports the results of regressions of the following general form:  
       
         
                
    
    
      
        
               
       
        
where the superscripts high and low refer   
    
    and   
    
   respectively,    
   =30 day (week or month) moving 
average.     when   
    
   , zero otherwise;      when   
    
   zero otherwise. The sample period is January 
1996 – June 2010, t-statistics are given in parentheses. The   ,    , and    are the  - statistics of the null hypotheses that 
  
    
   
   ,    
    
   
    and            respectively. 
The model is estimated by OLS method with adjusting the standard errors using the Newey-West procedure 
Variable definitions: 
CSAD: Cross Section Absolute Deviation;   : market returns  ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 
5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
CSAD Open-ended funds Closed-end funds 
 
Daily  Weekly Monthly Daily  Weekly Monthly 
αhigh 
0.1212 
(1.6075) 
0.1640 
(1.5674) 
0.6282* 
(1.8820) 
0.1882*** 
(5.2408) 
0.5613*** 
(4.0995) 
1.0191 
(1.5817) 
γ1
high 
0.5591*** 
(6.2262) 
0.3096*** 
(5.6198) 
0.1469 
(1.4061) 
0.4741*** 
(11.2194) 
 
0.3441*** 
(4.6269) 
0.4680** 
(2.1532) 
γ2
high 
0.0002 
(0.0115) 
-0.0065 
(-1.4450) 
-0.0004 
(-0.0584) 
0.0013 
(0.1386) 
0.0042 
(0.5260) 
-0.0107 
(-0.7460) 
α low 
0.4270*** 
(14.8555) 
0.7234*** 
(12.1490) 
1.3567*** 
(10.0090) 
0.4278*** 
(32.4585) 
1.0964*** 
(13.4395) 
2.7340*** 
(7.5140) 
γ1
low 
0.4102*** 
(3.3518) 
-0.0785 
(-0.5486) 
-0.2260 
(-1.4355) 
0.2881*** 
(6.1575) 
-0.0060 
(-0.0328) 
-0.2810 
(-0.7761) 
γ2
low 
0.0804 
(0.9604) 
0.0969 
(1.4824) 
0.0574 
(1.5353) 
0.0622** 
(2.3409) 
0.1047 
(1.2905) 
0.0823 
(1.0312) 
Adj-R2 0.3907 0.3111 0.1620 0.6354 0.4637 0.2221 
S.D. 0.5112 0.4813 0.5663 0.2668 0.5476 1.1041 
SSR 1020.624 185.5632 57.7319 278.0508 240.4587 219.4067 
Log LH -2922.491 -551.9674 -155.1184 -379.6261 -656.8488 -279.2843 
F1 0.7050 5.2822** 3.1908* 7.4466*** 2.6757 2.5848 
F2 0.7012 2.4068 2.1204 4.3089** 1.4449 1.2283 
F3 12.2295*** 17.9074*** 3.8553*** 35.7342*** 10.2773*** 4.7412** 
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5.4.5. Portfolio herding in different financial crisis stages 
In the last section, the financial crisis criterion was introduced as the ability to identify 
market turbulence periods, and the study indicates that fund managers are more likely 
to follow the crowd during the pre-crisis period in the short to medium terms.  
Therefore, the relation between return dispersion and market return under financial 
crisis conditions is examined in order to reveal the portfolio herd behaviour: 
       
           
                  
          
      
         
   
                   
       
    
      
        
   
                  
          
        
           (5.8) 
where the superscripts no-cri refers no-crisis period, pre-cri refers pre-crisis period and 
in-cri refers in the crisis period.     in the no-crisis period, zero otherwise;       
in the pre-crisis, zero otherwise;       in the crisis period, zero otherwise.  The 
absolute value of market return,     , is used to facilitate the comparisons of the 
coefficients of the linear term in the non-crisis period, pre-crisis period, and post-crisis 
period. The estimated results are shown in Table 5.9. 
 
The estimated coefficients from both open-ended and closed-end funds exhibited very 
similar stories. None of the coefficients is significantly negative to demonstrate that 
return dispersion is a decreasing function of market return in different stages of the 
financial crisis in all frequencies of data. No herding evidence, therefore, can be found 
in the normal, pre-crisis or in-crisis period. This is different from the results using CH 
approach which suggests herding behaviour in the pre-crisis period. CH approach 
suggests that return dispersion in the pre-crisis period, on average, is less than that in 
the normal period, but CCK approach indicates that return dispersion in pre-crisis is 
still not a decreasing function of the market return. The null of   
         
       
 is 
rejected at the 5% significant level in the daily data, implying a lesser degree of 
increasing relationship between return dispersion and market return in the pre-crisis 
period. This may be a sign of a very low degree of herding behaviour in the pre-crisis 
period.  
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Looking at the coefficients amongst the different time intervals, there is no clear 
evidence of herding behaviour under different crisis conditions. It is more likely that 
herding behaviour appears in the longer time horizon. For example, estimated values of 
  s in the pre-crisis period in monthly interval are negative, however they are not 
statistically significant. This phenomenon can be explained in that the performances of 
fund managers are more like to be appraised in a relatively longer time interval. In 
order to keep in line with their peers and protect their reputation, managers try to match 
their portfolios to the market average at a similar frequency to that of the performances 
being evaluated against.   
 
The investigations of institutional herding behaviour by using cross-section return 
dispersion as a measure have not provided significant evidence of fund managers 
herding behaviour by using CCK approach. None of the estimated coefficients is 
significantly negative to demonstrate that return dispersion is a decreasing (or 
increasing but in a decreasing rate) function of absolute term of market return. 
Particularly, the estimated coefficients by daily data indicate that return dispersions 
increase alongside absolute market returns regardless of market condition.  This 
suggests that fund managers do not herd in the short investment interval. Estimated 
coefficients by using weekly data, however, indicate that there is neither linear nor non-
linear relation between return dispersion and market return when market volatility is 
low. This may give a hint of some possibilities of the existence of herding behaviour. 
The sign gets stronger when using monthly data. This may suggest that fund managers’ 
are likely herd in a long investment interval. It may because the performance of fund 
managers is normally measured in a relatively longer time interval, for example 
monthly. In order to be in line with the benchmark return or catch up with peers, fund 
managers mimic others portfolio to prevent an unfavoured result.  
 
This is opposite to what CH and Lao and Singh (2011) suggested: that herding is likely 
to be a short-life activity if it is caused by investor sentiment. They demonstrate that 
investors are more likely to put more weight on the noise information and make 
decisions with psychological biases when market uncertainty is generated by lack of 
information in a short run, and in medium and long runs, this uncertainty is less likely 
to have effects in sophisticated fund managers’ decision making, therefore, sentiment 
caused herding dies down. However, the principle-agent problem may affect fund 
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managers’ investment decision in the long run. Career prospects, financial benefits, and 
reputational concerns are taken as factors into their investment decisions. These 
motivate them to be a ‘winner’ in the market not to be a ‘loser’, and the market 
condition is now not a factor that encourages them to herd more or less. The findings of 
herding under foreign market conditions, in turn, confirm the hypothesis that the US 
equity market has an influence on UK fund managers’ decision making.    
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Table 5.9: Regression results of CSAD on the linear and squared term of the 
market portfolio in different crisis stages 
Table 5.9  reports the results of regressions of the following general form 
       
           
                  
          
      
            
                   
       
    
    
             
                  
          
        
where     in no-crisis period, otherwise is zero;       in the pre-crisis, otherwise is zero;       in crisis period, otherwise is 
zero.  The absolute value of market return,     , is used to facilitate the comparisons of the coefficients of the linear term in the  
non-crisis period, pre-crisis period, and post-crisis period. The sample period is January 1996 – June 2010. t-statistics are given in 
parentheses. 
The    to    are the  - statistics of the null hypotheses that   
       
   
      ,    
         
       
,  
         
      ,    
       
 
  
      ,    
         
       
, and   
         
      , respectively. 
Variable definitions: 
CSAD: Cross Section Absolute Deviation;   : market returns  ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 
5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
CSAD Open-ended funds Closed-end funds 
 
Daily  Weekly Monthly Daily  Weekly Monthly 
αno-cri 
0.4157*** 
(13.4658) 
0.5341*** 
(11.9895) 
1.1723*** 
(9.5416) 
0.3708*** 
(27.7215) 
0.8966*** 
(16.6386) 
2.1251*** 
(11.0738) 
γ1
no-cri 
0.4086*** 
(6.3716) 
0.1946*** 
(4.0568) 
-0.0531 
(-1.0220) 
0.3514*** 
(12.6777) 
0.2079*** 
(3.3135) 
0.0607 
(0.5473) 
γ2
no-cri 
0.0175 
(1.0274) 
0.0022 
(0.4790) 
0.0128*** 
(3.5390) 
0.0168** 
(2.1655) 
0.0155** 
(2.1091) 
0.0137* 
(1.7494) 
αpre-cri 
0.4004*** 
(18.2867) 
0.7846*** 
(9.7069) 
1.3207*** 
(5.9320) 
0.4286*** 
(20.7699) 
1.1111*** 
(8.5324) 
2.9047*** 
(6.0947) 
γ1
pre-cri 
0.1996*** 
(3.5502) 
-0.0872 
(-1.1851) 
-0.1905 
(-1.5473) 
0.1779*** 
(2.8627) 
0.0959 
(0.7248) 
-0.2585 
(-1.3977) 
γ2
pre-cri 
0.0935*** 
(3.2759) 
0.0383** 
(2.3527) 
0.0435*** 
(2.9990) 
0.1028*** 
(2.7138) 
0.0435 
(1.3184) 
0.0814*** 
(3.5676) 
αin-cri 
0.5395*** 
(11.1442) 
0.7150*** 
(9.7588) 
1.3384*** 
(7.6954) 
0.5699*** 
(20.2888) 
1.2852*** 
(9.3665) 
3.2595*** 
(10.2306) 
γ1
in-cri 
0.3476*** 
(3.9968) 
0.1987** 
(2.5116) 
0.0884 
(0.1874) 
0.2017*** 
(4.3002) 
0.1738* 
(1.7817) 
-0.1143 
(-0.9286) 
γ2
in-cri 
0.0102 
(0.3738) 
-0.0143 
(-1.0498) 
-0.0068 
(-1.2360) 
0.0379*** 
(2.7668) 
0.0016 
(0.1071) 
0.0261* 
(1.8622) 
Adj-R2 0.3803 0.29926 0.2229 0.6335 0.4627 0.3355 
S.D. 0.5156 0.48543 0.5454 0.2675 0.5481 1.0204 
SSR 1037.1610 188.04480 52.6485 279.2854 240.0120 184.3023 
Log LH -2953.9220 -557.32780 -146.5464 -388.2899 -656.0976 -263.0698 
F1 2.0373 6.9518*** 3.4302* 0.0935 0.2357 0.4215 
F2 6.0178** 10.2536*** 1.0639 6.4991** 0.5880 2.4546 
F3 0.3189 0.0020 2.6253 7.5495*** 0.0863 1.3153 
F4   
8.8930*** 2.6049 1.3504 4.4096** 
F5   
4.2429** 4.9527** 0.6891 8.0056*** 
F6   
8.1846*** 1.8038 0.6657 0.6079 
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5.5    Overlapping and non-overlapping data 
The weekly and monthly analysis so far used non-overlapping data. Hansen and 
Hodrick (1980) state that the overlapping of observations can create a moving average 
error term and thus Ordinary Least Squares parameter estimates would be inefficient 
and hypothesis tests biased. One of the methods to deal with the overlapping 
observations problem is to use a reduced sample in which no observation is overlapped, 
but this means having to sacrifice observations in the process. However, according to 
Harri and Brorsen (2009), the majority of articles in finance now use overlapping data.  
They point out that the using of overlapping data can be for either economic reasons or 
statistical ones. One of the statistical reasons for using overlapping data is that the 
information discarded through using non-overlapping observation may lead to the 
estimation being inefficient. For example, in this study, for a 15.5-year period of 
monthly data, the number of overlapping observations that can be used in estimation is 
3889 instead of 186 of non-overlapping observations. In order to deal with the 
overlapping observations problem, several heteroskedasticity and autocovariance 
consistent (HAC) estimators, such as Hansen and Hodrick (1980), Newey-West (1987) 
and Andrews and Monahan (1990), have been constructed to provide asymptotically 
valid hypothesis tests. In order to add the robustness for the studies in previous sections, 
the regressions are re-conducted by using the overlapping data and estimated by 
applying the Newey-West estimator
39
.  
 
Table 5.10 to Table 5.14 present the results that overlapping weekly and monthly data 
are applied in regression to examine herd behaviour under financial crisis periods and 
different market conditions respectively. Generally, comparing the results to their 
corresponding non-overlapping regressions (Table 5.4 – Table 5.9), the estimation 
results are fairly similar. The coefficients and hypothesis tests under both overlapping 
and non-overlapping regressions provide some evidence of herd behaviour during 
market unrest periods and under different market conditions.    
 
When the examination of herding in the market stress period is conducted by using the 
financial crises as the criteria (Table 5.10), estimated coefficients from overlapping data 
present similar pictures to those from non-overlapping data. The coefficients for pre-
                                               
39 Only overlapping data of open-ended funds has been reported in this study since the results of closed-
end funds are very similar to open-ended funds.   
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crisis are negative and significant and the coefficients for in-crisis are positive and 
significant in weekly interval, suggesting herding behaviour in pre-crisis period but not 
in crisis period. The monthly estimated coefficients are not significant during pre-crisis 
period and significant positive during in-crisis period, which is similar to estimations 
from non-overlapping data.  
 
The overlapping regressions of herd behaviour under varying market conditions are 
also fairly consistent with those in non-overlapping regressions. For example, no 
coefficient is significantly negative under up- and down-market conditions (Table 5.11), 
which suggests no herding evidence regardless of the market condition. These agree 
with the results estimated from non-overlapping data (see Table 5.5A). However, some 
differences still exist. For instance, in the monthly up-market        , estimated 
  
  
is positive, but not significant, which gives no hint of herding in the up-market 
which is different from the result under non-overlapping regression.   
  under 
overlapping regression has a negative value implying a possibility of herd behaviour, 
but it is rejected by the significance test.  
 
The estimation of herding under different financial crisis stages in both weekly and 
monthly interval displays very similar patterns in overlapping regression (see Table 
5.14) and non-overlapping regression (Table 5.9). Differences, however, also exist, for 
example, in the weekly interval, the coefficient,   
      , is not significant and   
       is 
positive significant in overlapping regression. This suggests that a non-linear rather 
than linear relation between dispersion and market return, indicating herd behaviour 
may exist in the post-crisis period. This is different from the estimated coefficients by 
using non-overlapping data,    
        is significant positive and   
        is insignificant, 
indicating no herding evidence in the post-crisis period.  
 
Correspondingly, the overlapping regressions with different trading volume regimes 
(Table 5.12 Vs Table 5.6) and different foreign market conditions (Table 5.13 Vs Table 
5.7) all display similar features to those from non-overlapping estimations. There are 
still differences appearing in the results, particularly in the monthly interval. This may 
be because the moving average error term created by overlapping data in the monthly 
interval is not erased by the estimation method (Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & 
Covariance in this study) and thus the parameter estimates would be inefficient and 
hypothesis tests biased.   
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Table 5.10: Overlapping Regression Coefficients: Dispersions during periods of 
market stress identified by financial crises for open-ended funds 
Table 5.10 reports the results of regressions of the following general form:          
   
     
     ,  
Where               ; if the market return on day   lies in the extreme lower tail of the distribution,   
   
   
if day    is in the pre-crisis period; otherwise it is equal to zero.   
    if day    is in the in-crisis period; otherwise it 
is equal to zero.The    statistics test the null hypotheses that      . The sample period is January 1996 – June 
2010, t-statistics are given in parentheses.  
Variable definitions: 
CSAD: Cross Section Absolute Deviation; CSSD: Cross Section Standard Deviation ***Statistical significance at 1% level; 
**Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CSAD 
Market return in criteria pre- & in-
crisis period CSSD 
Market return in criteria pre- & in-
crisis period 
 Weekly Monthly  
Weekly Monthly 
α 
0.9531*** 
(26.3263) 
1.3666*** 
(33.8257) 
 
1.1517*** 
(28.4015) 
1.7541*** 
(35.3282) 
β1 
-0.1368*** 
(-3.0079) 
0.0012 
(0.0152) 
-0.1076** 
(-2.0073) 
0.1158 
(1.0441) 
β2 
0.1762*** 
(3.4181) 
0.3317*** 
(4.9588) 
0.2436*** 
(4.1266) 
0.5013*** 
(5.3035) 
Adj-R2 0.0203 0.0273 0.0231 0.0375 
S.D. 0.6818 0.7591 0.7342 0.9446 
SSR 1876.2490 2239.7690 2175.4620 3468.2560 
Log LH -4182.6970 -4445.9600 -4481.5150 -5296.4680 
Fc 46.6617*** 15.8311*** 40.2952*** 9.1712*** 
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Table 5.11: Overlapping regression results of CSAD on the linear and squared 
term of the market portfolio: up and down marketfor open-ended funds 
Table 5.11 reports the results of regressions of the following general form:                          
 
   ,  
where the whole sample data is estimated.  
 
Model with up and down-market conditions is:  
             
              
        
 
           
                
          
 
      ,  
where the superscripts up and down refer to market returns going up and market returns going down respectively.      
 when the market has a positive return, i.e.     ; otherwise equals to zero.     when the market has a positive return, 
i.e.     ; otherwise equals to zero.  The sample period is January 1996 – June 2010, t-statistics are given in 
parentheses. The   ,    , and    are the  - statistics of the null hypotheses that   
  
   
    ,    
  
   
     and     
      respectively. 
 
Variable definitions: 
CSAD: Cross Section Absolute Deviation;   : market returns  ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 
5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CSAD Weekly 
 
Monthly 
Coefficients Whole Sample 
Up market  
( R>0) 
Down market 
( R<0) 
 
Whole Sample 
Up market  
( R>0) 
Down market 
( R<0) 
α 
0.6582*** 
(28.6164) 
0.6164*** 
(19.6157) 
0.7220*** 
(26.6208) 
1.1228*** 
(30.5880) 
1.1313*** 
(23.1838) 
1.2708*** 
(25.9608) 
γ1 
0.1448*** 
(6.9491) 
0.1436*** 
(4.4151) 
0.1351*** 
(6.0615) 
0.0800*** 
(5.6028) 
0.0030 
(0.1083) 
0.0854*** 
(5.2478) 
γ2 
0.0069** 
(2.4019) 
0.0091* 
(1.8746) 
0.0064** 
(2.0924) 
0.0008 
(0.8747) 
0.0097*** 
(3.6512) 
-0.0003 
(-0.3672) 
F1  
0.0511 
 
6.8495*** 
F2  
0.2191 
 
13.226*** 
F3  
7.9928*** 
 
5.1387** 
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Table 5.12: Overlapping regression results of CSAD on the linear and squared 
term of the market portfolio: up and down volume market for open-ended funds 
Table 5.12 reports the results of regressions of the following general form 
       
           
                  
      
    
      
           
                  
          
        
where the superscripts up-vol and dw-vol refer to the volume greater of lesser than zero respectively.        in volume up-
market, which is defined as the market when         , otherwise is zero;       in volume down-market, which is 
defined as the market when         , otherwise is zero. The sample period is January 1996 – June 2010. t-statistics are given 
in parentheses. The    to    are the  - statistics of the null hypotheses that   
      
   
      ,      
      
   
      , , and 
               , respectively. 
The model is estimated by adjusting the standard errors using the Newey-West procedure 
Variable definitions: 
CSAD: Cross Section Absolute Deviation;   : market returns  ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 
5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CSAD Weekly Monthly 
 
Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic 
αup-vol 0.6679*** 23.7066 1.0838*** 27.4422 
γ1
up-vol 0.1389*** 6.2695 0.0964*** 6.2943 
γ2
up-vol 0.0066** 2.1874 -6.43E-05 -0.0749 
αdw--vol 0.6559*** 22.3977 1.1718*** 24.6544 
γ1
dw-vol 0.1405*** 4.8316 0.0568*** 2.8885 
γ2
dw-vol 0.0095** 2.3274 0.0022 1.4921 
F1 0.0025 4.2278** 
F2 0.3960 3.1025* 
F3 0.1166 3.5805* 
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Table 5.13: Overlapping regression results of CSAD on the linear and squared 
term of the market portfolio: up and down foreign market for open-ended funds 
 
Table 5.13 reports the results of regressions of the following general form 
       
           
                  
      
    
      
           
                  
      
    
        
where the superscripts up-for and dw-for refer to the foreign market returns greater of lesser than zero respectively.     in up-
foreign market, zero otherwise;       in down-foreign market, zero otherwise. The sample period is January 1996 – June 2010. t-
statistics are given in parentheses. The    to    are the  - statistics of the null hypotheses that   
      
   
      
,      
      
 
  
      
, , and                , respectively. 
The model is estimated by adjusting the standard errors using the Newey-West procedure 
Variable definitions: 
CSAD: Cross Section Absolute Deviation;   : market returns  ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 
5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CSAD Weekly Monthly 
 
Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic 
αup-for 0.6227*** 20.0453 1.1979*** 24.5307 
γ1
up-for 0.1392*** 4.5694 -0.01432 -0.5797 
γ2
up-for 0.0085* 1.9401 0.0104*** 4.2593 
αdw--for 0.7106*** 24.2275 1.1938*** 23.8341 
γ1
dw-for 0.1435*** 6.2274 0.0997*** 5.9041 
γ2
dw-for 0.0062** 2.0282 -0.0007 -0.9639 
F1 0.0147 15.326*** 
F2 0.2023 19.576*** 
F3 4.8981** 0.0041 
 179 
 
Table 5.14: Overlapping regression results of CSAD on the linear and squared 
term of the market portfolio: different crisis stages for open-ended funds 
Table 5.14 reports the results of regressions of the following general form 
       
           
                  
          
      
            
                   
       
    
    
             
                  
          
        
where     in no-crisis period, otherwise is zero;       in the pre-crisis, otherwise is zero;       in crisis period, otherwise is 
zero.  The absolute value of market return,     , is used to facilitate the comparisons of the coefficients of the linear term in the  
non-crisis period, pre-crisis period, and post-crisis period. The sample period is January 1996 – June 2010. t-statistics are given in 
parentheses. 
The    to    are the  - statistics of the null hypotheses that   
       
   
      ,    
         
      ,  
         
      ,    
       
 
  
      ,    
         
       
, and   
         
      , respectively. 
Variable definitions: 
CSAD: Cross Section Absolute Deviation;   : market returns  ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 
5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
CSAD Weekly 
 
Monthly 
αno-cri 
0.6026*** 
(22.5090) 
1.0377*** 
(23.5839) 
γ1
no-cri 
0.1786*** 
(7.2959) 
0.0843*** 
(4.5839) 
γ2
no-cri 
0.0047* 
(1.6746) 
0.0008 
(0.7438) 
αpre-cri 
0.6949*** 
(18.1920) 
1.2226*** 
(16.0463) 
γ1
pre-cri 
0.0276 
(0.7424) 
-0.0259 
(-0.4902) 
γ2
pre-cri 
0.0242*** 
(2.8413) 
0.0178*** 
(2.8276) 
αin-cri 
0.9478*** 
(17.0884) 
1.5096*** 
(14.2496) 
γ1
in-cri 
0.0399 
(1.0615) 
0.0425 
(1.2958) 
γ2
in-cri 
0.0142** 
(2.1781) 
0.0003 
(0.1078) 
F1 0.0537 1.2259 
F2 11.5047*** 3.8845** 
F3 9.5570*** 1.2388 
F4 0.8611 6.6807*** 
F5 4.7173** 7.0644*** 
F6 1.7905 0.0381 
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5.6    CAPM Beta dispersion and portfolio herding 
Hwang & Salmon (2004) (HS) suggest that the perception of risk return relationship of 
assets may be distorted if investors are influenced by behavioural biases, and it is 
possible that betas of the stocks will deviate from their equilibrium values. Thus the 
beta of a stock may change with fluctuations in investors’ sentiment, and the cross-
sectional dispersion of betas is expected to be smaller in the presence of herd behaviour.  
Empirical evidence shows that the risk-return relationship of UK unit trusts does vary 
over time (Black, Fraser and Power, 1992). Therefore, herding can also be tested by 
investigating the dispersion of the betas of UK open-ended funds.  
5.6.1. OLS estimated betas 
In accordance with HS approach, weekly and monthly betas are estimated by OLS from 
daily returns by applying the market model:  
           
                    (5.9) 
where      represent the return of fund portfolio   at date  ,      is market return at date 
 , and     
  is the weekly and     
  is the monthly beta estimated by using daily data 
over weekly (monthly) interval. The cross-sectional standard deviation of the estimated 
betas is then calculated as:   
       
    
      
    
     
   
   
  
                                          (5.10) 
where  
     is the cross-section average beta at week (month)  .  
 
Since herding can be a result of investors adjusting their investment to the market 
fundamentals and macroeconomic information, more tests are designed to detect 
whether herd behaviour is led by such factors. HS propose to add more independent 
variables in the measurement equation. The argument is that, after these variables are 
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included, a significant     indicates herding still remaining as a factor to explain the 
changes in the          
  . The analysis is therefore conducted in 3 different stages. 
 
The first stage is to examine herding of mutual fund in a basic model which does not 
take fundamental market and macroeconomic factors into account. This is to estimate 
the state space model of equation (4.10) and (4.11):  
             
                
                      
where          
   represent the standard deviation of UK fund betas,     is the 
unobservable herding parameter.   
 
The second stage is to examine whether herding is caused by fundamental market 
factors. This is done by adding market volatility (   ), market return (     and foreign 
market return (represented by return of S&P) into the measurement equation of the state 
space model. The foreign market return (   
 ) is included as an independent variable 
because previous studies suggest that foreign market return and investors’ sentiment 
have an impact on the UK market and investors’ behaviour (Verma & Soydemir, 2006). 
The basic state space model above is amended into model 2 as: 
             
                                   
      (5.11) 
                      (5.12) 
where        is log-market-volatility,    is market return and     
  is foreign market 
return at time  . 
 
The final stage is to examine herding concerned with fundamental market and 
macroeconomic factors by further adding macroeconomics factors of Term Spread (TS) 
and the relative Treasury Bill rate (RTB) in the measurement equation of the state space 
model 2. It examines whether such factors are the causes of the deviation of the funds’ 
betas. The estimation model becomes the model 3: 
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                                              (5.13) 
                      (5.14) 
where     is the term spread at time  . It is the difference between the UK 3-month 
Treasury Bill rate and the UK 10-year Government Bond rate.    is the relative 
treasury bill rate. It is the difference between the UK 3-month Treasury Bill rate and its 
4-week moving average for weekly interval (12-month moving average for monthly 
data). The estimated results from open-ended and closed-end funds are presented in 
Table 5.15.  
 
The estimations from open-ended and closed-end funds reveal very similar features. 
Among the weekly herding estimations, the results in the first column show that the 
estimated    is large and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that 
herding is highly persistent in the market.       satisfies the requirement that 
herding toward the market portfolio is not an explosive process, hence     is stationary. 
The estimated weekly    
  has a significant probability value less than the 10% 
significant level. This indicates that the standard deviation of      is highly possibly 
not zero, implying      . This can be interpreted as the existence of herding. The 
significant of    also supports the particular autoregressive structure.  
 
The results in the second column show that after including fundamental market factors, 
   
  is still significant at the 10% level, proving the evidence of herding after adding 
the three market fundamental variables. The large and significant   , again, states the 
highly persistent herd behaviour. Market return is significant at the 10% level in open-
ended funds, implying that the domestic equity market returns have some explanatory 
power to open-ended funds’         
  , but the significant    
  indicates that market 
returns do not generate much investor herding behaviour.  
 
The third column shows that    
  and    do not change much after taking market 
fundamental and macroeconomic factors into account, indicating that market 
fundamental and macroeconomic factors do not vary the Beta dispersion much. The 
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significance of some of the factors demonstrates their explanatory power to the 
         
  . However, the still significant    
  in model 3 indicates that the 
fundamental and macroeconomic factors do not generate much investor herding 
behaviour.  
 
Estimates form monthly data suggest very similar pictures to those of weekly data. 
  is large and significant and    
  has a significant probability value more than 5% but 
less than 10%, again, suggesting that       for all  . This can be interpreted as 
evidence for the existence of highly persistent herding. In model 2 and 3, the significant 
coefficient of market volatility (   ) and/or foreign market return (   ) state that they 
are the factors to explain the changes in the          
   but they cannot take over the 
explanatory power of the herding variable,    . 
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Table 5.15: Estimates of state-space basic models for herding in the UK mutual funds 
Table 5.15 reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
 
Model 1:              
                and                  
Model 2:              
                                  
       and                  
Model 3:              
                                  
                       and                  
where        
   represent the standard deviation of UK fund betas,     is the unobservable herding parameter;        is log-market-volatility,    is market return and     
  is foreign market return at time  ;     
is the term spread at time  . It is the difference between the UK 3-month Treasury Bill rate and the UK 10-year Government Bond rate.    is the relative treasury bill rate. It is the difference between the UK 3-
month Treasury Bill rate and its 4-week moving average for weekly interval (12-month moving average for monthly data). 
The sample period is January 1996 – June 2010.  Standard Deviations are given in parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level.  
 
Open-ended Funds Closed-end Funds 
 
Cross-sectional variance of weekly 
betas 
Cross-sectional variance of monthly 
betas 
Cross-sectional variance of weekly 
betas 
Cross-sectional variance of monthly 
betas 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
μm 
-0.987432*** 
(0.078410) 
-0.986901*** 
(0.079246) 
-0.985873*** 
(0.079100) 
-1.392156*** 
(0.112171) 
-1.416285*** 
(0.118011) 
-1.41371*** 
(0.124758) 
-0.611866 *** 
(0.0324986) 
-0.612351*** 
(0.031832) 
-0.610914*** 
(0.029683) 
-1.010265*** 
(0.019915) 
-1.019149*** 
(0.020430) 
-1.020053*** 
(0.020974) 
ϕm 
0.990471*** 
(0.007759) 
0.990753*** 
(0.007665) 
0.99117*** 
(0.007637) 
0.989348*** 
(0.013857) 
0.989397*** 
(0.013672) 
0.991308*** 
(0.011850) 
0.960937*** 
(0.0237995) 
0.964495*** 
(0.022327) 
0.956425*** 
(0.027643) 
0.784138*** 
(0.121990) 
0.766854*** 
(0.128472) 
0.778514*** 
(0.119173) 
θm1 
 
-0.000146 
(0.012079) 
-0.000292 
(0.012066)  
0.003227*** 
(0.011622) 
0.0332084*** 
(0.011662) 
 
-0.009006 
(0.011344) 
-0.007470 
(0.011370) 
 
0.010920 
(0.007965) 
0.010389 
(0.008013) 
θm2 
 
0.013246* 
(0.007973) 
0.014838* 
(0.008055)  
-0.004404 
(0.006256) 
-0.002990 
(0.006376) 
 
0.000849 
(0.007384) 
0.010299 
(0.007477) 
 
-0.004475 
(0.004307) 
-0.005094 
(0.004375) 
θm3 
 
-0.008564 
(0.007684) 
-0.006944 
(0.007749)  
0.011904** 
(0.005639) 
0.010351* 
(0.005855) 
 
-0.005900 
(0.007105) 
-0.006286 
(0.007200) 
 
0.006841* 
(0.003883) 
0.007486* 
(0.004002) 
θm4 
  
-0.006627 
(0.004700)   
-0.002475 
(0.002742) 
  
-0.006930 
(0.005203) 
  
0.001397 
(0.001962) 
θm5 
  
-0.010870** 
(0.005515)   
0.000118 
(0.002603) 
  
-0.007690* 
(0.004481) 
  
0.000105 
(0.002004) 
σ2mv 
0.122963** 
(0.006452) 
0.122632*** 
(0.006442) 
0.122486*** 
(0.006425) 
0.043245*** 
(0.004716) 
0.039581*** 
(0.004350) 
0.039826*** 
(0.004364) 
0.105723*** 
(0.005906) 
0.105549*** 
(0.005812) 
0.104574*** 
(0.005913) 
0.016891*** 
(0.002780) 
0.015886*** 
(0.002853) 
0.015989*** 
(0.002762) 
σ2mη 
0.000529* 
(0.000335) 
0.000511* 
(0.000332) 
0.000465* 
(0.000312) 
0.000497* 
(0.000360) 
0.000548* 
(0.000384) 
0.0004576* 
(0.000329) 
0.001192* 
(0.00085) 
0.000943* 
(0.000702) 
0.001194* 
(0.000921) 
0.002715* 
(0.002048) 
0.003116* 
(0.002320) 
0.002988* 
(0.002141) 
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5.6.2. CAPM betas estimated by Kalman Filter method 
In their approach, Hwang & Salmon (2004) estimate the standard OLS using non-over 
lapping monthly betas. This may lead to estimation error in the cross-sectional standard 
deviation of the betas. They suggest that the presence of estimation error makes it more 
difficult to find significant estimates of    , though it does not affect the estimated 
herding parameter. They further point out that more significant values of   can be 
found if the interval over which the initial beta estimates are computed is lengthened. 
However, lengthening the interval would reduce the ability to capture more rapid 
movements in herding.  Moreover, the HS approach is based on the argument that 
investor sentiment such as herding may lead to time-varying betas. Black, Fraser and 
Power (1992) suggest that the OLS regression model will be inefficient if the betas are 
time-varying and therefore it may be an unsuitable procedure for estimating the time 
varying betas. They propose instead to use the Kalman Filter to obtain the parameters. 
This procedure allows a set of ‘hyper-parameters’ to be obtained.  It enables daily betas 
to be obtained as well as weekly and monthly betas. In this section, the betas are 
recalculated by applying by Black et al (1992) method and the herding measure is 
estimated by utilising the models presented in the previous section. Table 5.16A and 
Table 5.16B reports the regression results open-ended and closed-end funds 
respectively. 
 
In the daily interval, the estimated parameters are very similar between open-ended and 
closed-end funds. Under the basic model, the results (in the 1
st
 column) show that the 
estimated    is again large and highly significant, indicating that herding is highly 
persistent in the market. The estimated daily    
  is significant at the 1% level, meaning 
that the standard deviation of     is statistically non-zero. This shows evidence of 
herding towards the market portfolio. Estimates of model 2 (column 2) show that 
returns of foreign market,    , is significant, demonstrating that it has some 
explanatory power to the changes in the          
  . The significance of    
 , however, 
suggests that herding still exists, and the significant of    indicates the herding is still 
highly persistent. This implies that the institutional investor herding behaviour is not 
caused by market fundamentals but other factors such as investor sentiment.
40
 
                                               
40The macroeconomic variables are not available in daily frequency.  Model 3 cannot be estimated.      
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In the weekly interval, the results from open-ended and closed-end funds are very 
similar again.    
  is highly significant, demonstrating       for all   . This provides 
evidence for the existence of herding.    is highly significant suggesting that herding 
is highly persistent among the investment portfolios. The significant level of    
  does 
not change much from model 1 (the basic model) to model 3 which includes market 
fundamental and macroeconomic factors. This suggests that the herding behaviour is 
not caused by the market fundamental and macroeconomic factors. Although some of 
the factors have explanatory power to the changes of the standard deviation of betas, 
the still significant    and    
  suggests that they do not generate much herding 
activity.  
 
Similar to the weekly result, estimated    
  and     from monthly data are significant, 
suggesting a persistent herding behaviour. Although several market and 
macroeconomic fundamental coefficients are significant demonstrating some 
explanatory power to the changes in the          
  . However,    
  is significant, 
demonstrating that the fundamentals and macroeconomic factors do not generate much 
herding, and the high value of     implies that herding behaviour still highly persistent. 
This suggests that the herding behaviour detected in model 1 is not caused by market 
and macroeconomic fundamentals. Instead, it again may be caused by investor 
sentiment.  
 
It is worth noting that in the monthly estimation, there is a different significant level of 
   
  from open-ended funds to closed-end funds. The     
  of open-ended funds has 
much higher significance level than that of closed-end funds, indicating that managers 
of open-ended funds are more likely to herd to a greater level than those of closed-end 
funds. This may be explained by the structure of the open-ended. As open-ended funds 
can issue shares or have to redeem investment any time when investors require, fund 
managers have the pressure to keep investment portfolios at the similar risk level to 
their peers’ to justify their investment returns. This leads to the portfolio betas diverting 
from the fundamental beta expected by the rational asset model.        
 
The estimated result from OLS Betas and Kalman Filter Betas both suggest herding 
evidence of UK fund managers, and the herding behaviour of fund managers is 
persistent.  In comparing the estimation results, coefficients from the Kalman Filter 
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betas exhibit much stronger herding signs than that from the OLS betas. In all three 
models, the parameters, standard deviation of the herding variable has greater value in 
herding estimation from the Kalman Filter betas, and the significant level of standard 
deviation of the herding by Kalman Filter beta is also greater than that in OLS beta 
herding estimations. This can be because the Kalman Filter method is more efficient in 
estimating time-varying Betas (Black, Fraser and Power, 1992) which contain better 
information.  
5.7    Conclusion 
In this chapter institutional investor herding is investigated by applying the measures of 
return and CAPM beta dispersion of UK open-ended funds and UK closed-end funds. 
The sample open-ended funds are equity focused mutual funds and the closed-end 
funds are randomly chosen from those listed on London Stock Exchange, where 
investment focuses can vary. The investigation is conducted by applying daily, weekly 
and monthly data to study fund managers herd behaviour in different investment 
intervals.  
 
The rationale is that a rise in herding would be reflected in a decrease in dispersion of 
fund returns or betas. Instead of investigating whether fund managers are crowded into 
or out of one or a group of stocks by examining micro-level of account data, the 
analysis utilises returns of funds as an indicator to explore the style of portfolio that 
fund managers follow to each other, i.e. the dispersion of fund returns decreases if fund 
managers herd on the return of a benchmark portfolio return.   
 
Applying CH approach, institutional herding behaviour in market extreme times was 
examined but no evidence have been found. Introducing financial crisis to define 
market stress periods, the study finds evidence of fund managers herding in the short 
and medium investment intervals during the pre-crisis bubble building period. This may 
be because when the market is overvalued by some irrational agents, fund managers 
ride the bubble to maximise their profit and to avoid losing out to their peers. In the 
long term interval there is no clear sign of herd behaviour of fund managers, but the 
significant larger return dispersion in the crisis period suggests the possibility of 
herding in the pre-crisis and normal periods. This may indicate that investors herd in 
 188 
 
normal time. It may confirm the statement that financial crisis is a process of asset 
prices correcting to the fundamentals from the bubble.     
 
Fund manager herd behaviour was further investigated by using CCK method which 
examines the relation between cross-section return dispersion and absolute market 
return. The estimated coefficients provide no significant evidence of herding behaviour 
among fund managers. Different market conditions including the up- and down-market 
conditions, up- and down-trading-volume, up- and down-foreign-market-return and 
high- and low-volatility market conditions were also considered to examine herding 
behaviour in different markets and the possible asymmetric effect of herding behaviour.  
Estimated results do not provided significant evidence of herding behaviour, and there 
is a general indication of symmetric return dispersion in the market.     
 
While CH and CCK approaches investigate herding behaviour based on the assumption 
that investors herd (or herd in a greater degree) in certain periods (or under certain 
conditions), HS focuses on examining what factors investors herd upon. HS suggest 
that herd behaviour is more likely to be persistent and affects CAPM betas of portfolios. 
Therefore, CAPM betas dispersions of UK open-ended and closed-end funds are 
examined for studying institutional herd behaviour. It appears that there is strong 
evidence of herding among fund managers in the risk-return relation of their portfolio 
returns and the market return. The study also demonstrates that the herd behaviour is 
not caused by market fundamental and macroeconomic factors, instead, it perhaps 
arises from investor sentiment.  
 
In the study, CAPM beta was obtained by using OLS and Kalman Filter technique 
respectively. The estimated parameters from OLS betas address similar results to those 
from Kalman Filter betas, however the level of significance of herding evidence was 
greater in the Kalman Filter betas than that of OLS betas. The Kalman Filter technique 
also overcomes the OLS method issue of only relatively lower frequency betas being 
obtained by estimating higher frequency returns. It allows daily fund betas to be used 
for herding study in addition to weekly and monthly betas. The estimated herding 
parameters provides stronger evidence of fund manager herd behaviour in all three 
investment intervals (daily, weekly and monthly), and the factors which causes 
managers herding is more likely to be investor sentiment rather than market 
fundamental and macroeconomic elements.    
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In the examination of UK institutional herding behaviour, the results from UK open-
ended funds are very similar to those from closed-end funds. Although they are in a 
different form of structure and have very different investment focuses, the examination 
of return dispersions by using CH and CCK approach suggest no significant evidence 
of herding behaviour of the fund managers and the examination of CAPM betas by HS 
approach indicate significant herding behaviour fund managers. This demonstrates that 
fund managers are more likely to herd on the systematic risk of the market rather than 
in a specific period or condition. This may also imply that herding behaviour is a 
general practice among the fund managers.  
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Table 5.16A: Estimates of state-space models for herding in the UK open-ended funds by using Kalman Filter betas 
Table 5.16A reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
Model 1:              
                and                  
Model 2:              
                                  
       and                  
Model 3:              
                                  
                             and                  
where        
   represent the standard deviation of UK fund betas,     is the unobservable herding parameter;        is log-market-volatility,    is market return and     
  is foreign market 
return at time  ;     is the term spread at time  . It is the difference between the UK 3-month Treasury Bill rate and the UK 10-year Government Bond rate.    is the relative treasury bill rate. It is 
the difference between the UK 3-month Treasury Bill rate and its 4-week moving average for weekly interval (12-month moving average for monthly data). 
The macroeconomic variables are not available in daily frequency. Therefore, the model 3 cannot be estimated. The sample period is January 1996 – June 2010.  Standard Deviations are given in 
parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level.  
 
Coefficients Cross-sectional variance of daily betas Cross-sectional variance of weekly betas (83 funds) Cross-sectional variance of monthly betas 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
μm 
-1.493539*** 
(0.030479) 
-1.493243*** 
(0.030574) 
-1.583567** 
(0.672617) 
-1.579118** 
(0.682150) 
-1.576918** 
(0.682605) 
-1.802604*** 
(0.666231) 
-1.791269** 
(0.691002) 
-1.792034** 
(0.693212) 
ϕm 
0.980917*** 
(0.003777) 
0.980995*** 
(0.003772) 
0.998503*** 
(0.001871) 
0.998560*** 
(0.001806) 
0.998570** 
(0.001794) 
0.991952*** 
(0.009417) 
0.992538*** 
(0.008843) 
0.992621*** 
(0.008767) 
θm1 
 
0.000258 
(0.000382)  
0.001463 
(0.001074) 
0.001569 
(0.001070) 
 0.005473 
(0.004212) 
0.005135 
(0.004218) 
θm2 
 
-0.000402 
(0.000372)  
-0.002547*** 
(0.000665) 
-0.002323*** 
(0.000670) 
 0.003563* 
(0.002130) 
0.003287 
(0.002143) 
θm3 
 
-0.000661** 
(0.000337)  
0.001324** 
(0.000646) 
0.001249* 
(0.000647) 
 -0.003890** 
(0.001965) 
-0.003540* 
(0.001981) 
θm4 
    
-0.000778* 
(0.000426) 
  0.000197 
(0.001141) 
θm5 
    
0.000082 
(0.000504) 
  -0.001265 
(0.001344) 
σ2mv - - - - - - - - 
σ2mη 
0.001342*** 
(0.000030) 
0.001340*** 
(0.000030) 
0.002052*** 
(0.000102) 
0.002008*** 
(0.000100) 
0.001990*** 
(0.000099) 
0.011680*** 
(0.001217) 
0.011324*** 
(0.001180) 
0.011230*** 
(0.001170) 
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Table 5.16B: Estimates of state-space models for herding in the UK Closed-end funds by using Kalman Filter betas 
Table 5.16B reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
Model 1:              
                and                  
Model 2:              
                                  
       and                  
Model 3:              
                                  
                             and                  
where        
   represent the standard deviation of UK fund betas,     is the unobservable herding parameter;        is log-market-volatility,    is market return and     
  is foreign market return at time  ;     
is the term spread at time  . It is the difference between the UK 3-month Treasury Bill rate and the UK 10-year Government Bond rate.    is the relative treasury bill rate. It is the difference between the UK 3-
month Treasury Bill rate and its 4-week moving average for weekly interval (12-month moving average for monthly data). 
The macroeconomic variables are not available in daily frequency. Therefore, the model 3 cannot be estimated. The sample period is January 1996 – June 2010.  Standard Deviations are given in parentheses. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level.  
 
Coefficients Cross-sectional variance of daily betas Cross-sectional variance of weekly betas  Cross-sectional variance of monthly betas 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
μm 
-1.43049 
(1.181365) 
-1.421931 
(1.182523) 
-0.646538*** 
(0.018991) 
-0.644569*** 
(0.018512) 
-0.648129*** 
(0.018747) 
-0.196591** 
(0.080966) 
-0.158018** 
(0.074414) 
-0.176577** 
(0.079228) 
ϕm 
0.999649*** 
(0.000414) 
0.999651*** 
(0.000411) 
0.674711*** 
(0.070466) 
0.662586*** 
(0.072842) 
0.692625*** 
(0.072501) 
0.902846*** 
(0.065543) 
0.907973*** 
(0.068907) 
0.925452*** 
(0.053068) 
θm1 
 
0.000567 
(0.000382)  
-0.021046*** 
(0.007302) 
-0.021704*** 
(0.007223) 
 -0.066031*** 
(0.020276) 
-0.069963*** 
(0.019716) 
θm2 
 
-0.000228 
(0.000372)  
0.003771 
(0.004718) 
0.002530 
(0.004708) 
 0.008537 
(0.010784) 
0.007929 
(0.010632) 
θm3 
 
-0.001016*** 
(0.000337)  
-0.003067 
(0.004522) 
-0.000707 
(0.004536) 
 0.000811 
(0.009731) 
-0.000778 
(0.009782) 
θm4 
    
-0.002618 
(0.003454) 
  0.007166 
(0.004716) 
θm5 
    
-0.000109 
(0.002884) 
  0.007422 
(0.004829) 
σ2mv - - 
0.021814* 
(0.006341) 
0.020979*** 
(0.006539) 
0.023001*** 
(0.006059) 
0.112986*** 
(0.016244) 
0.109824*** 
(0.015375) 
0.105345*** 
(0.004889) 
σ2mη 
0.001369*** 
(0.000031) 
0.001364*** 
(0.000030) 
0.028652*** 
(0.006341) 
0.029207*** 
(0.008418) 
0.024681*** 
(0.007663) 
0.011166* 
(0.008228) 
0.008114 
(0.006941) 
0.006312* 
(0.004889) 
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Chapter 6    Institutional herd behaviour and investor sentiment 
6.1    Introduction 
The experimental evidence in social psychology suggests that individuals tend to abide 
by the group decision even when they perceive the group to be wrong. Investors, much 
like every human being, dwell in societies among other people with whom they interact. 
Herd behaviour in financial markets is believed to reflect the irrational response rather 
than the outcome of rational decision making based on asset fundamental. The price of 
securities is affected by the interactions of trading activities of investors who hold 
heterogeneous beliefs, preferences, and trading strategies. The unpredictable nature of 
noise traders’ sentiment generates a new source of risk preventing rational traders from 
correcting mispricing, instead, rational traders may join ‘the crowds’ by taking a ride. 
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) divide herd behaviours into rational and irrational 
and define irrational herding as intentional herd behaviour caused by investor’s 
sentiment.   
 
Hwang and Salmon (2007) propose a model which incorporates the interaction between 
sentiment and herding to show that herding activity increases with market-wide 
sentiment. They show that individual asset returns are expected to increase regardless 
of their systematic risks when market-wide sentiment is positive, hence increasing 
herding.  Their empirical results show that investor sentiment explains up to 25 percent 
of beta herding. However, the model is based on examining how investor sentiment 
biasesthe betas of individual securities. Herding can also be the behaviour of returns of 
individual assets matching with the returns of the market as suggested by CH and CCK. 
A more direct method therefore, is used to examine the relation between investor 
sentiment and herd behaviour in this chapter.    
6.2    Weekly UK institutional herding and investor sentiment 
As discussed in the previous chapters, theoretically, institutional investors’ herd 
behaviour can be caused by information, agency problem, and/or investor sentiment. In 
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order to investigate the causal relation from investor sentiment to institutional herding, 
regressions are conducted upon the herding measures and the sentiment indexes. The 
herding measures include Cross-sectional absolute deviation (CSAD), Cross-sectional 
standard deviation (CSSD) and the estimated herd measurement by using HS method, 
named    . In chapter 5, the state space model (equation 4.10 and 4.11)41 is used for 
detecting the institutional herding behaviour. The unobservable herding variable,    , 
can therefore be estimated using the log standard deviation of open-ended  funds as 
      and log standard deviation of closed-ended funds as      .  
 
The investor sentiment measures include the two composed UK investor sentiment 
indexes: the UK market investor sentiment index,     , and the UK institutional 
investor sentiment index,     . Foreign investor sentiment is also considered in the 
analysis and represented by the US investor sentiment. The two US survey indices, 
AAII and II, are used to examine the influence from US individual sentiment and 
institutional sentiment respectively on UK institutional herding. The highest frequency 
of investor sentiment indices for UK investor sentiment constructed in Chapter 3 is in 
weekly. Investigations of whether institutional herding is affected by investor sentiment 
are therefore firstly conducted using weekly data.   
 
Table 6.1 presents the statistical summary of the variables. The autocorrelation tests 
show that all the variables are auto-correlated, especially the herding measure HSH. 
The first order autocorrelation coefficient is 0.989, which is very close to unity. The 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test of unit root shows that      cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of unit root, demonstrating the non-stationary nature of the series. 
Therefore, the first difference of      ,       , is considered and the ADF test 
indicates that the null of unit root is rejected at the 1% significance level. The 
autocorrelation coefficient also suggests that the series is unlikely to be autocorrelated.      
 
In order to explore the relationship between UK institutional herding and investor 
sentiment, tests of correlations between institutional herding measures and investor 
sentiment indexes are conducted: the correlation coefficients are reported in Table 6.2 
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              ,                 where          
   represent the standard deviation of UK fund 
betas,     is the unobservable herding parameter. 
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Panel A.  The negative coefficients of     and     , and the positive coefficients of 
    suggest a positive correlation between investor sentiment and institutional herd 
behaviour regardless of whether they are open-ended or closed-end funds. Absolute 
terms of the coefficients between return dispersions and        are higher than that of 
     for both category funds. For instance, the correlation between        and 
       is 47% in absolute terms compared to 35% between       and     .This 
suggests that institutional herding is more likely to have a stronger correlation to 
institutional sentiment than to individual sentiment. However, the correlation 
coefficients cannot prove that the stronger correlation to institutional sentiment is 
significant. This will be subject to further examination in the following sections. For the 
HSH measures, however, there is a different feature between open-ended funds and 
closed-end funds. The open-ended funds’ coefficients indicate that the herd measure 
may have a higher level of correlation to UK market sentiment than to UK institutional 
sentiment, and herding of close-ended funds has higher level of correlation to the UK 
institutional sentiment. 
 
The correlations between the UK institutional herd behaviour and US investor 
sentiment are also examined and the results are shown in Table 6.2 Panel A. The 
coefficients are all statistically significant at the 1% level, demonstrating that both US 
individual sentiment and US institutional sentiment are correlated to the UK 
institutional herd behaviour. Moreover, comparing the absolute value of the coefficients, 
it appears that the UK institutional herding may have a stronger correlation with the US 
institutional sentiment than with US individual sentiment. In addition, UK institutional 
herding generally has a stronger correlation to UK investor sentiment than to that of US 
investor sentiment. However, these are only indications from values of coefficients; 
they will still be subjected to further significant examination.   
 
Granger-causality tests whether institutional herding is led by investor sentiment or vice 
versa are presented in Table 6.2 Panel B.  Both open-ended and closed-end funds reveal 
very similar pictures. When herding is measured by CSAD and CSSD, the  -values 
show that the null of Granger-noncausality from UK market investors sentiment to 
herding cannot be rejected at the 5% level, and the null of Granger-noncausality from 
herding to investor sentiment are rejected at the 1% significance level. This suggests 
that UK market sentiment is led by UK institutional herding. For the UK institutional 
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sentiment,  -values give no clear sign of which one is the leading factor since both 
direction of Granger-noncausality assumption are rejected at the 5% significance level.  
 
When UK institutional herding is measured by HSH, both null hypotheses are rejected 
at the 1% level, giving no clear signal of whether herding leads to UK market sentiment 
or vice versa. However,  -values hint that it is more likely that UK market sentiment 
leads to UK institutional herding. This corresponds with that which HS suggested: that 
investor’s sentiment causes the diversion of CAPM beta from their fundamentals to 
market average. The examination of UK institutional herding in section 5.6 also 
indicated that UK institutional herding is not caused by market fundamental and 
macroeconomic factors, instead, it may be caused by investor sentiment. For UK 
institutional sentiment, the  -values indicate that UK institutional sentiment is led by 
institutional herding but not vice versa.  
 
For the US investor sentiment measures, the US individual sentiment statistically and 
significantly Granger-causes the UK institutional herding at the 5% level, but not vice 
versa. The US institutional sentiment does not show signs that it leads to or is led by the 
UK institutional herd behaviour when using CASD or CSSD to measure herd behaviour. 
However, the  -values indicate that there is a high probability that US institutional 
sentiment leads to UK institutional herding. The test results by using HSH as the 
herding measure confirms the suggestion.  
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Table 6.1: Statistic summary of weekly herding and sentiment variable 
AAII is American Association of Individual Investors index; GMI is  German Market Indicator; II is Investors Intelligence index;       isUK market investor sentiment index;      is UK institutional investor 
sentiment; CSADop is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK open-ended funds; CSSDop is Cross Section Standard Deviation of UK open-ended funds; HSHop is the herding measure generated by Hwang and 
Salmon (2004) approach from UK open-ended funds; DHSHop is the first order of HSHop; CSADcl is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK closed-end funds; CSSDcl is Cross Section Standard Deviation of UK 
closed0end funds; HSHcl is the herding measure generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK closed-end funds.The data cover the period 1
st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. 
AC (1) is autocorrelation coefficient at one lag.  AC (2) is autocorrelation coefficient at 2 lags. ADF is Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic with maximum 52 lags for weekly indexes and 12 lags for monthly 
indexes. Obs is number of observation.  ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Sum Sq. Dev. AC (1) AC (2) ADF Obs 
AAII 0.1092 0.1933 -0.0893 2.7079 3.942019 30.1047 0.672 0.567 -9.2572*** 807 
II 0.1863 0.1353 -0.7417 3.5538 84.51907*** 14.7866 0.939 0.859 -5.9866*** 809 
SENT 50.1432 26.1439 -0.4746 1.8324 76.1325*** 550904.3 0.872 0.733 -7.954*** 807 
SENT
p
 0.9436 0.5187 -0.8072 5.2046 251.3766*** 217.1586 0.708 0.686 -4.9581*** 808 
CSADop 0.8963 0.5799 2.3976 11.6998 3318.170*** 271.043 0.488 0.363 -8.3242*** 807 
CSSDop 1.1197 0.6453 2.3081 11.58805 3196.536*** 335.5822 0.519 0.410 -7.8868*** 807 
HSHop -0.0058 0.1383 0.0980 2.7565 3.2900 15.4453 0.989 0.977 -2.0198 808 
DHSHop -0.0001 0.0203 0.4774 4.6429 68.7410*** 0.3309 0.027 0.038 -27.7645*** 807 
CSADcl 1.4210 0.7477 2.5860 15.3109 6002.99*** 451.1929 0.506 0.453 -5.7849*** 808 
CSSDcl 1.9782 0.9911 2.3195 12.5475 3793.38*** 792.6433 0.527 0.460 -4.0997*** 808 
HSHcl 0.0022 0.0853 -0.0571 2.3633 14.0700*** 5.8623 0.960 0.918 -3.9679*** 807 
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Table 6.2: Weekly correlation and Granger Causality tests: institutional herding measures and investor sentiment 
      isUK market investor sentiment index;      is UK institutional investor sentiment; CSADop is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK open-ended funds; CSSDop is Cross Section 
Standard Deviation of UK open-ended funds; HSHop is the herding measure generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK open-ended funds; DHSHop is the first order of 
HSHop; CSADcl is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK closed-end funds; CSSDcl is Cross Section Standard Deviation of UK closed0end funds; HSHcl is the herding measure generated 
by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK closed-end funds. AAII is American Association of Individual Investors index; II is Investors Intelligence index. The data cover the period 
1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. 
 
Test 1:  : Granger-noncausality from herding measures to the sentiment indexes. 
Test 2:  : Granger-noncausality from sentiment indexes to herding measures. 
 
The tabulated statistics are the  -valus of the test statistics with 5 lags.  
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
Panel A: Correlation tests 
 
Open-ended funds Closed-end funds 
 
CSADop CSSDop DHSHop CSADcl CSSDcl HSHcl 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
AAII -0.2595*** -0.2373*** 0.1249*** -0.1897*** -0.1575*** 0.2228*** 
II -0.3803*** -0.3949*** 0.1439*** -0.3743*** -0.3660*** 0.2509*** 
SENT -0.3453*** -0.3607*** 0.1772*** -0.3689*** -0.3566*** 0.2586*** 
SENT
p
 -0.4730*** -0.5111*** 0.0891** -0.5257*** -0.4994*** 0.4713*** 
Panel B: Granger Causality test 
 
CSADop CSSDop DHSHop CSADcl CSSDcl HSHcl 
 
Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 
AAII 0.6778 0.0105 0.7551 0.0079 0.9485 0.0071 0.3877 0.0019 0.6434 0.0079 0.9983 0.0004 
II 0.0079 0.0008 0.0022 0.0006 0.8019 0.0001 0.0077 0.0005 0.0535 0.0021 0.9829 0.0007 
SENT 0.0001 0.0782 0.0004 0.1029 0.0006 0.0003 0.0003 0.1420 0.0006 0.2295 0.0044 0.0002 
SENT
p
 <0.0001 0.0022 <0.0001 0.0022 0.0147 0.2408 <0.0001 0.0003 <0.0001 0.0037 0.0334 0.0937 
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6.2.1. UK institutional herding and UK investor sentiment 
In the empirical studies in Chapter 5, it is suggested that the fund managers’ portfolio 
herding is likely to be caused by investor sentiment. Thus, a regression of herding measure 
on the sentiment indexes can provide more details of investor sentiment causing herd 
behaviour. The analysis starts by only looking at the UK investor sentiment effect on the 
UK institutional herd behaviour by using weekly data. The model to be estimated is started 
by including 5 lags of sentiment terms in the regression with lagged control variables:  
             
 
              
 
              
  
                   (6.1) 
where   is the level of investor’s herding behavior at time  , and it is measured by     , 
    , or              . The estimated coefficients of some high order lagged terms 
variables are statistically insignificant at the 10% level in the CSAD and CSSD regressions. 
Therefore, the above models are amended to be Model 2 by dropping the insignificant 
lagged terms of variable.  
 
The estimated results of open-ended funds are reported in Table 6.3A. When UK 
institutional herding is measured by cross-section return dispersions, CSAD or CSSD, the 
estimated coefficients demonstrate that both UK market sentiment and UK institutional 
sentiment have some impact on UK institutional herding behaviour. The negative 
coefficients of       and      
 
 indicates that higher investor sentiment leads to a lower 
level cross-section return dispersion, meaning the degree of herd behaviour is high. The 
positive value of         implies a reverse effect of the last period of market sentiment 
on institutional herd behaviour which corresponds to the reverse effect of investor 
sentiment in Chapter 3. If the immediate impact of investor sentiment changes is to induce 
herding behaviour, then herd reversals in the subsequent week(s), increasing UK 
institutional investors changing the degree of herding behaviour as a result. However, the 
reverse effect does not appear in the institutional sentiment, which suggests that 
institutional sentiment effect on herding behaviour is more likely persistent in the same 
direction. This can be explained by institutional investors normally being more confident 
in their investment decision making than individual investors, and they are more likely to 
stick with their investment strategies. The significance of higher order lagged term 
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coefficients of        and       
 
 also indicates that UK investor sentiment has a 
relatively long run effect on UK institutional herd behaviour.  
 
When herding is measured by      ,        and      
 
 are significant, again, showing 
that current UK market and institutional sentiment have influence over UK institutional 
herding. Positive values of the coefficients state that high investor sentiment leads to high 
level of UK institutional herd behaviour. The significance of higher order of lagged term 
of sentiment coefficient,         and       
 
, also suggests that UK investor sentiment 
has a relatively long influence over institutional investor herd behaviour. This agrees with 
the results from the CSAD measure, which may indicate that CSAD and HSH are better 
measures of institutional herding.  
 
The estimated results of closed-end funds (Table 6.3B) present very similar features as 
those of open-ended funds. UK market sentiment and institutional sentiment both have an 
effect on UK institutional herding behaviour. The reverse effect of market sentiment 
appears when herding is measured by return dispersions. However, the long-term impact 
on herding of open-ended fund managers does not appear on herding of closed-end fund 
managers, which suggests that investor sentiment effect on institutional herding may be 
over a relatively short term. The long-term effect in the open-end fund herding may come 
from the individual investors’ sentiment impact on open-end fund managers, as the 
investment performances are constantly assessed by individual investors who are more 
likely the noise traders. 
 
The regression results from both category UK mutual funds demonstrate that the 
institutional herd behaviour, which is measured by the return or beta dispersion of mutual 
funds in the UK market, to some degree, is a result of UK investor sentiment. This 
suggests that one of the sources causing investor herd behaviour is investor sentiment. 
Comparing the closed-end fund and open-ended funds, it appears that investor sentiment 
has a long effect on open-ended fund managers herd behaviour, as more larger order 
lagged terms of sentiment coefficients are statistically significant in the open-ended fund 
regressions.   
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Table 6.3A: Weekly regression results of Open-ended funds herding on UK investor 
sentiment 
Table 6.3A reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
             
 
   
           
 
   
           
 
 
   
    
The data are weekly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West 
standard errors 
Variable definitions: 
H= CSADop, CSSDop or DHSHop; so, CSADop is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK open-ended funds; CSSDop is Cross Section 
Standard Deviation of UK open-ended funds; HSHop is the herding measure generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK 
open-ended funds; DHSHop is the first order of HSHop; SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. S.E:Standard 
Error of regression; AIC: Akaike information criterion;  LM: Breusch/Godfrey LM test for residual autocorrelation; ARCH: ARCH test 
for Heteroskadasticity. t-statistics are given in parentheses.  
The model is estimated by using OLS with Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level.  
 
CSADop CSSDop DHSHop 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 α0 
0.9294*** 
(7.5719) 
1.1121*** 
(12.1687) 
1.1204*** 
(7.5965) 
1.3386*** 
(12.6641) 
-0.00498** 
(-2.3043) 
α1 
0.2755*** 
(5.7723) 
0.2945*** 
(6.5463) 
0.2715*** 
(5.7575) 
0.2943*** 
(6.7462) 
0.00345 
(0.0944) 
α2 
0.0484 
(0.9631)  
0.0660 
(1.2981) 
 
-0.00480 
(-0.1361) 
α3 
0.0171 
(0.3268)  
0.0138 
(0.2770) 
 
-0.03112 
(-0.8015) 
α4 
0.0447 
(0.9030)  
0.0486 
(1.0313) 
 
-0.07017* 
(-1.7908) 
α5 
0.0144 
(0.2314)  
0.0120 
(0.1989) 
 
0.04041 
(1.2345) 
SENTt 
-0.0067*** 
(-4.3131) 
-0.0068*** 
(-4.5187) 
-0.0075*** 
(-4.5252) 
-0.0073*** 
(-4.5885) 
0.00012* 
(1.8180) 
SENTt-1 
0.0058*** 
(2.8653) 
0.0056*** 
(2.8519) 
0.0063*** 
(2.9934) 
0.0047*** 
(3.1958) 
0.00001 
(0.0891) 
SENTt-2 
-0.0012 
(-0.6911) 
-0.0016 
(-0.8662) 
-0.0014 
(-0.6980) 
 
0.00001 
(0.0778) 
SENTt-3 
0.0023 
(1.4007) 
0.0025 
(1.4312) 
0.0023 
(1.2278) 
 
-0.00002 
(-0.2391) 
SENTt-4 
-0.0027* 
(-1.7414) 
-0.0028** 
(-2.1788) 
-0.0022 
(-1.2430) 
 
0.00010 
(1.1770) 
SENTt-5 
-0.0001 
(-0.0966)  
-0.0005 
(-0.3712) 
 
-0.00010* 
(-1.7933) 
SENT
P
 t 
-0.1980*** 
(-2.7964) 
-0.1937*** 
(-3.0439) 
-0.2264*** 
(-2.8903) 
-0.2273*** 
(-3.333) 
0.00507** 
(2.2685) 
SENT
P
 t-1 
0.0172 
(0.2013) 
0.0084 
(0.1219) 
-0.0046 
(-0.0476) 
-0.0285 
(-0.377) 
0.00046 
(0.1969) 
SENT
P
 t-2 
-0.0378 
(-0.6178) 
-0.0609 
(-1.1170) 
-0.0343 
(-0.5023) 
-0.0793 
(-1.312) 
-0.00369 
(-1.4996) 
SENT
P
 t-3 
-0.0888* 
(-1.7863) 
-0.0935* 
(-1.8227) 
-0.0900 
(-1.5887) 
-0.1062* 
(-1.897) 
0.00047 
(0.1741) 
SENT
P
 t-4 
-0.0025 
(-0.0320)  
-0.0159 
(-0.1929) 
 
0.00049 
(0.2052) 
SENT
P
 t-5 
0.0405 
(0.5396)  
0.0454 
(0.5438) 
 
-0.00365* 
(-1.7432) 
Adj. R
2 
0.3239 0.3255 0.3619 0.3605 0.0352 
S.D. 0.4777 0.4772 0.5164 0.5166 0.01963 
AIC 1.3826 1.3717 1.5384 1.5269 -5.0011 
LM  1.6447*** 1.6034*** 1.5277** 1.5887*** 4.2610*** 
ARCH 30.3503*** 30.4727*** 25.9671*** 25.6445*** 1.3179 
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Table 6.3B: Weekly regression results of Closed-end funds herding on UK investor 
sentiment 
Table 6.3B  reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
             
 
   
           
 
   
           
 
 
   
    
The data are weekly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West 
standard errors 
Variable definitions: 
H= CSADcl, CSSDcl or DHSHcl; so, CSADcl is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK closed-end funds; CSSDcl is Cross Section 
Standard Deviation of UK closed-end funds; HSHcl is the herding measure generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK 
closed-end funds; SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. S.E:Standard Error of regression; AIC: Akaike 
information criterion;  LM: Breusch/Godfrey LM test for residual autocorrelation; ARCH: ARCH test for Heteroskadasticity. t-statistics 
are given in parentheses.  
The model is estimated by using OLS with Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
CSADcl CSSDcl HSHcl 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
α0 
1.3983*** 
(6.0194) 
1.5388*** 
(12.1889) 
1.5254*** 
(5.6519) 
1.5498*** 
(5.7590) 
-0.0094*** 
(-3.6087) 
-0.0098*** 
(-4.0157) 
α1 
0.2088*** 
(4.8233) 
0.2171*** 
(5.9560) 
0.2555*** 
(7.4169) 
0.2586*** 
(7.7135) 
0.9549*** 
(26.6951) 
0.9465*** 
(83.1838) 
α2 
0.1138 
(1.6144) 
0.1206 
(3.2807) 
0.1072** 
(2.0222) 
0.1055* 
(1.9533) 
-0.0560 
(-1.1331) 
 
α3 
0.0272 
(0.6667)  
0.0458 
(1.1675) 
0.0442 
(1.1500) 
0.0318 
(0.6447) 
 
α4 
0.0328 
(0.8863)  
0.0851** 
(2.2989) 
0.0928*** 
(3.0025) 
0.0028 
(0.0575) 
 
α5 
0.0254 
(0.6056)  
0.0224 
(0.4941)  
0.0175 
(0.4935) 
 
SENTt 
-0.0075*** 
(-3.9906) 
-0.0072*** 
(-4.2406) 
-0.0089*** 
(-3.6328) 
-0.0088*** 
(-3.7149) 
0.0002*** 
(3.1683) 
0.0002*** 
(3.4972) 
SENTt-1 
0.0046** 
(2.0690) 
0.0044*** 
(2.6015) 
0.0052* 
(1.6656) 
0.0060*** 
(2.7785) 
-0.0001 
(-1.0065) 
-0.0001 
(-1.0736) 
SENTt-2 
0.0011 
(0.5048)  
0.0011 
(0.4215)  
0.0001 
(0.5705) 
 
SENTt-3 
0.0002 
(0.0866)  
0.0012 
(0.4335)  
0.00003 
(0.3649) 
 
SENTt-4 
-0.0016 
(-0.7901)  
-0.0011 
(-0.3948)  
-0.00001 
(-0.1241) 
 
SENTt-5 
0.0002 
(0.1518)  
-0.0007 
(-0.3173)  
-0.00004 
(-0.5563) 
 
SENT
P
 t 
-0.2709*** 
(-2.5300) 
-0.2826*** 
(-4.5278) 
-0.2530*** 
(-1.8265) 
-0.2587** 
(-2.4848) 
0.0051* 
(1.9426) 
0.0044* 
(1.7125) 
SENT
P
 t-1 
-0.1733 
(-1.3586) 
-0.2036** 
(23.0493) 
-0.1821 
(-1.1843) 
-0.1922** 
(-1.9661) 
0.0031 
(1.1437) 
0.0041 
(1.5595) 
SENT
P
 t-2 
0.1072 
(1.0316) 
 
0.0935 
(0.7132) 
 
-0.0042 
(-1.5083) 
-0.0040 
(-1.5289) 
SENT
P
 t-3 
-0.0200 
(-0.2550) 
 
0.0018 
(0.0193)  
-0.0028 
(-1.0256) 
-0.0025 
(-1.0298) 
SENT
P
 t-4 
-0.0411 
(-0.5365) 
 
-0.0959 
(-0.7261)  
0.0027 
(0.9790) 
 
SENT
P
 t-5 
-0.0317 
(-0.3139) 
 
0.0045 
(0.0359)  
-0.0022 
(-0.8356) 
 
Adj. R
2 0.3705 0.3731 0.3760 0.3803 0.9262 0.9261 
S.D. 0.5940 0.5924 0.7842 0.7813 0.0232 0.0232 
AIC 1.8184 1.7995 2.3739 2.3554 -4.6648 -4.6787 
LM  1.9693*** 1.9528*** 2.1937*** 2.0233*** 0.6726 0.6871 
ARCH 17.1022*** 23.0493*** 5.8468*** 6.8010*** 1.1240 1.4823 
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6.2.2. UK institutional herding and foreign investor sentiment 
Empirical study in Chapter 3 shows that investor sentiment is contagious across borders. 
More especially, US investor sentiment has a significant effect on UK investor sentiment 
and UK equity return. The correlation tests and Granger Causality tests also reveal that US 
individual and institutional sentiment may cause UK institutional investor sentiment. The 
model (model1) to be estimated is started by including 5 lags of sentiment terms in the 
regression with lagged control variables:  
             
 
   
           
 
   
           
 
 
   
           
 
   
         
 
   
    
           (6.2) 
where   is the level of investor’s herding behaviour at time  , and it is measured by     , 
    , or     . The estimations start by applying OLS method, but the residual 
correlation and Heteroskedasticity tests show that residuals are series correlated and 
heteroscedastic and the estimations are adjusted accordingly by Newey-West HAC 
Standard Errors & Covariance. The estimated coefficients of model 1(see Table 6.4A, and 
Table 6.4B) show that many of the high order lagged term of variables are statistically 
insignificant. The models are therefore are amended by dropping some of the insignificant 
high order lagged variables becoming model 2.  
 
The regression of        and        generate very similar results. Coefficients,      , 
       ,      
 
,        
 
           are significant, demonstrating that UK 
institutional herding is influenced by investor sentiment,  both domestic and foreign. The 
negative coefficient of      ,       
 
 and      suggests that current high investor 
sentiment will lead to high levels of institutional herd behaviour. The negative and 
significant        
 
 shows that UK institutional sentiment has a long term effect on UK 
institutional herd behaviour.  
 
When herding is measured by       , coefficients,        ,      
 
        
 
, 
     and       are statistically significant, suggesting that UK market, UK institutional and 
US institutional sentiment have an impact on UK institutional herding. The positive value 
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of estimated      
 
 and      indicates that high institutional investor sentiment leads to 
high levels of institutional herding.  
 
The regression of       and       suggests similar results to those of open-ended funds. 
Both domestic and foreign investor sentiment have an impact on UK institutional herding. 
However, herding of closed-end fund managers are not affected by US institutional 
investor sentiment, and the effect from US individual investor sentiment is less significant 
than that of open-ended fund managers. Unlike open-ended fund, closed-end funds do not 
have the constant capital injection and/or withdrawal. They are more likely make 
investment decisions according to public information and analysed private information 
which less likely to be influenced by the wider range of investor sentiment. Managers of 
open-ended fund, however, have to take their clients’ thoughts into account when make 
investment decisions. The majority open-ended funds are retail funds with clients 
dominantly being individual investors who are affected by a wider range of investor 
sentiment, such as foreign investor sentiment.  
 
Regression of     , coefficients,      ,      
 
and       are significant, suggesting 
that current UK market, UK institutional and US individual sentiment have an impact on 
UK institutional herding. The positive values of these coefficients indicate that high 
investor sentiment leads to a high level of institutional herding. As opposed to open-ended 
funds, the significance of US individual sentiment is rather high, which suggests that 
herding of closed-end fund managers is affected by foreign sentiment. This indicates that 
closed-ended fund managers are influenced by a wider range of investor sentiment when 
they consider the systematic risk of portfolio, i.e. portfolio beta.  
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Table 6.4A: Weekly regression results of open-ended herding on investor sentiment 
Table 6.4A reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
             
 
   
           
 
   
           
 
 
   
           
 
   
          
 
   
    
Variable definitions: 
H= CSADop, CSSDop or DHSHop; so, CSADop is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK open-ended funds; CSSDop is Cross Section 
Standard Deviation of UK open-ended funds; HSHop is the herding measure generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK 
open-ended funds; DHSHop is the first order of HSHop; SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. AAII is 
American Association of Individual Investors index; II is Investors Intelligence index. t-statistics are given in parentheses.  
The model is estimated by using OLS with Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance.The data cover the period 1st January 
1996 to 30th June 2011. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level.  
 
CSADop CSSDop DHSHop 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
α0 
0.9939*** 
(7.4934) 
1.1217*** 
(12.3681) 
1.1645*** 
(7.2602) 
1.3678*** 
(12.8047) 
-0.004953** 
(-2.3326) 
-0.00525** 
(-2.3910) 
α1 
0.2605*** 
(5.5261) 
0.2686*** 
(6.6080) 
0.2609*** 
(5.7137) 
0.2748*** 
(6.3672) 
0.005201 
(0.1426) 
0.00094 
(0.0259) 
α2 
0.0339 
(0.6603)  
0.0563 
(1.0848) 
 
0.002413 
(0.0679) 
-0.00258 
(-0.0722) 
α3 
0.0108 
(0.2117)  
0.0117 
(0.2387) 
 
-0.037921 
(-0.9499) 
-0.03450 
(-0.8862) 
α4 
0.0320 
(0.6739)  
0.0375 
(0.8150) 
 
-0.081198** 
(-2.1074) 
-0.08007** 
(-2.0667) 
α5 
0.0139 
(0.2202)  
0.0157 
(0.2560) 
 
0.034857 
(1.0351) 
 
SENTt 
-0.0050*** 
(-3.2223) 
-0.0047*** 
(-3.3785) 
-0.0055*** 
(-3.3044) 
-0.0054*** 
(-3.6201) 
0.000046 
(0.6648) 
0.00004 
(0.5202) 
SENTt-1 
0.0052*** 
(2.6341) 
0.0042*** 
(2.9709) 
0.0057*** 
(2.7257) 
0.0047*** 
(-3.1652) 
0.000014 
(0.1674) 
0.00001 
(0.0657) 
SENTt-2 
-0.0010 
(-0.5470)  
-0.0011 
(-0.5448) 
 
0.000050 
(0.6210) 
0.00004 
(0.5353) 
SENTt-3 
0.0024 
 (1.3935)  
0.0024 
(1.2091) 
 
-0.000004 
(-0.0460) 
0.00001 
(0.0977) 
SENTt-4 
-0.0025 
(-1.5962)   
-0.0023 
(-1.2635)  
0.000080 
(0.9330) 
0.00010 
(1.2465) 
SENTt-5 
0.0001 
(0.0907)   
-0.0002 
(-0.1619)  
-0.000112** 
(-2.0533) 
-0.00011** 
(-2.0917) 
SENT
P
 t 
-0.2053*** 
(-3.0507) 
-0.2048*** 
(-3.6252) 
-0.2277*** 
(-3.0402) 
-0.2313*** 
(-3.6292) 
0.005134** 
(2.2862) 
0.00501** 
(2.2350) 
SENT
P
 t-1 
0.0117 
(0.1399) 
0.0084 
(0.1294) 
-0.0110 
(-0.1167) 
-0.0234 
(-0.3206) 
-0.000248 
(-0.1030) 
-0.00011 
(-0.0467) 
SENT
P
 t-2 
-0.0514 
(-0.8621) 
-0.0718 
(-1.4086) 
-0.0410 
(-0.6091) 
-0.0791 
(-1.3082) 
-0.003115 
(-1.2758) 
-0.00330 
(-1.3411) 
SENT
P
 t-3 
-0.0962* 
(-1.9134) 
-0.0942* 
(-1.9347) 
-0.0957* 
(-1.6689 ) 
-0.1010* 
(-1.8443) 
0.001166 
(0.4297) 
0.00103 
(0.3812) 
SENT
P
 t-4 
-0.0091 
(-0.1144)  
-0.0256 
(-0.3103) 
 
-0.000210 
(-0.0907) 
0.00027 
(0.1173) 
SENT
P
 t-5 
0.0461 
(0.6306)  
0.0534 
(0.6564) 
 
-0.004133* 
(-1.9061) 
-0.00400* 
(-1.9044) 
AAIIt 
-0.3030** 
(-2.0092) 
-0.3541*** 
(-3.0201) 
-0.2820* 
(-1.7141) 
-0.3068** 
(-2.4882) 
0.005112 
(0.8810) 
0.00499 
(0.8693) 
AAIIt-1 
-0.0693 
(-0.4713)  
-0.1229 
(-0.7424) 
 
0.000983 
(0.1622) 
0.00119 
(0.2021) 
AAIIt-2 
0.1157 
(0.7031)  
0.2050 
(1.1048)  
 
0.006277 
(1.1045) 
0.00586 
(1.0507) 
AAIIt-3 
-0.0692 
(-0.4388)  
-0.0868 
(-0.5093) 
 
-0.007964 
(-1.3100) 
-0.00623 
(-1.0534) 
AAIIt-4 
0.0558 
(0.3606)  
0.0390 
(0.2328) 
 
-0.010496* 
(-1.8070) 
-0.00691 
(-1.2665) 
AAIIt-5 
-0.0878 
(-0.6507)   
-0.0171 
(-0.1120) 
 
0.006104 
(1.2715)  
IIt 
-0.7707* 
(-1.8164 ) 
-0.3304 
(-1.6465) 
-0.7065 
(-1.6430) 
-0.3938* 
(-1.9309) 
-0.000264 
(-0.0160) 
-0.00079 
(-0.0478) 
IIt-1 
0.6503 
(1.2674) 
 
0.6040 
(1.1040) 
 
0.042614* 
(1.8071) 
0.04234* 
(1.8032) 
IIt-2 
-0.0258 
(-0.0463) 
 
-0.2431 
(-0.3897)  
-0.035144 
(-1.5489) 
-0.03047* 
(-1.8341) 
IIt-3 
-0.2083 
(-0.3559) 
 
-0.1781 
(-0.2896)  
-0.014888 
(-0.6560)  
IIt-4 
-0.1344 
(-0.2514) 
 
-0.0356 
(-0.0629)  
0.025818 
(1.2357)  
IIt-5 
0.2451 
(0.5515) 
 
0.2575 
(0.5478)  
-0.005630 
(-0.3479)  
Adj. R
2 0.3353 0.3426 0.3619 0.3747 0.0430 0.0439 
S.D. 0.4750 0.4708 0.5164 0.5110 0.0196 0.0196 
AIC 1.3859 1.3438 1.5384 1.5076 -4.9893 -4.9973 
LM  1.5151** 1.5091** 1.5277** 1.5021** 3.7976*** 2.8759** 
ARCH 29.5854*** 29.6164*** 25.9671*** 25.1837*** 1.5562 1.5002 
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Table 6.4B: Weekly regression results of closed-end herding on investor sentiment 
Table 6.4B reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
             
 
   
           
 
   
           
 
 
   
           
 
   
          
 
   
    
Variable definitions: 
H= CSADcl, CSSDcl or DHSHcl; so, CSADcl is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK closed-end funds; CSSDcl is Cross Section 
Standard Deviation of UK closed-end funds; HSHcl is the herding measure generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK 
closed-end funds;; SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. AAII is American Association of Individual 
Investors index; II is Investors Intelligence index. t-statistics are given in parentheses. The model is estimated by using OLS with 
Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance.The data cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
CSADcl CSSDcl HSHcl 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
α0 
1.3898*** 
(5.9040) 
1.5491*** 
(6.7097) 
1.5428*** 
(5.5853) 
1.5930*** 
(5.7964) 
-0.0099*** 
(-3.7392) 
-0.0118*** 
(-5.4280) 
α1 
0.2043*** 
(4.9338) 
0.2105*** 
(4.8980) 
0.2531*** 
(7.4026) 
0.2541*** 
(7.7540) 
0.9544*** 
(26.4621) 
0.9348*** 
(82.7857) 
α2 
0.1118 
(1.5771) 
0.1190 
(1.5497) 
0.1030* 
(1.9321) 
0.1019* 
(1.8609) 
-0.0618 
(-1.2423) 
 
α3 
0.0249 
(0.5906)  
0.0392 
(0.9894) 
0.0371 
(0.9239) 
0.0351 
(0.7063) 
 
α4 
0.0378 
(0.9589)  
0.0928** 
(2.4656) 
0.0979*** 
(3.0535) 
0.0013 
(0.0265) 
 
α5 
0.0311 
(0.7034)  
0.0227 
(0.4662) 
 
0.0140 
(0.3925) 
 
SENTt 
-0.0049** 
(-2.3050) 
-0.0057*** 
(-2.9336) 
-0.0054* 
(-1.9499) 
-0.0052** 
(-2.0862) 
0.0002** 
(2.1370) 
0.0001*** 
(3.2703) 
SENTt-1 
0.0037 
(1.6418) 
0.0044** 
(2.5799) 
0.0031 
(0.9769) 
0.0037 
(1.5849) 
-0.0001 
(-0.9939) 
 
SENTt-2 
0.0008 
(0.3660)  
0.0016 
(0.5717) 
 
0.0001 
(0.9421) 
 
SENTt-3 
0.0002 
(0.1115)  
0.0014 
(0.4636) 
 
0.00003 
(0.3445) 
 
SENTt-4 
-0.0024 
(-1.1635)  
-0.0029 
(-1.0009) 
 
-0.00004 
(-0.4555) 
 
SENTt-5 
0.0008 
(0.4921)  
0.0002 
(0.1101) 
 
-0.00003 
(-0.4927) 
 
SENT
P
 t 
-0.2660*** 
(-2.6035) 
-0.2784*** 
(-3.2540) 
-0.2512** 
(-1.9149) 
-0.2526** 
(-2.4591) 
0.0058** 
(2.1631) 
0.0045** 
(2.1937) 
SENT
P
 t-1 
-0.1886 
(-1.4646) 
-0.2042** 
(-2.4356) 
-0.1997 
(-1.3033) 
-0.1874* 
(-1.8907) 
0.0027 
(0.9876) 
 
SENT
P
 t-2 
0.1077 
(1.0366)  
0.1012 
(0.7678) 
 
-0.0031 
(-1.1138) 
 
SENT
P
 t-3 
-0.0159 
(-0.1962)  
0.0078 
(0.0818) 
 
-0.0019 
(-0.6872) 
 
SENT
P
 t-4 
-0.0505 
(-0.6475)  
-0.1034 
(-0.7977) 
 
0.0024 
(0.8625) 
 
SENT
P
 t-5 
-0.0043 
(-0.0425)  
0.0379 
(0.3064) 
 
-0.0021 
(-0.7885) 
 
AAIIt 
-0.2391 
(-1.4846) 
-0.1576 
(-1.0257) 
-0.3255 
(-1.3250) 
-0.3437 
(-1.4183) 
0.0119* 
(1.8104) 
0.0153** 
(2.4973) 
AAIIt-1 
-0.3002 
(-1.5296) 
-0.1167 
(-0.6631) 
-0.2903 
(-1.0934) 
-0.2680 
(-1.0198) 
-0.0025 
(-0.3551) 
-0.0015 
(-0.2252) 
AAIIt-2 
0.2513 
(1.1157)  
0.4744 
(1.5814) 
0.4380 
(1.5538) 
0.0100 
(1.3806) 
0.0076 
(1.1163) 
AAIIt-3 
-0.0133 
(-0.0604)  
-0.1200 
(-0.4139) 
-0.0438 
(-0.1596) 
-0.0049 
(-0.6688) 
-0.0047 
(-0.7018) 
AAIIt-4 
-0.0038 
(-0.0188)  
-0.0299 
(-0.1160) 
0.0235 
(0.0919) 
-0.0075 
(-1.0525) 
-0.0089 
(-1.3390) 
AAIIt-5 
0.2890 
(1.5161)  
0.5003** 
(2.0581) 
0.3841* 
(1.8164) 
0.0109 
(1.6403) 
0.0095 
(1.5853) 
IIt 
-0.2911 
(-0.6018) 
-0.4128 
(-0.8976) 
-0.3012 
(-0.4354) 
-0.2647 
(-0.3765) 
0.0092 
(0.4856) 
-0.0048 
(-0.5589) 
IIt-1 
0.1625 
(0.2088) 
0.1532 
(0.2956) 
-0.2382 
(-0.2491) 
-0.3575 
(-0.5101) 
0.0128 
(0.4706) 
 
IIt-2 
-0.4246 
(-0.6036) 
 
0.1729 
(0.1782) 
 
-0.0237 
(-0.8584) 
 
IIt-3 
0.1828 
(0.2446) 
 
-0.4957 
(-0.4252) 
 
-0.0249 
(-0.9037) 
 
IIt-4 
0.0900 
(0.1293) 
 
0.2119 
(0.2178) 
 
0.0290 
(1.0523) 
 
IIt-5 
-0.0766 
(-0.1289) 
 
0.0382 
(0.0502) 
 
-0.0080 
(-0.4049) 
 
Adj. R
2 
0.3738 0.3771 0.3810 0.3872 0.9272 0.9277 
S.D. 0.5946 0.5913 0.7834 0.7795 0.0232 0.0231 
AIC 1.8351 1.8005 2.3866 2.3607 -4.6567 -4.6863 
LM  1.6817*** 1.9085*** 1.6021*** 1.4353*** 0.7239 0.5820 
ARCH 14.2953*** 22.2884*** 5.0132*** 5.7806 1.0193 1.3204 
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6.2.3. Sentiment effect on herding in different financial crisis stages 
As pointed out in previous sections, investor sentiment is more likely to influence 
investors’ decision making during market extreme times, more precisely the financial or 
economic crisis time. What about the relation between investor herd behaviour and 
investor sentiment under the different market conditions? Are investors more likely to herd 
on investor sentiment in the normal time, crisis time, or when the market is in the bubble 
generating period? The sample period of 1996-2011 has experienced several major 
economic and financial crises; therefore the sentiment effects in the crisis time can be 
investigated by using the same defined pre and in-crisis times. This is done by regressing 
herding measures on       and       under three conditions: non-crisis period, pre-
crisis periods, and in-crisis periods respectively. The model is: 
     
           
                 
             
 
   
       
             
 
 
   
      
       
     
       
           
       
       
 
   
   
    
       
       
 
 
   
      
           
             
    
             
 
   
       
             
 
 
   
       
           (6.3) 
Where the superscripts nor-cri, pre-cri and in-cri refer to no-crisis, pre-crisis and in 
crisis periods respectively;    is the institutional herding measures of      ,     , or 
                .      in non-crisis periods and zero otherwise;      in pre-
crisis periods and zero otherwise;      for in-crisis periods and zero otherwiseThe 
regression results are displayed in Table 6.5A and Table 6.5B.  
 
During the normal period, the regressions of return dispersion (CSAD and CSSD)generate 
very similar results for both open-ended funds and closed-end funds. The significance 
of  
         
      and   
       demonstrate that market and institutional sentiment have 
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some explanatory power to institutional herd behaviour. The opposite sign of   
       
and  
      suggests the ‘second thought’ effect on institutional herding. Regressions of 
HSH show that institutional herding is affected by institutional sentiment in both 
categories of funds, which is consistent with the suggestion from CSAD and CSSD. 
However, market sentiment has no significant effect on open-ended fund manager’s 
herding on market Beta. This is because returns of the funds are normally to be used as a 
measure to assess open-ended fund managers’ performance by their clients. In order to 
satisfy their clients expected returns, fund managers are more likely to concentrate on the 
market return rather than the beta of the equity.  
 
During pre-crisis period, regressions of return dispersion (      and       ) and beta 
herding of open-ended funds (      ) display similar pictures. The significance of 
coefficients of   
       
and insignificance of        s suggest that institutional herding 
during a pre-crisis period is mainly caused by market sentiment rather than institutional 
sentiment. This corresponds to estimates of      , which demonstrate that market 
sentiment rather than institutional sentiment has some explanatory power to beta herding 
of closed-end fund managers. However, return dispersions of closed-end funds 
(      and       ) reveal a different picture. Both market and institutional sentiment 
have effect on institutional herding behaviour, and institutional sentiment has a higher 
significant level effect than that of individual sentiment. This may be able to be explained 
by the majority investors of closed-end funds being institutional investors.  
 
During the crisis period, regressions of beta herding (HSH) from both open-ended and 
closed-end funds demonstrate that herding during crisis period is not caused by investor 
sentiment. This suggests that investors in this period are more likely to herd on public 
information and asset fundamentals.  This, again, corresponds with the suggestion that 
financial crisis is the process of adjusting asset prices to their fundamental. Estimates of 
return dispersions (CSAD and CSSD), however, show different features. Coefficients 
suggest that market and institutional sentiment has some effect on institutional herding 
behaviour, though the significant level of institutional sentiment is rather low for closed-
end funds, between 5% to 10% significant levels, and it is high for open-ended funds, 
between 1% to 5% significant levels. This, once again, demonstrates that differences 
between open-ended and closed-end funds can lead to the manager of a fund following 
different factors when he/she forms the investor portfolio. 
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In general, estimates of return dispersion from both open-ended funds and closed-end 
funds suggest that institutional herding on returns is affected by both market and 
institutional sentiment in all period. During no-crisis, i.e. normal period, there is a reverse 
effect from market sentiment. During pre-crisis, market sentiment is one of the factors 
causing institutional herding behaviour, and institutional sentiment has no significant 
effect on it, especially for open-ended funds. Herding on beta of closed-end funds (     ) 
also displays such characteristics. Herding on returns of closed-end funds however, is still 
influenced by both market and institutional sentiment and there is an implication of a 
higher degree of effect from institutional sentiment than that from market sentiment. 
During the crisis period, investor sentiment has no effect on beta herding, suggesting 
institutional herding in this period may be caused by fundamental factors. Return herding, 
on the other hand, still appears to be affected by both market and institutional sentiment. 
Market sentiment has a greater effect on closed-end fund return herding and institutional 
sentiment influences open-ended fund return herding to a greater level.  
 
The examination of investor sentiment effect on herding behaviour in different financial 
crisis stages demonstrates that investor sentiment generally affects institutional herding 
behaviour in all stages of financial crisis. However, sentiment from different groups of 
investors has a different degree of effect on herding behaviour according to the stage and 
what factor managers herd on. Different categories of mutual funds can also cause the 
differences in the effect from investor sentiment because of the structure of the fund, 
investor group of the fund, and the market environment of the fund. The analysis of 
investor sentiment effect on institutional herding in different stages of financial crises not 
only gives evidence that investor sentiment is a significant factor in explaining institutional 
herd behaviour, but also identifies the sentiment effects that come from different group’s 
of investors under different conditions.     
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Table 6.5A: weekly regression open-ended funds herding on investor sentiment under financial crisis conditions 
Table 6.5A reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
     
           
                 
             
 
          
             
  
         
       
     
       
           
       
       
 
          
       
       
  
         
         
  
                 
             
 
          
             
  
           
Variable definitions: 
H= CSADop, CSSDop or DHSHop; so, CSADop is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK open-ended funds; CSSDop is Cross Section Standard Deviation of UK open-ended funds; HSHop is the herding measure 
generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK open-ended funds; DHSHop is the first order of HSHop; SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. t-statistics are given in 
parentheses. D1 = 1 in non-crisis periods and zero otherwise;  D2 = 1 in pre-crisis periods and zero otherwise;  D3 = 1 in in-crisis periods and zero otherwise.  The pre- and in-crisis periods are as defined in 
Appendix 2.  The no-crisis periods consist of the remaining observations in the sample.  
The model is estimated by using OLS with Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CSADop 
 
CSSDop 
 
DHSHop 
Coefficients 
Normal 
period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period  
Normal period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period  
Normal period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period 
α1 
1.1719*** 
(9.7051) 
0.8711*** 
(5.9607) 
0.7519*** 
(4.1282)  
1.3880*** 
(10.3002) 
1.2363*** 
(7.5273) 
1.0045*** 
(4.2203)  
-0.0050*** 
(-2.0619) 
-0.0201*** 
(-2.25981) 
0.0022 
(0.4284) 
α2 
0.2756*** 
(4.6504) 
0.2783*** 
(3.7839) 
0.2769*** 
(3.5266)  
0.2885*** 
(5.0059) 
0.2624*** 
(3.5299) 
0.2730*** 
(3.0530)  
0.0130 
(0.2902) 
-0.1916** 
(-2.3194) 
0.0441 
(0.6271) 
SENTt 
-0.0077*** 
(-3.6146) 
-0.0044** 
(-2.2658) 
-0.0029 
(-0.8467)  
-0.0083*** 
(-3.6251) 
-0.0061** 
(-2.5699) 
-0.0028 
(-0.7868)  
0.00002 
(0.3583) 
0.0005*** 
(3.4440) 
0.0002 
(1.4998) 
SENTt-1 
0.0079*** 
(2.8456) 
0.0057*** 
(2.7707) 
-0.0016 
(-0.3764)  
0.0079*** 
(2.6794) 
0.0086*** 
(3.5344) 
-0.0023 
(-0.5361)  
0.00003 
(0.3256) 
-0.0002 
(-1.0198) 
0.0001 
(0.6487) 
SENTt-2 
-0.0032* 
(-1.8565) 
-0.0028 
(-1.3515) 
0.0049* 
(1.8171)  
-0.0031* 
(-1.6480) 
-0.0047* 
(-1.7329) 
0.0058** 
(2.2159)  
0.00004 
(0.6609) 
-0.00006 
(-0.3710) 
-0.00001 
(-0.0590) 
SENT
P
 t 
-0.3222*** 
(-4.1259) 
-0.1230 
(-1.5520) 
0.0592 
(0.5057)  
-0.3605*** 
(-4.1343) 
-0.1314 
(-1.3056) 
0.0410 
(0.3333)  
0.0069** 
(2.3083) 
0.0047 
(1.1624) 
-0.0050 
(-1.1923) 
SENT
P
 t-1 
-0.0541 
(-0.6373) 
-0.0124 
(-0.1503) 
0.1503 
(1.5039)  
-0.0806 
(-0.8747) 
-0.1119 
(-1.1840) 
0.1379 
(1.2033)  
-0.000002 
(-0.0006) 
0.0039 
(0.6922) 
-0.0053 
(-1.3093) 
SENT
P
 t-2 
-0.0168 
(-0.2564) 
-0.0697 
(-0.7292) 
-0.2227** 
(-2.0482)  
-0.0144 
(-0.1772) 
-0.0834 
(-0.8533) 
-0.2729** 
(-2.2427)  
-0.0060** 
(-2.3993) 
-0.0053 
(-1.0495) 
-0.0046 
(-0.9425) 
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Table 6.5B: weekly regression closed-end funds herding on investor sentiment under financial crisis conditions 
Table 6.5B reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
     
           
                 
             
 
          
             
  
         
       
     
       
           
       
       
 
          
       
       
  
         
         
  
                 
             
 
          
             
  
           
Variable definitions: 
H= CSADcl, CSSDcl or DHSHcl; so, CSADcl is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK closed-end funds; CSSDcl is Cross Section Standard Deviation of UK closed-end funds; HSHcl is the herding measure 
generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK closed-end funds;  SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. t-statistics are given in parentheses. D1 = 1 in non-crisis periods 
and zero otherwise;  D2 = 1 in pre-crisis periods and zero otherwise;  D3 = 1 in in-crisis periods and zero otherwise.  The pre- and in-crisis periods are as defined in Appendix 2.  The no-crisis periods consist of the 
remaining observations in the sample.  
The model is estimated by using OLS with Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance.The data cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
CSADcl 
 
CSSDcl 
 
HSHcl 
Coefficients 
Normal 
period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period  
Normal period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period  
Normal period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period 
α1 
1.8555*** 
(8.3105) 
1.9145*** 
(8.6028) 
1.4709*** 
(6.4411)  
2.2994*** 
(10.1105) 
2.5781*** 
(9.0235) 
1.8919*** 
(6.4823)  
-0.0106*** 
(-3.3795) 
-0.0095 
(-1.2160) 
-0.0098 
(-1.6051) 
α2 0.2102*** 
(2.9432) 
0.2413*** 
(3.5526) 
0.2621*** 
(3.4230)  
0.2609*** 
(4.2401) 
0.3157*** 
(5.2228) 
0.3281*** 
(5.1168)  
0.9408*** 
(57.6060) 
0.9116*** 
(30.3448) 
0.9382*** 
(35.0586) 
SENTt 
-0.0092*** 
(-3.5715) 
-0.0080* 
(-1.9874) 
-0.0013 
(-0.3894)  
-0.0120*** 
(-3.5700) 
-0.0097* 
(-1.7795) 
-0.0003 
(-0.0557)  
0.0002** 
(-1.9855) 
0.0005*** 
(3.0837) 
0.0002 
(1.6283) 
SENTt-1 0.0075** 
(2.4665) 
0.0049 
(1.4225) 
-0.0053 
(-1.2662)  
0.0099** 
(2.4518) 
0.0065 
(1.1232) 
-0.0105* 
(-1.6792)  
-0.0001 
(-1.1943) 
-0.0001 
(-0.7330) 
-0.0001 
(-0.2672) 
SENTt-2 -0.0024 
(-1.0809) 
-0.0008 
(-0.3092) 
0.0064** 
(1.9997)  
-0.0032 
(-1.2297) 
-0.0032 
(-0.7938) 
0.0115** 
(2.5100)  
0.0001 
(0.8566) 
-0.00004 
(-0.2760) 
0.0001 
(0.7677) 
SENT
P
 t 
-0.4430*** 
(-3.2449) 
-0.0960 
(-0.7293) 
-0.0739 
(-0.5945)  
-0.4375*** 
(-2.6086) 
-0.1432 
(-0.8173) 
-0.0625 
(-0.4031)  
0.0075** 
(2.2970) 
-0.0044 
(-0.7364) 
0.0006 
(0.1021) 
SENT
P
 t-1 -0.2741* 
(-1.9255) 
-0.3676*** 
(-2.9104) 
-0.0881 
(-0.4783)  
-0.3401** 
(-2.0233) 
-0.4115** 
(-2.3854) 
-0.1157 
(-0.4496)  
0.0023 
(0.6947) 
0.0086 
(1.3972) 
0.0023 
(0.4027) 
SENT
P
 t-2 0.1103 
(0.7084) 
-0.1278 
(-1.0162) 
-0.1269 
(-1.3096)  
0.0789 
0.4100) 
-0.2111 
(-1.3363) 
-0.2649* 
(-1.8965)  
-0.0047 
(-1.2160) 
-0.0068 
(-1.6051) 
-0.0064 
(-1.1353) 
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6.2.4. Sentiment effect on herding under different market sentiment conditions 
In this part, the impact that investor sentiment has on investor herding is examined by 
investigating the possible asymmetric effect under different market sentiment conditions. 
The market wide sentiment is defined as high when the sentiment at time   is higher than 
its mean, i.e.                   , where              is the mean of the composed market sentiment. 
The market sentiment is defined as low when                   . Herding measures are 
regressed on the market sentiment,     , and the institutional sentiment,       under 
high sentiment and low sentiment conditions. The model is: 
     
    
     
    
           
    
       
 
   
       
    
       
 
 
   
   
   
        
              
          
 
   
       
          
 
 
   
       
           (6.4) 
where the superscripts high and low refer to high market sentiment and low market 
sentiment periods respectively;    is the herding measures of     ,     , 
and      (or      .      when                     and zero otherwise;      when 
                   and zero otherwise. The regression results are reported in Table 6.6. 
 
The estimates of open-ended fund return dispersion,        and         suggest that 
institutional herding is more likely to be influenced by institutional sentiment rather than 
market sentiment when market sentiment is high since  
    
 is strongly significant but 
       are not significant.Although  
    
 under       is significant at 10% level, the 
insignificance  
    
of        indicates that the effect from market sentiment to open-
ended funds’ herding is rather weak. For closed-end funds, however, the significant of 
  
    
demonstrates that both market and institutional sentiment has a significant effect on 
institutional herding. 
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When market sentiment is low, estimates from both open-ended funds and closed-end 
funds reveal very similar pictures. The significant of   
   ,   
    and   
    suggests that 
institutional herding is affected by both market sentiment and institutional sentiment. The 
test of nulls of   
    
   
   and   
    
   
   are rejected at the 5% significant level, 
suggesting that market sentiment and institutional sentiment have asymmetric effects on 
institutional herding under different market sentiment conditions. According to the value 
of coefficients, investor sentiment generally has a greater impact on institutional herding 
when market sentiment is low.      
 
When institutional herding is measured by    , herding by both open-ended funds and 
closed-end funds is affected by market and institutional sentiment when market wide 
sentiment is high. However, the significant level of coefficients of open-ended funds is 
higher than that of closed-end funds, which may suggest that investor sentiment has a 
higher degree of impact on beta herding among open-ended funds when market wide 
sentiment is high. When market sentiment is low, estimated coefficients show that herding 
of open-ended funds is affected by institutional sentiment and herding of closed-end funds 
is affected by both market and institutional sentiment, which corresponds to the estimates 
in the high market sentiment condition. This can be explained by managers of open-ended 
funds needing to consider their clients (or potential clients)’s expectations when they form 
investment portfolios. Individual investors are more likely to be irrational in decision 
making compared to institutional investors. Therefore, managers of open-ended funds are 
more likely to be affected by investor sentiment to a greater degree than those of closed-
end funds, whose capital does not fluctuate because of new joiners and redemptions.  
 
The asymmetric effect on herding which is found in regressions of return dispersions 
cannot be found in regressions of beta herding. This suggests that investor sentiment has a 
symmetric effect on institutional beta herding when market wide sentiment is high or low.  
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Table 6.6: Weekly regression herding on investor sentiment indexes under market sentiment conditions 
Table 6.6  reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
     
    
     
    
           
    
       
 
          
    
       
  
         
        
              
          
 
          
          
  
           
Variable definitions: 
H= CSAD, CSSD or DHSH; so, CSADop is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK open-ended funds; CSSDop is Cross Section Standard Deviation of UK open-ended funds; HSHop is the herding measure 
generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK open-ended funds; DHSHop is the first order of HSHop; CSADcl is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK closed-end funds; CSSDcl is Cross 
Section Standard Deviation of UK closed0end funds; HSHcl is the herding measure generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK closed-end funds.SENT: UK market sentiment;  
SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. t-statistics are given in parentheses.     when                    and zero otherwise;      when                    and zero otherwise. F1 is f-statistic of null hypothesis of 
  
    
   
   , where   
    
 is    when                    and   
    is    when                   .  F2 is f-statistic of null hypothesis of    
    
   
   , where   
    
 is    when                    and   
    is    when 
                  .   F3 is f-statistic of null hypothesis of   
    
   
   , where   
    
 is    when                    and   
    is    when                   . F4 is f-statistic of null hypothesis of   
    
   
   , where  
  
    
 is    when                    and    
    is    when                   .  
The model is estimated by using OLS with Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance.The data cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
Open-ended Funds Closed-end Funds 
 
CSADop CSSDop DHSHop CSADcl CSSDcl HSHcl 
 
High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low 
α1 
0.8544*** 
(5.1652) 
1.1771*** 
8.6223) 
1.0146*** 
(5.5368) 
1.4449*** 
(9.5037) 
-0.012153* 
(-1.7170) 
-0.00584** 
(-2.4822) 
1.2217*** 
(7.0254) 
2.0627*** 
(8.3578) 
1.5500*** 
(6.8340) 
2.4630*** 
(9.4118) 
-0.0141* 
(-1.6688) 
-0.0106*** 
(-3.3829) 
α2 
0.2733*** 
(4.3663) 
0.2815*** 
(4.9296) 
0.2920*** 
(4.3547) 
0.2717*** 
(5.0458) 
-0.096937** 
(-2.1347) 
0.142210** 
(2.4743) 
0.3392*** 
(5.8682) 
0.1581** 
(2.3928) 
0.3819*** 
(8.3316) 
0.2446*** 
(4.2785) 
0.9312*** 
63.2076) 
0.9635*** 
(53.8167) 
SENTt 
-0.0018 
(-0.7283) 
-0.0102*** 
(-3.3542) 
-0.0017 
(-0.6321) 
-0.0106*** 
(-3.1932) 
0.000356*** 
(2.7389) 
0.000125 
(1.2836) 
-0.0041 
(-1.4300) 
-0.0094** 
(-2.3617) 
-0.0044 
-1.0803) 
-0.0111** 
(-2.1027) 
0.0004** 
(2.3571) 
0.0003** 
(2.5587) 
SENTt-1 
0.0035 
(1.5930) 
0.0061* 
(1.7743) 
0.0045* 
(1.8818) 
0.0062* 
(1.7451) 
-0.000095 
(-0.7796) 
0.000022 
(0.2081) 
0.0080*** 
(2.8119) 
0.0013 
(0.3759) 
0.0095** 
(2.4385) 
0.0011 
(0.2218) 
-0.0001 
(-0.7573) 
-0.0002 
(-1.3913) 
SENTt-2 
-0.0017 
(-1.0818) 
-0.0010 
(-0.4380) 
-0.0020 
(-1.1956) 
-0.0011 
(-0.4268) 
-0.000003 
(-0.0316) 
-0.000020 
(-0.2472) 
-0.0030 
(-1.4504) 
0.0023 
(0.8344) 
-0.0037 
(-1.3802) 
0.0036 
(1.0003) 
-0.0001 
(-0.7159) 
0.0002* 
(1.7130) 
SENT
P
 t 
-0.0731 
(-1.2506) 
-0.3568*** 
(-3.8798) 
-0.0733 
(-1.1140) 
-0.4253*** 
(-4.2562) 
0.006180** 
(2.0117) 
0.000937 
(0.3141) 
-0.0667 
(-0.8049) 
-0.5567*** 
(-3.8531) 
-0.0426 
(-0.4066) 
-0.5675*** 
(-3.2546) 
0.0062* 
(1.6947) 
0.0008 
(0.2137) 
SENT
P
 t-1 
-0.0589 
(-0.9267) 
0.0512 
(0.4963) 
-0.1056 
(-1.4723) 
0.0300 
(0.2551) 
-0.003513 
(-1.2090) 
0.004620 
(1.4163) 
-0.2647*** 
(-3.3102) 
-0.2138 
(-1.1231) 
-0.3316*** 
(-3.0083) 
-0.2255 
(-0.9833) 
0.0024 
(0.6858) 
0.0055 
(1.4098) 
SENT
P
 t-2 
-0.1514*** 
(-2.6555) 
-0.0897 
(-1.1721) 
-0.1849*** 
(-3.1784) 
-0.0801 
(-0.8218) 
-0.006192** 
(-2.0031) 
-0.00518* 
(-1.7511) 
-0.1010* 
(-1.7027) 
0.0702 
(0.3915) 
-0.1657* 
(-1.9552) 
0.0134 
(0.0604) 
-0.0043 
(-1.1700) 
-0.0076** 
(-2.1581) 
F1 4.0489** 3.8643** 2.0271 1.0844 1.0009 0.1063 
F2 0.3188 0.1333 0.5309 2.0863 1.8307 0.1044 
F3 6.4553** 8.2814*** 1.4984 8.4070*** 6.4337** 0.0054 
F4 0.4278 0.8742 0.0559 0.0624 0.1788  
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Examination of investor sentiment effect on institutional herding presents several 
characteristics: firstly, it seems that current investor sentiment affects herding in the 
general low market sentiment period and lagged investor sentiment affects herding in the 
high market sentiment time. Secondly, investor sentiment asymmetric effect on herding 
depends on the measure of herding. Return dispersion herding measurement shows a 
strong asymmetric market sentiment, but beta dispersion herding measurement shows no 
asymmetric effect. Lastly, investor sentiment may have a different degree of effect on 
herding between open-ended funds and closed-end funds, but this difference is not 
significant and it is more likely to appear in the return dispersion measures.  
6.2.5. Monthly institutional herding and Investor sentiment 
The examinations of how investor sentiment affects UK institutional herding were 
conducted by using weekly data in previous sections. In this section, the sentiment effect 
on institutional herding is investigated by using monthly data. As in the weekly analysis, 
UK institutional herding measures, CSAD, CSSD, and     are examined against the two 
composed UK investor sentiment indexes,      and      , as well as US individual 
and institutional sentiment indexes, AAII and II. Similar to the weekly data, the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test of      (Table 6.7) cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of unit root, the first difference of the series,        is considered, and the 
ADF test shows that        is a stationary series.  
 
The correlation tests (Table 6.8 Panel A) demonstrate that return dispersions (CSAD and 
CSSD) have significant correlation to UK investor sentiment and US institutional 
sentiment which is similar to weekly data. However, the coefficient correlation 
between        and      is not significant, demonstrating insignificant correlation 
between UK market sentiment and institutional return herding. The less significant level of  
      may be caused by the way it is calculated. Different from weekly data, the 
insignificant coefficients demonstrate return dispersions of open-ended funds and closed-
end funds are not correlated to US individual sentiment. The correlation coefficients of 
beta herding measures show very different pictures. Beta herding of open-ended funds is 
significantly correlated to US individual and institutional sentiment, but has no significant 
correlation to UK investor sentiment. However, beta herding of closed-end funds 
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significantly correlates to UK investor sentiment, but has no significant correlation to US 
investor sentiment. 
 
The Granger causality tests (Table 6.8 Panel B) show that US institutional sentiment is one 
of the factors to cause return herding of open-ended funds, but not cause return herding of 
closed-end funds. On the other hand, UK institutional sentiment is likely to be caused by 
institutional herding rather than vice versa for both open-ended and closed-end funds. P-
values of the Granger causality tests of beta herding suggest that, except US individual 
sentiment which is led by open-ended fund herding, there is no clear Granger causal 
relation among the pairwise variables.   
The investigation of whether UK investor sentiment has effects on institutional herding is 
conducted by using monthly data. The model is started by including 3 lagged terms of 
variables, and is called model 1:  
            
 
              
 
              
  
                          (6.5) 
where   is the level of investor’s herding behavior at time  , and it is measured by     , 
    , or        (or      ). The estimation results are presented in Table 6.9A and 
Table 6.9B. Coefficients for the lagged term of sentiment variables are all statistically 
insignificant. Model 1 therefore is amended to model 2 by dropping them.  
 
The estimated coefficients for return dispersion (    and     ) tell similar stories for 
both open-ended and closed-end funds. The significant of      
 
 demonstrates that UK 
institutional sentiment has an effect on UK institutional herding. The negative value 
suggests that a high institutional investor sentiment leads to a low level cross-section 
return dispersion, meaning the degree of herd behaviour is high. This echoes the estimated 
results from weekly data.     are not significant, implying the UK market sentiment may 
not affect UK institutional herding in the monthly frequency. This may be explained by the 
reverse effect of market sentiment in the weekly data, which shows that the market 
sentiment effect on herding is reversed from one week to another week. The sentiment 
effect in the short run is eliminated in the long-run.  
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Table 6.7: Statistic summary of monthly herding and sentiment variable 
AAII is American Association of Individual Investors index; GMI is  German Market Indicator; II is Investors Intelligence index;       isUK market investor sentiment index;      is UK institutional investor sentiment; CSADop is Cross 
Section Absolute Deviation of UK open-ended funds; CSSDop is Cross Section Standard Deviation of UK open-ended funds; HSHop is the herding measure generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK open-ended funds; DHSHop 
is the first order of HSHop; CSADcl is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK closed-end funds; CSSDcl is Cross Section Standard Deviation of UK closed0end funds; HSHcl is the herding measure generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) 
approach from UK closed-end funds.The data cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. 
AC (1) is autocorrelation coefficient at one lag.  AC (2) is autocorrelation coefficient at 2 lags. ADF is Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic with maximum 52 lags for weekly indexes and 12 lags for monthly indexes. Obs is number of 
observation.  ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level.  
 
 
Statistical summary of monthly variables  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Sum Sq. Dev. AC (1) AC (2) ADF Obs 
AAII 0.1043 0.1984 0.1534 2.3353 4.1538 7.2809 0.429 0.279 -8.5466*** 186 
GMI 0.2989 0.3687 -0.4968 2.3965 10.4727*** 25.1489 0.955 0.870 -3.4685*** 186 
II 0.1829 0.1319 -0.7156 3.3733 16.9560*** 32.18934 0.695 0.456 -5.7242*** 186 
SENT 20.3275 10.4377 -0.1456 2.5854 1.9680 19936.92 0.821 0.665 -3.3222** 184 
SENT
p
 1.0212 0.4356 -0.8064 4.4858 37.0646*** 34.9081 0.801 0.665 -4.4809*** 185 
CSADop 1.3152 0.6187 1.3777 5.0065 90.0444*** 70.8078 0.413 0.290 -8.6963*** 186 
CSSDop 1.7379 0.8265 1.4729 5.4070 112.1528*** 126.3872 0.439 0.379 -4.2822*** 186 
HSHop 0.0015 0.1150 -0.0956 2.4631 2.5169 2.4483 0.977 0.954 -0.9526 186 
DHSHop -0.0008 0.0222 0.8591 5.2463 61.6523*** 0.0904 -0.020 -0.004 -14.2228*** 185 
CSADcl 2.8803 1.2518 1.6030 6.1559 156.8451*** 289.8764 0.458 0.484 -4.7876*** 186 
CSSDcl 4.0611 1.8201 1.7202 6.5177 187.6395*** 612.8286 0.473 0.492 -4.7065*** 186 
HSHcl 0.0011 0.0440 0.7299 3.8775 22.3613*** 0.3554 0.782 0.610 -4.6685*** 185 
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Table 6.8: Monthly correlation and Granger Causality tests: institutional herding measures and investor sentiment 
      isUK market investor sentiment index;      is UK institutional investor sentiment; CSADop is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK open-ended funds; CSSDop is Cross Section 
Standard Deviation of UK open-ended funds; HSHop is the herding measure generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK open-ended funds; DHSHop is the first order of 
HSHop; CSADcl is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK closed-end funds; CSSDcl is Cross Section Standard Deviation of UK closed0end funds; HSHcl is the herding measure generated 
by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK closed-end funds. AAII is American Association of Individual Investors index; II is Investors Intelligence index. The data cover the period 
1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. 
 
Test 1:  : Granger-noncausality from herding measures to the sentiment indexes. 
Test 2:  : Granger-noncausality from sentiment indexes to herding measures. 
 
The tabulated statistics are the  -valus of the test statistics with 5 lags.  
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
Panel A: Correlation tests 
 
Open-ended funds Closed-end funds 
 
CSADop CSSDop DHSHop CSADcl CSSDcl HSHcl 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
AAII 0.0036 0.0058 0.2239*** 0.017 0.0177 -0.0993 
II -0.3169*** -0.2814*** 0.1765** -0.2739*** -0.2555*** 0.0690 
SENT -0.2333*** -0.2021*** 0.0682 -0.1477** -0.1044 0.2429*** 
SENT
p
 -0.5053*** -0.4924*** 0.0912 -0.4375*** -0.4030*** 0.1604** 
Panel B: Granger Causality test 
 
CSADop CSSDop DHSHop CSADcl CSSDcl HSHcl 
 
Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 
AAII 0.3973 0.1221 0.3996 0.1725 0.0224 0.3493 0.4623 0.2204 0.4514 0.3259 0.7080 0.6475 
II 0.6159 0.0007 0.7709 0.0062 0.1527 0.3140 0.8475 0.1157 0.7756 0.2621 0.8138 0.8974 
SENT 0.208 0.7924 0.2309 0.9252 0.4470 0.4507 0.1955 0.6643 0.7828 0.2790 0.8575 0.5146 
SENT
p
 <0.0001 0.1347 <0.0001 0.3254 0.2800 0.8350 0.0001 0.2557 0.0007 0.4230 0.7718 0.9791 
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Regressions of beta herding suggest that both market sentiment and institutional sentiment 
has some power to explain open-ended funds herding, which is consistent with the results 
from weekly data. The estimated coefficients of closed-ended fund beta herding reveal a 
different story. The insignificant coefficients of sentiment variables suggest that UK 
institutional herding is affected neither by UK institutional sentiment nor UK market 
sentiment. Managers of open-ended fund are limited from arbitrageurs by the risk of large 
withdrawals if their performance is poor in the short-run (Stein, 2005) which puts them in 
danger to put on trades with attractive prospects in a long-run but the convergence to 
fundamentals may be not a rapid and smooth journey (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997).Managers of closed-end funds, however, are not constrained by such liquidity risk, 
which allows them to be able to enter in trades that are attractive in a long-run sense.  
 
An examination of the impact from foreign investors’ sentiment (represented by US 
investor sentiment) on UK institutional herding is also conducted in the monthly data. By 
including US sentiment variables and their lagged terms the model (model 1) is as follows:   
 
            
 
   
           
 
   
           
 
 
   
           
 
   
         
 
   
    
           (6.6) 
where   is the level of investor’s herding behavior at time  , and it is measured by     , 
    ,       or      .     is UK market sentiment,     
  is UK institutional 
sentiment,      is US individual sentiment and    is US institutional sentiment.  The 
estimated parameters are presented in Table 6.10A and Table 6.10B. Some coefficients of 
the high order lagged term variables are highly insignificant; therefore, model 1 is 
amended by dropping some of the insignificant lagged terms to become model 2. The 
estimated parameters are also reported in Table 6.10A and 6.10B.  
 
When open-ended fund herding is measured by return dispersions,       or       , 
Significant of      
 
,       and       demonstrates that except current UK institutional 
sentiment, US institutional sentiment also affects UK institutional herding which is in two 
periods lagged and lasts for two periods. The insignificance of other coefficients implies 
that UK market sentiment and US individual sentiment have very little impact on 
institutional return herding. For       measure, significant of coefficients of      , 
       ,      
 
, and       suggests that not only UK market and institutional sentiment 
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but also US individual sentiment has influence over open-ended funds beta herding. The 
estimates from monthly data are different from those of weekly data which indicate that 
the UK market sentiment and US individual sentiment has influence over open-ended 
funds return herding and US institutional sentiment affects open-ended funds beta herding. 
As explained above, this may because of the reverse effect in short run being eliminated in 
long-run. 
 
Estimated coefficients of closed-end funds demonstrate that UK institutional sentiment, 
US individual and institutional sentiment have some power to explain the return herding 
and US institutional sentiment has an impact on closed-end funds beta herding. These 
results are, again, different from those of weekly data, which suggests that US institutional 
sentiment together with UK market and institutional sentiment influence the return herding. 
For beta herding, although the coefficient of      is significant in 10% level, both the 
value of the coefficient and the significant level indicate the effect from US institutional 
sentiment on closed-end funds beta herding is rather small. The insignificance of all other 
coefficients of sentiment variable implies that herding of closed-end funds on beta is 
unlikely to be caused by investor sentiment. This corresponds to the results of regression 
of weekly data.   
 
As in the weekly analysis, institutional herding is examined in the different stages of 
financial crisis. The return and beta herding measures are separately regressed on       
and       under the conditions of non-crisis period, pre-crisis period, and in-crisis period.  
The model includes one lagged terms variable: 
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where the superscripts nor-cri, pre-cri and in-cri refer to no-crisis, pre-crisis and in 
crisis periods respectively;    is the institutional herding measures of      ,     , or 
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                .     in non-crisis periods and zero otherwise;      in pre-crisis 
periods and zero otherwise;      for in-crisis periods and zero otherwiseThe regression 
results of open-ended funds and closed-end funds are displayed in Table 6.11A and Table 
6.11B respectively. 
 
The significant coefficients of   
       and   
       
 from both        and        
demonstrates that current institutional sentiment affects return herding of open-ended 
funds when the market is normal and in the pre-crisis period. Coefficients of UK market 
sentiment variables are statistically insignificant in all three stages, implying that UK 
market sentiment has hardly any impact on open-ended funds’ return herding in all time. 
The tests of asymmetric effect of institutional sentiment on herding are rejected suggesting 
that the effect of institutional sentiment on return herding is symmetric during in all stages 
of the financial crisis. Return herding of closed-end funds (Tale 6.11B) demonstrates a 
similar picture: return herding is affected by institutional sentiment in the normal time and 
pre-crisis time. However, it is the lagged term rather than current institutional sentiment 
that has the effect, suggesting that institutional sentiment has one period delayed effect on 
return herding of closed-end funds.  The significant of        s suggests that market 
sentiment has some explanatory power over return herding of closed-end funds during 
financial crisis period. The estimates of        show that beta herding of open-ended 
funds are affected by both market and institutional sentiment during normal time. It is 
affected by market sentiment during pre-crisis period and institutional sentiment in the 
crisis time. The beta herding of closed-ended funds, however, are not influenced by either 
market or institutional sentiment regardless the stage of financial sentiment.  
 
Estimates of monthly data display some difference to those of weekly data. The effect of 
market sentiment on return herding significant in weekly estimations is insignificant in 
monthly estimations during normal time and pre-crisis period. The elimination of market 
sentiment effect in estimations of monthly data can be interpreted as the result of the 
‘second thought’ effect in the short run, i.e. one week’s sentiment effect is reversed in the 
following week (or weeks), the aggregate effect on herding from market sentiment in the 
long run is, therefore, not significant. During financial crisis, return herding of open-ended 
funds is unlikely to be affected by investor sentiment in monthly data which is influenced 
by both market and institutional sentiment in the weekly regression. This further suggests 
that investor sentiment effect on herding is in a short term rather than a long term. Beta 
herding estimations of open-ended funds demonstrate that only institutional sentiment has 
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an impact to herding during normal time in the weekly data but both market and 
institutional sentiment have an impact in the monthly data, demonstrating that managers of 
open-ended funds are more likely influenced by market sentiment in a long run. This may 
because clients of open-ended funds normally assess fund performance, the return, in a 
relatively long run, mostly monthly or quarterly rather than in a short run such as daily or 
weekly. For closed-end funds, on the other hand, managers are less likely to be affected by 
market sentiment during normal and pre-crisis period in the long rung such as monthly, 
instead, they are influence by market sentiment in the short run such as weekly. This is 
confirmed by the estimates of beta herding of closed-end funds.    
 
The possible asymmetric effect of investor sentiment under high and low UK market 
sentiment conditions is also examined in the monthly data. The market wide sentiment is 
defined as high when the sentiment at time   is higher than the mean, i.e.                   , 
where              is mean of the composted market sentiment. The market sentiment is defined 
as low when                   . Herding measures are regressed on the market sentiment, 
    , and the institutional sentiment,       under high sentiment and low sentiment 
condition separately. The model is as follows: 
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where the superscripts high and low refer to high market sentiment and low market 
sentiment periods respectively;    is the herding measures of     ,     , and 
      (or       .      when                     and zero otherwise;      when 
                   and zero otherwise. The regression results are reported in Table 6.12.  
 
The estimated coefficients demonstrate that institutional sentiment has a significant effect 
on institutional herding in terms of return and beta for both open-ended funds and closed-
ended funds when market sentiment is high. However, the significant     
    
for        
demonstrates that open-ended fund beta herding is influenced by market sentiment rather 
than institutional sentiment in the high sentiment market. When market wide sentiment is 
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low, institutional herding is generally not affected by investor sentiment, except closed-end 
fund return herding, which suggested that both market and institutional sentiment have an 
impact on beta herding of closed-end funds. Tests of asymmetric effect of investor 
sentiment on herding under high- and low-sentiment market suggest that effect of investor 
sentiment is symmetric under high or low market sentiment condition. This is different 
from the estimated results estimated from weekly data which indicate that there is an 
asymmetric effect of investor sentiment on return herding, which, again, corresponds to 
what CH suggested: that investor sentiment effect on returns is in a short run. 
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Table 6.9A: Monthly regression results of Open-ended funds herding on UK investor 
sentiment 
Table 6.9A reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
             
 
   
           
 
   
           
 
 
   
    
Variable definitions: 
H= CSADop, CSSDop or DHSHop; so, CSADop is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK open-ended funds; CSSDop is Cross Section 
Standard Deviation of UK open-ended funds; HSHop is the herding measure generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK 
open-ended funds; DHSHop is the first order of HSHop; SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. S.E:Standard 
Error of regression; AIC: Akaike information criterion;  LM: Breusch/Godfrey LM test for residual autocorrelation; ARCH: ARCH test 
for Heteroskadasticity. t-statistics are given in parentheses.  
 
The model is estimated by using OLS with Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance.The data cover the period 1st January 
1996 to 30th June 2011. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
CSADop CSSDop DHSHop 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
α0 
1.4750*** 
(4.7458) 
1.6820*** 
(8.1982) 
1.4611** 
(2.2854) 
1.5585*** 
(3.0562) 
-0.0045 
(-0.9034) 
-0.0049 
(-1.1271) 
α1 
0.1583* 
(1.9202) 
0.1731** 
(2.1812) 
0.1696* 
(1.7485) 
0.1855* 
(1.8735) 
-0.0771 
(-1.2725) 
-0.0983 
(-1.3021) 
α2 
-0.0132 
(-0.1580)  
0.1036 
(0.8036) 
0.0987 
(0.8595) 
-0.0522 
(-0.6560) 
 
α3 
0.1255 
(1.5084)  
0.1562** 
(2.3119) 
0.1317** 
(2.3814) 
-0.0495 
(-0.7216) 
 
SENTt 
-0.0060 
(-0.8475) 
-0.0008 
(-0.1958) 
-0.0059 
(-0.6712) 
0.0005 
(0.0943) 
0.0006** 
(2.0677) 
0.0006** 
(2.3593) 
SENTt-1 
0.0044 
(0.4742)  
0.0034 
(0.2746) 
 -0.0003 
(-0.7917) 
-0.0005 
(-1.3441) 
SENTt-2 
0.0014 
(0.1459)  
0.0051 
(0.3894) 
 -0.0005 
(-1.4729) 
-0.0003 
(-1.2372) 
SENTt-3 
0.0015 
(0.2094)  
0.0017 
(0.1534) 
 0.00001 
(-0.0370) 
 
SENT
P
 t 
-0.5715*** 
(-3.2672) 
-0.5641*** 
(-4.6749) 
-0.6529*** 
(-3.2646) 
-0.5444*** 
(-2.8731) 
0.0089* 
(1.7368) 
0.0069* 
(1.6845) 
SENT
P
 t-1 
0.0264 
(0.1280)  
0.0497 
(0.1727) 
 -0.0027 
(-0.3817) 
 
SENT
P
 t-2 
0.0335 
(0.1641)  
0.0022 
(0.0098) 
 0.0050 
(0.7349) 
 
SENT
P
 t-3 
-0.0204 
(-0.1274)  
0.0524 
(0.2119) 
 -0.0050 
(-0.7285) 
 
Adj. R
2 
0.2449 0.2630 0.2704 0.2870 0.0158 0.0343 
S.D. 0.5443 0.5336 0.7147 0.7028 0.0201 0.0210 
AIC 1.6854 1.6032 2.2300 2.1645 -4.9127 -4.8585 
LM  
1.0713 1.1128 1.0561 0.9187 1.6334* 1.0669 
ARCH 
1.4294 2.1629 4.5731** 4.7744*** 0.6432 1.9313 
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Table 6.9B: Monthly regression results of Closed-end funds herding on UK investor 
sentiment 
Table 6.9B reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
             
 
   
           
 
   
           
 
 
   
    
Variable definitions: 
H= CSADcl, CSSDcl or DHSHcl; so, CSADcl is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK closed-end funds; CSSDcl is Cross Section 
Standard Deviation of UK closed-end funds; HSHcl is the herding measure generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK 
closed-end funds; SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. S.E:Standard Error of regression; AIC: Akaike 
information criterion;  LM: Breusch/Godfrey LM test for residual autocorrelation; ARCH: ARCH test for Heteroskadasticity. t-statistics 
are given in parentheses.  
The model is estimated by using OLS with Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance.The data cover the period 1st January 
1996 to 30th June 2011. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level.  
 
CSADcl CSSDcl HSHcl 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
α0 
1.9194*** 
(3.0383) 
1.8087*** 
(3.1284) 
2.2652*** 
(2.9042) 
2.2620*** 
(3.2334) 
-0.0052 
(-0.8082) 
-0.0070 
(-1.2286) 
α1 
0.2113* 
(1.7623) 
0.2318** 
(2.2062) 
0.2211* 
(1.8801) 
0.2570** 
(2.4725) 
0.7662*** 
(9.9198) 
0.7675*** 
(16.2116) 
α2 
0.2770*** 
(3.3985) 
0.3002*** 
(4.6790) 
0.2834*** 
(3.5177) 
0.3121*** 
(4.6919) 
-0.0049 
(-0.0508) 
 
α3 
0.0283 
(0.3374)  
0.0722 
(0.8750) 
 0.0008 
(0.0102) 
 
SENTt 
-0.0038 
(-0.3177) 
0.0051 
(0.6114) 
0.0007 
(0.0417) 
0.0110 
(0.9440) 
0.0003 
(0.8067) 
0.0003 
(1.3381) 
SENTt-1 
0.0216 
(1.2577)  
0.0252 
(0.9791) 
 -0.0001 
(-0.2669) 
 
SENTt-2 
-0.0187 
(-0.9222)  
-0.0227 
(-0.8205) 
 0.0003 
(0.6298) 
 
SENTt-3 
0.0098 
(0.6384)  
0.0141 
(0.6687) 
 -0.0001 
(-0.2614) 
 
SENT
P
 t 
-0.4050 
(-1.4560) 
-0.5522*** 
(-2.7537) 
-0.5940 
(-1.5454) 
-0.7244*** 
(-2.7718) 
0.0068 
(0.8130) 
0.0012 
(0.2250) 
SENT
P
 t-1 
-0.3040 
(-0.8289)  
-0.3272 
(-0.5569) 
 -0.0081 
(-0.7877) 
 
SENT
P
 t-2 
0.1143 
(0.2812)  
0.2637 
(0.3909) 
 0.0021 
(0.2095) 
 
SENT
P
 t-3 
-0.0899 
(-0.2658)  
-0.2124 
(-0.4416) 
 -0.0026 
(-0.3182) 
 
Adj. R
2 
0.2947 0.3151 0.3059 0.3245 0.5956 0.6126 
S.D. 1.0573 1.0396 1.5254 1.5020 0.0279 0.0274 
AIC 3.0132 2.9423 3.7464 3.6783 -4.2562 -4.3337 
LM  0.8569 0.8559 1.1708 1.2512 1.0026 0.6915 
ARCH 3.1522** 3.9848** 4.0222** 3.9413** 1.6866 1.2024 
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Table 6.10A: Monthly regression results of open-ended herding on investor sentiment 
Table 6.10A reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
             
 
   
           
 
   
           
 
 
   
           
 
   
          
 
   
    
Variable definitions: 
H= CSADop, CSSDop or DHSHop; so, CSADop is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK open-ended funds; CSSDop is Cross Section 
Standard Deviation of UK open-ended funds; HSHop is the herding measure generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK 
open-ended funds; DHSHop is the first order of HSHop; SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. AAII is 
American Association of Individual Investors index; II is Investors Intelligence index. t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
The estimations are started from OLS method, if the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test (including 2 lags) or ARCH test for 
Heteroskedasticity (including 1 lags) indicate that there is residual serial correlation and/or Heteroskedasticity in estimation, the method 
of Least Square with Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance is applied. The data cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th 
June 2011. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level.  
 
CSADop CSSDop DHSHop 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
α0 
1.5170*** 
(2.9177) 
1.6917*** 
(6.2568) 
1.5159*** 
(3.9840) 
1.6016*** 
(4.9780) 
-0.00524 
(-1.2466) 
-0.0058 
 (-1.3340) 
α1 
0.1714 
(1.5580) 
0.1787 
(1.4126) 
0.1801** 
(2.1701) 
0.1853** 
(2.3248) 
-0.07826 
(-1.1251)  
α2 
-0.0346 
(-0.3191) 
 
0.0845 
(1.0164) 
0.0902 
(1.1697) 
-0.03146 
(-0.3499)  
α3 
0.1194 
(1.3988) 
 
0.1483* 
(1.8023) 
0.1286* 
(1.7762) 
-0.01413 
(-0.1910)  
SENTt 
0.0005 
(0.0587) 
0.0028 
(0.6819) 
0.0006 
(0.0559) 
0.0044 
(0.7196) 
0.00045 
(1.5019) 
0.0004* 
(1.6685) 
SENTt-1 
-0.0026 
(-0.2383) 
 
-0.0048 
(-0.3733) 
 
-0.00045 
(-1.2443) 
-0.0007** 
(-2.5653) 
SENTt-2 
0.0062 
(0.6434) 
 
0.0123 
(0.9503 
 
-0.00032 
(-1.1060)  
SENTt-3 
0.0025 
(0.3062) 
 
0.0014 
(0.1463) 
 
-0.00004 
(-0.1458)  
SENT
P
 t 
-0.4681*** 
(-2.7149) 
-0.4596*** 
(-3.1935) 
-0.5253*** 
(-2.2138) 
-0.4295** 
(-2.4499) 
0.00904* 
(1.8092) 
0.0117* 
(1.8844) 
SENT
P
 t-1 
-0.0523 
(-0.2271) 
 
-0.0199 
(-0.0728) 
 
-0.00256 
(-0.3930) 
-0.0068 
(-1.1361) 
SENT
P
 t-2 
0.0693 
(0.3820) 
 
0.0409 
(0.1503) 
 
0.00299 
(0.4625)  
SENT
P
 t-3 
-0.0080 
(-0.0461) 
 
0.0608 
(0.2823) 
 
-0.00533 
(-0.8287)  
AAIIt 
0.0008 
(0.2757) 
0.0007 
(0.2773) 
0.0027 
(0.7574) 
0.0024 
(0.7765) 
0.00020** 
(2.3790) 
0.0002*** 
(2.9697) 
AAIIt-1 
-0.0018 
(-0.7977) 
 
-0.0030 
(-0.7983) 
 
-0.00002 
(-0.1636) 
-0.0001 
(-1.3486) 
AAIIt-2 
0.0007 
(0.2423) 
 
0.0025 
(0.6797) 
 
0.00002 
(0.1768)  
AAIIt-3 
-0.0006 
(-0.2586) 
 
-0.0013 
(-0.3803) 
 
-0.00014 
(-1.3105)  
IIt 
-0.0046 
(-0.7732) 
-0.0050 
(-0.8677) 
-0.0061 
(-0.9410) 
-0.0061 
(-0.9868) 
0.00004 
(0.2740) 
0.0001 
(0.9343) 
IIt-1 
-0.0054 
(-0.9824) 
-0.0072 
(-1.3427) 
-0.0049 
(-0.5914) 
-0.0090 
(-1.2542) 
0.00008 
(0.3923)  
IIt-2 
0.0104 
(1.6434) 
0.0104** 
(2.0062) 
0.0094 
(1.1157) 
0.0114* 
(1.6718) 
0.00018 
(0.7216)  
IIt-3 
-0.0110* 
(-1.9117) 
-0.0096** 
(-2.0708) 
-0.0120* 
(-1.7187) 
-0.0096* 
(-1.6900) 
0.00001 
(0.0300)  
Adj. R
2 0.2618 0.2894 0.2780 0.3010 0.0329 0.0816 
S.D. 0.5382 0.5252 0.7109 0.6958 0.0199 0.0205 
AIC 1.7026 1.5978 2.2594 2.1707 -4.8904 -4.8972 
LM  0.9793 0.0755 0.9905 0.7930 3.8719** 0.6331 
ARCH 2.8303* 4.5953** 1.6733 1.8477 0.3780 0.9868 
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Table 6.10B: Monthly regression results of closed-end herding on investor sentiment 
Table 6.10B reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
             
 
   
           
 
   
           
 
 
   
           
 
   
          
 
   
    
Variable definitions: 
H= CSADcl, CSSDclor DHSHcl; so, CSADcl is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK closed-end funds; CSSDcl is Cross Section 
Standard Deviation of UK closed-end funds; HSHcl is the herding measure generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK 
closed-end funds;; SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENTP: UK institutional sentiment. AAII is American Association of Individual 
Investors index; II is Investors Intelligence index. t-statistics are given in parentheses.F1 is F-statistic for null of      . F2 is F-statistic 
for null of      .  
The estimations are started from OLS method, if the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test(including 2 lags) or ARCH test for 
Heteroskedasticity (including 1 lags) indicate that there is residual serial correlation and/or Heteroskedasticity in estimation, the method 
of Least Square with Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance is applied. The data cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th 
June 2011. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
CSADcl CSSDcl HSHcl 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
α0 
2.1866*** 
(3.0683) 
2.0635*** 
(3.4066) 
2.7109*** 
(3.1892) 
2.6687*** 
(3.6899) 
-0.0063 
(-0.9694) 
-0.0073 
(-1.2815) 
α1 
0.1895 
(1.4989) 
0.2015* 
(1.8796) 
0.1861 
(1.5185) 
0.2243** 
(2.1033) 
0.7605*** 
(9.6794) 
0.7620*** 
(15.75) 
α2 
0.2598*** 
(3.1161) 
0.2868*** 
(4.3840) 
0.2589*** 
(3.3003) 
0.2941*** 
(4.4639) 
-0.0180 
(-0.1827)  
α3 
0.0197 
(0.2413)  
0.0718 
(0.9464) 
 
0.0004 
(0.0054)  
SENTt 
0.0041 
(0.3882) 
0.0060 
(0.7679) 
0.0090 
(0.5968) 
0.0117 
(0.9936) 
0.0003 
(0.7901) 
0.0004 
(1.5902) 
SENTt-1 
0.0143 
(0.8097)  
0.0184 
(0.6845) 
 
-0.00002 
(-0.0362)  
SENTt-2 
-0.0159 
(-0.8583)  
-0.0214 
(-0.8371) 
 
0.0003 
(0.5850)  
SENTt-3 
0.0087 
(0.5212)  
0.0141 
(0.6067) 
 
0.00002 
(0.0435)  
SENT
P
 t 
-0.3041 
(-0.9896) 
-0.4824** 
(-2.1814) 
-0.5352 
(-1.3834) 
-0.6501** 
(-2.4268) 
0.0084 
(0.9443) 
0.0029 
(0.5146) 
SENT
P
 t-1 
-0.3111 
(-0.7960)  
-0.3258 
(-0.5207) 
 
-0.0078 
(-0.7391)  
SENT
P
 t-2 
0.2327 
(0.5687)  
0.5085 
(0.7674) 
 
0.0048 
(0.4608)  
SENT
P
 t-3 
-0.1309 
(-0.3798)  
-0.2761 
(-0.5455) 
 
-0.0039 
(-0.4643)  
AAIIt 
0.0011 
(0.2176) 
0.0024 
(0.5415) 
-0.0025 
(-0.3462) 
0.0004 
(0.0569) 
-0.0002 
(-1.2309) 
-0.0002 
(-1.4416) 
AAIIt-1 
0.0018 
(0.3912) 
0.00001 
(0.0079) 
0.0064 
(0.9144) 
0.0033 
(0.5868) 
0.0002 
(1.1556) 
0.0001 
(1.12773) 
AAIIt-2 
0.0105* 
(1.9158) 
0.0104*** 
(3.0325) 
0.0142* 
(1.7911) 
0.0146*** 
(2.9087) 
-0.0002 
(-1.2471)  
AAIIt-3 
-0.0014 
(-0.3056)  
0.0015 
(0.2301) 
 
0.0001 
(0.5874)  
IIt 
-0.0178 
(-1.3943) 
-0.0194** 
(-2.2293) 
-0.0235 
(-1.2557) 
-0.0264** 
(-2.0935) 
0.0003 
(1.0382) 
0.0003 
(1.1850) 
IIt-1 
-0.0055 
(-0.4696)  
-0.0081 
(-0.4404) 
 
-0.0004 
(-1.2242) 
-0.0005* 
(1.7785) 
IIt-2 
0.0026 
(0.2108)  
0.0016 
(0.0854) 
 
0.0002 
(0.6229)  
IIt-3 
-0.0050 
(-0.3611)  
-0.0084 
(-0.4385) 
 
-0.0004 
(-1.4804)  
Adj. R
2 0.3134 0.3431 0.3247 0.3505 0.5929 0.6130 
S.D. 1.0431 1.0181 1.5046 1.4727 0.0280 0.0274 
AIC 3.0263 2.9215 3.7589 3.6598 -4.2096 -4.3135 
LM  0.6587 0.2351 1.0085 1.2860 0.5502 0.0743 
ARCH 6.4382** 9.2581*** 5.1118** 6.3994** 1.6866 1.8541 
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Table 6.11A: Monthly regression open-ended funds herding on investor sentiment under financial crisis conditions 
Table 6.11A reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
     
           
                 
             
 
          
             
  
         
       
     
       
           
       
       
 
          
       
       
  
         
         
  
                 
             
 
          
             
  
           
Variable definitions: 
H= CSADop, CSSDop or DHSHop; so, CSADop is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK open-ended funds; CSSDop is Cross Section Standard Deviation of UK open-ended funds; HSHop is the herding measure 
generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK open-ended funds; DHSHop is the first order of HSHop; SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. t-statistics are given in 
parentheses. D1 = 1 in non-crisis periods and zero otherwise;  D2 = 1 in pre-crisis periods and zero otherwise;  D3 = 1 in in-crisis periods and zero otherwise.  The pre- and in-crisis periods are as defined in 
Appendix 2.  The no-crisis periods consist of the remaining observations in the sample. F1: f-statistical of hypothesis of      . F2 is f-statistic of null hypothesis of   
         
       
. F3 is f-statistic 
of null hypothesis of   
       
   
      .  F4 is f-statistic of null hypothesis of    
           
       . 
The model is estimated by using OLS with Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance. The data cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
 
 
CSADop CSSDop DHSHop 
Coefficients 
Normal 
period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period 
Normal period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period 
Normal period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period 
α1 1.7081*** 
(6.3714) 
2.4635*** 
(3.1789) 
2.5775*** 
(4.1746) 
2.2890*** 
(9.2776) 
3.3635*** 
(3.4648) 
3.4934*** 
(9.6772) 
-0.0081 
(-1.4348) 
-0.0063 
(-0.4657) 
0.0242 
(1.2287) 
α2 0.1087 
(0.9514) 
0.2859* 
(1.7327) 
-0.1482 
(-0.7639) 
0.0696 
(0.8448) 
0.3506** 
(2.1324) 
-0.1478 
(-1.2898) 
-0.1581* 
(-1.8275) 
0.0128 
(0.0935) 
0.2466 
(1.3422) 
SENTt -0.0087 
(-1.0122) 
-0.0179 
(-1.1167) 
0.0050 
(0.2422) 
-0.0080 
(-0.7529) 
-0.0225 
(-1.0989) 
-0.0066 
(-0.2670) 
0.0005 
(1.6043) 
0.0015*** 
3.7957 
-0.0003 
(-0.5387) 
SENTt-1 0.0021 
(0.2357) 
0.0070 
(0.4592) 
-0.0095 
(-0.4917) 
-0.0006 
(-0.0500) 
0.0058 
(0.2418) 
0.0023 
(0.0831) 
-0.0008** 
(-2.2648) 
-0.0016*** 
(-3.3783) 
0.0002 
(0.3474) 
SENT
P
 t -0.3864* 
(-1.7289) 
-0.7377** 
(-1.9741) 
-0.8645* 
(-1.9319) 
-0.4430** 
(-2.2250) 
-1.0559*** 
(-3.0110) 
-0.8274 
(-1.1776) 
0.0205*** 
(3.0427) 
0.0053 
(0.7055) 
-0.0400** 
(-2.0308) 
SENT
P
 t-1 -0.0938 
(-0.4905) 
-0.2755 
(-0.6645) 
-0.0041 
(-0.0091) 
-0.1984 
(-0.8931) 
-0.3723 
(-0.7774) 
-0.4135 
(-0.6559) 
-0.0078 
(-0.8288) 
-0.0025 
(-0.2680) 
0.0099 
(0.5536) 
F1 2.8057* 3.7481* 3.6603* 4.6111** 8.8453*** 1.2869 8.6469*** 0.2425 4.0908** 
F2 0.6508 2.2887 2.2983 
F3 0.0473 0.0826 4.2650** 
F4 0.9135 0.2765 8.3739*** 
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Table 6.11B: Monthly regression closed-end funds herding on investor sentiment under financial crisis conditions 
Table 6.11B reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
     
           
                 
             
 
          
             
  
         
       
     
       
           
       
       
 
          
       
       
  
         
         
  
                 
             
 
          
             
  
           
Variable definitions: 
H= CSADcl, CSSDcl or DHSHcl; so, CSADcl is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK closed-end funds; CSSDcl is Cross Section Standard Deviation of UK closed-end funds; HSHcl is the herding measure 
generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK closed-end funds;  SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. t-statistics are given in parentheses. D1 = 1 in non-crisis periods 
and zero otherwise;  D2 = 1 in pre-crisis periods and zero otherwise;  D3 = 1 in in-crisis periods and zero otherwise.  The pre- and in-crisis periods are as defined in Appendix 2.  The no-crisis periods consist of 
the remaining observations in the sample. F1: f-statistical of hypothesis of      .  F2: f-statistical of hypothesis of      . F3 is f-statistic of null hypothesis of   
         
       
. F4 is f-statistic of 
null hypothesis of   
       
   
      .  F5 is f-statistic of null hypothesis of   
          
      . 
The model is estimated by using OLS with Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance. The data cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
 
CSADcl CSSDcl HSHcl 
Coefficients 
Normal 
period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period 
Normal period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period 
Normal period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period 
α1 
4.3969*** 
(8.5815) 
4.6233*** 
(3.6531) 
2.0367** 
(2.3616) 
5.9110*** 
(6.5582) 
6.9264*** 
(3.7762) 
2.1159** 
(2.0214) 
-0.0078 
(-1.1403) 
-0.0195 
(-0.7618) 
0.0127 
(0.6453) 
α2 
-0.1041 
(-1.2173) 
0.4790*** 
(3.4702) 
0.0492 
(0.3048) 
-0.0882 
(-0.8451) 
0.4516*** 
(3.4224) 
0.0903 
(0.5097) 
0.7168*** 
(9.4628) 
0.7923*** 
(9.4858) 
0.8508*** 
(9.0277) 
SENTt 
-0.0138 
(-1.0689) 
-0.0138 
(-0.4697) 
0.0154 
(0.9225) 
-0.0174 
(-0.9867) 
-0.0274 
(-0.6848) 
0.0600* 
(1.9414) 
0.0005 
(1.0786) 
0.0006 
(0.6674) 
-0.0010 
(-1.0947) 
SENTt-1 
-0.0057 
(-0.5075) 
-0.0120 
(-0.3070) 
0.0834*** 
(2.6434) 
-0.0105 
(-0.6233) 
-0.0093 
(-0.1674) 
0.1158** 
(2.0186) 
-0.0004 
(-1.0212) 
0.0003 
(0.2686) 
0.0008 
(0.8059) 
SENT
P
 t 
-0.5406 
(-1.3899) 
0.0247 
(0.0409) 
-0.2887 
(-0.6407) 
-0.6715 
(-1.2843) 
0.2229 
(0.2151) 
-0.5522 
(-0.7526) 
0.0117 
(1.0579) 
0.0023 
(0.1122) 
0.0008 
(0.0344) 
SENT
P
 t-1 
-0.6012* 
(-1.8108) 
-1.9030** 
(-2.9235) 
-0.3833 
(-0.8794) 
-0.7939* 
(-1.7765) 
-3.0201*** 
(-2.7698) 
-0.4718 
(-0.6643) 
-0.0059 
(-0.6713) 
-0.0020 
(-0.0718) 
-0.0131 
(-0.7423) 
F1 - - - - - 0.6741 - - - 
F2 3.1796* 8.8649*** 1.0668 3.0106* 7.8409*** 0.6263 0.378 0.0068 0.5817 
F3 3.1573* 3.5615* 0.018 
F4 3.8203* 3.7658* 0.1288 
F5 0.1562 0.1469 0.1323 
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Table 6.12: Monthly regression herding on investor sentiment indexes under market sentiment conditions 
Table 6.12 reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
     
    
     
    
           
    
       
 
          
    
       
  
         
        
              
          
 
          
          
  
           
Variable definitions: 
H= CSAD, CSSD or DHSH; so, CSADop is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK open-ended funds; CSSDop is Cross Section Standard Deviation of UK open-ended funds; HSHop is the herding measure 
generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK open-ended funds; DHSHop is the first order of HSHop; CSADcl is Cross Section Absolute Deviation of UK closed-end funds; CSSDcl is Cross 
Section Standard Deviation of UK closed0end funds; HSHcl is the herding measure generated by Hwang and Salmon (2004) approach from UK closed-end funds.SENT: UK market sentiment;  
SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. t-statistics are given in parentheses.     when                    and zero otherwise;      when                    and zero otherwise.F1 is f-statistic of null hypothesis of 
     , F2 is f-statistic of null hypothesis of          F3 is f-statistic of null hypothesis of   
    
   
   , where   
    
 is    when                   and   
    is    when                  .   F4 is f-statistic of null 
hypothesis of    
    
   
   , where   
    
 is    when                   and   
    is    when                  .     F5 is f-statistic of null hypothesis of    
    
   
   , where   
    
 is    when                   and   
    is 
   when                  . .     F6 is f-statistic of null hypothesis of    
    
   
   , where   
    
 is    when                    and   
    is    when                   .      is UK market investor sentiment index; 
      is UK institutional investor sentiment.  
 
The model is estimated by using OLS with Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance. The data cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
Open-ended Funds Closed-end Funds 
 
CSADop CSSDop DHSHop CSADcl CSSDcl HSHcl 
 
High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low 
α1 
2.3608*** 
(7.6108) 
1.4832*** 
(4.6517) 
3.0202*** 
(6.4995) 
1.7931*** 
(4.0374) 
0.0081 
(0.6312) 
-0.0088 
(-1.5455) 
2.7955*** 
(4.4019) 
3.2871*** 
(3.4867) 
3.7658*** 
(4.0902) 
4.1168*** 
(2.9383) 
-0.0037 
(-0.2941) 
-0.0073 
(-1.0131 
α2 
0.0037 
(0.0291) 
0.2740* 
(1.9253) 
0.0793 
(0.4859) 
0.3162 
(2.0225) 
-0.1553 
(-1.4916) 
-0.0553 
(-0.6508) 
0.5180*** 
(3.9309) 
0.2055 
(1.0217) 
0.5290*** 
(4.6702) 
0.2686 
(1.2969) 
0.8648*** 
(16.1533) 
0.5764*** 
(7.0828) 
SENTt 
-0.0152 
(-1.3374) 
-0.0136 
(-0.8642) 
-0.0191 
(-1.3848) 
-0.0154 
(-0.8571) 
0.0005 
(0.9220) 
0.0007 
(1.5828) 
-0.0051 
(-0.2633) 
-0.0391* 
(-1.9649) 
-0.0009 
(-0.0339) 
-0.0495** 
(-2.0062) 
0.0001 
(0.1627) 
0.0001 
(0.1824) 
SENTt-1 
0.0088 
(0.8184) 
0.0014 
(0.1160) 
0.0098 
(0.7144) 
0.0028 
(0.1833) 
-0.0009** 
(-2.5315) 
-0.0006 
(-1.6222) 
-0.0003 
(-0.0146) 
0.0255 
(1.4464) 
-0.0032 
(-0.1162) 
0.0362 
(1.3054) 
-0.0002 
(-0.5090) 
0.0003 
(0.5597) 
SENT
P
 t 
-0.6878*** 
(-3.9490) 
-0.3659 
(-1.2918) 
-0.7844*** 
(-3.0385) 
-0.3982 
(-1.1905) 
0.0147 
(1.3258) 
0.0084 
(1.1544) 
-0.6559* 
(-1.7213) 
-0.2406 
(-0.4967) 
-1.1047* 
(-1.8486) 
-0.1608 
(-0.2224) 
0.0187* 
(1.6683) 
0.0062 
(0.4555) 
SENT
P
 t-1 
-0.1105 
(-0.7697) 
-0.0267 
(-0.1175) 
-0.2589 
(-1.1077) 
-0.0899 
(-0.3333) 
-0.0147 
(-1.2743) 
-0.0018 
(-0.2608) 
-0.3906 
(-1.0184) 
-0.6933* 
(-1.9743) 
-0.3179 
(-0.5209) 
-1.0110** 
(-1.9989) 
-0.0100 
(-0.7936) 
-0.0098 
(-1.0969) 
F1 14.8360*** 1.4368 9.0338*** 1.2265 - 1.0530 2.9228* 0.1709 3.3906* 0.0237 2.7760* 0.1823 
F2 - - - - 1.4456 - 1.0123 4.0141** 0.2585 4.0851** 0.6049 1.2078 
F3 4.1607** 4.4886** - 0.2097 0.0457 - 
F4 0.9211 0.8022 - 0.4453 0.9548 0.5314 
F5 - - - 1.5335 1.7392 - 
F6 - - 0.2375 - - - 
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6.3    Conclusion 
In this chapter, the interest of research is the relationship between institutional herding and 
investor sentiment, particularly, the effects of investor sentiment on institutional herding. 
The analysis examines herding measure which is defined as return herding (represented by 
CSAD and CSSD) and beta herding, HSH, against domestic,     and      , and 
foreign investor sentiment measures, AAII and II. This process is conducted by using UK 
open-ended funds and closed-end funds as test samples and exploring how sentiment of 
different groups of investors influences institutional investor herd behaviour.  Weekly and 
monthly data are used to examine sentiment effects on herding in different frequency data. 
The similar estimation results from different frequency data demonstrate the consistence of 
sentiment effect on herding behaviour. Estimation differences, however, suggests that 
factors which influence institutional herding vary in different investment intervals.  
 
The investor sentiment effect on institutional herding is firstly investigated by using 
weekly data. Regressions reveal that investor sentiment, in general, contributes to 
institutional investor herd behaviour, more especially, institutional sentiment has an 
important role in herding. When considering foreign investor sentiment (represented by 
US investor sentiment) in the analysis, it shows that US investor sentiment also has 
significant influence on the UK institutional herding. However, the significance of foreign 
sentiment effect is to a greater level in open-ended funds than that in closed-end funds. 
This difference demonstrates that managers of open-ended funds are more likely to be 
affected by a wider range of investor sentiment because investor flows cause liquidity-
motivated trading of open-ended funds.  
 
The impact on UK institutional herding from different groups of investors is also examined 
in the different stages of financial crisis. Both market and institutional sentiment have 
some impact on institutional herding in normal times. Market sentiment tends to have a 
reverse effect on herding, i.e. one week’s effect is reversed in the following week (or 
weeks).   
 
In pre-crisis periods, only market sentiment has explanatory power to the institutional 
herding. However, institutional sentiment also plays a role in open-ended funds’ return 
herd behaviour. During financial crisis periods, both market and institutional sentiment 
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have a delayed effect on institutional herding. However, the beta dispersion measure 
shows that institutional herding in financial crisis periods has no relation to investor 
sentiment. This may suggest that the bias of fund managers’ risk-return relation is caused 
by other factors rather than investor sentiment.  
 
The investor sentiment effect on institutional herding is examined under different market 
sentiment condition. There is an asymmetric sentiment effect on return herding, but 
sentiment effect on beta herding is symmetric under high- or low-market-sentiment 
conditions.  
 
The examination using monthly data confirms that both UK and US investor sentiment 
have an impact on UK institutional herding suggested by weekly analysis. However, the 
UK market sentiment is not significant in the monthly estimation which may because of 
the reverse effect in the weekly data. The market sentiment effect on herding in one week 
is reversed in the following week (weeks), suggesting that the sentiment effect in the short 
run is eliminated in the long-run. The estimated coefficients also indicate that institutional 
sentiment influence is more significant in the short investment interval (weekly) than that 
in the long investment interval (monthly). However, this is not always the case when 
herding is measured by the dispersion of CAPM betas, which suggest that the institutional 
sentiment and individual sentiment may have the same degree of impact on beta herding in 
the monthly interval.      
 
Estimates of monthly data by examining sentiment effect on herding in different stages of 
financial crisis display some differences to those of weekly data. The effect of market 
sentiment on return herding is not significant in monthly estimations during normal time 
and pre-crisis period. The elimination of market sentiment effect in estimations of monthly 
data can be interpreted as the result of the reverse effect in the short run. During financial 
crisis, return herding of open-ended funds is unlikely to be affected by investor sentiment 
in monthly data. This further suggests that investor sentiment effect on herding is in a short 
term rather than a long term. Beta herding estimations of open-ended funds demonstrate 
that only institutional sentiment has an impact to herding during normal time in the weekly 
data but both market and institutional sentiment have impact in the monthly data, 
suggesting that managers of open-ended funds are more likely influenced by market 
sentiment in a long run.  
 
 232 
 
The estimated coefficients demonstrate that institutional sentiment has significant effect on 
institutional herding in terms of return and beta in the high sentiment market, but investor 
sentiment generally has no effect on institutional herding when market wide sentiment is 
low in the monthly estimation. Tests of asymmetric effect of investor sentiment under 
high- and low-sentiment market suggest that it is symmetric. This is different from the 
estimated results from weekly data which indicate that there is an asymmetric effect of 
investor sentiment on return herding, which, again, corresponds to what CH suggested: 
that investor sentiment effect on returns is in a short run.  
 
The contributions of the chapter are: firstly, it is the first attempt to examine the relation 
between investor sentiment and investor herding directly by using the measures generated 
in previous studies; secondly, a comprehensive study of herding source of UK open-ended 
and closed-end funds is conducted in the chapter and the similarities and differences of the 
investor sentiment effects are revealed; finally, the study also investigates the sentiment 
effect on institutional herding under different market conditions, and finds that different 
measures of institutional herding can lead to quite different results.       
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Chapter 7    Conclusion and Future Work 
Recent studies shed important light on a range of issues regarding investor sentiment and 
behaviour: the impact that investor sentiment has on asset prices; how sentiment of 
different groups of investors influence asset pricing; how far investor sentiment is 
contagious across borders; how institutional investors herd in the market; and whether 
institutional herding is caused by investor sentiment.  
 
The content in this thesis is a further step in analysing investor sentiment as well as 
investor herd behaviour and focuses on the UK financial market. Section 7.1 is a summary 
and the key findings of the study. Section 7.2 points out the limitations of the thesis and 
proposes the directions for future research.     
7.1    Summary and the key findings 
The objectives of this thesis are threefold.  First, using weekly and monthly financial data, 
the impact of investor sentiment in UK financial markets in different investment intervals 
is investigated. This is conducted by constructing measures of sentiment for the UK 
investors and examining how far sentiment in one country (focussing on the UK) is caused 
by sentiment in the others (the US and Germany), or vice-versa. The impact of investor 
sentiment in the UK, US and Germany on UK asset returns is further studied, including 
distinguishing between ‘tranquil’ market periods and periods of financial crisis. Three key 
results are found: i) UK sentiment is Granger-caused by US individual and institutional 
sentiment but not the reverse; ii) when US and UK sentiment are included in the same 
regression, UK equity returns are significantly influenced by US individual and 
institutional sentiment and hardly at all by local UK investor sentiment. In other words, 
our results suggest that UK investor sentiment is “made in the USA”. iii) The sentiment 
contagion across borders is more pronounced in the shorter investment interval (i.e. 
weekly interval). 
 
Second, the thesis investigates herd behaviour, particularly institutional herding by 
studying UK mutual fund data. The investigation is conducted by examining return 
dispersions of UK mutual funds in daily, weekly and monthly intervals. Two categories of 
mutual funds (UK open-ended and UK closed-end) are collected for the investigation of 
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institutional herding behaviour. UK open-end funds concentrate on UK equity focused 
funds, and closed-end funds are not limited by asset allocation.  
 
Return dispersion methods proposed by CH and CCK are used to detect herding behaviour 
of UK institutional investors. Little evidence of herding in return dispersion measures is 
found, i.e. a lower level return dispersion during market stress time or a trend of reducing 
dispersion among increasing market return has not been found. This is consistent for both 
open-ended and closed-end funds. However, when market stress period is defined as 
financial crisis in CH method, return herding is found in the daily and weekly investment 
intervals during the pre-crisis period.  
 
Beta dispersion method introduced by HS is also utilised in the study. It suggests that herd 
behaviour is more likely to be persistent and to affect CAPM betas of portfolios. Strong 
evidence of herding among fund managers in CAPM beta is found, and this is consistent in 
both open-ended and closed-end funds. The study also demonstrates that beta herding is 
not caused by market fundamental and macroeconomic factors, instead, it perhaps arises 
from investor sentiment.  
 
Finally, the causal relation between institutional herding and investor sentiment is explored. 
This is conducted by directly examining the measures of institutional herding against the 
measures of investor sentiment in UK and US.  The key results that have been found in 
this part of study are: i) investigations of both return herding and beta herding suggest that 
UK institutional herding is generally influenced by investor sentiment. When taking US 
investor sentiment into account, the investigation shows that US investor sentiment also 
has significant influence on the UK institutional herding. ii) Sentiment of different groups 
of investors affect institutional herding in a different degree and it depends on the forms of 
the fund particular in weekly investment interval. Open-end fund managers are more likely 
to be affected by individual investor sentiment, whereas closed-end fund managers herd on 
institutional sentiment. iii) The investigation of sentiment effect on UK institutional 
herding in different stages of financial crisis suggests investor sentiment has a significant 
effect on return herding behaviour in all stages of financial crisis, but has no significant 
effect on beta herding during financial crisis in the weekly interval.         
 
The main contribution of this thesis is that practical investor sentiment indices are 
constructed to measure UK market wide investor sentiment and UK institutional investor. 
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Prior literature and available sentiment indices focus on the United States: very few 
sentiment indices have been constructed for UK investor sentiment. The only two, to the 
author’s knowledge, are an annual market-wide index by Baker et al (2012), and a weekly 
market-wide index by Bai (2014) based on the Baker and Wurgler (2006) approach.The 
UK market wide investor sentiment composed in this study, although not the first, it is a 
more comprehensive one. Combining the approaches of Brown and Cliff (2004) and Baker 
and Wurger (2006), the index is constructed by including a wider range of investor 
sentiment proxies and at both weekly and monthly frequencies.  Moreover, the UK 
institutional sentiment index is one of the very few composed indices which measure 
institutional investor sentiment and it is the first such for the UK.  
 
The second contribution of the thesis is that the composed UK investor sentiment measures 
are examined against the US, German investor sentiment measures and it reveals that the 
UK investor sentiment is heavily influenced by US and German investor sentiment. US 
individual and institutional sentiment, and German sentiment all have the power to predict 
UK market sentiment, and US institutional sentiment has a greater effect on UK market 
sentiment than US individual sentiment has. UK institutional sentiment, on the other hand 
co-moves with the US investor sentiment, and it is also affected by German investor 
sentiment.  
 
The third contribution of this thesis is the investigation of the impact of investor sentiment 
on asset returns with size effect. Specifically, we examine the sentiment impact across 
different financial crisis stages, which demonstrate that price bubble, to some degree, is 
caused by investor sentiment, and financial crisis is normally a process of price reversal 
back to the fundamental. Moreover, the impact of foreign investor sentiment on UK equity 
returns is studied, as a large proportion of UK equities are held by foreign investors, and 
we find that UK equity returns are influenced heavily by US individual and institutional 
sentiment and hardly at all by local investor sentiment.   
 
The fourth contribution of the thesis is the attempt to examine institutional herding on a 
cross-section basis. The previous studies of institutional herding focus on examining 
whether the individual stock has been bought or sold by a number of financial institutions 
at the same time. The methods developed by CH, CCK and HS are applied for the first 
time to study institutional herding. CH and CCK approaches are used to examine herding 
behaviour of portfolio returns and HS approach investigates herding behaviour of portfolio 
 236 
 
betas. The study also examines two different groups of UK mutual funds, open-ended and 
closed-end fund, for institutional herding behaviour, which is the first attempt of 
comparing herding behaviour of these two categories funds.          
 
The fifth contribution of the thesis is to explore the relation between investor sentiment 
and investor herding by directly examining the measures of institutional herding along 
with investor sentiment measures. This is the first attempt to examine the causal relation of 
investor sentiment to institutional herding by building models which use sentiment 
measures as explanatory variables.    
7.2    Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
A number of limitations in this study and a future research area as follow. 
 
The first limitation of the thesis perhaps involves the component sentiment variables that 
are used for constructing UK sentiment indexes. Eight sentiment indicators were used in 
the study, but this did not include variables such as the number of IPOs and the first day 
return of IPOs which are used in the Baker & Wurgler (2006) approach. These are not very 
suitable weekly frequency data. The absence of direct survey data on investor sentiment in 
UK financial markets leads to the difficulty of checking the validity of the constructed 
indexes.  This provides one of the future research areas that identify further sentiment 
indicators which are suitable for weekly or even higher frequencies to construct better 
measures for investor sentiment. 
 
The second limitation of the thesis relates to the methodology of detecting herd behaviour 
in the market. In the study, institutional herding was investigated by utilizing Christie and 
Huang (1995), Chang, Cheng, and Khorana (2000), and Hwang & Salmon (2004) methods. 
The former two approaches reveal the herd behaviour by examining the relation between 
return dispersion and market returns and the latter is to discover herding by examining 
CAPM Beta dispersion. As discussed in the study, each of the methods has its drawbacks. 
Although, alternative methods are introduced to overcome them, there still more could be 
done. For example, to define a better criterion for market stress in Christie and Huang 
(1995) approach. Moreover, in contrast to Hwang & Salmon (2004)’s CAPM Beta bias, 
Jensen’s Alpha (Jensen, 1967) of mutual funds may also reveal the fund managers herd 
behaviour. 
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The third limitation of the thesis relates to the number of UK open-end mutual funds used 
for studying institutional herd behaviour. Research on a mature market usually prefers a 
much larger sample of data; however, it is difficult to expand the data without shortening 
the examination time period. Since the methods of studying institutional herding are time-
series analysis, sacrifice on the number of sample funds is better than length of sample 
period. This, on the other hand provides another possible empirical study opportunity. 
Investment funds include hedge fund, mutual funds, and pension funds. UK mutual funds 
are studied in the thesis as a sample of institutional herding, but the investigation of herd 
behaviour on UK hedge funds and pension funds is still absent. Therefore, a study of other 
classes of UK investment fund can be further research to prove institutional herd behaviour.       
 
Moreover, this thesis focuses on sentiment effects on UK equity pricing. The reverse 
relation is already hinted in some tests in the thesis. This research may be able to shed light 
on how investor sentiment is contagious across borders. The study suggests that US 
investor sentiment has a significant effect on UK equity returns, and the UK investor 
sentiment that affects return, is in fact “Made in USA”. Will this actually transfer through 
to the return of asset, as the US investors hold a significant proportion of the UK equities?  
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Appendix 1: List of UK Open-ended Funds 
ABERDEEN UK MID CAP A INC. L&G.UK INDEX RET.DIS. 
AEGON UK EQUITY A GBP L&G.N UK GROWTH AC. 
ALLIANZ RCM UK GROWTH LEGG MASON UK EQUITY A 
ALLIANZ RCM UK MID CAP LIONTRUST UK GROWTH 
ALLIANZ RCM UK INDEX A ACCUMULATION LIONTRUST TOP 100 R 
ARTEMIS UK SPECIAL SITUATIONS M&G UK GROWTH A AC. 
AEGON ETHICAL EQUITY A M&G UK SELECT A INC GBP 
AXA FRAMLINGTON UK SELECT OPPS.INC M&G SECS.UK.GW.INC. 
AXA FRAM.UK GW.INC. M&G SECS.REC.FD.AC. 
BAILLIE GIFF UK EQUITY ALPHA C INC. M &.G RECOVERY A INC. 
BAILLIE GIFF UK EQUITY ALPHA B INC. MARKS & SPENCER UK SEL. PTF INC. 
BAILLIE GIFF UK EQUITY ALPHA A INC. MARKS &.SPEN.UK 100 COS. AC. 
BARING UK GROWTH NEWTON INCOME SIS 
BLACKROCK UK EQUITY INC. OLD MUT.UK SLT.EQ.INC. 
BLACKROCK UK SPECIAL SITUATIONS INC. PREMIER UK ALPHA GROWTH R INC. 
BLACKROCK UK INC. PREMIER ETHICAL R INC. 
CAZENOVE UK OPPS.A AC. PREMIER UK MID 250 RET 
CF CANLIFE GW. PRU.UK GROWTH A INC. 
CIS UK GROWTH RATHBONE RECOVERY INC. 
CIS.SUSTAINABLE LEADERS TRUST RYL.BK.SCTL.GW.FD. 
ECCLESIASTICAL AMITY UK A RELIANCE BRITISH LIFE 
ECCLESIASTICAL AMITY C RENSBURG UK BLCHP.GW. TRUST 
F&C UK ALPHA SC1 AC. ROYAL LONDON UK GROWTH A 
F&C STEWARDSHIP GROWTH SC1 INC SANTANDER UK GROWTH INC. 
FAMILY CHARITIES ETHICAL INC. SANTANDER N &.P UK GW. 
FAMILY ASSET SCHRODER UK EQUITY A INC. 
FIDELITY SPECIAL SITUATIONS AC. SCOT.MUT.UK EQUITY INC. 
HSBC FTSE 100 IDX.RET.INC. SCWID.UK SLT.GW.CL.A AC. 
HSBC FTSE 100 INDEX AC. RETAIL SCWID.UK SLT.GW.RET.C AC. 
IGNIS BALANCED GROWTH INC. SCWID.UK GW.A 
INVESCO PERP.CHILDREN'S SCWID.UK TRKR.RET.A INC. 
INVESCO PERP.UK GW.INC. 
STANDARD LIFE TM.UK EQ. GENERAL 
INC. 
INVESTEC UK SPECIAL SITUATIONS A INC. 
SMITH & WILLIAMSON UK EQUITY 
GROWTH 
INVESTEC UK ALP.A NET AC. SJP UK & GENERAL PROGRESSIVE INC. 
INVESTEC UK SM.COS.A NET ACC SWIP UK OPPORTUNITIES A 
JPM PREMIER EQUITY GROWTH A ACC THORNHILL CAPITAL 
JUPITER UK GROWTH INC. THREADNEEDLE UK INSTL.2 
L&G.BCLYS 500 DIST. THREADNEEDLE UK SLT.1 
L&G.EQUITY E AC. THREADNEEDLE UK GW.& INC.1 
L&G.EQUITY E DIS. THREADNEEDLE UK OVERSEAS EARNS.2 
L&G.UK ACTIVE OPPS.E DIS. TU BRITISH 
L&G.UK 100 INDEX E AC. VIRGIN UK INDEX TRACKING 
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Appendix 2: List of UK Closed-end Funds 
3I GROUP GRAPHITE ENTERPRISE TST.  
ABDN.SMCOS.HI.INC.TST. GRESHAM HOUSE  
ABERDEEN ASIAN SMCOS.  HANSA TRUST  
ABERDEEN NEW DAWN IT.  HANSA TRUST 'A'  
ABERDEEN NEW THAI  HEND.EUROTR.ORD.  
ABERFORTH SMCOS.  HENDERSON ASIAN GW.TST.  
ALBANY INV.TRUST  HENDERSON EUR.FOCUS TST.  
ALLIANCE TRUST  HENDERSON FAR EAST INC.  
BAILLIE GIFF.JAPAN  HENDERSON FLEDGLING TST.  
BAILLIE GIFF.SHIN NIPPON  HENDERSON GLB.TST.  
BANKERS INV.TRUST  HENDERSON OPPS.TRUST  
BARONSMEAD VCT  HENDERSON PRIV.EQ.IT.  
BLACKROCK LNAMER.IT.  HENDERSON SMALLER COS.  
BLACKROCK SMCOS.TST.  HERALD INV.TST.  
BLACKROCK WORLD MNG.  HG CAPITAL TRUST  
BRITISH & AMERICAN IT.  INTL.BIOTECHNOLOGY  
BRITISH ASSETS  INVESCO ASIA TRUST  
BRITISH EMPIRE SECS.  INVESCO PERP.UK SMCOS.  
BRUNNER INV.TST.  JPMORGAN AMERICAN IT.  
CANDOVER INVS.  JPMORGAN CHINESE  
CAPITAL GEARING TST.  JPMORGAN CLAVERHOUSE  
CAYENNE TRUST  JPMORGAN EMRG.MKTS.  
CITY NATRES.HI.YLD.TST.  JPMORGAN EUR.SMALL CO.  
CITY OF LONDON IT.  JPMORGAN EUROPEAN IT.  
DUNEDIN ENTERPRISE  JPMORGAN INDIAN IT.  
DUNEDIN INC.GROWTH  JPMORGAN JAP.SMCOS.TST.  
DUNEDIN SMALLER COS.  JPMORGAN JAPANESE  
EASTERN EUROPEAN TRUST  JPMORGAN MID CAP IT.  
EDINBURGH DRAGON TST.  JPMORGAN OVERSEAS IT.  
EDINBURGH INV.TRUST  JPMORGAN SMALLER COS.  
EDINBURGH UK TRACKER  JPMORGAN US SMALLER COS.  
ELECTRA PRIVATE EQUITY  JUPITER PRIMADONA GROWTH  
EUROPEAN ASSETS TST.  KEYSTONE IT.  
F&C CAPITAL & INCOME  LAW DEBENTURE  
F&C GLOBAL SMALLER COS.  LLOYDS SMCOS.CAPITAL DELISTED  
F&C US.SMALLER COS.  LONDON & ST.LAWRENCE  
FIDELITY EUR.VALUES  LOWLAND INV.  
FIDELITY JAPANESE VALUES  MAJEDIE INVS.  
FIDELITY SPC.VALUES  MARTIN CURRIE PACIFIC  
FINSBURY GW.& INC.TST.  MERCANTILE IT.  
FOREIGN & COLONIAL  MERCHANTS TRUST  
GENESIS EMRG.MKTS.  MID WYND INTL.IT.  
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List of UK Closed-end Funds (continue) 
MITHRAS INV.TST.  WITAN INV.TRUST  
MONKS INV.TRUST  WITAN PACIFIC IT.  
MONTANARO EUR.SMCOS.TST  WORLD TRUST FUND  
MONTANARO UK SMCOS.IT.  WORLDWIDE HLTHCR.TST.  
MURRAY INCOME   
MURRAY INTL.   
MURRAY INTL.'B'   
NEW CITY HIGH YIELD FD.   
NEW INDIA IT.   
NORTH AMERICAN INC.TST.   
NORTH ATLANTIC SMCOS.   
NORTHERN INVESTORS CO.   
NORTHERN VENTURE TST.   
PACIFIC ASSETS   
PACIFIC HORIZON   
PANTHEON INTL.PARTS.   
PERSONAL ASSETS   
RCM TECHNOLOGY TRUST   
RIGHTS & ISSUES CAP.   
RIT CAPITAL PARTNERS   
SCHRODER ASIA PAC.FD.   
SCHRODER INCOME GW.FD.   
SCHRODER JAPAN GW.FD.   
SCHRODER UK GROWTH FD.   
SCHRODER UK MID CAP.FD.   
SCOTTISH AMERICAN   
SCOTTISH INV.TST.   
SCOTTISH MORTGAGE   
SCOTTISH ORIENTAL SMCOS.   
SHIRES INCOME   
STANDARD LIFE UK SM.COS.   
STD.LIFE EQUITY INC.TST.   
SVM GLOBAL FUND   
TEMPLE BAR   
TEMPLETON EMRG.MKTS.IT.   
THE EUROPEAN IT.   
THROGMORTON TRUST   
TR EUROPEAN GROWTH   
TR PROPERTY INV.   
TROY INCOME & GW.TST.   
UK SELECT TRUST   
VALUE AND INC.TST.   
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Appendix 3 Results for regressions without 
contemporaneous variables 
 
Table A1: Weekly regressions of returns on sentiment proxies 
Table A1 shows the results of estimating equations of the following form: 
                     
 
   
             
 
   
            
 
   
            
 
   
            
 
   
            
 
   
             
 
   
             
 
   
    
          
As there is some evidence of autocorrelation, the estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard 
errors. 
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock 
portfolio;  Rsmall: return on small-size stock portfolio;  AVDC: Advances to declines ratio;  CEFD: Closed-
end Fund Discount;  MFI: Money Flow Index;  PCV: Put-call volume ratio;  PCO: Put-call open interest 
ratio;  RSI: Relative Strength Index;  VOLA: Realized volatility;  DVRA: first difference of Trading volume. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% 
level. 
 
  
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
AVDCt-1 -0.5128** -2.2193 -0.1572 -0.7172 0.7900*** 4.6034 
AVDCt-2 -0.0645 -0.3071 0.0284 0.1086 0.3942* 1.8778 
CEFDt-1 0.1245 0.5640 0.5084** 2.3354 0.4485*** 3.1522 
CEFDt-2 -0.0881 -0.4160 -0.3455** -1.7865 -0.2630** -2.0019 
MFIt-1 0.0025 0.4101 0.0047 0.7163 0.0106* 1.8744 
MFIt-2 -0.0057 -0.8975 -0.0032 -0.4970 -0.0055 -1.0795 
PCVt-1 -0.1799 -0.8118 0.0862 0.4679 0.2177 1.5059 
PCVt-2 0.1677 0.8137 -0.0387 -0.2300 0.0130 0.0970 
PCOt-1 2.4341 1.3562 1.7221 1.1018 1.4706 1.1632 
PCOt-2 -2.2657 -1.2815 -2.3377 -1.5175 -2.4847** -2.0485 
RSIt-1 0.0026 0.5744 0.0055 1.1527 0.0057 1.4528 
RSIt-2 -0.0002 -0.0385 -0.0014 -0.2893 -0.0007 -0.1823 
VOLAt-1 -0.7398 -1.4502 -1.0458** -2.3020 -0.7660** -2.5083 
VOLAt-2 0.6791 1.5732 0.5088 1.5378 0.1476 0.5559 
DVARt-1 -0.7779 -0.5026 -1.3572 -0.8130 -0.7044 -0.4815 
DVARt-2 3.2671** 2.1243 5.0027*** 3.3418 3.8999*** 3.1153 
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Table A2: Regression of weekly returns on UK sentiment indexes 
Table A2  reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
                       
 
              
 
              
  
          
The data are weekly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. Exceptionally the SENTIX index is available only from 
28
th
 February 2001. The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard errors.   
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on small-
size stock portfolio;  SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. 
  : the Adjusted R-squared; S.E:Standard Error of regression; AIC: Akaike information criterion;  LM: Breusch/Godfrey LM test for 
residual autocorrelation; ARCH: ARCH test for Heteroskadasticity.  
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
α0 
0.0273 
(0.09140) 
0.0603 
(0.1922) 
0.0605 
(0.1929) 
-0.0658 
(-0.2219) 
-0.0472 
(-0.1645) 
Rt-1 
-0.0938* 
(-1.7124) 
0.0365 
(0.7075) 
0.0360 
(0.7032) 
0.2790*** 
(5.9043) 
 0.2769*** 
(5.7893) 
Rt-2 
-0.0168 
(-0.2707) 
0.0218 
(0.3814) 
0.0171 
(0.3400) 
0.0731 
(1.5792) 
0.0677 
(1.5273) 
Rt-3 
0.0032 
(0.0413) 
0.0566 
(0.9956) 
0.0580 
(1.1439) 
0.1104 
(1.2980) 
0.1018 
(1.3619) 
Rt-4 
-0.0885 
(-1.5683) 
-0.0213 
(-0.4127) 
 -0.0792 
(-1.4919) 
-0.0674 
(-1.4806) 
SENTt-1 
0.0022 
(0.2307) 
0.0029 
(0.3406) 
0.0049 
(1.1954) 
0.0026 
(0.4366) 
0.0044 
(1.1889) 
SENTt-2 -0.0004 
(-0.0408) 
0.0021 
(0.1855) 
 -0.0013 
(-0.1403) 
 
SENTt-3 0.0070 
(0.6198) 
0.0059 
(0.6162) 
 0.0050 
(0.6214) 
 
SENTt-4 -0.0073 
(-0.9557) 
-0.0062 
(-0.9540) 
 -0.0013 
(-0.2416) 
 
SENT
P
 t-1 
-0.2460 
(-0.5324) 
0.0985 
(0.2770) 
 0.0744 
(0.2311) 
0.2070 
(0.8391) 
 0.2219 
(0.9578) 
SENT
P
 t-2 
0.0027 
(0.0081) 
-0.4867* 
(-1.7376) 
-0.4955* 
(-1.8317) 
-0.4248* 
(-1.9193) 
-0.3824** 
(-2.0519) 
SENT
P
 t-3 
0.1968 
(0.5871) 
0.2524 
(0.8894) 
0.2288 
(0.8271) 
0.0858 
(0.3709) 
 
SENT
P
 t-4 
0.0072 
(0.0254) 
-0.0396 
(-0.1181) 
 -0.0389 
(-01744) 
 
Adj. R
2 
0.0005 -0.0007 0.0048 0.1183  0.131 
S.E. 2.4780 2.4693 2.4597 2.0053  1.9974 
AIC 4.6688 4.6618 4.6478 4.2455  4.2315 
LM 1.1575 1.7244*** 1.5832*** 1.5101***  1.4137** 
ARCH 51.8061*** 48.5615*** 48.3342*** 25.8196*** 27.3964*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 243 
 
Table A3: Regression of returns on weekly UK & US sentiment indexes 
Table A3  reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
                       
 
              
 
              
  
              
 
            
 
         
The data are weekly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West 
standard errors. 
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on small-
size stock portfolio;  SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. 
  : the Adjusted R-squared; S.E:Standard Error of regression; AIC: Akaike information criterion;  LM: Breusch/Godfrey LM test for 
residual autocorrelation; ARCH: ARCH test for Heteroskadasticity. ***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 
5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
α0 -0.1313 -0.4344 -0.0622 -0.1943 -0.1370 -0.4611 
Rt-1 -0.1587*** -3.1344 -0.0154 -0.3198 0.2303*** 5.1540 
Rt-2 -0.0723 -1.1046 -0.0076 -0.1287 0.0707 1.5135 
Rt-3 -0.0486 -0.6265 0.0374 0.6835 0.1118 1.3649 
Rt-4 -0.1129** -2.0468 -0.0296 -0.5483 -0.0716 -1.3838 
SENTt-1 0.0003 0.0350 0.0016 0.1822 0.0012 0.2132 
SENTt-2 -0.0004 -0.0332 -0.0010 -0.0909 -0.0037 -0.4082 
SENTt-3 0.0085 0.7104 0.0077 0.8022 0.0053 0.6691 
SENTt-4 -0.0056 -0.7144 -0.0050 -0.7505 0.0005 0.0914 
SENT
P
 t-1 -0.2989 -0.6787 0.0083 0.0245 0.1365 0.5785 
SENT
P
 t-2 0.0084 0.0264 -0.5065* -1.8643 -0.4563** -2.0987 
SENT
P
 t-3 0.3191 0.9480 0.3721 1.2420 0.2077 0.8564 
SENT
P
 t-4 0.0699 0.2352 -0.0557 -0.1565 -0.0362 -0.1529 
AAIIt-1 -0.8791 -1.4932 -0.9904 -1.4139 -0.4446 -0.7581 
AAIIt-2 0.3071 0.3837 -0.2293 -0.2975 -0.7431 -1.1547 
AAIIt-3 0.6143 0.8172 1.3625* 1.6674 1.3828* 1.9182 
AAIIt-4 -0.2390 -0.3149 -0.4762 -0.6216 -0.1655 -0.2687 
IIt-1 10.6719*** 3.9132 12.0170*** 4.6422 10.5272*** 4.7110 
IIt-2 -6.1435** -2.3152 -9.9050*** -3.0836 -9.4091*** -3.2411 
IIt-3 -0.5571 -0.1741 1.5109 0.4241 0.9251 0.3167 
IIt-4 -3.9995** -2.0150 -2.3299 -1.0471 -1.3488 -0.7246 
Adj. R
2 0.0382 0.0395 0.2414 
S.E. 2.4351 2.4245 1.8657 
AIC 4.6438 4.6351 4.1160 
LM 1.1509 1.8172*** 1.2199 
ARCH 42.1111*** 92.0202*** 16.5329*** 
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Table A4: Regression analysis of weekly UK sentiment measures on foreign 
sentiment indexes 
Table A4 reports the results of estimating equations of the general form:  
     
               
 
            
 
                
 
              
  
        
The data are weekly and cover the period 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. Exceptionally the SENTIX index is available only from 
28
th
 February 2001. The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard errors. 
Variable definitions: 
SENT
K
 = UK market sentiment (K=M), or institutional sentiment (K=P); AAII: American Association of Individual Investors index; II: 
American Investors Intelligence index; SENTIX: German equity sentiment index. t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level. 
 
Including European sentiment  
28/02/2001 - 30/06/2011 
Excluding European sentiment  
01/01/1996 - 30/06/2011 
 SENT SENTP SENT SENTP 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
AAIIt-1 
22.3316*** 
(5.7034) 
20.1818*** 
(6.5024) 
0.1824 
(1.5758) 
0.1704 
(1.4934) 
21.4844*** 
(6.7702) 
21.1721*** 
(6.7694) 
0.2147** 
(2.5187) 
0.2156** 
(2.5224) 
AAIIt-2 
-14.8494*** 
(-3.5003) 
–12.2305*** 
(-3.9048) 
0.0344 
(0.2910) 
0.0500 
(0.4351) 
-10.7766*** 
(-3.0242) 
–10.2876*** 
(-3.0434) 
-0.0166 
(-0.1934) 
-0.0007 
(-0.0086) 
AAIIt-3 
-3.9336 
(-1.1605) 
 -0.1885* 
(-1.6846) 
-0.1952* 
(-1.7807) 
-4.6311 
(-1.4261) 
-4.5919 
(-1.4742) 
-0.1439 
(-1.5979) 
-0.1407 
(-1.5667) 
AAIIt-4 
3.8522 
(1.0880) 
 0.1105 
(1.0428) 
0.0938 
(0.8911) 
0.0327 
(0.0102) 
 
0.1012 
(1.2387) 
0.0847 
(1.0562) 
IIt-1 70.5882*** 
(6.3106) 
68.3516*** 
(7.4807) 
0.4538 
(1.1469) 
0.4801 
(1.2194) 
67.3856*** 
(7.1436) 
67.2479*** 
(7.2519) 
0.4009 
(1.2773) 
0.4107 
(1.3070) 
IIt-2 -29.1462 
(-1.5968) 
–32.3656** 
(-2.1129) 
0.8786** 
(2.0117) 
0.8819** 
(2.0126) 
-34.6384** 
(-2.2185) 
–25.2721** 
(-2.43941) 
0.5164 
(1.4087) 
0.5306 
(1.4394) 
IIt-3 2.4374 
(0.1650) 
-7.8378 
(-0.6085) 
-0.7097 
(-1.5580) 
-0.9620*** 
(-2.9839) 
-6.7328 
(-0.5059) 
–5.6663 
(-0.4204) 
-0.3693 
(-1.9717) 
-0.6236** 
(-2.2141) 
IIt-4 -32.5058 
(-3.1949) 
–23.7306*** 
(-2.9904) 
-0.2697 
(-0.9365) 
 -17.9287** 
(-2.0906) 
–23.3995*** 
(-2.57098) 
-0.2530 
(-1.0811) 
 
SENTIXt-1 
2.4805 
(0.2349) 
 0.2973 
(1.2294) 
0.3044 
(1.2790) 
    
SENTIXt-2 
7.9972 
(0.7087) 
 -0.7796*** 
(-2.7572) 
–0.7585*** 
(-2.7693) 
    
SENTIXt-3 
0.9222 
(0.0848) 
 0.4053 
(1.4078) 
0.4434** 
(2.0010)   
  
SENTIXt-4 
-7.2663 
(-0.8307) 
 0.0775 
(0.3401) 
 
  
  
SENTt-1 0.8193*** 
(17.1549) 
0.8234*** 
(43.7837) 
  
0.8448*** 
(22.8091) 
0.825648*** 
(41.6942) 
  
SENTt-2 
0.0182 
(0.2556) 
   
0.0176 
(0.3199) 
   
SENTt-3 
-0.0096 
(-0.1493) 
   
-0.0276 
(-0.5357) 
   
SENTt-4 
-0.0442 
(-1.2285) 
   
-0.0271 
(-0.7757) 
   
SENT
P
t-1   0.3738*** 
(6.4087) 
0.3766*** 
(6.4375) 
  0.3249*** 
(6.4732) 
0.3268*** 
(6.4626) 
SENT
P
t-2   0.2328*** 
(4.8043) 
0.2297*** 
(4.8081) 
  0.2309*** 
(6.5864) 
0.2304*** 
(6.5528) 
SENT
P
t-3   0.1424*** 
(2.8967) 
0.1342*** 
(2.7421) 
  0.1260*** 
(3.7105) 
0.1251*** 
(3.6767) 
SENT
P
t-4   0.0865 
(1.5839) 
0.0895* 
(1.6850) 
  0.1568*** 
(3.6417) 
0.1524*** 
(3.5121) 
Adj. R
2 
0.8344 0.8059 0.6881 0.6877 0.8058 0.8060 0.6165 0.6165 
S.E. 10.9455 11.5380 0.3175 0.3163 11.5536 11.5412 0.3221 0.3220 
AIC 7.6564 7.7391 0.5763 0.5648 7.7480 7.7409 0.5879 0.5866 
LM test 1.5791*** 1.2045 0.4194 0.4739 1.3880** 1.1502 1.2320 1.2474 
ARCH 2.3827* 1.8583 2.4218* 2.4345* 1.8212 1.8448 10.7166*** 10.9044*** 
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Appendix 4  Methodology  
A4.1. Principal Components Analysis 
 
Principal components analysis expresses the variance-covariance structure in a set of data 
in such a way as to highlight their similarities and differences. This allows a specific 
number of time series that explain the most variation to be identified (Brown & Cliff, 
2004).  The orthogonal time series, extracted from the dataset, account for as much as 
possible of the (residual) variation. Principal components analysis has been employed to 
construct UK market sentiment and UK institutional sentiment index. 
 
According to Johnson & Wichern (1992), principal components are particular linear 
combinations of p random variables,   ,   , …,   : 
 
                         
                         
  
                         
 
The linear combinations have variance-covariance matrix,                
 , where 
  (  ,   , …,    ,    is the variance-covariance matrix of X,  
  (  ,   , …,    , and   is 
the     matrix.  
 
 The first principal component is the linear combination with maximum overall variance, 
and the least principal component has the smallest variance among all linear combinations. 
Assuming the first principal components,   , is the linear combination:   
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It is calculated so that it accounts for the greatest possible variance in the data set, i.e. 
maximizes           
       subject to   
      (where                   ), since 
        can be increased by multiplying any    by a constant.   
 
The second principal component is calculated such that maximizes           
        
subject to   
     (where                   ) and uncorrelated to the first principal 
component.  
 
This process continues until the last principal component is calculated, which suggests that 
the original variables are transformed to the principal components, since the sum of the 
variance of the entire principal components equal the sum of the variances of all of the 
variables. All principal components combined contain the same information as the original 
variables. However, the important information is partitioned over the components in terms 
of the components and orthogonal.   
 
This procedure is now a generally accepted method of constructing measures of investor 
sentiment, and has been used by Brown and Cliff (2004), Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007), 
Chen, Chong and Duan (2010), Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan (2012), Chen, Chong and She 
(2014) and Bai (2014) to construct sentiment indices by using investor sentiment proxies 
as the original variables.  
 
Transforming the original variables, sentiment proxies, to the principal components:   
     
where Y is the vector matrix of principal components, and   is the matrix of original 
variables, AVDC, CEFD, MFI, PCO PCV RSI VOLA and DVRA. The rows of matrix A 
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are the eigenvectors, the variance-covariance matrix of the original data. The elements of 
an eigenvector are the weights    , where            . The first principal component of 
various financial market indicators is likely to provide a reliable measure of unobserved 
investor sentiment as it accounts for the greatest possible variance in the data set by 
maximizing variance of the components.  
 
 
A4.2. Kalman Filter Method 
 
The Kalman Filter addresses the general problem of estimating the state vector of a linear 
dynamic system.  The Kalman Filter assumes that the signal and measurement process 
have the following structure:  
           
             
 
where   is the measurement data which is related to    ,    and    are white-noise.  
According to Morrison and Pike (1997), the Kalman Filter produces an estimate of   ,   , 
from the observations    , and the estimate is to be computed so as to minimize the mean-
square error, i.e. minimizing: 
             
  
Where   is the true value and    minimizes the length of the error vector      . 
 
While each new observation    becomes available, it is used to update the estimate of     , 
producing a new estimate,   . The Kalman Filter is, therefore, a sequential estimation 
procedure for generating optimal estimates of   .   
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An alternative derivation of mean-squared error is to use maximum likelihood statistics, 
which defines the goal of the filter to finding the    which maximises the probability of   .  
Assuming that the additive random noise is Gaussian distributed with a standard deviation 
of   , the probability of     is:  
                
         
 
   
   
where     is a normalisation constant, and the maximum likelihood function of this is:  
               
         
 
   
  
 
 
Taking logarithms of the equation leads to:  
                
         
 
   
  
 
 
The mean-squared error may be maximised by the variation of      and provides the value 
of    which maximises the likelihood of the signal   .  
 
In Section 5.6, the unobservable herding variable,      was estimated by applying the 
Kalman Filter method. By assuming the cross-sectional standard deviations of CAPM beta 
is the noisy observation of herding measure, the state space model is structured as:      
             
                   
                     
where        represent the cross-sectional standard deviation,                       
            
 ) and              
  . The estimated     is to be computed so as to 
minimize the mean-square error or maximises the likelihood of the              
   .  
 
In order to compute time-varying betas in 5.6.2, CAPM model is casted in ‘state space’ 
(Black, Fraser and Power, 1992): 
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Where     is the return of portfolio,     is the risk-free return and     is the market return 
at time  .           is an     known matrix;    is an     vector and            ;    
is a     vector and           .   
 
The parameter β is allowed to vary over time and the information on the dependent 
variable is available. The Kalman filter is applied to compute optimal estimates of    from 
an initial estimate of      and its covariance matrix,      by minimum mean square linear 
estimation. The prediction equation for the state vector    and its covariance matrix,    is 
             
                
The updating of the state equation by incorporating the new information from the 
prediction error of the minimum mean square linear estimation:    
           
                     
        
  
         
    
Where     is the covariance matrix of    and the         /  
          is the       vector 
of the Kalman gain.   
                is the error made in predicting the minimum 
mean square linear estimation at    . The one step ahead prediction errors and their 
covariance matrix can be used in the likelihood function, and equations predict and 
updated by using all the available information incorporated at the end of the period.   
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